
Today BIS released the Interim Final Rule on remote access restrictions. Actually, with one exception that we will discuss, the rule is better described as a restriction on exporting certain A.I. capable chips to foreign data centers that are providing specified levels of remote access to users from D:5 countries and Macau.
You don’t have to look long at the new rule without realizing that however admirable its purpose, it is going to be a compliance and an enforcement nightmare. The new 744.24(a) of the EAR provides:
[Y]ou may not export, reexport, or transfer (in-county)[sic] items specified in [the following] ECCNs . . . without a license if you have ‘‘knowledge’’ at the time of the export, reexport, or transfer (incountry) that the item is destined to a data center to or within any destination
worldwide that is providing or will provide access to [specified computing power] to
or for companies headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5.
Of course, determining the amount of computing power a foreign data center is providing to any and all of its D:5- and Macau-based customers is not going to be an easy task, particularly because this determination must cover “linked data centers,” which are defined so broadly as to be almost incomprehensible. It’s probably a little easier to get the broom of the Wicked Witch of the West or Shakespeare’s First Folio. Data centers do not now, and are unlikely ever to, post the names, country and data usage of their customers on their websites or otherwise.
Fear not! There’s a “Note” for that:
Note 3 to paragraph (a)(1): To satisfy the requirement that you do not have ‘‘knowledge’’ for purposes of this paragraph, you will be expected to obtain and be able to provide sufficient information from the foreign data center regarding that data center’s ‘‘know your customer’’ due diligence checks. Such diligence checks will include diligence on whether any data center customers are subject to direct or indirect ownership or control by persons located in, headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5. A foreign data center declining or being unable to provide information sufficient to verify compliance with this end use control shall be considered a red flag that presumptively provides you with ‘‘knowledge’’ unless you
are able to resolve that red flag before proceeding with the transaction.
Right, because data centers all do due diligence checks on their customers. And even if and when they start to do that, what is the exporter supposed to obtain from the due diligence? The Note is of no help on that issue. Is it enough that the data center gives a written statement like this: “Based on reasonable due diligence, none of our customers is receiving computing power in circumstances that would trigger the license requirement in section 744.24(a) of the EAR.”? “Easy, peasy” says every data center ever, “we’ll just print up a batch of such statements and hand them out like candy corn on Halloween or bead necklaces on Mardi Gras in New Orleans.”
The last sentence of the Note is also a humdinger. If the data center is unable to provide information sufficient to verify that it’s not providing AI computing power to a bad country, that is presumptively “knowledge” that they are doing that. BIS can only say that if it tosses out its long-standing definition of knowledge in section 772.1:
Knowledge of a circumstance . . . includes not only positive knowledge that the circumstance exists or is substantially certain to occur, but also an awareness of a high probability of its existence or future occurrence.
The definition does not say that an inability to provide due diligence information establishes a high probability of a prohibited end use. It’s just a high probability that the data center doesn’t engage in due diligence.
The exception mentioned above is in a little provision hidden in the IFR where the rule seeks to effectively assert jurisdiction over every data center everywhere.
Any data center providing significant volume of compute power to companies
headquartered, or with an ultimate parent headquartered, in Macau or Country Group D:5 prior to the publication date of this rule that wishes to continue providing these services
must obtain a license with 90 days of the effective date of this IFR [November 19, 2026] or face future export restrictions.
Now, it is one thing for BIS to say it won’t allow unlicensed exports of chips to data centers giving China and other D:5 countries access to specified amounts of computing power. It is entirely another thing for BIS to threaten every data center in the world, including those without one single screw from the United States, with unspecified and potentially crippling export restrictions unless they receive a license within 90 days. Oh, and BIS thinks it can grant these licenses in 90 days? Sure, and Santa is bringing me a sleek little Ferrari for Christmas.
