Archive for the ‘Iran Sanctions’ Category


Jul

28

Pay Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain


Posted by at 9:42 pm on July 28, 2010
Category: Iran Sanctions

What, Me Worry?An excellent article titled “The Nuclear Puppet-Master” by Charlie Gillis and David Armstrong delves into the network behind Mahmoud Yadegari, a Canadian of Iranian origin who was recently convicted in Canada for attempting to transship pressure transducers through the U.A.E. to Iran without a license. Yadegari’s lawyer tried to portray him as an innocent “rube” caught up in international machinations by Iran.

Whether or not Yadegari was a “rube” — do they even have “rubes” in Canada? — everyone knows or at least suspects that in these Iranian export transactions, there is a procurement network behind the front man who actually makes the purchase of the exported goods. And the Gillis and Armstrong article goes into great detail in describing (with names) the actual network behind Yadegari.

The pattern, according to the authors, is for the Iranian government to offer money to anyone that can procure specified technology for it. Independent businessmen try to fill these orders, usually setting up a procurement network of friends and relatives outside Iran. One Canadian investigator is quoted in the article as saying that are “thousands, if not tens of thousands” of such networks, although that seems to me to be perhaps a bit on the high side.

Most interestingly, the article ends with this:

In ominous remarks made public two weeks ago, CSIS director Richard Fadden revealed that Toronto has become a haven for those trying to acquire technology to build weapons of mass destruction. “There are a lot of people who are very, very active in this area,” Fadden said in a speech to the Canadian Military Institute.

Exporters should keep this in mind when dealing with new or unknown customers from Toronto.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jul

23

ETS Stops Administering TOEFL in Iran


Posted by at 9:23 am on July 23, 2010
Category: Iran Sanctions

ETS HQThe New-Jersey-based Educational Testing Service recently put up an announcement on its website indicating that it had, at least temporarily, stopped administering the “Test of English as a Foreign Language” (“TOEFL”) in Iran.

The United Nations Security Council has passed a resolution affecting banks and financial institutions that conduct business in Iran. As a result of this resolution, ETS is currently unable to process payments from Iran and has had to temporarily suspend registration and all paid services until alternative arrangements can be made. ETS is working on a solution that will allow us to reopen registration as soon as possible. This message will be updated when we have more specific information to share.

U.S. colleges and universities typically require that Iranians, and other foreign students, demonstrate English proficiency through satisfactory scores on the TOEFL prior to admission, and the cessation of the TOEFL in Iran will make it more difficult for Iranian students to study in the United States.

It’s more than a little embarrassing for a company that tests others for their knowledge to make a n avoidable mistake on their website. The recently passed UNSCR 1929 does not prevent banks from processing payments from students taking TOEFL unless processing those payments “contribute[s] to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems” in contravention of Paragraph 21 of the resolution.

ETS may have meant to refer to recently passed U.S. sanctions on Iran, but even then those sanctions don’t prohibit banks from processing TOEFL payments. Section 104(c)(1) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 requires Treasury to promulgate regulations (which has not yet occurred) to forbid foreign banks from opening correspondent accounts with U.S. banks if the foreign bank has aided Iran’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction or to support foreign terrorist organizations. Processing TOEFL payments from Iranian students is several steps short of that.

The New York Times weighs in on the situation with this:

Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said E.T.S. was exactly the kind of organization that should be exempt from the sanctions.

“Prohibiting Toefl from operating in Iran is counterproductive to the spirit of smart sanctions,” he said, noting that the exam is often a path to the outside world for young Iranians.

“The government is not being hurt by Toefl not operating in Iran,” he said. “It’s the people, and precisely the people we’re hoping to empower.”

Neither the new U.N. or U.S. sanctions are prohibiting ETS from administering tests in Iran. At most, foreign banks, spooked by potential due diligence obligations that may be imposed by not yet adopted Treasury regulations, have decided to stop doing business with all Iranian banks.

(For those of you wondering what ETS is doing providing testing services in Iran, the company is probably exploiting the loophole in section 560.314 of OFAC’s Iranian Transaction Regulations that would permit its Dutch subsidiary to operate in Iran.)

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jul

15

Nigel Malpass Redux


Posted by at 9:38 pm on July 15, 2010
Category: Iran SanctionsU.N. Sanctions

Nigel Malpass
ABOVE: Nigel Howard Malpass


This blog reported back in June on the shenanigans of Nigel Howard Malpass, who assisted the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”) in evading U.S. sanctions on IRISL vessels by re-naming, re-registering and re-flagging those vessels. As we noted, Malpass accomplished this by setting up, and serving as a director of, shell companies in the Isle of Man and elsewhere that then became the “new” owners of the IRISL vessels.

Malpass, when his participation in the IRISL scheme was discovered by the New York Times, tried to run away from it as fast as he could, telling the Times (falsely) that he had ended all association with IRISL. But it’s not only the New York Times that took an interest in Mr. Malpass. The BBC’s investigative program “File on 4” took an interest in Mr. Malpass after the Israelis boarded an IRISL vessel registered to one of Mr. Malpass’s Isle of Man companies and discovered the vessel was carrying hundreds of tons of weapons disguised as civilian cargo. And now Mr. Malpass has (surprise, surprise!) a brand new story to tell the Beeb’s File on 4 when they asked him why he was setting up, and serving on, shell companies in the Isle of Man that owned gun-running IRISL vessels.

Malpass has now stopped trying to push the canard that he is no longer associated with IRISL. Now he is claiming instead that everything he did, and is doing, for IRISL is completely legal. And he’s enlisted the government of the Isle of Man to back him up on this dubious story:

Captain Malpass would not be interviewed by the BBC but said the companies had been formed at the request of a German bank which holds a mortgage on all of the ships.

In a statement he said the transactions were governed by English law and the way companies were set up was “the absolute norm in the business of ship ownership”.

He added that the Manx authorities approved his business dealings which were arranged some years before the sanctions came into force.

Captain Malpass did not address whether these arrangements are also helping the Iranians evade the sanctions.

Even if you believe the German bank story or you believe Malpass’s claim that IRISL decided to set up shell companies as new owners of its vessels and to re-register and re-name them long before the thought of sanctions on IRISL had crossed anyone’s mind, the rest of his story is no defense. Paragraph 19 of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 requires member states to freeze the assets of persons, like Mr. Malpass, acting on behalf of IRISL, whether or not those actions might have previously been legal.

The Isle of Man is also busy trying to whitewash Mr. Malpass’s ongoing activities on behalf of IRISL:

Concerns were raised last month in the Manx Parliament but the island’s chief minister Tony Brown maintained that an investigation had revealed no wrongdoing and he denied that island had aided any breach of the sanctions.

“We have to be realistic we can’t do any more, we shouldn’t be expected to do any more.”

He added: “Why should we shut down legitimate businesses…. we shouldn’t be expected to take action the rest of the world won’t.”

Actually, that’s exactly what the “rest of the world” required in the UNSCR 1929 and that is exactly what the “rest of the world” is expected to do. Malpass might have been within his legal rights to set up the shell companies for IRISL prior to the passage of UNSCR 1929. That doesn’t mean he can continue to serve as a director on the boards of shell companies that act on behalf of IRISL after the passage of UNSCR 1929, at least as long as the Isle of Man, which is not a member of the UN, purports nonetheless to follow UN Security Council Resolutions.

[Thanks to my colleague Anita Esslinger for catching the Beeb report.]

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jul

9

Arms Export Charges Added to Mac Aviation Indictment


Posted by at 9:19 am on July 9, 2010
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Oyster Bay Pump Works
ABOVE: Thomas McGuinn


This blog previously reported on the indictment of three Irish residents — Tom McGuinn, his son Sean McGuinn, and Sean Byrne — and their company Mac Aviation for exports of helicopter engines from the United States to Iran. The defendants allegedly had the engines shipped from the United States to Mac Aviation in Ireland and then re-exported them to Iran.

Now comes news of a superseding indictment in that case with new charges against the defendants. Most significantly, the superseding indictment now alleges that the defendants bought F-5 canopy panels in the United States and then exported them to Iran. Based on these allegations, the superseding indictment adds for the first time counts for violating the Arms Export Control Act.

The significance here is that these charges may make it easier to extradite the defendants from Ireland because these exports violate current U.N. sanctions and would (at least presumably) violate Irish law, whereas the helicopter engine exports likely were legal under Irish law. The only problem here is that the F-5 canopy panel exports occurred in 2005. This was before U.N Security Council Resolution 1747 which imposed the international arms embargo on Iran in 2007.

The story told by the superseding indictment about how McGuinn and company got the canopy panels out of the U.S. is both interesting and a little unclear. McGuinn allegedly purchased the panels from a California company and told the company that the panels were going to the Nigerian Air Force. The California company naturally refused to sell the panels to McGuinn without an export license authorizing the panels to go to Nigeria. McGuinn then, according to the indictment, asked the California company to ship the panels to a representative of McGuinn’s freight forwarder in the United States, something the California company also declined to do without an export license. (Obviously, the California company had undergone good compliance training on export red flags!)

Now comes the interesting part. According to the indictment:

[D]efendant MAC AVIATION caused a representative of ABL freight, located in Compton, California, to remove all attached invoices from [the California company] from the F-5 forward canopy panels, and replace them with a Packing List and Proforma Invoice on defendant MAC AVIATION letterhead addressed to “Microset Systems Sdn Bhd,” Free Commercial Zone, Southern Zone, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia for three (3) Plastic Panels, Part Number 3-13204-01, Serial Numbers 2146, 2149, and 2150.

The packages were then shipped by ABL to Malaysia and, thereafter, McGuinn allegedly had them shipped on to Tehran.

It’s not clear who ABL is. Probably they are the California company’s freight forwarder. How MacGuinn got ABL to change the packing information and then ship the panels is even more unclear, although if that happened, my guess would be that some improper financial incentives to some ABL employee was involved. The panels had either been consigned to an ABL facility pending the licenses or the ABL employee had access to the California company’s parts warehouse. This part of the export scenario, if true, would also increase the likelihood of extradition from Ireland by strengthening the claims of U.S. jurisdiction over McGuinn who, it would appear, engaged in substantial activities in the United States in order to avoid the U.S. requirement for an export license.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jul

7

Mr. Gaillard Not So Gaillard Now


Posted by at 10:19 pm on July 7, 2010
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesCuba SanctionsIran Sanctions

Oyster Bay Pump Works
ABOVE: Oyster Bay Pump Works


Patrick Gaillard, president of Oyster Bay Pump Works, a producer of automated liquid dispensing laboratory equipment, recently signed a consent agreement with the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) under which he agreed to a three-year denial order and a $300,000 fine, $275,000 of which was suspended for one year provided that he commits no further export violations. According to the charging documents, Gaillard shipped laboratory equipment made by his company to Cuba and Iran by transshipping the equipment through Germany and the U.A.E.

Back in 2007. Gaillard pleaded guilty to criminal charges arising out of one of these exports and was sentenced to 30 days in prison, a $25,000 criminal fine, three years of probation, and a $300 special assessment. And, apparently, as Mr. Gaillard walked out of prison after serving his time, there were his friends from BIS, who participated no doubt in the criminal investigation, waiting at the prison gate for a second bite at Mr. Gaillard’s apple. BIS is free to waive about the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), which held that subsequent administrative fines almost never violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, but that doesn’t make the double whammy fair or decent, particularly where BIS is knee deep in the criminal trial.

The charging documents also accuse Gaillard of “acting with knowledge,” but the facts supporting these charges don’t seem altogether consistent with that.

Gaillard had knowledge that violations of the regulations were occurring or were about and intended to occur because Gaillard knew of the U.S. embargo of Iran and that the items could not be exported to Iran without U.S. Government authorization. In or around November 2005, a sales representative from an Iranian company approached Gaillard for the sale and export of the items described above to Iran. When Gaillard declined, citing the U.S. embargo of exports to Iran, the sales representative arranged with Gaillard to have the items exported to the Iranian company’s trading arm in the U.A.E., from where the items would be transshipped to Iran.

This suggests that Gaillard may have held the common, but incorrect, belief that the Iran sanctions would not block an export to a country other than Iran. Once the item is in the foreign country, so the belief goes, it is the law of that foreign country which governs whether or not the item can be exported to Iran. If that is what Gaillard believed, it is hard to assert that Gaillard acted with knowledge that his actions were illegal even if his belief were incorrect.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)