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Feb

15

Prosecutor Denies That She Wanted to Indict NASA on Export Charges


Posted by at 2:49 pm on February 15, 2013
Category: General

Representatives Smith and WolfLast week, Aviation Week repeated claims by House members Frank Wolf and Lamar Smith that employees of NASA’s Ames Research Center were being investigated for unauthorized release of ITAR-controlled technical data. Specifically, the two members claimed that the NASA employees released information about a space propulsion system at a conference at which Chinese nationals and foreign officials were present. But the kicker, according to Wolf and Smith, was this:

We were very concerned to learn earlier this week that despite the U.S. Attorney’s request for permission from the Justice Department to proceed with indictments, this request was recently denied without explanation, despite the backing of both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s office. We are deeply concerned that political pressure may be a factor and are formally requesting an investigation into the circumstances of the Justice Department’s actions with regard to this case.

But, according to a report in yesterday’s Mountain View Voice, the prosecutor allegedly making the request to indict said that the two Congressman were wrong.

On Feb. 12 a statement from Melinda Haag, the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of California, contradicted Wolf. She denied that her office had sought an indictment.

“I am aware of allegations our office sought authority from [the Justice Department in Washington, D.C., to bring charges in a particular matter and that our request was denied,” Ms. Haag said, according to the Washington Times. “Those allegations are untrue. No such request was made, and no such denial was received.”

Of course, I’m shocked, shocked to hear that Congressmen might get export matters wrong.

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Feb

13

L.A. Sheriff’s Department Given Pass on Export Law Violations


Posted by at 9:07 pm on February 13, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

LA Sheriff's CarAccording to this investigative report that appeared in the Los Angeles Times over the weekend, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department apparently committed criminal export violations over 10 years ago when it shipped body armor without a license to Cambodia. Surprisingly (or maybe not), federal investigators gave the department and the individuals involved a pass.

What makes the case particularly interesting are the steps that the Sheriff’s Department took to conceal the export. The bulletproof vests were, at least on paper, allegedly sold to the City of Gardena, California. However, Gardena never received the vests. Instead, they were retrieved by someone in the Sheriff’s Department who, even though not an employee of the City of Gardena, signed on behalf of the city. The vests were then hidden inside patrol cars that were being shipped to Cambodia. The bulletproof vests were neither licensed or declared in export documents.

Federal investigators decided not to press charges on the ground that there was no evidence that anyone involved in the transactions were aware of the relevant export laws.  Of course, that’s not the standard. The scienter requirement is that the accused knew that the exports were against the law, not that they were aware of the particular export laws in question. Call me cynical, but if someone not in law enforcement went to these extremes to disguise what they were doing, that person would be indicted faster than you can say “ham sandwich.”

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Feb

12

Report Blames U.S. Sanctions for Medicine Shortage in Iran


Posted by at 6:29 pm on February 12, 2013
Category: General

Imam
ABOVE: Pharmacy in Iran


A report just released by the Woodrow Wilson Center faults U.S. sanctions for critical shortages in medicines in Iran. Although there is, in theory, an exemption in the sanctions which permits the licensed sale of medicines to Iran, other provisions of the sanctions — particularly those targeting Iranian finacial institutions — have, as a practical matter, cut off the exports of medicines from the United States to Iran. As the report notes:

Presently, despite provisions of limited exemptions in American and European sanctions that are meant to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran, the intertwined structure of the sanctions regime makes it nearly impossible to do so. As an American industry lobby group USA Engage explained in a letter to President Barack Obama in September 2012, “What is ostensibly permitted by license under one rubric is in fact ruled out by express prohibition under another.” Blacklisting Iran’s main banking infrastructure and cutting the Islamic Republic from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) created obstacles for international trade; trade in humanitarian goods, including medicine, is no exception. By removing the larger Iranian banks—especially Bank Tejarat, which is the country’s main trade bank—from the system, the banking circuit was cut between the Iranian importer of legal humanitarian goods and the seller.

In addition the report notes that draconian enforcement actions and gargantuan penalties from OFAC have discouraged many financial institutions from having anything to do with even legitimate and licensed pharmaceutical sales.

The recent experience of a reputable Iranian pharmaceutical group shows the magnitude of the problem. When a senior company representative flew to Paris to present a French bank with documentation showing that the trade was fully legal, he was told: “Even if you bring a letter from the French president himself saying it is OK to do so, we will not risk this.”

Further complicating matters, the U.S. sanctions have caused supplies of hard dollar currencies to dry up, leaving Iranian pharmaceutical distributors with no money to pay for even licensed transactions.

The author of the report proposes the simple and obvious solution: an exception to the financial institution sanctions for licensed sales of medicines needs to be put in place. Additionally, the author notes that even with that change, a good deal of diplomacy will be required with foreign banks to assure them that the United States will not seek to impose crippling sanctions on them if they become involved in financing exports of medicines from the United States to Iran.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jan

30

It’s Always Harder the Second Time Around


Posted by at 6:08 pm on January 30, 2013
Category: DDTCPart 122

Clickenbeard HQWell, today is truly a red letter day in the annals of ITAR registration puffery. For the first time ever (at least that I’ve seen), we have a company boasting that it has received ITAR re-certification. This blog has reported plenty of instances of companies that breathlessly announce that they have received “certification” upon their first ITAR registration filing, but until now no company has tried to make a news event from filing their renewal of that registration.

The proud company is Illinois-based Clickenbeard & Associates, Inc., and their press release really slathers it on thickly:

Clinkenbeard … has received official International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) re-certification from the United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

… Companies receiving this certification demonstrate that they have knowledge and understanding to fully comply with the AECA and ITAR as well as having corporate procedures and controls in place to ensure compliance.

“This re-certification is evidence of our commitment and ability to safeguard all defense- and government-related data for our customers and our country. Further, it demonstrates our government‘s trust in our doing so,” explains Steve Helfer, Clinkenbeard general manager.

I particularly like the statement that registration renewal demonstrates the “government’s trust” in Clickenbeard. To repeat (for the, oh, four thousandth time), all that ITAR registration (or re-registration for that matter) demonstrates is that the company had the filing fee in its bank account, could figure out how to fill out a form and send it to DDTC, and was able to pay for the postage required to send it in. Registration numbers are given by DDTC to everyone who can do those three things, even if they don’t know the difference between “registration” and “certification,”  between an export and a deemed export or between a DSP-83 and a salt shaker.

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Jan

28

Specially Designated Global Twitterers Booted


Posted by at 6:45 pm on January 28, 2013
Category: OFAC

Al-ShabaabLast Friday, there were news reports, like this one in the BBC, that the Twitter account of Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab, had been suspended by Twitter. Apparently, some of its more outrageous tweets violated the Twitter terms of service. Of course, my first thought ran along these lines: how did Al-Shabaab, which is listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Entities and Blocked Persons as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”) get a Twitter account in the first place? And why are they just now getting booted off the service?

One of the sections of the regulations under which Al-Shabaab was designated, 31 C.F.R. 594.201, explicitly forbids any U.S. person from providing any “technological support for, or financial or other services to” anyone designated as an SDGT. A Twitter account is certainly a “technological” or “other” service, and Twitter, headquartered in San Francisco, is clearly a U.S. person subject to the rules. And there is no provisions in the regulations for SDGTs, as there are in the Iran and Cuba sanctions regulations, permitting “services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet.”

Part of the explanation for what may have happened is that the group used the Twitter handle @HSMPress and not @Al-Shabaab or something that might have given its identity away to the computers that screen new accounts for Twitter. Of course, this raises an interesting question. As we all know, there is no intent or knowledge requirement needed to violate OFAC’s economic sanctions regulations. Even if Twitter didn’t know that HSMPress was Al-Shabaab, it was still providing services to Al-Shabaab in violation of the rules and potentially liable. But with that in mind, what was Twitter supposed to do? Is it supposed to read every tweet and try to figure out who might be an SDN?

Another issue, I suppose, would be proving that @HSMpress was, in fact, Al-Shabaab. Again, it’s doubtful that the account was registered in such a way as to indicate that connection even if this was the official account of Al-Shabaab rather than, say, the account of someone who was merely sympathetic to the group. It reminds me of the famous New Yorker cartoon with one dog, seated at a computer, telling another dog sitting on the floor nearby: “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)