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Dec

15

UAE to BIS: “Huh?”


Posted by at 3:11 pm on December 15, 2006
Category: BIS

DubaiThe UAE was apparently as surprised as I was by the veiled threats of action delivered at WITA yesterday by BIS Assistant Secretary Chris Padilla. During his speech, Padilla indicated that unspecified sanctions against the UAE were imminent because of diversion of U.S. origin goods from the Emirates to Iran and Syria.

Abdulla Bin Ahmed Al-Saleh, undersecretary of the Ministry of the Economy of the UAE, had this to say:

This is truly a surprising claim and I am sure it will raise many reservations. Actually our cooperation and coordination with several U.S. government departments over this issue is very close and effective. . . .We are very happy with this cooperation and consistently working to make it even stronger.

Not to be overly cynical here but since the UAE trades regularly with Iran and Syria, the occasional diversion of U.S. goods to both those countries really doesn’t ruin anyone’s day in Dubai. So of course they are happy with the current state of affairs.

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Dec

14

BIS to UAE: “Time is Running Short”


Posted by at 6:52 pm on December 14, 2006
Category: BIS

DubaiIllya Antonenko, one of our intrepid associate editors, attended a presentation today at the Washington International Trade Association by Chris Padilla, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration. As expected, Mr. Padilla continued to tout BIS’s plans to expand the Validated End User (VEU) concept to China and beyond, with India being the next country on BIS’s radar screen. We have previously expressed our view here at ExportLawBlog that national sovereignty issues may complicate, if not prevent, the kind of in-country inspections by USG officials that the VEU process contemplates.

Of more interest, in our view at least, was the appearance by Mr. Padilla of stepping up the rhetoric about BIS’s concerns with the UAE. Avid readers of BIS consent orders — and there must be some of you out there other than me — have no doubt noticed that Dubai seems to be the current transshipment point of choice for exporters hoping to sneak things into Iran or other sanctioned destinations.

The Assistant Secretary repeated several times his concerns over the UAE’s “alarming lack of oversight” that has led to repeated diversions of shipments at the ports in Dubai and Abu Dhabi to Iran and Syria. He said that if the UAE does not adopt and implement an export control regime within months, then the US will take some steps, although he did not specify what steps might be taken. According to Mr. Padilla, the US has talked to the UAE for years about this issue and provided technical assistance to the Emirates to assist its export control program. Nevertheless, Mr. Padilla made it clear that “the time is running short” on this issue for the UAE.

Hong Kong was singled out by Mr. Padilla as a country having a good program of export controls to prevent diversion. This seems an odd time to be patting Hong Kong on the back in this regard since it was just last month that BIS issued an order denying export privileges to an exporter who had been transshipping items to the PRC through Hong Kong.

UPDATE: The prepared text of Assistant Secretary Padilla’s remarks to WITA can be found here.

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Dec

13

European Court Reverses Sanctions Against Terrorist Group


Posted by at 8:36 pm on December 13, 2006
Category: Sanctions

Logo of the Peoples Mujahideen of Iran“Bad cases make bad law.” The truth of that law school axiom has rarely been on better display than in yesterday’s decision by the European Court of First Instance to remove the People’s Mujahideen of Iran (Mujahideen-e-Khalq) from the EU’s list of blocked entities. The PMOI had been added to that list by the E.U. Council in May 2002.

The European court reversed the designation because the PMOI had not been accorded an adequate hearing, because no reasons had been supplied by the Council to justify the decision, and because the procedures used by the Council to designate the PMOI lacked effective mechanisms for judicial review.

The right to a hearing, according to the court, arose because the order designating PMOI blocked PMOI funds. The court acknowledged that the Council had a legitimate interest in countering terrorism and that this could justify a preliminary order without a hearing; it could not, however, justify a decision to deny a hearing by the Council altogether.

The ruling of the court on the Council’s refusal to state reasons for the designation is why I say that this a bad case making bad law. It is difficult to fathom why the Council never stated any reasons to support the designation of the PMOI since the PMOI’s terrorist activities were known to the entire world and admitted openly by PMOI. These activities, many of which risked civilian casualties by targeting buildings in large urban areas, included the following:

  • The series of mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids during 2000 and 2001 against Iranian government buildings; one of these killed Iran’s chief of staff
  • The 2000 mortar attack on President Mohammad Khatami’s palace in Tehran
  • The February 2000 “Operation Great Bahman,” during which MEK launched 12 attacks against Iran
  • The 1999 assassination of the deputy chief of Iran’s armed forces general staff, Ali Sayyad Shirazi
  • The 1998 assassination of the director of Iran’s prison system, Asadollah Lajevardi
  • The 1992 near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and institutions in 13 countries
  • Assistance to Saddam Hussein’s suppression of the 1991 Iraqi Shiite and Kurdish uprisings
  • The 1981 bombing of the offices of the Islamic Republic Party and of Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei.
  • Support for the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by Iranian revolutionaries
  • The 1970s killings of U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran
  • Given the PMOI’s demonstrated and public record of terrorism, it is hard to understand why the Council decided to be cagey about supplying any reason at all for the designation. Any one of the above reasons could justify the designation. And even though the PMOI was urging that it had reformed and was no longer a terrorist group, the Council could legitimately insist that more time needed to pass before the Council could be certain that the PMOI had renounced terrorism. The Court of First Instance indicated that there might be a national security basis for not disclosing particular reasons, but since no specific reasons were given by the Council, the court had no occasion to determine whether that exception might apply to any possible justifications for the Council’s action in this case.

    Finally, the court held that the designation procedure lacked adequate provisions for judicial review. Decisions of the Council to designate a terrorist group could only be appealed on the following limited grounds: “lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the EC Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application or misuse of powers.” The court found that in order to ensure the right to a fair hearing and to a statement of reasons the reviewing court would necessarily have the right to a fuller review of the record and actions of the Council.

    The Council, it seems to me, made a critical mistake in its decision not to hold a hearing or to provide reasons for the designation, particularly where the case for designating the PMOI was so strong. This mistake led to directly to a decision by the Court of First Instance that was broader than it might have been and which may haunt the Council in its efforts to designate terrorist groups and individuals in the future.

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    Dec

    12

    GAO Scolds DDTC and BIS over University Research Issues


    Posted by at 10:33 pm on December 12, 2006
    Category: BISDDTC

    Deering Library, Northwestern UniversityLast week the GAO released an unusually critical report which chided both DDTC and BIS over the way both agencies handled deemed export issues posed by university research programs. The report was prompted by an inquiry from Representative James Sensenbrenner, an outspoken critic of immigration. Sensenbrenner asked the agency to review the procedures used by DDTC and BIS to keep sensitive technology out of the hands of foreign students.

    The report noted that most universities that it contacted attempted to avoid deemed export issues by relying on the “fundamental research” exception. In order to do that, universities in many instances try to reject research projects where limitations are imposed on the ability of the university to publish the results of the research. On the other hand, the universities complained that in cases where the fundamental research exception was unavailable, it was difficult to determine whether or not particular research was export controlled or not. Although ITAR-controlled technology may be relatively easy to identify, there is certainly some force to the argument that it is difficult for universities to identify dual-use technologies controlled by the EAR.

    Compounding this difficulty were the admissions by DDTC that the U.S. export control regulations are “designed for ‘self-compliance,'” which is export bureaucrat-ese for “proceed at your own risk.” Both agencies were candid in stating that their top priority were to consider license applications and not to provide education or outreach to parties subject to the regulations.

    University officials complained that agency seminars provided no guidance to the issues confronted by universities:

    Several university officials indicated that the agency training and guidance have limited utility for academic institutions. For example, according to some university officials, training provided by Commerce and State does not discuss how export regulations apply to universities that have fundamental research exclusions. One university official characterized the Commerce-sponsored session that he attended as being “entry level” training directed at the corporate community. Commerce officials have acknowledged that about 95 percent of the attendees at their seminars are repeat attendees, primarily from industry. Some university officials stated that the training was too narrowly focused on topics that do not pertain to universities.

    Although BIS’s response to the report generally indicated agreement, DDTC had this to say:

    We disagree with the GAO’s assertion that we are not presently assesing the risk of unauthorized data exports. While State’s DDTC may not have concretely quantified the potential risk, there is a recognition that a risk exists. We estimate that it would take from one-half to one full man year to conduct an assessment and are presently determining if we can conduct the study, along with the planned outreach to universities in FY 2007, within the limits of existing resources.

    Or, we know that there’s a problem, but we don’t know how big it is and may not have the resources to do anything about it.

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    Dec

    11

    Fallout from Finmeccanica Acquisition of BAE Avionics


    Posted by at 10:17 pm on December 11, 2006
    Category: DDTC

    Finmeccanica AdvertisementIn April 2005, Finmeccanica acquired BAE Systems Avionics, Ltd. which it renamed SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems Limited. A notice posted on December 7 on the DDTC website reveals that DDTC’s Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (“DTCC”) is not entirely happy with how this acquisition was handled:

    The Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (DTCC) conducted an extensive review of issues relating to the BAE Systems plc sale to Finmeccanica SpA of a majority interest in the stock in BAE Systems Avionics Limited, since renamed SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems Limited. As a result of that review, DTCC has received written acknowledgement from BAE Systems that it did not request prior authorization from the Department of State for the sale of stock in SELEX to Finmeccanica. BAE understands that this authorization should have been obtained to address those Department of State licenses and agreements (active and expired) to which BAE Systems Avionics was a party.

    You may be scratching your head and wondering where does the ITAR require prior authorization of a merger or acquisition? Section 122.4 of the ITAR requires 60-day advance written notice to DDTC if there is a transfer of control of a registrant to a foreign person, but that’s not a requirement of prior approval.

    Or is it? The regulation notes that the purpose for this notification is to provide DDTC “with the information necessary to determine whether the authority of section 38(g)(6) of the Arms Export Control Act . . . should be invoked.” And section 38(g)(6) provides DDTC with the authority to require a license “before any item on the United States Munitions List is sold or otherwise transferred to the control or possession of a foreign person.”

    So, although this isn’t technically a prior approval requirement, it is quite close to one. Since BAE Avionics no doubt owned items on the USML at the time of the purchase of its stock by Finmeccanica, DDTC had the right to require a license and approval for the sale. And since apparently BAE and Finmeccanica must not have filed the section 122.4 notice, DDTC never had an opportunity to invoke its discretion to require a license. DDTC seems a bit miffed about this, but not sufficiently miffed to, say, consider a penalty. Perhaps Finmeccanica’s participation in the construction of the new Marine One helicopters for the White House had something to do with DDTC’s disinterest in any enforcement action for noncompliance with section 122.4.

    The other interesting part of the Finmeccanica/BAE notice is this:

    New Licenses Required: Valid State Department authorizations must be replaced by new licenses reflecting the new ownership structure. Requests for new licenses must be submitted to the Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing. Note that the transaction involves a change in ownership of an approved party and therefore a DSP-119 (amendment form) cannot be used.

    The ITAR provides no guidance on the procedure to be followed with licenses after or merger or acquisition. The SIA Handbook on Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures, which was a cooperative effort between DDTC, the defense export industry and a number of export lawyers (including myself), tried to fill that gap. Various officials of DDTC reviewed and participated in the writing of the MAD Handbook, which was quite clear that a DSP-119 was to be used to amend licenses to reflect a change in ownership of the licensed company. That apparently has now changed, meaning that a new license, rather than a DSP-119 license amendment, must be filed for change of ownership.

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    Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
    (No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)