The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) today announced a new round of sanctions against various Iranian entities including the national airline Iran Air and its domestic air carrier Iran Air Tours. The press release announcing the sanctions highlighted Iran Air’s involvement in transporting missiles and parts and components used in developing ballistic missiles. The sanctions also targeted Tidewater Middle East Co. (“Tidewater”), which is the company that manages seven of Iran’s ports. The press release highlighted a number of Iranian vessels that were found to be carrying arms and materiel that had been loaded at ports managed by Tidewater. But the most interesting part of the designation was a footnote:

*There is no relationship between today’s target, Tidewater Middle East Co., and Tidewater (US), an international shipping company headquartered in the United States, listed on the New York Stock Exchange as TDW.

In the past, OFAC has usually declined to provide any statements about people or companies that are not on the SDN list, even though it gives an avenue to parties on the SDN list to argue that they should not be on the list. In short, an innocent party, like someone named Daniel Garcia, who is denied a loan because there is another Daniel Garcia on the list, has less rights with respect to the SDN list than a terrorist who is actually nam mmed on the list. OFAC’s reasoning has been that it doesn’t won’t to say who is not on the list because that person might someday be on the list and the previous negative certification would then be misleading. So what gives with Tidewater, Inc., the Tidewater that is not the Tidewater now on the SDN list? Is this the beginning of a reversal of OFAC’s unwillingness to provide negative certifications, or does Tidewater have extra special clout at OFAC? I am aware of only one other instance where OFAC specifically called out companies with similar names to make clear that they are not on the list. Should all the Daniel Garcias that aren’t the Daniel Garcia on the SDN list give OFAC a call?

Although the UAE is still probably the most significant country involved in the transshipment of U.S. origin goods to Iran, the Iranian procurement network is extending to other countries as well. A recent article on SETimes.com noted on expansion of Iranian activity in Turkey and identified two recent cases of concern:

Despite the Turkish government’s commitment to crackdown on these procurement networks, two high profile cases have proven just how difficult these illicit networks are to stop.

Step-SA, a firm established by Iranian nationals operating in Istanbul, was indicted by a grand jury for allegedly procuring dual-use items for Iran’s ballistic missile programme this year.

The indictment followed news that two Turkish companies, Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri and ETI Elektronik, were connected to the Abdul Qadeer Khan’s extensive proliferation network. Khan is known to have supplied critical nuclear technologies to North Korea, Libya and Iran from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s.

And another article in the Tapei Times reports the existence of State Department concerns over shipments by a Taiwanese company of item to Iran by transshipping them through Turkey and Malaysia. The equipment was believed to be destined to Iran for use in its nuclear and ballistic missile program. The United States used the American Institute in Taiwan to request that Taiwan deny license for the exports of these items to Turkey and Malaysia.