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Jan

16

GAO Report Questions Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions on Iran


Posted by at 7:23 pm on January 16, 2008
Category: Iran Sanctions

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad


The General Accounting Office (GAO) today released a report on the effectiveness of the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran. The report cast doubt on the effectiveness of these sanctions and criticized the agencies charged with enforcing the sanctions for failing to make any efforts to assess or to determine the effectiveness of these sanctions.

The broad details of the report are neither surprising or particularly controversial. The report notes that because Iran’s oil-based economy makes it a key player in the global economy, U.S. bans on exports to, and imports from, Iran have been followed by substantial increases in exports from, and imports to, Iran. A timeline graph in the report makes this point eloquently:

Iran Graph

The report also notes that transhipment of goods from the U.S. to Iran through third countries also compromises the effectiveness of the sanctions:

According to officials at key U.S. export enforcement agencies, the trade ban may be circumvented by the transshipment of U.S. exports through third countries. Officials identified several locations that serve as common transshipment points for goods destined for Iran. These locations include Germany, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and, according to Commerce officials, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular.

Two trends underscore the possibility that U.S. goods are being shipped to Iran through the UAE. First is the considerable growth in U.S. trade flows through the UAE. The United States has become the number one supplier of imports to the UAE and Iran is the UAE’s largest trade partner.

The inclusion of the U.K. and Germany in the list of common transshipment points is a bit surprising, but indicates that exporters can’t ignore the possibility of transshipment based on the country to which the item is being exported.

Finally, the report notes that the Departments of State, Commerce and Treasury, all of which enforce the Iran sanctions, do not engage in any systematic review of the effectiveness of these programs. The Treasury Department, in its response to the GAO findings, took issue with this:

The Treasury Department continues to assess the effectiveness of its authorities that have been used against Iranian entities or Iranian interests. These assessments, which are not publicly available, are designed to determine the specific impact of Treasury actions and their success in meeting policy goals.

Of course if these assessments are, like double secret probation, kept secret, the wisdom of the sanctions is effectively removed from criticism by the U.S. businesses that are negatively impacted by the sanctions.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jan

15

U.S. and Canada Differ on More than the Spelling of “Defense”


Posted by at 7:54 pm on January 15, 2008
Category: Arms ExportDDTC

Maxime Bernier
Canadian Foreign Minister
Maxime Bernier


An article in today’s Toronto-based Globe and Mail uses the occasion of the recent visit of Canadian Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier to Washington to see his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, as an opportunity to comment on disagreements between the two countries on defense trade and export controls. As reported previously on this blog, a major bone of contention between the U.S. and Canada is over Canada’s legal prohibition against nationality-based discrimination and the U.S. refusal to permit transfer of defense technology to Canadians who are dual-nationals of countries subject to U.S. arms embargo, such as China and Syria.

According to the article:

[Canadian] officials have said recently that a solution is not imminent, although they insist they want a deal. And Public Works Minister Michael Fortier, who met U.S. procurement officials in Washington last week and is now the designated point man in negotiations with Washington, won’t discuss the status of the file. Nor did he meet anyone at the State Department, which administers the contentious U.S. export controls.

The article posits two reasons that an agreement over this issue with Canada languishes while the United States has entered into agreements with the United Kingdom and Australia which would ease transfer of technical data to individuals and entities in those countries. First, the article quotes a Virginia-based “trade consultant” who said that

Canada doesn’t have a deal yet because it’s resisting concessions made by the British and the Australians. She pointed out that both those countries agreed to aggressively prosecute violators of the technology-sharing deals, most notably by applying domestic Official Secrets laws.

The second reason cited by the article is this:

Unlike the Aussies and the Brits, Canada buys relatively little of what U.S. military suppliers produce.

I’m not entirely convinced that these are reasons that the U.S. and Canada can’t see eye to eye over the dual national issue. The U.S.-U.K. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty leaves open the criteria for determining what companies will be within the approved “community” of companies eligible for transfers with export licenses. It would not be surprising if those criteria require agreements by such companies not to transfer defense technologies to dual-nationals of countries subject to an arms embargo. If that’s the case, Canada can’t expect different treatment of dual nationals even if it increases its defense spending in the U.S. or agrees to cover re-exports of non-classified technical data under Canadian laws relating to official secrets or classified data.

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Jan

11

Because You Can’t Eat a Trade Show Booth


Posted by at 5:04 pm on January 11, 2008
Category: Iran Sanctions

iranian_caviarThe Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) released today its monthly summary of enforcement actions. It would appear that the OFAC Task Force devoted to crushing sales of Cuban stogies on the Internets was either on vacation or disbanded because this is the first month where some hapless Internaut wasn’t fined a couple of hundred dollars for snagging a few boxes of Cuban Cohibas on-line. Or perhaps the Task Force was assigned to Iranian caviar given the circumstances surrounding the penalty paid by Diversified Business Communications.

Diversified organizes trade shows and conferences, including the annual European Seafood Exposition in Brussels. Sometime after 2000 (the Penalty Notice doesn’t specify a precise date), Diversified sold booth space to Shilat Trading Company, the Iranian company charged with sales and distribution of Iranian caviar.

In it’s defense, Diversified argued to OFAC that on March 17, 2000, the Secretary of State announced that sanctions against Iran would be eased to allow U.S. persons to purchase and import carpets and food products, such as dried fruits, nuts, and caviar from Iran, citing 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.534 and 560.535, which authorize the trade in, among other things, “foodstuffs intended for human consumption.” Diversified also argued that “Shilat is the exclusive producer of Iran’s caviar, which appears to be a primary focus of this exemption.”

OFAC’s response was, in short, that you can’t eat a trade show booth:

Company does not allege to [sic] have purchased foodstuffs from Shilat. Moreover, Company has not denied its provision of services, in the form of booth space booking arrangements, at an annual European seafood exposition, to Shilat, an entity located in Iran.

Because Diversified took steps to keep Shilat from participating in future European Seafood Expositions, OFAC whacked the possible penalty in half, down to $5,500. That’s enough, by the way, to buy about two pounds of Iranian Beluga Caviar at retail.

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Jan

10

Treasury Sanctions Syrian Television Station


Posted by at 5:16 pm on January 10, 2008
Category: OFACSanctions

Al-Zawraa
Screen clip from Al-Zawraa


On January 9, the Department of Treasury designated Syrian television station Al-Zawraa under Executive Order 13438. That executive order targets parties that threaten Iraqi stabilization, including insurgent and militia groups and their support. Among the reasons cited for sanctioning Al-Zawraa were its broadcast of insurgent videos showing attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq.

According to a State Department authored article disseminated by the Voice of America:

Administration officials concede Wednesday’s order will likely have little practical impact. But Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism Stuart Levey said the move brings to light “the lethal actions” of the sanction targets, and he urged the international community to join the United States in isolating them from the global economy.

One reason that this order “will likely have little practical impact” is that Al-Zawraa has been off the air since July 2007 and no longer appears to exist.

This is also the first time, at least that I am aware of, that Treasury has based a designation, at least in part, on the content of a broadcast or a publication. There is no reason to doubt Treasury’s claim that the station, while it was in existence, broadcast videos of insurgent attacks on U.S. troops. But so did major U.S. networks, including CNN.

The Treasury release also stated as a ground for the designation of Al-Zawraa that the station agreed “to broadcast open-coded messages through patriotic songs to [a] Sunni terrorist group.” Of course, coded messages are quite a different story from broadcast of insurgent videos and should have been sufficient, in and of itself, to designate that station. At least assuming that there is any point in blocking the assets of defunct entities.

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Jan

9

Sometimes Settling Is Cheaper Than Fighting


Posted by at 11:04 pm on January 9, 2008
Category: Anti-BoycottBIS

ColorconBack in November, Pennsylvania-based Colorcon, a manufacturer of specialty chemicals for the food and pharmaceutical industries, agreed to pay $39,000 to the Bureau of Industry and Security, based on alleged violations of BIS’s anti-boycott regulations. According to the charging documents and settlement agreement, Colorcon’s U.K. subsidiary provided assurances in connections with sales to Syrian companies that no Israeli components were used and that Colorcon would otherwise comply with Syria’s boycott of Israel. Additional charges settled by Colorcon included Colorcon’s failure to report the boycott requests at issues.

A recent article in the Jerusalem Post provides some interesting detail on the settlement agreement and the circumstances that led to it. The reporter interviewed Pam Lehrer, general counsel for the Berwind Group, a private investment firm that owns Colorcon. She said that the violations were the result of an “oversight”:

This matter occurred at Colorcon’s UK subsidiary. The requests were typically in the fine print of the terms and conditions, and the UK subsidiary’s employees were not aware of the requirement to look carefully for these matters and report them. We became aware of the issue through an internal audit review. We felt it was important to review our compliance with the antiboycott laws and performed an audit of our subsidiaries. As a result, we found the issue and voluntarily reported it to the US Commerce Department.

That statement differs from what Colorcon admitted in the settlement documents. In those documents, the company conceded that the anti-boycott certifications “with intent to comply with, further or support an unsanctioned foreign boycott.” This specific intent requirement is contained in section 760.1(e) of the Export Administration Regulations. If the information was buried in the fine print and the U.K. employees were not aware of the requirement to find such provisions, it’s hard to say that the U.K. employees signed these contracts with the intent to participate in the boycott against Israel.

Of course, agreeing to pay $39,000 to BIS may make more sense than paying much more to lawyers to litigate with BIS over whether the U.K. subsidiary had the requisite intent to comply with the Syrian boycott of Israel.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)