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Jul

7

BIS Tightens Noose Around Iran’s Mahan Airways


Posted by at 9:05 pm on July 7, 2011
Category: BISIran Sanctions

Mahan Air AirbusOn March 17, 2008, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued a temporary denial order (“TDO”) against Iran’s Mahan Airways based on leases of three 747s to Mahan by Balli Aviation. The TDO has been renewed ever since, and Balli agreed to pay BIS a penalty of $15 million in connection with the leases. (BIS recently fined Balli $2 million for a late payment under the settlement agreement.)

BIS has now added Paris-based Zarand Aviation to the TDO based on a lease of an Airbus 310 by Zarand to Mahan. The Airbus 310 in question is now grounded for the forseeable at the Birmingham Airport in the United Kingdom. Although the aircraft was manufactured in and exported from France, BIS claims jurisdiction over the aircraft because it has U.S.-origin G.E. engines which are classified as ECCN 9A991.d and which constitute more than 10 percent of the value of the aircraft. Information on the leased 310-304 can be found here, including confirmation that the aircraft has two GE CF6-80C2A2 engines.

A Google search for Zarand Aviation suggests that it has little other business activity than the Mahan lease in question. The major effect, then, of this TDO will be to keep the aircraft grounded in the United Kingdom.

Mahan is supposed to have eight Airbus aircraft in its fleet.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jul

6

Somali Pirate Ransoms Alleged to Be Winding Up in Terrorists’ Hands


Posted by at 5:34 pm on July 6, 2011
Category: Piracy on the High SeasSomalia Sanctions

SomaliaA report originating from Reuters states that United Nations officials are alleging that ransom payments made to Somali pirates are going, at least in part, to Somali militants, raising the possibility that shipping groups and insurance companies making these payments might be breaching economic sanctions targeting Somalian militants. The report went on to say that in February the Somali militant group al-Shabaab had seized a number of pirate leaders and forced them to agree to pay 20 percent of all future ransoms to al-Shabaab. Reuters then cited its own investigations showing these instances in which ransoms were diverted to the militant group:

• Feb. 25: $200,000 from the release of the Japanese-owned MV Izumi after pirates received a $4.5 million ransom.

• March 8: $80,000 from the $2 million release of the St. Vincent & Grenadines-flagged MV Rak Africana.

• March 9: $100,000 after the Singapore-flagged MV York was freed for $4.5 million.

• April 13: $600,000 from the release of the German ship Beluga Nomination after a $5.5 million ransom was paid.

• April 15: A $66,000 share of the $3.6 million ransom handed over for the Panama-flagged MV Asphalt Venture.

• May 14: $100,000 from the release of two Spanish crew of the Spanish-owned FV VEGA 5.

According to Reuters, the payment of these amounts was “corroborated” by pirates, al-Shabaab and Somali residents.

Al-Shabaab is listed on the Treasury Department’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, but payments made by shipping and insurance companies to pirates that wound up in the hands of the group would not violate Treasury regulations unless the payments were made knowing that they would wind up in the hands of al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is also listed by the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Because of that designation, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A prohibits the provision of money to al-Shabaab “knowing or intending” that the money be used for the commission of certain terrorist crimes enumerated in the statute. It seems hard to argue, even given the alleged 20% take agreement, that payment of ransom to the pirates satisfies the standards of that statute.

In an earlier post on Somali piracy, I noted that OFAC agreed that its rules only forbid payment to individual pirates and pirate groups that had been designated but recommended that, nonetheless, ship owners and insurance companies consult with OFAC before making ransom payments to Somali pirates. The Reuters story suggests that some companies have been consulting with OFAC prior to ransom payments even though that is not legally required:

Michael Frodl, a Washington lawyer and head of C-level Maritime Risks, … said the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) carried out reviews of all potential ransom payments to determine if the pirate group in question had ever handed over part of a ransom to al-Shabaab.

“Most times OFAC has authorized payment because it has found no link,” Mr. Frodl said. “But if there is indeed a 20% ‘tax’ being applied by Shabaab against pirate ransoms in Haradhere, a major pirate hub it now controls, then things could change.”

Yes, things “could” change, but only the 20 percent tax is actually occuring and the person making the payment was aware of it. Even then, where the payment is not going directly to al-Shabaab and is necessary to end an imminent threat to the life and safety of crew members, OFAC may be in a difficult position arguing that the payment to the non-designated pirates is a violation of its rules.

UPDATE: As commenter Josh points out, al-Shabaab is on the SDN list. In my original post, I was unable to find them. My guess is that there was a typo in my search request. The post has been updated to reflect the designation of al-Shabaab as an SDN

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jun

30

Captain Obvious Hacks DDTC Website


Posted by at 7:24 pm on June 30, 2011
Category: DDTC

More Work By Captain ObviousBecause most of Washington, DC, has emptied out in anticipation of the upcoming long weekend for the Fourth of July, the nefarious Captain Obvious took the opportunity to hack into the DDTC website and leave this important reminder to exporters:

Reminder: Individuals and companies transporting ITAR controlled goods are responsible for meeting the requirements of both the United States and the country/ies to which they will be transporting goods. The Department of State’s website on travel (www.travel.state.gov) and the country’s customs office should be consulted to ensure compliance.

The exclamation point in a warning triangle that the hacker put to the left of this important announcement was a particularly malicious touch.

This just goes to show that no one — even the Department of State and its various bureaus — is safe these days from the scourge of hacking. Even this blog had to fend off an attack earlier today from Captain Obvious who attempted, unsuccessfully, to put a reminder on our home page that all exporters, sooner or later, will have to breathe in order to continue exporting.

In case someone at DDTC catches this and removes the hacker’s handiwork, a screen grab of the hacked page can be found here.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jun

29

Reinsurance Firm Agrees To Fine For Violating Iran Sanctions


Posted by at 6:22 pm on June 29, 2011
Category: Iran Sanctions

NITC TankerThe Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) today released its monthly civil penalty report for June. The report indicates that General Reinsurance Company (“Gen Re”) agreed to pay $59,130 to settle allegations that it had paid $309,740.65 in 2005 under a facultative reinsurance policy issued to Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Limited (“Steamship”). The payment was made in connection with claims made against Steamship for losses between 1998 and 2002 covered by a policy issued by Steamship to the National Iranian Tanker Company (“NITC”). In reducing (somewhat) the base penalty of $131,424, OFAC cited a number of mitigating factors including the company’s entry into a tolling agreement, its voluntary disclosure of the violations, its cooperation in the investigation, its subsequent enhancement of its compliance program, and the absence of prior OFAC violations.

The discussion of the violation by OFAC might leave the misleading impression that the payment of the premium by General Reinsurance was the crux of the violation rather than the issuance of the reinsurance policy covering Steamship’s insurance policy for NITC in the first place. OFAC guidance to the insurance industry makes clear that the issuance of the reinsurance to Steamship for its NITC policy would itself have violated OFAC rules without regard to whether any claims were actually made or paid to Steamship.

The reason, however, for the focus on the payment was the five-year statute of limitations. Based on the claim dates involved, the reinsurance policy had to have been issued in 1998 or earlier and thus was well beyond the statute of limitations by the time that General Reinsurance voluntarily disclosed its payments under the reinsurance policy in 2005.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jun

27

Export Defendant Given Probation For Cooperating Against Employer


Posted by at 4:43 pm on June 27, 2011
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Hitachi JU-72According to this Law360 post (subscription required), James Larrison, a former employee of Aegis Electronic Group, was sentenced to probation for his role in the company’s export of an EAR99 Hitachi JU72 video camera junction to Iran. Larrison pleaded guilty to the export violation in December 2009. In April 2011, Aegis entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and agreed to pay a $20,000 fine to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) in connection with this export.

Aegis and Larrison came under investigation when information relating to them was found on the laptop seized by the government from Amir Ardebili, an Iranian procurement agent. Ardebili was lured by federal agents from Iran into the former Soviet Republic of Georgia where he was arrested, whisked away to the U.S., and thrown into solitary confinement to keep him quiet while agents pursued leads they found on his laptop. This blog wrote about the Ardebili case here, here and here.

Larrison was given probation because he cooperated against his former employer and provided the government prosecutors and investigators information about the complete absence of an export compliance program at Aegis. Readers of this blog may well recall a post from a few months ago where Aegis patted itself on its back, and even gave itself a gold seal, when the company registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls under part 122 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)