Archive for April, 2007


Apr

10

Note So Fast There


Posted by at 4:04 pm on April 10, 2007
Category: Cuba SanctionsOFAC

Intel i960 MicroprocessorSteve Clemons, a Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation and a popular blogger who blogs at The Washington Note, has announced that he will soon be starting The Havana Note. He bills this new blog as a “new resource for those interested in yet another dimension of US foreign policy as well as evolving political realities in Cuba.” We certainly look forward to Clemons’s insights in this area, but regret to, er, note that he appears to have already gotten himself caught up in the byzantine complexities of the Cuba Sanctions Regulations administered by the Office of Foreign Asset Controls (“OFAC”).

In his announcement, Clemons says that The Havana Note will publish blog posts by Abel Prieto, Cuba’s Minister of Culture, whom Clemons recently met during a trip to Cuba:

[Prieto] said that he had thought of launching his own blog. He said he doodles all the time and might want to post some of these doodles with a few lines now and then. . . . But as i thought about it, the chances of Abel Prieto actually starting a blog . . . are pretty low. But. . .that said, Abel Prieto ought to send some doodles and commentary our way — to test the waters of blogging — and we’d be happy to post those as his original expression (allowed actually under the rules of the Treasury Department’s OFAC restrictions) on The Havana Note (and HuffPost!)

Clemons might want to go back and read the regulations a bit more carefully if he thinks that he and The Huffington Post can post Prieto’s doodles and commentary without risking a nastygram from the Cuba police at OFAC.

Clemons apparently got the idea that he could be the blogospheric amanuensis for Prieto from the General License for Publishing Activities which OFAC released back in 2004. The purpose of that General License was to get rid of the much-maligned “camera-ready” rule. Under the “camera-ready” rule, articles from authors in sanctioned countries could be published under the information exception only if they supplied “camera ready” copy to the publisher. Typesetting and editing the article were deemed to be services that the publisher couldn’t render under that exception. Under the General License, publishers may engage in “all transactions necessary and ordinarily incident to the publishing and marketing” of manuscripts, books and newspapers in paper and electronic form.”

Unfortunately for Clemons’s plans there is a significant exception. Under section 515.577(a) of the Cuba Sanctions Regulations, this license doesn’t apply if the author is “any person occupying the positions identified in [section] 515.570(a)(3).” And the Minister of Culture is one of the positions identified in section 515.570(a)(3).

Oops.

Regular readers know that we oppose all unilateral sanctions programs, including the U.S. embargo on Cuba. So we are not agreeing with the policy that forbids Clemons to publish Prieto’s thoughts on his new blog. We also think that significant First Amendment interests are implicated by applying OFAC’s rules to prevent such publication. But that being said, I’d be surprised if OFAC doesn’t put up a fight to stop Clemons from printing Prieto.

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Apr

9

Close Enough for Government Work


Posted by at 3:03 pm on April 9, 2007
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesDDTC

Intel i960 MicroprocessorThey say that close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades. It also, however, counts in indictments, and the recent Sudarshan indictment, which we reported last week, is a case in point. That indictment is only half right, but that would be enough, if a jury buys it, to send Mr. Sudarshan to jail.

The half of the indictment that appears right is pretty straightforward. The indictment alleges that Mr. Sudarshan, through Singapore-based Cirrus Electronics took orders for electronic components from the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (“VSSC”) and Bharat Dynamics, Ltd (“BDL”) both Indian-government related companies on the Entity List. Sudarshan would then use a U.S. subsidiary of Cirrus to source these parts from U.S. vendors. The U.S. subsidiary would then ship the components to Cirrus in Singapore which would then ship the components to VSSC and BDL without obtaining the licenses required by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) for exports to parties on the Entity List.

When the U.S. vendors requested end-use statements for the parts being sold to Cirrus, Sudarshan would lie to them and claim that the parts were destined for the Navy Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory in Kochi, India. If the allegations are proven, Mr. Sudarshan, who was arrested two weeks ago in South Carolina, may have to delay his return trip to Singapore for a good deal longer than he expected.

The second half of the indictment alleges that Sudarshan exported defense articles without the necessary license from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), and it’s here that the indictment appears to start getting things wrong. The indictment alleges that Sudarshan obtained and exported without DDTC authorization Intel i960 microprocessors, which the indictment alleges is an item on the United States Munitions List. Additionally, the indictment singles out exports by Sudarshan of M39014/01-1284, M39014/01-1299, M39014/01-1317, M39014/01-1535, and M39014/01-1553 capacitors, which it also alleges were USML items. Neither seems to be the case.

The Intel i960 processor was popular in the 1990s. Only one flavor of the chip, the i960MX, was specifically designed or configured for military use. The indictment, however, doesn’t allege that the i960MX chip was involved and refers only to the i960. Moreover, the i960MX was apparently no longer even in production during the time frame covered by the indictment.

The i960 chip itself is a microprocessor that can be used in a wide variety of applications and is, according to Intel, “a time-proven and excellent choice for local and wide-area networking, telecom and imaging applications.” It is also used in slot machines, not normally considered a military application.

Sudarshan obtained the i960 chips from a vendor in Newburyport, Massachusetts, which produced these chips under license from Intel. The vendor also apparently did not believe that the i960 chip that it was selling to Sudarshan was USML. According to the indictment:

SUDARSHAN falsely assured representatives of the vendor in Newburyport, Massachusetts, that the i960 microprocessors were going to remain in Singapore for use in a joint Government of India project with Lockheed Martin, when, in fact, Cirrus Singapore was going to re-export the i960 microprocessors to ADE [the Aeronautical Development Establishment] in India for use in the navigation and weapons guidance systems of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft.

Thus, it was clear to the vendor that the i960 was being exported by Cirrus to ADE and yet it did not insist that Sudarshan obtain a DDTC license for that export.

The capacitors identified by the indictment as exported without the necessary DDTC license are widely available “off-the-shelf” components, as a simple Google search demonstrates. There is no indication that they were specifically designed or configured for military use, making any claim that they are USML more than a little untenable.

It appears that the government’s theory is that these items were USML because they were being shipped to India for use with the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft. That, however, has never been enough to turn a commercially-available, off-the-shelf item into a defense item on the USML.

Perhaps DDTC should start doing export training for Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Apr

6

One That Should Have Gotten Away


Posted by at 11:12 am on April 6, 2007
Category: BISCuba Sanctions

Lethal WeaponCaptain Ted Baier and his charter fishing boat “Lethal Weapon” went fishing in March 2003 and encountered Jaws — or, at least, the jaws of the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). According to charging letters and settlement agreements just posted on the BIS website, this fateful trip started from the tropic port of Key West. Captain Baier, the skipper brave and sure, apparently wandered into Cuban territorial waters not so far south of Key West. And the rest is history — a $5,000 fine for the Skipper and a $12,000 fine for his company Lethal Weapon Charters.

The charging letters accuse the boat of being exported without an OFAC license from Cuba when it traveled twice “from the United States to Cuba or enter[ed] Cuban territorial waters.” It’s doubtful that the Lethal Weapon landed in Cuba and much more likely that, in pursuit of marlin or other quarry, the eager crew entered Cuban territorial waters 12 miles from the coast of Cuba (and 78 miles from Key West). I’ve heard that this is not uncommon for charters out of Key West. A little Google work and you can quickly find some Key West charter boats that trumpet on their websites their successes in Cuba’s annual International Hemingway Fishing Tournament.

Now, we’re not going to claim that Captain Baier and his boat didn’t break the law here. But we can’t resist saying “Come on, doesn’t BIS have better things to do??” The purpose of the Cuba embargo is to deprive Castro of needed financial resources. Castro didn’t earn one red dime from the Lethal Weapon’s foray into his waters. If anything, U.S. fishing in Cuban waters takes money away from Castro.

So, BIS should stop wasting time worrying about where charter boats are in the Florida Straits and do what they are supposed to do which, we thought, was to protect national security.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

5

You Mean England Is a Separate Country?


Posted by at 7:50 am on April 5, 2007
Category: BIS

flagThe Bureau of Industry and Security has a new target: foreign employees of U.S. companies. BIS just posted an order, effective April 2, 2007, imposing a seven-year denial of export privileges on Stephen Lincoln, a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom. The order was the result of a settlement agreement between Lincoln and BIS.

According to BIS, Lincoln shipped U.S. origin software with an encryption module to Iran while he was the Sales Manager of the UK office of Buehler, Ltd., a U.S. company that manufactures scientific instruments and supplies for material analysis. The charging letter does not allege that Mr. Lincoln ever set foot in the United States or had any connection to the United States other than his employment by a U.K. subsidiary of a U.S. company.

Of course, issues as to the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws are merely legal niceties with which BIS cannot be bothered. However, U.S. law restricts extraterritorial application of U.S. law to two cases. First, a statute may have extraterritorial application where it clearly states an intent to have such application. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). Second a statute may have extraterritorial application where it is being used to punish extraterritorial misconduct that was intended to have an effect in the United States. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 623 (1927). The classic paradigm of this second situation is where someone fires a shot across a border and kills somebody in the other country.

Nothing in the Lincoln case suggests that the second factor, extraterritorial effect, can justify punishment of a U.K. citizen for an export from the U.K. to Iran. Nor do the EAR or IEEPA, the authorizing statute, manifest a clear intent to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign citizens in their home countries. Section 734.5 of the EAR is the only provision of the EAR that directly addresses the jurisdiction of the EAR over foreign persons outside the U.S. That section — titled “Activities of U.S. and foreign persons subject to the EAR” — provides that foreign persons are only subject to the EAR for violations of an order issued under the EAR. No order had been issued against Mr. Lincoln at the time of Mr. Lincoln’s shipment of the software, and so that shipment violated no order under the EAR. Of course, now that Mr. Lincoln has consented to an order denying him export privileges, his future conduct may be held to be covered by the EAR.

But even if the U.S. could in theory exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Lincoln for his shipment of software to Iran, the U.S. couldn’t exercise this jurisdiction in practice unless it could extradite him. The recently-adopted extradition treaty between the U.S. and the U.K., however, makes extradition seem at best a distant possibility. Article 2(4) deals with crimes committed outside the territory of the “Requesting State,” which, in this instance would be the United States. Under the treaty, the crime would be an extraditable offense only if the laws of the U.K provide for punishment of U.S. citizens for extraterritorial violations of U.K. export laws, a dubious proposition at best.

So why didn’t Mr. Lincoln tell the BIS simply to take a hike? Here we can only speculate, but my guess is Disneyland. Or perhaps the Grand Canyon. Mr. Lincoln didn’t want to risk being arrested if he visited the U.S. on holiday so he thought that agreeing to the order, particularly inasmuch as he didn’t have to pay a fine, was a simple way to avoid that problem.

Unfortunately, complying with the Order may be more difficult for Mr. Lincoln than he imagines. The Order entered is a typical BIS order that prohibits the person subject to the order from, inter alia, “receiving [or] using . . . any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations.” Under section 734.3(a)(2), an item subject to the Regulations includes all “U.S. origin items wherever located.”

Now this language makes perfect sense for an order denying export privileges to someone in the United States. It makes no sense whatsoever when applied to Mr. Lincoln, who will violate the terms of the order if he orders a Budweiser at the local pub, rents a DVD of “Casino Royale” at his neighborhood video store, or uses a computer running a Windows operating system. And by agreeing to the order, he has obviously made himself subject to U.S. jurisdiction as well as the absurd requirements of this order.

Perhaps Mr. Lincoln should rethink that trip to Disneyland.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

4

Prosecution’s Argument in Mak Trial Makes Exports of 757s to China Illegal


Posted by at 8:05 am on April 4, 2007
Category: General

QRS-11 Navigational ChipWe have criticized before the prosecution’s claim in the Chi Mak prosecution that the public domain exclusion doesn’t apply to exports of technical data to China. The prosecution bases its argument on language in section 126.1(a) of the ITAR that says that “exemptions” can’t be used for exports to embargoed countries. As we have noted, that language clearly refers to parts of the ITAR explicitly denominated as “exemptions” and not to the various definitional exclusions scattered through the ITAR, such as the exclusions of public domain information and basic research principles from the definition of technical data.

It recently occurred to us that one exclusion in particular shows the folly of the government’s position — the exclusion of quartz rate sensors from Category VIII(e). That category covers “inertial navigation systems.” A note to Category VIII(e) states that the category “does not include” quartz rate sensors if the sensor is “included as an integral part of a commercial standby instrument system” on commercial aircraft.

The background behind that rule is the infamous QRS-11 navigational chip that Boeing began to put in the navigational systems of commercial jetliners in 2000. In April 2006, Boeing agreed to pay a $15 million civil penalty for, among other violations set forth in the charging letter, exporting commercial jetliners equipped with that chip to embargoed countries, including China from 2000 until 2003.

Beginning in 2003, Boeing began to apply for license for exports of commercial aircraft equipped with the QRS-11. In September 2003, Boeing applied for a license to export such aircraft to China. It was clear to DDTC that the arms embargo wasn’t intended to prevent shipment of QRS-11 equipped planes to China. Accordingly, it sought and obtained Presidential waivers to permit shipment of such planes to China, notwithstanding the arms embargo. Additionally, DDTC ultimately amended the rules on January 7, 2004, to exclude QRS-11 equipped commercial airplanes from the USML. The clear intent of this provision was to remove such aircraft from the strictures of the arms embargo in section 126.1.

The argument by the prosecution in the Mak case is counter to the understanding of DDTC of its own rules. DDTC clearly intended to permit QRS-11 aircraft to be shipped to proscribed countries under section 126.1. If the prosecution’s argument were accepted, Boeing will be breaking the law by selling its commercial aircraft to China. The prosecution might actually believe that but DDTC, which makes the rules, doesn’t.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)