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Dec

7

DDTC Gets Snippy With Exporters


Posted by at 12:16 pm on December 7, 2006
Category: DDTC

Returned Without ActionIn an announcement posted yesterday on its website, DDTC chides exporters for a recent increase in “low-quality” applications and says that it will no longer help exporters correct errors in applications but will simply return them without action. If true, this will be the final triumph of form over substance at the agency.

Many applications involve exports to our allies in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as to private contractors providing security services for our troops in both countries. These exports are crucial to the safety of our troops, the outcome of the conflicts in both countries, and the security of the nation. DDTC now says than an application will simply be “returned without action” if there is a discrepancy between “the value on the license application . . . [and] the value on the purchase order.” With the safety of our troops and national security at issue here, to do this without affording the applicant an opportunity to correct the minor discrepancy is nothing short of a scandal.

Further, when an agency finds a decrease in the quality of submissions, perhaps it should look inward to discern the cause rather than reflexively blaming the submitters. Has the agency provided adequate resources for the education of submitters? Are the agency’s rules and application forms clear? Are licensing officers available to assist applicants with respect to questions that they might have prior to submission of applications? We certainly know that, since the DDTC shut down the phone lines to its licensing officers, the answer to the last question is no.

Finally, DDTC singles out problems in “incomplete and deficient” registration applications. It is likely that many of these are now registration applications filed by foreign brokers as a result of DDTC’s widely criticized decision to expand the scope of its jurisdiction to include foreign sales representatives with no contacts with the U.S. other than their dealings with the exporter. For almost all of these brokers, English is not their first language. The registration form (DS-2032) and the instructions, and the accompanying guidance document and “Helpful Hints” are not models of clarity, particularly for someone whose grasp of English may be limited.

Question 7, for example, requires the broker to provide a social security number even though the overseas broker will not have one and will have no idea what is meant by this requirement. Question 8 asks for the foreign broker to list “U.S. Munitions Articles Manufactured and/or Exported and Defense Services Provided” along with requisite USML category numbers. The foreign broker will have no idea whether his brokering services are a “defense service” or what category they should be placed in. Question 12 refers the foreign broker to a complicated provision of the ITAR to determine if it is owned by a foreign person, a question which may be uniquely confusing to an individual (as opposed to corporate) foreign registrant. The Guidelines issued by the DDTC have a “Registration Checklist” which still requires the foreign broker to submit evidence of qualification to do business in the United States even though the regulations have been updated to permit the foreign broker to submit its foreign business license instead. The “Sample Transmittal Letter” in that same guidance document still requires the foreign broker to certify that it is not a foreign person, even though the registering foreign broker necessarily is foreign.

This is all a prescription for disaster that guarantees deficient registration applications from foreign registrants. It seems to me the fault here may well rest with the failure of DDTC to take the time to do its own job properly, not with a foreign broker who fails to understand this confusing morass.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

6

Daewoo Head Indicted for Illegal Exports


Posted by at 3:40 pm on December 6, 2006
Category: Arms ExportWassenaar

Lee Tae Yong at Myanmar Ministry of DefenseLt-Gen Khin Nyunt receiving visiting President of Daewoo International Corporation Mr Lee Tae Yong and party at the Myanmar Ministry of Defence

According to a news item in today’s Korea Times, Lee Tae Yong, the President of Daewoo International, was indicted by South Korea for illegal exports of military items to Myanmar (Burma). The indictment of the Daewoo chief was one of a group of multiple indictments which included indictments of seven companies and fourteen officials from those companies.

The indictment alleged the export of production facilities and weapons technology to Myanmar in violation of the law on exports of strategic goods. According to the prosecutor for the case, the companies had “made contracts with Myanmar to export plant facilities, machines and technology information which can be used to make various cannon weapons.” Apparently before the companies and officials were collared by Korean authorities, 90 percent of the weapons-making facilities had been completed and 90 percent of contract funds had been dispensed to the Korean companies.

South Korea is part of the Wassenaar Arrangement pursuant to which it is committed to restrict exports of military and dual-use items.

The South Korean authorities could have obtained their first hints of the illegal exports of Daewoo through a simple Internet search. On February 6, 2002, Mr. Lee visited the Myanmar Ministry of Defense. His visit was captured by Myanmar Television, and a picture (shown above) and a report of that visit were printed in The New Light of Myanmar, the official newspaper of the Myanmar government. That New Light news story and photograph were then made available on the government’s website. Next time Mr. Lee attempts to become an international arms dealer for sanctioned regimes, he might want to make his official visits to his customers a little more surreptitiously.

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Dec

5

OFAC Gives Two Thumbs Down to Oliver Stone Film


Posted by at 9:46 am on December 5, 2006
Category: OFAC

Fidel Castro and Oliver Stone in 2002Tucked away in the penalty notices released by OFAC last week was this typically terse and unhelpful entry:

IXTLAN Corporation and Four Individuals Settle Cuban Embargo Allegations: IXTLAN Corporation, Santa Monica, California (“IXTLAN”), and four individuals have agreed to a settlement for $6,322.20 to resolve allegations of violations of the Cuban embargo occurring between February 2002 and May 2003. OFAC alleged that IXTLAN and four individuals dealt in services in which the government of Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest incident to the making of a documentary film. This matter was not voluntarily disclosed to OFAC.

Film buffs (and only a few others) will immediately recognize IXTLAN Corporation as film-maker Oliver Stone’s production company. Stone aficionados (and probably no one else other than a few Cuba crusaders at OFAC) will probably also realize that the documentary involved was Comandante — Stone’s ill-fated 2003 homage to El Presidente Castro. A slated showing on HBO was cancelled by the network, and the film was never commercially released in the United States.

Figuring out what exactly Stone (presumably one of the four unnamed individuals) and IXTLAN were whacked for is not quite so easy. The penalty notice charged Stone and company with dealing “in services in which the government of Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest incident to the making of a documentary film.” If Stone went to Cuba without a general or specific license from OFAC, the violation should have simply been categorized as a travel violation. If he had a specific license or was covered under a general license (as a journalist perhaps), then he would have been permitted to obtain necessary and incidental services from Cuba or Cuban nationals.

Any speculation you have on what was going on here is welcome in the comments section. And saying that Comandante (the film or the dictator) is a stinker doesn’t count.

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Dec

4

Shake, Rattle and Roll


Posted by at 4:55 pm on December 4, 2006
Category: BIS

10, 9, 8, 7 . . .I was going to title this post “Exporter Temporarily Loses Export Privileges for Having Copy of the EAR in Its Offices.” However, after the uproar that a similar title (“BIS Fines Exporter for Filing Voluntary Disclosure“) created at BIS, I thought that a more anodyne title would be appropriate. The actual post title “Shake, Rattle and Roll” is a reference to the core business of Data Physics Corporation, a company which provides vibration testing equipment and which is in hot water with BIS for shipping that test equipment to the PRC.

BIS released today on its website an order, dated November 17, which renewed a previous temporary order denying export privileges against Data Physics based on its export of test shakers (and related equipment) to two end-users in the PRC in violation of section 744.3 of the EAR. Section 744.3 prohibits unlicensed exports to companies that are engaged in missile proliferation and that are located in countries, such as China, which are listed in the D:4 Country group set forth in Supplement 1 to part 740 of the EAR. Data Physics objected to the renewal of the denial order and a hearing was held. As a result, we have considerably more information than usual in the Order about the facts that led to the renewal of the temporary denial order.

Two exports of test shakers and related equipment were at issue. The first was an export of a vector vibration controller in September 2005 to Shanghai Xinyue Instrument Factory in the PRC. Shanghai Xinyue Instrument Factory is not on the Entity List. BIS contended that the export violated section 744.3 of the EAR because Data Physics knew that Shanghai Xinyue was engaged in the development of missile technology. BIS relied on an email that Data Physics received in 2002 from a BIS Special Agent in Charge and that identified Shanghai Xinyue as involved in missile proliferation.

When Data Physics responded that the email was three years before the export, BIS responded with evidence that investigators executing a search warrant had found a copy of part 744 in Data Physics offices. (Hence, what almost became the title of this post). BIS also noted that a manager for Data Physics attend a training session of part 744 where he would have learned, among other things, to do an internet search on proposed end-users. This latter argument is significant because the first result of a Google search on “Shanghai Xinyue Instrument Factory” is a page that clearly identifies Shanghai Xinyue as involved in missile development.

Although exporters should always do such Internet searches on end-users, the standard of section 744.3 is that the exporter knew that the end user in China was involved in missile proliferation, not that it “should have known” of such involvement. Frankly, BIS’s evidence here appears flimsy. Fortunately for BIS, and not so fortunately for Data Physics, the evidence on the second export is on much firmer ground.

The second export involved the shipment of a test shaker to China Hai Yang Electro-Mechanical Academy (a.k.a. “3rd Academy”). Here BIS produced evidence of internal emails instructing employees to use a false end-user name — 27th Locomotive — in place of 3rd Academy. That, of course, isn’t just a smoking gun, it’s a smoking locomotive, clearly suggesting that Data Physics was well aware of the missile proliferation concerns posed by a shipment to 3rd Academy.

One other point not raised by BIS but which seems significant to me. Companies that have pictures of rockets taking-off on their home page should pay careful attention to section 744.3 and know exactly what their customers are doing with exported items.

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Nov

30

Land Rover, Land Rover, Send Darfur a Range Rover!


Posted by at 11:25 pm on November 30, 2006
Category: SanctionsSEC

Land Rover in DarfurYou may not have heard of the SEC’s relatively new Office of Global Security Risk. But Ford Motor has heard of the OGSR. And I suspect export professionals will hear more of this SEC office in the future.

The OGSR is tasked with reviewing SEC filings to determine whether particular publicly-traded companies are subject to global security risks that should be disclosed to corporate shareholders. One area of focus by the OGSR appears to be the dealings of publicly-traded subsidiaries, both directly and through overseas affiliates, with sanctioned countries.

This is made clear by recent correspondence between the OGSR and Ford Motor. The correspondence occurred this summer but only appeared last week on EDGAR, the SEC filing database, according to this BNA article (paid subscription required). Upon review of Ford’s SEC filings the OGSR sent a letter on July 26 to Ford inquiring about its dealings with Syria, Iraq and Sudan. The interchange relating to the dealings of the company’s Land Rover subsidiary in Sudan is particularly interesting.

The July 26 letter from the SEC noted that Ford’s 2005 Annual Report (Form 10-K) revealed that Land Rover has a relationship with a U.K. distributor that sells vehicles to Sudan. The letter asked Ford whether these sales were made to the government of Sudan (or state-owned entities) and, if so, to detail these sales.

One has to assume that the SEC letter is a response to existing OFAC sanctions on Sudan, but it appears that the SEC office is not completely familiar with those sanctions and believes that only dealings with the government and state-owned entities are proscribed. In fact, OFAC’s Sudanese Sanctions Regulations are much broader than that. Section 538.205 of the regulations prohibits exports of any goods by U.S. person to Sudan, not just to the government of Sudan. Section 538.206 goes further and prohibits any U.S. person from facilitating such an export.

Ford responded to the SEC by a letter dated August 16 and frankly admitted that sales were being made to the Government of Sudan:

Ford and its majority-owned subsidiaries do not directly or indirectly conduct business in Sudan or Iran, except that our Land Rover subsidiary has a contractual relationship with a distributor in the United Kingdom that sells Land Rover models into various markets, including Sudan. As discussed below, we requested additional information from this distributor in response to your further inquiry, and we have been assured by this distributor that its sales into Sudan are negligible. We do not believe that this lawful, de minimis sale of Land Rover vehicles by an independent distributor has had or will have a significant negative impact on our reputation or share value.

[W]ith regard to Sudan, the distributor sells the vehicles that it purchases from Land Rover to a retail outlet in Sudan, which does supply vehicles to various government departments in Sudan. We have been advised by the distributor that the bulk of the small sales volume of this retail outlet has been directed toward the Ministry of Interior. We have been advised further that the other government sales have been largely used for agricultural development purposes.

Clearly no one who knew anything about the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations crafted this response for Ford to the SEC. There is no de minimis exception for sales to Sudan. Moreover, the response seems to think that the sanctions regulations only cover exports by U.S. persons from the United States to Sudan. But Section 538.205 forbids exports to Sudan by U.S. persons from any location to Sudan. And Section 538.206 forbids any U.S. person from facilitating these exports from any location to Sudan. So for Ford to say that a U.K subsidiary sells Land Rovers to a distributor which then sells them to Sudan does not dismiss the possibility that these sales may violate the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations.

Instead the real question is whether Ford Motor “facilitated” these sales in violation of Section 538.206. The Sudanese Sanctions Regulations provide guidance on the meaning of facilitation in Section 538.407. That section notes that reporting the sale in financial statements is not facilitation but that financing or warranting the sales would be. Forwarding orders would also be facilitation. More broadly the interpretative rule states that the foreign subsidiary engaging in the sales to Sudan must act completely independently of the U.S. parent. Nothing in Ford’s representations to the SEC’s OGSR even remotely addresses these issues and does not permit any conclusion by the SEC that Ford is not violating the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations. Nonetheless the OGSR issued a letter on August 23 stating that it had no further comment on the Ford Motor filings.

This issue may not go away soon for Ford even if the SEC has stopped pursuing it. News reports indicate that an increasing number of Land Rovers equipped with machine guns are appearing in Northern Darfur.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)