Author Archive


Sep

6

Scramjet Conference Conundrum


Posted by at 10:17 pm on September 6, 2007
Category: DDTCDeemed ExportsIran Sanctions

Scramjet engines title=An alert reader pointed out this interesting article in Aviation Week which raises the issue, which we last talked about in relation to the Chi Mak prosecution, of deemed exports at scientific conferences. The conference in question was an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics conference in July on propulsion technologies, including scramjet and related technologies.

The Cincinnati meeting differed from a traditional U.S. industry gathering, because nearly a dozen engineers from Iran also submitted papers on Iranian solid and liquid rocket technologies. The Iranian engineers are based at the Sharif University of Technology and the KNT Technical University, both in Tehran. They apparently did not deliver the papers in person. However, as participants, the Iranians have access to all of the highly detailed U.S. aircraft and rocket propulsion presentations made at the conference.

Of course, the non-attendance of the Iranians isn’t surprising, since the probably didn’t apply for visas and even if they had those visas would likely have been denied. And the sanctions against Iran would not forbid access to presentations from the conference under the informational exception.

But, of course, if the information at the conference went beyond public domain information or fundamental research under section 120.11 of the ITAR, then companies and individuals at the conference may have committed export violations, not only because of any access to that information by Iranians nationals but also because of access to that information by any other foreign nationals. And it would appear that all the papers presented at the conference can be purchased from the AIAA website.

So, was any such information available? Consider this:

[O]ne [of] the more interesting historical papers presented at the forum was a detailed description of how the U.S. Air Force and Lockheed combined top-secret ramjet propulsion technologies with segmented solid rocket boosters for the Mach 3 D-21B reconnaissance drones that were launched by modified SR-71s and B-52Hs in the late 1960s. … This was the first time details on the segmented rocket booster portion of the D-21B program have been presented publicly, says Robert Geisler of Geisler Industries, who led the analysis with retired Pratt & Whitney and ATK Tactical Propulsion engineers.

Yikes. If I were the one who presented that paper, I might be a little nervous right now.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

4

UAE Responds to U.S. Pressure and Adopts Export Laws


Posted by at 4:56 pm on September 4, 2007
Category: Arms ExportIran Sanctions

DubaiLast Friday, the UAE announced it’s long-promised export law. The new law not only forbids the unlicensed export of “strategic goods” including military hardware, CBW precursors and dual use items but also creates a catch-all exception that would allow the UAE government to ban other exports that it deems a threat to the country’s “national security, foreign policy, natural resources, public health and safety or the environment.” The announcement of the new law is part of the UAE’s response to continuing complaints from the United States that sensitive exports to Iran have been funneled through the UAE.

The ink on the new law was scarcely dry before Iran chimed in to denounce the law:

The U.S. pressure on the UAE is in the direction of the same illegal U.S. policy against Iran in the past and beyond the U.N. resolutions,” said Mohammad Ali Hosseini, spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry.

Iran’s most widely circulated newspaper, Hamshahri, warned in its editorial Sunday that trade restrictions would hurt Iran, the UAE and other Mideast countries.

“Putting Iran’s economic interactions in danger would mean economic risk for many countries,” said the paper. “Under the circumstances, the UAE would not be able to repeat its economic boom years.”

Since the U.A.E. law doesn’t forbid all exports to Iran, the hue and cry from Tehran seems an implicit concession that defense articles and dual use items are indeed being funneled to Iran through the UAE.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Aug

29

U.K. Legislative Committee Tackles Brokering Issues


Posted by at 10:25 pm on August 29, 2007
Category: DDTCPart 129

Big BenEarlier this month, the the House of Commons’ Quadripartite Committee released a report entitled Strategic Export Controls: 2007 Review. In the report, the Committee recommends that the U.K. adopt a broker registration system that is interesting both in itself and in comparison to the current treatment of brokers in the United States under the provisions of Part 129:

We accept that the EU Council Common Position on the control of arms brokering, adopted on 23 June 2003, does not call for the registration of arms brokers. Article 4 suggests that Member States “may” establish a register of arms brokers, and that “registration or authorisation to act as a broker would […] not replace the requirement to obtain the necessary licence or written authorisation for each transaction”. We conclude that the EU Common Position on the control of arms brokering sets the best practice and we recommend that the Government follow best practice to establish a register of arms brokers. We conclude that a register will help to ensure that brokers meet defined standards, requirements and checks as well as deterring those—for example, with a relevant criminal conviction—for applying for registration. We also recommend that any brokering or trafficking in arms by a person in the UK or a British citizen abroad who is not registered be made a criminal offence.

The report doesn’t address, or even seem aware of, the difficulty of defining what activities in connection with the sale of a defense article constitute brokering. But leaving aside that question, it approaches the registration issue in ways that are significantly different from Part 129.

First, under Part 129, the registration process is purely informational. There is no endorsement by the DDTC when it issues a registration number that it has made a determination that the registrant is indeed qualified to act as a broker. The Committee’s proposal, however, clearly contemplates the enforcement of certain standards, including background checks, that more closely resemble a professional licensing system.

Second, the U.K. proposal relating to brokers requires registration only. There is no suggestion that broker participation in particular transactions may require specific licenses as is the case under Part 129 of the ITAR.

Third, one of the most significant controversies relating to Part 129 has been its jurisdictional scope. Part 129 requires registration by brokers “otherwise subject to” U.S. jurisdiction. The question here has been whether “otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction” covers brokers who are outside the United States, have no contacts with the United States and are not U.S. citizens but who are engaged in brokering with respect to U.S. origin defense articles. The U.K proposal applies only to British citizens engaging in brokering in the United Kingdom and throughout the world and to citizens of other countries engaging in brokering in the United Kingdom. It does not apply to parties that are not British citizens and are brokering outside the United Kingdom.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Aug

28

Who Wants to Play The Price is Right?


Posted by at 3:13 pm on August 28, 2007
Category: BISGeneral

Plastic HandcuffsThree of the 167 counts charged against Armor Holdings which led to the recent $1,102,200 settlement agreement related to charges that Armor exported items in excess of licensed value in violation of EAR Section 764.2(a). For example, Armor exported plastic handcuffs valued at $1,980 under a license that authorized export of plastic handcuffs valued at $1,000. The Settlement Agreement doesn’t make clear why exporting merchandise in excess of authorized value under the license is a violation of the EAR, but it is, and it’s instructive to see why it is a violation.

The specific violation charged with respect to the export of excess-value plastic handcuffs was Section 764.2(a) which says:

No person may engage in any conduct prohibited by or contrary to, or refrain from engaging in any conduct required by, the EAA, the EAR, or any order, license or authorization issued thereunder.

But where exactly in the EAR is there a prohibition on shipping items in excess of the value authorized in the license? That would be Section 750.7(c)(1)(ii) which lists the “non-material changes” in an export that do not require the issuance of a replacement license, including:

Increase in price or quantity if permitted under the shipping tolerances in §750.11 of this part.

Under Section 750.11, shipping tolerances depend upon the unit value specified in the relevant ECCN. If the unit reads “$ value,” there is no shipping tolerance. If the unit reads “Number” or “in Number,” then the value of all shipments under one license may exceed the authorized dollar value by up to 25 percent. If the unit refers to weight, area or some other similar measure, then that measure may be exceed by up to 10 percent and authorized value by up to 25 percent.

Plastic handcuffs are categorized under ECCN 0A982, which specifies the unit as “$ value.” That means that, under the zero tolerance policy, you can get whacked for shipping plastic handcuffs valued at $1000.01 under a license authorizing exports of $1,000. Is that a compliance nightmare or what?

Consider for example nylon hand restraints also categorized under ECCN 0A982 and subject to the zero tolerance policy. These restraints are valued as low as fifty cents, so a license authorizing $1,000 would authorize the export of 2,000 such restraints. How do you know you haven’t exported 2,001? How many times did your shipping department count the contents of the package being exported? Let’s even suppose that you are shipping ten 200-count packages that you purchased from a third party. How do you know that there are 200 in each package? How many export compliance officers reading this have just broken into a cold sweat?

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Aug

27

General Order No. 3 Strikes Again


Posted by at 11:00 pm on August 27, 2007
Category: BIS

Dialogic Voice CardAce Systems, a Georgia-based reseller of refurbished voice cards and other PC-based telephony products, agreed to a fine of $36,000 to settle these charges as set forth in the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Charging Letter:

On or about July 3, 2006, Ace attempted a violation of the Regulations by attempting to export dialogic [sic] voice cards to Mayrow General Trading (“Mayrow”) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates,
without the Department of Commerce license required by General Order No. 3 of Supplement No. 1 to Part 736 of the Regulations. Dialogic voice cards are items subject to the Regulations and are designated as EAR99 items. Ace tendered ten dialogic [sic] voice cards items to its freight forwarder with instructions to export such items to Mayrow. The export did not reach Mayrow because the U.S. Government ordered its return pursuant to the Regulations. In so doing, Ace committed one violation of Section 764.2(c) of the Regulations.

It seems reasonable to suppose that Ace Systems was more than a little surprised when this charging letter showed up in its mailbox. The Dialogic voice cards were, after all, EAR99, and weren’t headed for a country subject to sanctions. Like many other exporters, Ace Systems had probably never heard of General Order No. 3.

There is, of course, no question here that Ace Systems attempted to violate the law and that, technically, more than a $36,000 fine could have been imposed. But is only Ace Systems at fault here? What has BIS done to inform companies like Ace, which appears to be a relatively small Internet-based merchant with little export experience, about General Order No. 3? Wasn’t this attempted export more an occasion for an educational outreach visit from BIS than a fine? Granted there may be facts not stated in the Charging Letter that justify a significant whack in this case, but at least on the face of it, Ace was more in need of education than correction.

BIS also issued a press release on the Ace Systems settlement. That press release, arguably, vastly overstates the situation:

“We have reason to believe that Mayrow General Trading and its affiliates have been acquiring U.S.-made components for use in improvised explosive devices (IED) in Iraq and Afghanistan,” said Mario Mancuso, under secretary of commerce for industry and security. “We will do everything in our power to protect our forces in the field by prosecuting those who illegally export sensitive U.S. technology.”

Clearly Mancuso is trying to imply that the Dialogic voice cards could have been used in IEDs in Iran and Afghanistan, even though I could find no evidence that these computer boards have ever been used, or could be reasonably used, for IEDs. Nor is his claim that these EAR99 voice cards were “sensitive U.S. technology” very convincing.

Frankly, it’s not clear that anyone at BIS had a clear idea what the exported product was. The Charging Letter, Settlement Agreement, Order and press release all make multiple references to “dialogic voice cards” as if “dialogic” is a generic description of the product. In fact, Dialogic is the name of the Intel subsidiary that makes the cards and is the brand name of these cards.

To be clear, BIS had every right to fine Ace Systems here. My point is that a more sensible outcome, at least based on the facts set forth in the documents posted by BIS, was a warning. If after being made aware of General Order No. 3, Ace violated it again, then, as they say, “book ’em, Danno.”

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)