Archive for the ‘Iran Sanctions’ Category


Feb

25

Balli Exec Tells Alma Mater His Defense to Iran Export Charges


Posted by at 9:14 pm on February 25, 2010
Category: BISIran Sanctions

Vahid Alaghband
ABOVE: Valid
Alaghband


Valid Alaghband, Chairman of the Balli Group, which just agreed to a $17 million fine to settle charges that it exported U.S.-origin commercial passenger aircraft to Iran, took to the pages of the daily student newspaper of his alma mater Cornell University to present his side of the story. Frankly, his story isn’t very convincing, and I doubt that regular readers of this blog or others familiar with U.S. export laws will be swayed by Alaghband’s story. Some may, in fact, chuckle that Alaghband would publicly mount the defense that he does.

The confusion arises from the use of the term “export” which, to a layman, signifies a sale and purchase (or physical trade) of goods across international borders. That is not how the U.S. regulations necessarily define exports and our settlement with the U.S. authorities does not remotely suggest that Balli Aviation sold its aircraft to Iran. Balli Aviation legally and beneficially owned its fleet of aircraft at all material times.

Epic fail, as the kids on the blogs say nowadays. Anybody with even a smidgen of familiarity with U.S. export laws is aware that you can export stuff to Iran which hasn’t been sold to Iran. To begin with, the aircraft in question were flown in an out of Iran carrying commercial passengers. Balli was charged with re-exporting the aircraft to Iran and the Export Administration Regulations, in section 734.2(b), provide a pretty unambiguous definition of re-export:

“Reexport” means an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country

Hmm. I don’t see anything in that restricting an export to a cross-border purchase and sale, do you? I didn’t think so.

What happened here was that Balli leased the aircraft to an Armenian airline, Blue Sky, that then operated the aircraft in and out of Iran under a code-sharing arrangement with Mahan Airways. Or as Mr. Alaghband admits:

Balli Aviation … [leased] three of the aircraft to an Armenian operator which serviced the civilian passenger traffic under arrangements with a local operator.

The “local operator, which Alaghband can’t bring himself to name, was the Iranian carrier Mahan.

Alaghband also claims that Norton Rose, a prominent U.K. law firm, told him that this scheme would comply with U.S. export laws. If Norton Rose did indeed provide such profoundly awful advice, and I have no evidence of this other than Alaghband’s claim that they did, this would underline what I might have thought obvious: a firm of British solicitors with not even a single office in the United States might not be the best choice for obtaining advice on complying with U.S. export laws.

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Jan

20

U.S. Extradition Request for Export Defendant Heard by French Court


Posted by at 9:03 pm on January 20, 2010
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Majid Kakavand
ABOVE: Majid Kakavand


Amir Ardebili, who we posted on here and here, is not the only Iranian being chased by U.S. prosecutors for activities he committed entirely outside the United States and which were legal in the country where they took place. Majid Kakavand, on whom we previously posted here, used a company of his in Malaysia to order electronic components from U.S. companies and then transshipped those components to Iran. He was provisionally arrested in France in March 2009 at the request of the United States and is currently in France, out of jail but unable to leave France, awaiting the French court’s decision on the U.S. extradition request.

According to this article in the New York Times, a hearing was held last week by a French court on the extradition request. Kakavand’s lawyers argued that Kakavand’s activities did not violate any laws of France or the European Union and that the items were innocuous items that were not useful in the defense industry. Because these items could be legally shipped to Malaysia without an export license and because the U.S. criminal information against Kakavand did not allege that the items in question were on the Commerce Control List or the United States Munitions List, this argument seems to have some force. Another hearing has been scheduled by the French court for February 17.

And as with the Ardebili case, the Iranians were quick to link the fate of Kakavand with an Iranian trial. In this case, the trial in question is a prosecution brought by Iran against a 24-year-old French academic, Clotilde Reiss, in connection with her alleged participation in opposition protests following the Iranian elections last June. Apparently, the concept of a fair trial is so foreign to Iran that it hasn’t occurred to the Iranian government that a French court might actually listen to defense arguments and make a decision based on the rule of law.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

17

@Ahmadinejad: Twitter Is Coming to Town. #IranElection


Posted by at 9:31 pm on December 17, 2009
Category: Iran Sanctions

Twitter Keeps Iran AfloatThe Department of State sent on Tuesday, December 15,  a report to Congress under section 1606 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note)(“IIANPA”). Under section 1603 of  IIANPA, no items on the Commerce Control List can be exported to Iran. However, section 1606 gives the President the authority to waive that restriction 15 days after a report to Congress explaining in detail why the waiver is in the interest of U.S. national security.

The report set forth the national security rationale as follows:

Personal internet-based communications are a vital tool for change in Iran as recent events have demonstrated. However, U.S. sanctions on Iran are having an unintended chilling effect on the ability of companies such as Microsoft and Google to continue providing essential communications tools to ordinary Iranians. This waiver will authorize free downloads to Iran of certain nominally dual-use software (because of low-level encryption elements) classified as mass market software by the Department of Commerce and essential for the exchange of personal communications and/or sharing of information over the internet. The waiver will enable Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [“OFAC”] to issue a broader general license covering these downloads and related services.

The report leaves open several interesting questions. First, what services does it cover? Just Microsoft and Google’s instant messaging services or other communications services such as Twitter and YouTube? The State Department report talks about export of certain software to Iran (assuming apparently that allowing the download of software is an export rather than a provision of a service). However, it says nothing about services not involving downloads.

Twitter and YouTube don’t require any downloads. Twitter and YouTube both provide services to Iranians by providing a unique URI to each Iranian Tweeter (n., from geekspeak, a person who uses Twitter; a Twitterer) or YouTuber. But the IIANPA only requires a sanction on exports of goods, not services, so OFAC is presumably free to issue a general license allowing access to the Twitter and YouTube services to ordinary Iranians, and it seems reasonable to suppose that is about to happen given the State Department letter’s reference to a “broader general license covering these downloads and related services.” (Compliance question: how is Twitter to know that “tedintehran” isn’t actually Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s twitter ID?).

The second question is what about other sanctioned countries? Shouldn’t their ordinary citizens have access to these communications technologies as well? This is a more complicated question and depends on the extent to which those countries are subject to legislatively imposed sanctions. The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 has similar provisions as the IIANPA relating to exports of dual-use items to Syria and also provides a mechanism for a Presidential report to Congress to waive application of those mandatory sanctions. Without a similar report from the State Department on Syria, the restrictions on instant messaging and internet communications technologies such as Twitter and YouTube will remain in place, although there doesn’t seem to be any good reason to treat ordinary Syrians any differently from ordinary Iranians in this regard.

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

15

Maybe the Shoe Is on the Other Foot


Posted by at 11:18 pm on December 15, 2009
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Free The HikersOn Monday, a U.S. Federal District Court Judge in Delaware sentenced Amir Hossein Ardebili, who was the subject of this earlier post on Export Law Blog, to five years in prison, less time served and credit for good behavior, based on Ardebili’s guilty plea to U.S. charges arising out of attempted exports of military goods to Iran. During Ardebili’s statement at the sentencing hearing, he frequently burst into tears, even at one point crying so much that a break was taken.

Iran immediately denounced the sentence and announced that it would try three American hikers that wandered into Iran last summer, implicitly linking Ardebili’s fate to that of the three U.S. hikers now held in Iranian prisons According to an Iranian press agency, Iran Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, said that the jail sentence handed down yesterday was “illegal.” Tehran has also argued that under international law officials in Georgia were obliged to return Ardebili to Iran rather than giving him to U.S. agents, reports Iran’s Press TV network.

Iran’s claim of a requirement to return Ardebili under international law is not quite on the mark since there really isn’t such a recognized right in extradition matters. As generally understood, international law holds that no country is obliged to extradite anyone. This understanding of international law explains why there are a hundreds of bilateral extradition treaties, although the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Georgia. That doesn’t mean that a country, such as Georgia, cannot voluntarily hand over someone in the absence of a treaty. However, that is normally only done after a representation of reciprocal treatment by the country requesting extradition.

U.S. law does permit, in limited circumstances, extradition from the United States in the absence of a treaty with the country requesting extradition. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) the U.S. will allow such extradition from the United States of foreign persons but only for violent crimes that are not deemed political offenses. Certainly the crime that Ardebili was alleged to have committed was not a violent crime and so an extradition of a person from the U.S. on export charges by a country without an extradition treaty would be illegal under U.S. law. This means that the U.S. couldn’t really make a commitment of reciprocal treatment to Georgia to support its request for a non-treaty extradition of Ardebili. If the situation were reversed, U.S. law would actually prohibit the extradition

The problem created here is that the shaky grounds for U.S. jurisdiction over Ardebili detract from our own country’s argument that Iran should return the hikers. After all, Iran’s claim of jurisdiction to hold the hikers is stronger than the U.S. claim of jurisdiction over Ardebili even if Iran’s substantive claim that the hikers broke the law is dubious. After all, the hikers were captured in Iran whereas Ardebili was lured into Georgia and arrested there.

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Dec

9

And If The Shoe Were on the Other Foot?


Posted by at 8:28 pm on December 9, 2009
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Amir Ardebili
ABOVE: Amir Ardebili captured on
surveillance video in Tbilsi, Georgia


Amir Hossein Ardebili, an Iranian national, engaged in extensive negotiations from Iran and apparently on behalf of the Iranian government to export defense items from the United States to Iran. The U.S. companies, however, were sting operations set up by U.S. undercover agents. When the agents lured Ardebili from Iran to Tbilsi, Georgia, they arrested him in October 2007 and, seemingly with the cooperation of Georgian authorities, brought him back to the United States where he was secretly imprisoned and held under a sealed indictment.

Ardebili has pleaded guilty to charges, among other things, that he violated the United States Arms Export Control Act. In preparation for his sentencing on December 14, some of the sealed documents, including a redacted version of the indictment have been unsealed. Prior to the unsealing, the identity of the city where Ardebili was snatched had been undisclosed but it’s now clear that, as had been rumored, Ardebili had traveled to Georgia to meet with the agents.

The government’s sentencing memorandum, in an effort to obtain the maximum term of imprisonment possible, provides further details of the undercover investigation. Significantly, the memo stresses that the Ardebili was engaged in procurement activities for his sole customer, the government of Iran, which was seeking the items because it believed it was going to go to war with the United States.

Ardebili’s attorney has filed a motion for a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines, arguing that the 22 months already served in solitary confinement caused Ardebili to become clinically depressed. The motion further noted that all of Ardebili’s activities were legal in Iran, where they took place, and that he was acting “indirectly on behalf of the Government of Iran.”

What are we to make of the fact here that the defendant was acting in Iran on behalf of the Iranian government and was later taken by U.S. agents from Georgia to stand trial in the United States? After the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), abduction of defendants from foreign countries in order to bring them to the United States to stand trial is legal. The doctrine of functional sovereign immunity from prosecution for acts taken on behalf of foreign governments is basically confined to high officials of those countries. And the U.S. takes the controversial position that it has criminal jurisdiction over anyone located in foreign countries trying to export items from the United States.

Of course, if the shoe were on the other foot, if an American businessman had been abducted by Iranian agents from a hotel in, say, Russia and then secretly held in solitary confinement for two years in Iran, you can bet your you-know-what that we would be screaming bloody murder. I am not a fan of the Government of Iran or its nuclear aspirations, but we really have to understand that if we employ extraordinary means such as were employed here then we will have no cause to complain when those same methods are used against U.S. citizens abroad.

Here is some of the surveillance video of the meeting between the U.S. agents and Ardebili in Georgia:

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)