Jun

15

DOJ Limits What Lawyers Can Say to OFAC without Registering as a Foreign Agent


Posted by at 5:37 pm on June 15, 2018
Category: FARAOFAC

By Another Believer [CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Department_of_Justice,_Washington,_D.C._2012.JPG [cropped and processed]Now that DOJ has started more actively prosecuting FARA violations, it decided to upload to its website a bunch of advisory opinions that apparently had been languishing in a file cabinet somewhere in the depths of Main Justice. Whether or not this is good news remains to be seen, but at least one of the advisory opinions given to a law firm handling a matter before the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) is more than a little troubling.

The advisory opinion responded to a request by an unnamed law firm that was representing an unnamed foreign company and an unnamed foreign individual in connection with the potential designation and blocking of the company and individual by OFAC. The opinion notes, rightly, that a law firm acting on behalf of a foreign company or a foreign individual would be an “agent of a foreign principal” (or as some newspaper reporters like to say, a “spy”) under section 1(c) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) and would be required to register under that act unless an exemption applies.

The discussion in the opinion then turns to the exemption in section 613(g) for “persons qualified to practice law.” That exemption expressly excludes, as the advisory opinion notes,

attempts to influence or persuade agency personnel or officials other than in the course of judicial proceedings, criminal or civil law enforcement inquiries, investigations, or proceedings, or agency proceedings required by statute or regulation to be conducted on the record.

The advisory opinion notes the further qualifications on this exclusion contained in section 5.306 of the FARA regulations, which limits such exclusion of activity outside the described proceedings to “only such attempts to influence or persuade with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States.” (Emphasis added.)

Now the ordinary, indeed the only, reading of this is that contacts with agencies outside of the proceedings, inquiries and investigations described in the exemption require registration only if they are designed to influence formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States. But that’s not how DOJ reads it.  Instead, the opinion states that attempts to influence policy will require registration even if those attempts occur during the types proceedings described in the exemption.

[T]he two primary activities you described in your letter, first [US law firm]’s representation with respect to any investigation or enforcement proceedings undertaken by the Department of Justice or another U.S. government agency involving [foreign person] or [foreign bank], and second, [US law firm]’s December 8, 2017, request to OFAC on behalf of [foreign person] and [foreign bank], that OFAC stay designation of [US law firm]’s clients until [US law firm] could present facts to OFAC, fall within the definitions set out within Section [61]3(g) FARA and its implementing regulations. In particular, the limited scope of [US law firm]’s December 8, 2017, letter to OFAC, appears to stop short of an attempt to influence OFAC’s policies regarding its sanctions regime beyond its specific application to [US law firm]’s representation of [foreign person and foreign bank]. If at any point in the future, [US law firm] engages in a discussion or exchange with OFAC that implicates wider policy or political considerations, then it would not be able to avail itself of the exemption and could be required to register.

It is significant here that DOJ starts by saying explicitly that the activities before OFAC by the law firm on behalf of the foreign company and individual are the types proceedings covered by the exemption for lawyers set forth in section 613(g). Even so, it applies the restriction on attempts to influence policy even though section 5.306 only refers to lawyers contacts with agencies outside of the types of proceedings described in section 613(g). It isn’t hard to see the difficulty here. If a law firm argues that its client has not violated any rules that require designation by OFAC, no FARA registration is required. But if the law firm argues, as might often be the case, that even if the client has violated those rules there are policy reasons that the agency should consider in exercising its administrative discretion not to designate the client, FARA registration is required. Even if that is what the act and the regulations say (and they do not), that would be stupid policy. Oops. Wait, do I have to register now???

My guess is that the law firm had an entirely different concern than whatever it was that caused DOJ to jump down the rabbit hole of limiting policy arguments. Although DOJ readily conceded that the proceeding in front of OFAC was one of the types of proceedings described in section 613(g), that really is a rather difficult question. The language in 613(g) could be read to cover agency proceedings only if they are required to be “on the record.”

Nothing in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or OFAC regulations require the determination to designate a foreign company or individual to be conducted “on the record.” Not even the rules in section 501.807 for setting aside a designation require these proceedings to be “on the record.” This is probably what prompted the law firm’s inquiry in the first place since it was attempting to influence the agency’s determination to designate its clients. a proceeding that was not arguably required to be “on the record.”  It seems DOJ here says, albeit indirectly, that the proceedings to designate were one of the type of proceedings described in the exemption for lawyers representing foreign clients and that, by implication, the exemption for lawyers covers agency proceedings that are not on the record.  But having said that, DOJ went on and, in violation of both the statute and the rules, imposed a troublesome limitation on what lawyers can do in those proceedings without registering as a foreign agent.

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Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jun

8

EU Commission Menacingly Threatens Toothless Blocking Regulation


Posted by at 7:34 pm on June 8, 2018
Category: Foreign CountermeasuresIran SanctionsOFAC

Louis XIVOn June 6, the European Union Commission adopted a delegated regulation amending the Annex to Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 of 22 November 1996.  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 is the notorious EU blocking regulation which forbids individuals and companies in EU member states from complying with the U.S. embargo on Cuba.   The Annex to that Regulation specifies the laws and regulations that are blocked.  The delegated regulation will add U.S. sanctions on Iran to the Annex, and it will go into force on August 6 unless, between now and then, the EU Council or Parliament objects.

As you might imagine, I think that this is a misguided, if not preposterous, response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal.  The blocking regulation, as currently applied to Cuba, has had no effect on the U.S. embargo on Cuba and has instead put businesses in the untenable position of having to decide whether to break U.S. law or EU law.  And, of course, we all know what decision businesses in this position have invariably made in the past and will continue to do so even in the face of the expanded scope of the blocking regulation.

And the reason for that is clear:  OFAC has imposed significant penalties for violating the Cuba sanctions even where the Company was required by the EU blocking regulation to violate those sanctions.  OFAC has ignored the existence of the statute and not even considered it a mitigating factor.  In fact, it could be argued that in at least one case it has considered it an aggravating factor if the European company was attempting to comply with the blocking regulation.  Companies measure the risk of the wrath of OFAC against the toothless enforcement of the EU blocking regulation and decide to bow down to their OFAC overlords, not their European ones.

The U.S. sanctions on Iran can apply to European companies in three situations.  First, the sanctions apply if the European company is a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company.   Second, they apply if the European company causes the export of goods or services from the United States to Iran.  Third, there are “secondary” sanctions that will apply to certain activities unconnected to the US, like engaging in significant transactions with the Iranian shipping, ship-building and energy sectors.  The laws and regulations added to the blocking regulation would prohibit compliance with the U.S. sanctions in all three instances.

On the other hand, the Annex does not reach all instances of U.S. sanctions on Iran.  Many Iranian entities, such as Bank Saderat, Mahan Air and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are designated under the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations which are not mentioned in the amended Annex. Tidewater Middle East, which operates the port at Bandar Abbas, is designated under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, also not added to the amended Annex.

As with all blocking statutes, enforcing this will be a headache.  Article 5 provides that “no person referred to in Article 11 shall comply, … actively or by deliberate omission, with any requirement or prohibition … based on … the laws specified in the Annex.” So let’s say that an EU company decides not to invest in an Iranian oil field project. Was that because of the sanctions or because the company thought it was a bad investment for reasons unrelated to the sanctions, say fear of corruption or geopolitical risks? Suppose an EU company complies with a request from a US customer to provide a certificate that the goods being sold originate from an EU Member State. Is providing that certificate complying with the US law prohibiting U.S. companies from acquiring goods of Iranian origin or just accommodating a US customer’s desire for EU-origin goods?

Of course, the group of companies that the amendment really puts in a pickle are EU subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Article 11 states that the regulation applies to any “legal person incorporated within the Community.” Section 560.215 of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, now added to the Annex, makes it illegal for such EU subsidiary to engage in a transaction with Iran if it would be illegal for a U.S. person to engage in that same transaction.  These two provisions mean that sooner or later these companies will be in the unenviable position of deciding which law to break. And we know which law they will chose to break already, don’t we?

So what exactly does the EU think it’s accomplishing here? The blocking regulation has been in effect with respect to Cuba for 22 years with no appreciable effect on the Cuba embargo. Do the wise men and sages of the European Commission expect that Trump, when he hears of their bold amendment of the Annex, will burst into tears and beg to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal? Do they think this Amendment will cause OFAC to tear the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations into tiny pieces and scatter them over the Potomac River? Because none of these things is going to happen. You know what will happen? Sanctions lawyers will have a lot more work. That’s it.

Morale of the story (from Louis XIV): “C’est toujours l’impatience de gagner qui fait perdre.”

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Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



May

16

DDTC’s Buzzer Beater to Save Brokering Authority over Firearms Misses the Hoop


Posted by at 10:49 am on May 16, 2018
Category: General

Pistol Heckler & Koch P9S by Hecklerfan [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heckler_%26_Koch_P9#/media/File:Heckler_%26_Koch_p9s.jpg [cropped]As noted in my post yesterday on the proposed rules to transition certain Category I, II and III items from the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control List, DDTC attempted to preserve its brokering authority over the transferred firearms and related items by amending the brokering rules to contain items both on the United States Munitions List (“USML”) and the United States Munitions Import List (“USMIL”).  An alert reader pointed out, quite correctly, that this clever regulatory sleight-of-hand was, ahem, not authorized by the Brokering Amendment to the Arms Control Export Act. 22 U.S.C. § 2278(b)(1)(A)(ii).

The Brokering Amendment provides authority to DDTC to register brokers and license brokering transactions.   The problem is that it authorizes this only with respect to items on the USML.   It makes no reference to the USMIL and provides no authority to regulate brokers of, and brokering transactions related to, items on the USMIL.

Section 2278(b)(1)(A)(ii)(I) provides the statutory mandate and authority to require registration of brokers:

As prescribed in regulations issued under this section, every person (other than an officer or employee of the United States Government acting in official capacity) who engages in the business of brokering activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of any defense article or defense service designated by the President under subsection (a)(1), or in the business of brokering activities with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of any foreign defense article or defense service (as defined in subclause (IV)), shall register with the United States Government agency charged with the administration of this section.

Subclause III requires licensing for “brokering activities described in [the above-cited] subclause (I)”.

The relevant language here then is “any defense article … designated by the President under subsection (a)(1)” and “any foreign defense article … as defined in subclause (IV)”.  Both of these are, it turns out, references only to items on the USML

Subsection (a)(1), which gives the President the authority to designate defense articles subject to export controls, says this in the last sentence of the subsection:

The items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List.

Subclause IV only references the USML in its definition of “foreign defense article”:

For purposes of this clause, the term “foreign defense article or defense service” includes any non-United States defense article or defense service of a nature described on the United States Munitions List regardless of whether such article or service is of United States origin.

Not surprisingly, DDTC’s discussion of these proposed rules fails to mention this little problem in relying on the Brokering Amendment or where it believes it can otherwise find statutory authority to extend its brokering rules to items on the USMIL.

UPDATE: I just got off the phone with a spokesperson from DDTC who explained the agency’s theory as to how they could exert brokering authority over USMIL items. According to the spokesperson, section 2278(a)(1) gives the President the authority to “control the import and export of defense articles” and to “to designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles.” The USMIL and the USML are, thus, separate subsets of the broader “statutory” USML referenced in subsection (a)(1).  The USMIL administered by ATF lists those items subject to controls on permanent imports.  The USML  administered by DDTC lists items subject to controls on exports and temporary imports. While this argument is at least plausible, it does require taking the facially counter-intuitive position that the USMIL is really the USML and that the USML in the ITAR isn’t really the entire USML.

Photo Credit: Pistol Heckler & Koch P9S by Hecklerfan [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heckler_%26_Koch_P9#/media/File:Heckler_%26_Koch_p9s.jpg [cropped]. Copyright 2004 Hecklerfan

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Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



May

15

Export Control Reform Finally Announced for Guns and Ammo


Posted by at 7:04 pm on May 15, 2018
Category: BISCCLDDTCExport ReformUSMILUSML

Guns by Al [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/6gPGbx [cropped]The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and the Bureau of Industry and Security today announced the proposed rules for the long awaited export control reform of Categories I, II and III of the United States Munitions List.  The proposed rules for DDTC are here; the proposed rules for BIS are here.

Under the proposed rules, the only items remaining in Category I will be firearms that fire caseless ammunition, are fully automatic, or are specially designed to integrate fire control, automatic tracking, or automatic firing.  Other small arms that were once in Category I will be moved to 0A501 and 0A502.  Small arms that are on Category I of the USMIL will still be subject to the brokering rules of the ITAR even if they have been moved to 0A501 or 0A502.

These new proposed ECCNs will be controlled by, among others, RS1 and FC meaning that licenses will be required for all destinations.  (RS1 captures every country but Canada and FC captures Canada).  The BIS proposed rules also exclude the use of most license exceptions so that the new regime will closely parallel the available exemptions that were available under the ITAR.   So the result of the transition of these items from the USML to the CCL will mostly be a change in the agency with licensing authority.

There are a few significant changes, however, worth noting.  First, the proposed rules would eliminate a particular bugbear of mine relating to the classification of rifle scopes.  Currently, rifle scopes are ITAR if they are “manufactured to military specifications,” whatever that means.   Foreign manufacturers of rifle scopes routinely decline to state whether their scopes are Category I(f) or 0A987 and do not provide enough information to decide whether a particular scope is manufactured to military specifications.  Under the proposed rules, a scope is on the USML only if it has night vision or infrared capabilities that would cause it to be captured under Category XII.  Everything else is now 0A987.

Second, these new rules will reverse the questionable position that DDTC has taken in the Defense Distributed case.   In that case, DDTC argued that posting 3D gun plans on the Internet is an export of controlled technical date on Category I firearms to every foreign person with access to the Internet.  BIS has a somewhat different take on posting things to the Internet.   Here’s what the proposed BIS rules say:

The EAR also includes well-established and well understood criteria for excluding certain information from the scope of what is “subject to the EAR.” (See part 734 of the EAR.) Items that would move to the CCL would be subject to existing EAR concepts of jurisdiction and controls related to “development” and “production,” as well operation, installation, and maintenance “technology.” While controlling such “technology,” as well as other “technology” is important, the EAR includes criteria in part 734 that would exclude certain information and software from control. For example, if a gun manufacturer posts a firearm’s operation and maintenance manual on the Internet, making it publicly available to anyone interested in accessing it and without restrictions on further dissemination (i.e., unlimited distribution), the operation and maintenance information included in that published operation and maintenance manual would no longer be “subject to the EAR.”

Part 734 makes clear that publication of technology on the Internet is not an export of that technology to the rest of the world; rather it is a release of that technology from export controls.

Third, the new rules will eliminate the issue as to whether firearms training is a defense service that cannot be provided by a U.S. person to a foreign individual without a license.  Both the existing and latest proposed DDTC rule defining defense services would require a license to provide basic firearms training to a foreign individual.  (The latest proposed rule permits basic training but only if there is an approved license to export the firearm to that individual.)  The BIS analysis of this is somewhat different.  The BIS notice of proposed rulemaking somewhat wryly states:

The EAR does not include a concept of “defense services,” and the “technology” related controls are more narrowly focused and apply in limited contexts as compared to the ITAR.

In fact, of course, under the proposed rules training a foreign individual in firearms use would require a license only if it involved a control of technology covered by proposed ECCNs 0E501 or 0E502.  However, neither ECCN covers information related to the use of 0A501 or 0A502 firearms.   As a result, firearms training that would have required a license under the old rules will not require a license if the new rules are adopted.

Photo Credit: Guns by Al [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/6gPGbx [cropped]. Copyright 2009 Al

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Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



May

11

CBP Sued Over Requiring Hold Harmless Agreement for Return of Seized Property


Posted by at 8:15 pm on May 11, 2018
Category: BISCBP

OFO Officer via Flickr https://www.flickr.com/photos/cbpphotos/8406672912/in/album-72157632584772091/ [Public Domain - Work of U.S. Government]Okay, exporters, raise your hands if this has happened to you. You are exporting goods and some over excited and under informed U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Agent wrongfully seizes the item. For example, he decides that the EAR99 spark plugs that you are exporting are ECCN 3A228 triggered spark gaps. You file the necessary paperwork in response to the notice of seizure. In the meantime, your customer sues you for non-delivery. CBP finally admits after consulting with BIS that these are spark plugs and not triggered spark gaps and, six months later, agrees to return them. But here’s the catch:  they will return them only if you sign a standard release form absolving CBP from any liability for having wrongfully seized your spark plugs. Reluctantly you sign the papers, wait for your spark plugs and settle the lawsuit with your customer for unreimbursable damages caused by CBP.

Of course, the bitter taste here comes from the fact that these spark plugs are yours. You have the right to them unconditionally. You don’t have to waive your rights or promise to run naked through a public square as a prerequisite to the return of what is yours and which CBP should never have seized in the first place.

Now consider the case of Anthonia Nwaorie, a nurse who was traveling to Nigeria to establish a medical clinic for women and children in Nigeria. She had with her $41,377.  This was money which she had saved from her nurse’s salary.  It was intended to seed money for the clinic.   All of the money was seized by CBP at the airport because she did not file a declaration of the cash at the CBP Office six miles from the airport just before her departure.

When she received the Notice of Seizure under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (“CAFRA”), she elected the option of having the matter referred to the U.S. Attorney for judicial resolution and filed that election along with the required CAFRA form. When the U.S. government did not file a judicial forfeiture action within 90 days of receiving the claim form, CAFRA required the government to “promptly release” the seized property and forbade the government from taking “any further action to effect the civil forfeiture of such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B)(ii).

Thereafter CBP mailed her the all-too-familiar letter saying it would give her cash back to her but only if she signed a hold harmless agreement which would prevent her from filing suit against the government and would require her to indemnify the government against any future claims made against the released property. The letter also said that if she did not sign the hold harmless agreement within 30 days, administrative procedures to forfeit the cash would be instituted. Ms. Nwaorie refused to sign and instead called a lawyer. The Institute for Justice then took on her case, and, on May 2, filed a class action lawsuit against CBP alleging that CBP had no right to condition the return of forfeited funds on a hold harmless agreement. The suit requests return of Ms. Nwaorie’s seized property as well as that of the class members who also refused to sign the hold harmless agreement. It also seeks a judgment enjoining CBP in the future from conditioning release of seized funds on the hold harmless agreement.

The theory behind the suit is simple. Nothing in CAFRA authorizes conditioning the release of funds on a hold harmless agreement. Moreover, doing so violates the specific requirement to “promptly release” the funds if no forfeiture action has been filed within the statutorily mandated time period. And, of course, CAFRA’s prohibition on further forfeiture proceedings directly prohibits CBP from threatening administrative forfeiture if the hold harmless agreement is not signed.

Although this seizure, because it involved a currency reporting violation, was under CAFRA, the same logic would apply to seizures under the Tariff Act of 1930. If an exporter files a claim under 19 U.S.C. § 1608 and prevails in the subsequent federal court litigation or the government decides under 19 U.S.C. § 1604 not to prosecute the forfeiture action, nothing in the statute permits CBP to condition return upon a hold harmless or waiver of rights.

One thing to consider while waiting for the outcome of this lawsuit is this:  when signing and returning the hold harmless agreement, send it back with a cover letter indicating that the hold harmless was not signed voluntarily but was signed because of CBP’s unlawful demand that it be signed as a condition to return property that is lawfully yours.  Be aware, of course, that this is not something that should be done where Customs has lawfully seized the property and has decided to mitigate the forfeiture.

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Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)


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