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Feb

8

It Could Have Been Worse


Posted by at 4:05 pm on February 8, 2008
Category: BISIran Sanctions

Iran AirYesterday the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) released a Settlement Agreement it had entered into with Selex Sistemi Integrati, Inc. According to the charging papers, Selex had exported an instrument landing system classified under ECCN 7A994 and then re-exported it without a license to Iran. The export and re-export in question occurred in November 2002. Selex agreed to a fine of $12,300. The violation was not voluntarily disclosed by Selex to BIS.

Interestingly, this is the first reported enforcement action commenced after the effective date of Public Law 110-96 which increased the penalties for export violations (under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or “IEEPA”) to the greater of $250,000 or twice the value of the transaction. Amended section 206(b) states that the higher penalty is applicable in any enforcement action which is “pending or commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.” Because of BIS’s annoying habit of not dating much of its correspondence, it is impossible in this case to tell from the documents posted whether the enforcement action was commenced after after October 16, 2007, the date of enactment. Assuming, however, that this was the case, the $250,000 penalty would be, under the terms of the amendment, retroactively applicable.

In that light, the $12,600 fine is relatively low. There are several possible explanations for this. I do not think that one explanation was any concern about the legality of increasing the civil penalty retroactively. The black letter law is that the constitutional provision against ex post facto laws applies to criminal penalties but not to civil penalties. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990). Granted there is some support for the proposition that a civil penalty that is essentially punitive and not remedial might be covered under the ex post facto clause. But it can’t be easily concluded that IEEPA’s $250,000 penalty is essentially punitive rather than remedial, although that might well be the case.

Another, and more likely possibility, is that the item exported, an instrument landing system, is a key component of aviation safety. The Iranian sanctions have been severely criticized for their detrimental impact on aviation safety and have been argued to have played a role in a recent civilian air disaster in Iran.

Finally, and probably the most likely possibility, is that the increase in maximum penalty available has not altered BIS’s perception of what a fair settlement is in a particular case. With most penalties in the past being in the five-figure range and only the rare penalty in the six- or seven-figure range, it may well be that BIS is not inclined to ratchet up penalties in the average case just because of the IEEPA amendment, but will reserve the maximum penalty for the most egregious cases.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Feb

6

Cuff ‘Em, Dano XiānshÄ“ng!


Posted by at 3:35 pm on February 6, 2008
Category: BIS

The Latest Fashion in HandcuffsA recent story in the New York Times reveals that the Bureau of Industry and Security is drafting new rules relative to exports of crime control equipment to China. The revision has been prompted by the desire of U.S. companies to sell face-recognition software and hardware to China as anti-terrorism measures in advance of the Olympics in Beijing.

E. Richard Mills, speaking for BIS, said it was unclear whether the regulations would have the overall effect of tightening or loosening export controls. He noted that BIS’s review of the relevant export regulations reflected a general effort at the agency to make sure that all export controls were up to date. Finally he noted that the agency would take into account availability of similar crime control products from non-U.S. sources.

As aficionados of crime control items will no doubt already know, the Commodity Control List includes under the crime control category, and regulates the export of, such whimsical items as straight-jackets, thumbscrews, thumb-cuffs, cattle prods and mind-reading, er, polygraph devices. Needless to say all such items are readily available from many sources outside the United States, leading one to wonder whether perhaps they will be dropped from the CCL in this round of revisions.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Feb

5

An Eye for an Eye, A Boycott for a Boycott


Posted by at 10:20 pm on February 5, 2008
Category: Anti-BoycottBIS

Arab LeagueThe Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) released Settlement Agreements that the agency entered into with AR-AM Medical Services LLC and DMA Med-Chem Corporation, two related medical device distributors located in Great Neck, NY. According to the charging papers, the companies supplied commercial invoices to the New York branch of the Bank of Egypt containing the following language:

The goods are neither of Israeli materials nor [sic] they contain any Israeli materials nor are they exported from Israel.

We declare that no raw material of Israeli origin has been used for production or preparation of the goods mentioned in this invoice.

AR-AM was alleged to have included this language in three invoices and agreed to a fine of $7,200. DMA was alleged to have included this language in one invoice and agreed to a proportionate fine of $2,400. Both companies agreed to a “non-standard” two-year denial order forbidding them from engaging in exports to Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and the Republic of Yemen. Both fines were suspended for two-years contingent upon compliance with the non-standard denial order and no further export violations by the companies.

Since the language was contained in the invoices generated by both companies, this is not a case where the company simply missed the boycott language in terms and conditions or other documents supplied by the purchaser. As a result, neither company was in very good position to claim that it was an oversight or a failure to read all documents thoroughly. This probably explains the two-year denial order.

However, the “non-standard” denial order is hard to defend even in this circumstance. Section 764.3(a)(2) of the EAR permits a “non-standard” denial order which is described as “narrower in scope” than a “standard” denial order. The order at issue is non-standard because it is restricted to specific Arab countries. Since only four instances of anti-boycott compliance were alleged, and three of those for Syria and the fourth was for an unspecified country, these aren’t the countries that were involved in the transactions in dispute. Nor or these all the countries in the Arab League.

Instead, the list seems to be derived from the list of countries reported in the 2007 BIS report to have been involved in anti-boycott requests, excluding Egypt and Jordan which were involved in only a handful of such requests. That being said, it seems more than a little ironic that a boycott would be punished not be a general denial order but by an order that in effect was itself a boycott of specific countries.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Feb

4

BIS Announces Modification of AES Filing Requirements


Posted by at 6:17 pm on February 4, 2008
Category: BIS

AES LogoThe Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) announced late this afternoon that starting April 28, 2008, an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) would be required by the Automated Export System when exporters sought to export items under license exceptions TSR, RPL, GOV, GFT, TSU, BAG, AVS, APR, KMI, TAPS and ENC. Currently, the ECCN is required by the AES entry form only for exports under exceptions LVS, GBS, CIV, AGR, and APP.

This should not be a burden to exporters. Any reasonably robust export compliance program should assure that before any item is exported, it is classified either under a particular ECCN or as EAR99.

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Jan

31

Two of Five BIS Validated End Users Linked to Chinese Military


Posted by at 8:19 pm on January 31, 2008
Category: BIS

Chinese Military  PosterThe Validated End User program of the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) has experienced a fox-in-the-henhouse moment and may come crashing to a screeching halt. Apparently two of the five companies first awarded Validated End User status have ties to the Chinese military, prompting an inquiry by one U.S. lawmaker as to how this might have occurred.

Back in October, BIS announced its first participants in the Validated End User program in China. Chinese companies with a “record of using [dual-use] items responsibly” are eligible for the status of a Validated End User after review by BIS. Under the program, certain dual use items may be exported and re-exported to the Validated End User without a license from BIS.

Unfortunately, according to this AP wire report, two of the five Validated End Users — Shanghai Hua Hong NEC Electronics Co. Ltd. and BHA Aerocomposite Parts Co. Ltd. — have links to the Chinese military. Hua Hong NEC is owned by China Electronics Corp., which provides electronics to China’s People’s Liberation Army. And BHA Aerocomposite is partly owned by China Aviation Industry Corporation I, a state-owned company that makes Chinese military aircraft. Its other owners are two U.S companies: Boeing and Hexcel.

As a result of these revelations, first reported by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, U.S. Representative Edward Markey sent a letter of inquiry to the Department of Commerce questioning whether BIS’s Validated End User program “has unwisely reduced controls on the sale of dual-use American products with significant links to the the People’s Liberation Army.” The letter requests information relating to the process by which the two companies were designated under the Validated End User program.

Although the designation of Hua Hong NEC clearly seems problematic, I am less convinced that BHA Composites wasn’t properly designated as a Validated End User. After all, BHA is a joint venture that includes two U.S. companies, which should significantly reduce the risk of diversion of dual use products to the Chinese military. The Chinese partner, AVIC I, owns only one-third of the joint venture. The Wisconsin Project argued that Boeing and Hexcel “have a history of violating U.S. export controls that should have barred BHA from consideration.” Admittedly, both companies have entered into settlement agreements relating to export violations, but none of the violations involved illegal exports to the Chinese military or otherwise suggest that the two companies would engage in illegal exports to the Chinese military.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)