Archive for the ‘Iran Sanctions’ Category


Apr

9

Another Hearing for Kakavand


Posted by at 4:52 pm on April 9, 2010
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Majid Kakavand
ABOVE: Majid Kakavand


This blog has previously reported on the case of Majid Kakavand, both here and, most recently, here. Kakavand, an Iranian citizen, was provisionally arrested in March 2009 by French authorities at the request of the U.S. Government. The provisional arrest warrant alleged that Kakavand used a company of his in Malaysia to order electronic components from U.S. companies and then transshipped those components to Iran. On April 14, the French court will hold its sixth hearing on the US request for Kakavand’s extradition from France.

There has been almost no coverage of this case in the U.S. press. Most of the English-language press coverage of this case originates from the Government of Iran, which is, needless to say, a less than reliable source on matters such as this. But a recent French-language report from TF1 provides some interesting detail about the upcoming hearing on April 14.

First, the court has now received the reports on the exported items that it requested from French authorities, namely from the DGA, the French agency responsible for developing and procuring items for the French military, and from two bureaus of the Ministry of the Economy. Both agencies have reportedly concluded that the items exported by Kakavand from the United States to Iran (through Malaysia) were not dual-use items. If that is the conclusion of these two reports, it will mean that there is a good chance that the extradition request will be denied by the French court.

Second, Kakavand’s lawyers have now alleged that the U.S. government falsified documents that it presented to the French court in support of the extradition request. In addition, his lawyers claim that they are requesting prosecutors in San Francisco to investigate these allegations of document forgery. The basis for this claim of falsification seems, frankly, not very convincing. The lawyers allege that the U.S. submitted emails that had attachments with dates that did not correspond to the emails.

I suspect that on that basis alone most of my emails might be subject to a claim of falsification, because they often have attachments created before the date of the email. If the allegation is that the documents bore dates after the date of the email to which they were attached, there are also reasonable explanations for that. In particular, the date shown by the operating system for the attachment might reflect the last time it was accessed on a particular computer. Dates on pages of the document might be typographical errors. And, of course, if someone is going to forge documents, it is unlikely that such obvious discrepancies would be permitted in the forged documents. It would be like adding “1982” after the signature of a forged Vermeer.

In all events, even though I think the U.S. claim for jurisdiction to prosecute Kakavand for his activities in Iran and Malaysia is dubious, I don’t buy the notion that the U.S. Government would go so far as to falsify documents to support its request.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Apr

7

BIS Sets New Record for Detail in a Charging Letter


Posted by at 8:57 pm on April 7, 2010
Category: BISIran Sanctions

Cooling TowersAqua Loop Cooling Towers, a California-based supplier of cooling equipment to power plants, recently agreed to a ten-year denial order and a $100,000 fine to settle charges by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) arising out of charges of illegal exports of, and a conspiracy to export, EAR99 goods to Iran. The items involved were filament winding machines and rolls of hog hair filter media. (For those perplexed about exports of hog products to a Muslim country, hog hair filters are not made from hog hair, at least they aren’t anymore.)

More interesting than the charges themselves and the agreed settlement is the unusual amount of detail that BIS put into the charging letter and the associated documents. Typically a charging letter says, for each count, that on A date B company violated C rule by exporting item D, classified as ECCN 0X000, to country Y. Each count rarely exceeds a short paragraph. In this instance, the Charging Letter, while many pages short of the length of, say, Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, is quite detailed and, certainly, a step in the right direction. Greater detail in charging letters provides more notice to the export community as to how BIS interprets its own regulations.

The charging letter tells a story of a contact made by Parto Abgardan, a Tehran-based manufacturer of cooling towers, with Aqua Loop to procure items for shipment to Tehran. The president of Aqua Loop replied that he was “more than happy if I can be of assistance on your purchase of filament winding machines.” Upon contacting a distributor of those items, the Aqua Loop president reported back:

I should emphasize that I found this lady a bit reluctant on the subject of export the unit [sic] to Iran, but she sound [sic] OK to work with us, if we do not mention any thing [sic] about Iran.

Later Aqua Loop’s president reported that the only way he could get the items to Iran was through a Gulf state:

I am trying to find a way to send the components that I promised to you. Unfortunately after many unsuccesssful [sic]attempts, I came to a conclusion that the only was to open this channel is what you were thinking, and if I understood correctly, you are going to have some kind of agent or office in one of the Gulf countries. I tell you this that I would have no problem getting a container to my place and loading to a steam ship toward Dubai. . . . Many shipping companies express that you shouldn’t have any major problem getting the goods to Tehran from Dubai

Finally, the charging letter notes that Aqua Loop’s president had told a BIS special agent that he was aware that it was illegal to ship goods to Iran through third countries, noting that the practice was called “diversion.” Not surprisingly, the Aqua Loop president agreed individually to a ten-year denial order and a $100,000 penalty suspended for ten years provided that no export violations were committed by him during that period.

If you clicked on the link earlier in this post to Parto Abgardan’s website (which appears only to work in Internet Explorer and not to work in either Firefox or Chrome), you may have noticed something interesting. Abgardan claims to have a “sister factory in the USA.” Here’s a screen grab (with highlighting added by me) showing that claim.

Screen Grab

And on its website Abgardan gives as its U.S contact information the same address, telephone number and fax number as shown on Aqua Loop’s contact page. Here’s another screen grab if your browser doesn’t like Abgardan’s website:

Screen Grab

I would have thought they would have changed that by now.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

23

Not So Fast There, Buster


Posted by at 4:40 pm on March 23, 2010
Category: Iran SanctionsSudan

Google EarthThe folks over at the (unofficial) Google Earth Blog are all excited that Google Earth might soon be available for download in Sudan, Syria and other sanctioned countries. Export Law Blog reported earlier that Google was blocking downloads of Google Earth from IP addresses allocated to Sudan.

The cause of celebration by the Google Earthers is the recent announcement by the Office of Foreign Assets Control that permits downloads in Sudan and Iran of certain free Internet related software. However, I think the Earthers have donned their party hats a little bit too soon because that general license doesn’t appear to cover programs like Google Earth. That license is limited to

software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and e-mail, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging.

Although there are aspects of Google Earth that permit users to share certain photographs, that is far from the principal function of the program, which is to provide detailed information on various locations around the world based on satellite photos of those locations. That’s not quite the same thing as instant messaging or blogging software covered by the newly announced general license.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

10

GAO Report on Iran Sanctions Blasts OFAC’s Dead Tree Licensing System


Posted by at 8:26 pm on March 10, 2010
Category: Iran Sanctions

Piles of PaperThe Government Accountability Office released a report last Thursday on the Iran Sanctions and there is, you might say, good news, bad news and old news in the report.

First, the good news. The GAO’s audit of the licensing process of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) found that all of the licenses that OFAC had granted for exports of food, medicine and medical devices to Iran under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”) were properly granted. The 58 licenses examined by GAO all involved exports of items authorized under TSRA for export to Iran. Additionally, none of the licenses involved exports to anyone on the SDN list.

Next, the bad news.

Treasury cannot provide other agencies or Congress with complete and timely information concerning the licenses it has issued. It cannot do so because it relies on paper-based information systems that cannot be searched to identify licenses for the export of goods to Iran. … In January 2009, an internal Treasury budget request characterized the TSRA information system as a “largely paper-based” system that hinders “the speed, efficacy, reliability, and security of [Treasury’s] licensing, enforcement and compliance activities.” Treasury officials must manually review all TSRA licensing data for Iran to identify licenses that authorize the export of goods. Because the TSRA system is not integrated with Treasury’s primary licensing information system, TSRA licensing officials must manually enter the same data into both systems.

Finally, the old news. GAO discovered that U.S. goods were being successfully exported to Iran through the use of intermediary companies and transshipment of U.S. goods through other countries to Iran.

More than 50 percent of the cases listed involved use of intermediaries in the UAE for transshipment. About 20 percent involved the use of Malaysia and Singapore

Regular readers of this blog will be forgiven if they can’t suppress a yawn while reading these shocking revelations, particularly with regard to the diversion of exports to the U.A.E. Still, GAO’s report should emphasize for exporters that exports to UAE, Malaysia and Singapore deserve extra scrutiny to assure that items aren’t merely transiting those countries on their way to Iran.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

9

Some Things Change; Some Things Don’t


Posted by at 9:14 pm on March 9, 2010
Category: Cuba SanctionsIran SanctionsSudanSyriaTechnology Exports

Twitter Keeps Iran AfloatHere’s what has changed at OFAC. Yesterday OFAC announced a general license for Iran and Sudan that would permit export of

certain services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging.

To be eligible the services must be offered free of charge and any software must be EAR99, not subject to the EAR, or mass market software classified under ECCN 5D992. Also, the exporter must not have any reason to believe that the services or software is destined to be used by the government of Sudan or Iran. A similar license was announced for Cuba but it only covered services since BIS controls exports of software to Cuba. Any bets on how long it will take for BIS to act to permit these software exports to Cuba? BIS action will also be necessary for similar exports to Syria.

And here is what hasn’t changed at OFAC. Today OFAC announced that it spent untold tens of thousands of taxpayer dollars to fine some poor schlub $575 for buying Cuban cigars over the Internet. I have to assume that this single cigar purchase will provide funds to the current Cuban government that will keep it in power for about five minutes longer than otherwise would have been the case thereby justifying all the government expense involved in imposing the fine.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)