Aug

1

Federal Court Incorrectly Says DDTC Jumped the Gun on Gun Printing Plans


Posted by at 1:29 pm on August 1, 2018
Category: Arms ExportBISDDTCUSML

Printed Guns via http://defdist.tumblr.com/post/85127166199/i-have-often-been-asked-who-the-first-person-to-be [Fair Use]Just hours before Defense Distributed, pursuant to a Settlement Agreement with the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, planned to upload plans to allow anyone who can afford a 3-D printer to make their own plastic guns, a federal district court in Seattle entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the uploading of those plans.   The temporary restraining order was entered at the request of attorneys general from eight states and the District of Columbia.   In entering the order, the court stated that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits for two reasons — both, frankly, fairly questionable.

The first reason the court thought that plaintiffs would likely prevail is that, in the court’s view, the Settlement Agreement effectively removed items from the United States Munitions List (“USML”) without the prior thirty-day notice to Congress as required by section 38(f) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2278(f).  As you probably recall, DDTC and BIS so far have only issued proposed rules.   As noted early on in the export control process, State and Commerce indicated that they would provide the section 38(f) notices to Congress 30 days prior to publishing the final rule.  At this point, only the proposed rules have been issued and the comment period ended on July 9, so it is likely that no section 38(f) notices have been sent to Congress as the court states. Certainly they would not have been sent thirty days prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement on June 29 as the Court said should have been done.

The problem with this argument is that the Settlement Agreement did not remove Category I (or any other) items from the USML.  The Settlement Agreement is quite clear that DDTC was not removing anything from the list but, rather, was granting an exemption under ITAR  section 125.4(b)(13).  Under that section, an export of technical data does not require a license if that data has been “approved for public release” by DDTC.  All that DDTC did in the Settlement Agreement was approve public release of specified Defense Distributed plans making their export eligible for the exemption in section 125.4(b)(13).  Nothing has been removed from the USML by the Settlement Agreement, and, thus, no section 38(f) notice was required as a result of the Settlement Agreement.

The other reason relied on by the district court in temporarily blocking the Settlement Agreement was the requirement in Executive Order 11958 that any removal of any item from the USML by DDTC would need the concurrence of the Department of Defense.  The court stated:

When the President delegated his authority under the AECA to the Secretary of State, he also imposed a requirement that any changes in designations of defense articles and defense services subject to export control had to have the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. There is no indication that the federal government followed the prescribed procedures

Apparently, the district court had not bothered to read the initial notice from the Department of Commerce on the proposed removal of Category I firearms from the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control List.   That notice clearly states:

The changes described in this proposed rule and in the State Department’s companion proposed rule on Categories I, II, and III of the USML are based on a review of those categories by the Department of Defense, which worked with the Departments of State and Commerce in preparing the amendments.

Oops.  So even if the Settlement Agreement effectively removed certain Article I items from the USML, which it did not, the DOD had already agreed to that prior to the publication of the initial notices proposing removal of those items.

The problem here is that if states or the federal government want to regulate 3-D gun plans, the export laws are not the way to do it because the policy driving these decisions has nothing to do with exports at all but rather with purely domestic considerations such as detectability and traceability.  The states attorneys general presumably don’t really care whether these gun plans and the plastic guns made from them wreak havoc in Croatia; they are worried about the consequences right at home in their own states.  Moreover, there is already a law on the books –  the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 922(p) — which makes it illegal to manufacture undetectable weapons.  So, rather than try to shoehorn these issues into the Arms Export Control Act, lawmakers and officials should confront any issues with these plans directly.

 

 

Permalink Comments Off on Federal Court Incorrectly Says DDTC Jumped the Gun on Gun Printing Plans



Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



Jul

25

Tinker, Tailor, Dinner Planner, Spy


Posted by at 3:44 pm on July 25, 2018
Category: Criminal PenaltiesFARAOFACRussia DesignationsRussia Sanctions

Vladimir Putin via http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/27394 [Fair Use]Prosecutions for violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) might kindly be thought of as press ops for prosecutors and catnip for reporters.  And the recent indictment of Maria Butina certainly fits that description:  Spies!  Sex!  Twitter exchanges!  Red Sparrow!  A duped “boyfriend”!!!  Sell me the movie rights now.

On the other hand, economic sanctions prosecutions are boring.  Specially Designated Nationals . . . yawn.  The International Emergency Economic Powers Act . . . big yawn.

But the, ahem, sex appeal of a FARA case as opposed to an IEEPA case may well be a possible explanation for why Butina was indicted under FARA rather than under IEEPA for having performed services in the United States on behalf of a Russian SDN.  It seems to me that the FARA case has some significant difficulties whereas the IEEPA case approaches being a slam dunk.

To simplify matters somewhat, to prosecute Butina for failing to register as a foreign agent, the government needs to prove that she engaged in political activities on behalf of a foreign person in the United States.   The Act defines “political activities” as

any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

But the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint against Butina, which provides the most detailed statement of the government’s case, summarizes Butina’s activities in the United States as follows:

BUTINA’s efforts in the United States to promote the political interests of the Russian Federation were diverse and multifaceted, including BUTINA’s efforts to organize a series of”friendship and dialogue” dinners, some of which are believed to have taken place in the District of Columbia, as well as BUTINA’s attendance at two National Prayer Breakfasts in the District of Columbia.

It certainly seems to me that going to two prayer breakfasts and arranging dinners probably don’t constitute “political activities.”  But perhaps the government thinks that if it can put a Russian in the dock and yell “Spy!” enough times, the jury won’t be bothered with such legal niceties as the proper outlines of “political activities” under the law.

On the other hand, the criminal complaint provides detailed information on Butina’s interactions with her handler in Moscow, who was not named, but is almost certainly Alexander Torshin.  Torshin was placed on OFAC’s SDN List on April 6, 2018.  To prove a violation of the Ukraine sanctions, it would only be necessary to show that Butina provided  “funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of” Torshin.  The definition of providing services is, of course, significantly broader than the definition of “political activities” in FARA.

Now although the actions in the criminal complaint pre-date Torshin’s designation in April 2018, there is no reason to believe that Butina was not continuing to act on Torshin’s behalf after his designation.   The complaint details actions by Butina in cooperation with Torshin as late February 8, 2017. Of course, there is a chance that government has no evidence after the designation or has reasons not to reveal such evidence, but I still think that a sanctions case, if there were services performed after April 6, 2018, would be a much easier case to win.

 

Permalink Comments Off on Tinker, Tailor, Dinner Planner, Spy



Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



Jul

16

Chronicle of a Death Foretold


Posted by at 4:40 pm on July 16, 2018
Category: BISDDTCExport Reform

Printed Guns via http://defdist.tumblr.com/post/85127166199/i-have-often-been-asked-who-the-first-person-to-be [Fair Use] Of course, the Interwebs are all abuzz with the news that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) settled the Defense Distributed case as if that were somehow remarkable.  Of course, it was about as remarkable as 100 degree days in DC in August or the All Star Game being a pointless, mind-numbing bore.  DDTC’s position in this case was on life support, if not already dead, since last May when DDTC and BIS finally announced export control reform which would result in the transfer of most firearms and related technical data, including the types of firearms described in the 3-D printing plans at issue in the  case, from the jurisdiction of DDTC to that of the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”).

It is no secret that BIS and DDTC have radically different ideas about the consequences of putting something of the Internet.   As far as DDTC is concerned, putting anything of the Internet is an export of that item to every foreign country with access to the Internet, i.e.,  everywhere but the outer reaches of Mongolia.  BIS, on the other hand, takes the position that publication on the Internet means that an item is no longer subject to export controls.  As BIS said in its proposed notice of rulemaking:

[I]f a gun manufacturer posts a firearm’s operation and maintenance manual on the Internet, making it publicly available to anyone interested in accessing it and without restrictions on further dissemination (i.e., unlimited distribution), the operation and maintenance information included in that published operation and maintenance manual would no longer be “subject to the EAR.”

So once the Category I transition is complete, the fat tenor has sung and the game is over.

DDTC, of course, could have waited until the last notes of Nessun Dorma, but instead agreed to move ahead. To do that before the transition of the firearms in question to BIS was complete, there are several housekeeping matters that the settlement agreement needed to address. First, DDTC agreed to continue with the announced proposed rules and to adopt a final rule that would remove the plans at issue from Category I of the USML. Second, DDTC would announce a temporary modification of the rules to exempt the plans prior to the transition from the USML to the Commerce Control List becoming effective. Third, DDTC agreed to issue a letter saying that the plans had been approved for public release — something not really necessary in light of the temporary modification of the rules to exempt the plans. Fourth, an acknowledgment that the letter permitted people to do whatever they wanted with those plans — again something not really necessary in light of the temporary modification and the letter itself.

What comes as a surprise to me was not that DDTC dropped the case, or that it did so before the guns at issue were removed from the USML, but that it agreed to fork over $39,581 to the plaintiffs. Granted that’s not a huge sum. Still, DDTC has not conceded that its position that putting USML technical data on the Internet is an export is wrong. Indeed, that will continue to be the case for items remaining on the USML. Well, I guess lawyers have to eat too.

Permalink Comments Off on Chronicle of a Death Foretold



Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



Jul

11

Aspirin and Terrorism in Sudan


Posted by at 5:41 pm on July 11, 2018
Category: OFACSudanTSRA

Meroe (49) by joepyrek [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/dD4ue9 [cropped]In October 2017, OFAC started down the long and winding road of eliminating the sanctions on Sudan. As we noted in a post then, OFAC — rather oddly — did not just get rid of the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations but simply made effective section 538.540(a) which was a general license to do everything prohibited by the SSR. It also made effective section 538.540(b), which was a general license to export agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices for one-year after signing a contract for the export of such goods.

Finally, a few days ago on June 29, OFAC took the momentous step of repealing the Sudan Sanctions Regulations in their entirety. Nothing in the Federal Register notice repealing the SSR indicates what had occurred since October 2017 that meant now — as opposed to last October — was a propitious time to repeal the SSR. But, as they say, better late than never.

In addition, the latest Federal Register notice moved the general license in section 538.540(b) for agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices from the now defunct SSR to section 596.506 of the Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations. This, of course, results in an odd situation where, due to the repeal of the SSR, you can send any and all EAR99 items to Sudan without needing to comply with a general license but aspirin requires you to comply with the terms of a general license.

This is the result of section 906(a)(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”) which says that agricultural commodities, medicine and medical devices could only be exported to state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to a 1-year license. Of course, there is no way that Congress intended to impose more stringent controls on aspirin and tongue depressors than other EAR99 items like shoes (which can be made into bombs) and razor blades. The idea of TSRA was that where the President had comprehensively sanctioned a country, broader humanitarian reason would prohibit him or her from restricting exports of aspirin, tongue depressors and apples to the country. If the country was a state sponsor of terrorism then a license would be required. But there is no indication that Congress meant for section 906 to apply the license requirement to food and medicine when all other sanctions had been lifted. Not even Congress, well, not even most of Congress could imagine that aspirin is more useful to terrorists than shoes and razor blades.

Permalink Comments Off on Aspirin and Terrorism in Sudan



Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



Jun

27

US to China: No Robots for You!


Posted by at 11:23 am on June 27, 2018
Category: BISChinaExport Control Proposals

Robot by Johnson Cameraface [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/87B4de [cropped]The Wall Street Journal reports that the White House is cooking up new export controls on China. The idea is to restrict exports to China of technologies that could assist in China’s Made in China 2025 manufacturing upgrade initiative. That initiative focuses on 10 priority industries, which include new advanced information technology; automated machine tools and robotics; aerospace and aeronautical equipment; maritime equipment and high-tech shipping; modern rail transport equipment; new-energy vehicles and equipment; power equipment; agricultural equipment; new materials; and biopharma and advanced medical products.

Some of these items and technology might on the Commerce Control List and may already be controlled for export to China. Others clearly are not. Politico reports that the National Security Council is drawing up a list of technologies to be controlled for export to China targeting the priority sectors for Made in China 2025. It is not clear whether “technology” here includes the common usage which would cover goods or only the more technical use of that term by BIS which covers information only. The NSC List is scheduled to be released on Friday, so we should know more then.

How this new list will play out in relation to foreign availability determinations under Part 768 of the EAR is also anyone’s guess. Certainly technologies in many of the targeted sectors will remain available to China from other foreign countries, none of which can reasonably be expected to adopt these controls.

Another issue, not to suppose that the White House cares about complying with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), is the extent to which these new export restrictions comply with the prohibition on quantitative export restrictions in Article XI of GATT. Certainly, these restrictions will not fit within the stated exceptions to the prohibitions on such restrictions in Article XI — namely, protection of domestic supply of “foodstuffs or other products essential to” the exporting country. Nor do they have any relation to “classification, grading or marketing of commodities in international trade.”

Instead, the restrictions can only be justified on the basis of Article XXI’s national security exception which provides the basis in GATT for most export control regimes. The national security exception in Article XII is related to “fissionable materials,” “traffic in arms,” or “war or other emergency in international relations.” Obviously the reference to war in Article XII is not a reference to a trade war, so it seems unlikely that the new export restrictions could survive a WTO challenge.

Photo Credit: Robot by Johnson Cameraface [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/87B4de [cropped]. Copyright 2010 Johnson Cameraface

Permalink Comments Off on US to China: No Robots for You!



Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)


« Previous posts | Next posts »