Archive for the ‘OFAC’ Category

This Isn’t the Transparency You Were Hoping For?

Wednesday, January 27th, 2010

Locked HornsMy colleague Stan Marcuss points out that the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) appears to have changed course in treating Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests and has decided to hand out OFAC license applications willy-nilly to anyone who can afford a postage stamp. Several years ago, after someone requested copies of all licenses to ship food, medicine and medical devices to Iran, OFAC sent letters to the affected parties asking them if they wished to assert protection under Exemption 4 of the FOIA which exempts from disclosure confidential commercial information. If a licensee asserted the exemption, OFAC normally would withhold the license from disclosure.

Now, citing the new administration’s policy of transparency, OFAC has sent letters indicating that these licenses will be released to the public. The filing of such a license, and the contents thereof, will be freely disclosed over the objection of the licensee even though such disclosure may discourage some from filing these licenses in the future, clearly in contravention of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 which clearly sought to encourage the export of such humanitarian supplies to sanctioned countries. Even if we don’t like the government of Iran, Congress passed TSRA because it did not want to see the people of Iran deprived of food and life-saving medicines and medical devices. Those requesting TSRA licenses, of course, don’t really have those interests in mind.

At least two things make OFAC’s new position more than a little absurd. OFAC is still using FOIA Exemption 6 to black out the names of any individuals mentioned in disclosed documents. The absurdity here is that this policy is even used to withhold the names of terrorist and other specially designated nationals (“SDNs”) when releasing information on enforcement actions against companies that have engaged in transactions with SDNs. That means, of course, that Osama Bin Laden has more protections under OFAC’s interpretation of the FOIA than an exporter shipping food to a sanctioned country.

Worse, when an agency promises transparency, one might reasonably assume that transparency would extend to providing information on export enforcement cases that might actually assist exporters in trying to interpret and to understand the scope of OFAC’s vaguely worded regulations.   Not so.   OFAC continues to release as little information as possible about enforcement actions.  That sort of transparency would prevent the OFAC from being able to use ambiguities in its own regulations to deter certain exports — a practice I like to call in terrorem regulation.

Apparently, what’s transparent for the goose isn’t really transparent for the gander.

The Name Game Chinese Style

Tuesday, January 5th, 2010

Tiananmen SquareAn interesting story in today’s Wall Street Journal details instances in which a number of U.S. companies imported items from China Precision Machinery Import Export Corporation despite the fact that CPMIEC is on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals List. The reason for this, asserts the story, is that Chinese companies on the SDN list “have proved adept at creating aliases or subsidiary shell companies to mask their ownership.”

Consider this example cited in the article:

John Iliff, general manager of American Forge & Foundry, says the single shipment of oil-drainage tanks it received in 2006 from the CPMIEC unit set off no alarms. “Trading in illegal goods certainly never crossed our minds,” he says.

The shipment came from China JMM Import & Export Shanghai Pudong Corp., which didn’t appear on any sanctions list until Thursday. Records indicate the company shares an address and phone number with a CPMIEC unit that was previously banned: CPMIEC Shanghai Pudong Corp. The Treasury determined that the two companies are affiliated.

That designation of JMM Import & Export occurred just a few days ago on December 31, 2009, almost three years after the cited shipment. But there were several red flags that American companies might have picked up on before OFAC’s belated designation of the CPMIEC affiliate. Not only is there a similarity in the names of the two companies, but they shared the same street address. Standard procedure should be not only to check names on the SDN list but addresses as well.

But the larger issue here is that the obvious ease with which Chinese companies can morph into new entities effectively renders company-based sanctions almost completely ineffective. It’s obviously as easy for Chinese companies to rename themselves as it is for underage Chinese gymnasts to acquire new, earlier and eligible birth dates on official documents. I’m not so sure what the solution is here but it doesn’t appear to be imposing penalties or additional compliance obligations on U.S. companies that deal with affiliates of companies on the SDN list.

How the OFAC Stole Christmas

Thursday, December 24th, 2009
Santa Flanked by F-16

A spokesman for the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) told Export Law Blog this morning that discussions between OFAC and the North Pole over Santa Claus’s Christmas Eve itinerary had broken down and were not expected to be resumed before Santa’s scheduled departure on December 24 at 10 pm EST.

The dispute arose from a dilemma that the U.S. sanctions against Cuba posed for Santa’s planned delivery of toys to children in Cuba. If Santa delivers toys for U.S. children first, there will be toys destined for Cuba in the sleigh in violation of 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(b). That rule prohibits Santa’s sleigh from entering the United States with “goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest.” On the other hand, if Santa delivers the toys to Cuban children first, then 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(a) prohibits the sleigh from entering the United States and “unloading freight for a period of 180 days from the date the vessel departed from a port or place in Cuba.”

A press release from the North Pole announced that the OFAC rules left Santa no choice but to bypass the children of the United States this Christmas. A spokesman from OFAC warned that if Santa attempted to overfly the United States, his sleigh would be forced to land and his cargo seized. He continued:

We know that the outcome is harsh, but we cannot allow Fidel Castro’s regime to continue to be propped up by Santa’s annual delivery of valuable Christmas toys to Cuban children.

Congressional leaders did not return our calls.


This post is an annual Christmas Eve tradition and appeared previously in 2007 and 2008 in slightly altered form. Export Law Blog would like to take the opportunity of this post to extend its best holiday wishes to all of its readers. Posting will be light between now and the end of the holidays due as much to the holidays as to a heartless clerk at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals who established a briefing schedule that requires me to file a brief on December 30.

Let Them Write Letters

Monday, November 2nd, 2009

Twitter Keeps Iran AfloatLast week several readers brought to my attention a Bloomberg story that announced in its headline “U.S. Wants Microsoft to End Message Ban in Iran, Cuba.” This created a bit of a hubbub at the world headquarters of Export Law Blog, since this blog has been advocating for some time that the information exception be read to cover instant messaging, twittering, and the like. Alas, as we learned at a tender age, you can’t believe everything you read in the newspapers. (You can, of course, believe everything you read in blogs.)

The Bloomberg story referenced a letter that OFAC sent last month to the Center for Democracy in the Americas, a group that, like Export Law Blog, has been a persistent critic of the Cuba sanctions. But when you read the letter, it’s quite clear that the letter doesn’t exactly say that the U.S. wants to end the application of sanctions to instant messaging services:

We assure you that the discontinuation of instant messaging services [by Microsoft to users in Cuba, Syria, Iran, Sudan and North Korea] was not directed by OFAC or, to our knowledge, any other Federal agency. Ensuring the flow and access to information available through the Internet and similar public sources is consistent with the policy interests of the United States Government.

OFAC is participating in an interagency effort to review any discontinuation of certain instant messaging services to sanctioned countries, with the goal of insuring that such services will be available to persons in sanctioned countries to the extent permitted by current U.S. law. [emphasis added]

The last clause is the catch here. OFAC has typically interpreted the information exception very narrowly, and there is no indication that OFAC has changed its view of what’s “permitted by current U.S. law.”

Instant messaging services require the download of software, and OFAC takes the position that software isn’t information covered by the information exception. Twitter creates a miniblog page with a unique URI for each user, which would, under OFAC’s narrow view of “information,” be considered provision of a service in violation of the sanctions regulations.

OFAC’s antiquated view of information, apparently formulated sometime between the invention of the printing press and Columbus’s discovery of the Americas, comprises only things written in ink on paper. Throw a few electrons into the mix and all bets are off.

So I wouldn’t take this OFAC letter to the bank if I were you. At least not yet.

OFAC Guidance Imposes New Burdens on Exports of Medical Devices

Wednesday, October 7th, 2009

Star Trek Dermal RegeneratorThe Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued a guidance today on exports of medical parts to support medical devices legally exported under OFAC licenses to Iran or Sudan, the two countries for which OFAC exercises licensing authority over medical devices. And, not surprisingly, OFAC continues its efforts to resist the mandate of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which sought, on obvious humanitarian grounds, to prevent OFAC and other export agencies, from restricting exports of food, medicine and medical devices to sanctioned countries.

Under the new guidance, rather than saying simply that exports of replacement parts are ordinarily incident to the export of medical device itself, and therefore allowed, OFAC imposes burdensome conditions on those exports. The potential impact of this red tape on ordinary citizens in Iran and Sudan who are sick or dying just doesn’t matter. Worse, such punitive measures directed at the sick and dying are not going to cause Iran to give up its nuclear aspirations or cause the regime in Sudan to rethink its genocidal policies.

First, if the part that needs to be replaced fails during the one-year period of validity of the export license for the medical device itself, the part can be exported, but only as a one-for-one replacement. But there is another, and more significant, catch. The replacement part must have obtained a specific classification as EAR99 from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). And even if the exporter has a classification for the medical device as EAR99, it doesn’t count unless that classification specifically mentions the replacement part in question.

Medical devices on this list don’t require a specific BIS classification, but the list doesn’t include parts. So even though an OFAC license for a digital blood pressure monitor doesn’t require a specific classification from BIS, exporting a replacement display screen for that device does!

Second, if the underlying license has expired, a new OFAC license is required to export the replacement parts. And, again, a specific BIS classification is required for each of the replacement parts exported, even if the device itself was classified as EAR99 or was on the exempted list and did not require a BIS classification. OFAC license approvals can take from 40 days to six months or more, which means that patients may go without care while the exporter waits for a BIS classification and an OFAC license.

Third, even an import of the device back to the United States for repair will require a license — as will the re-export after the device is repaired. The application will require, among other things, a “statement regarding the circumstances under which the medical device broke.” It’s not clear that simply saying that the device was being used and it just failed will suffice as a justification for a license.

If you are an exporter of medical devices under TSRA licenses to either Iran or Sudan, you should make sure that any request for a required BIS classification of the device also includes a request for classification of the important parts of that device. You also should be aware that you can’t solve this problem by continually renewing the license. Parts can only be shipped without a license under this guidance if they are shipped during the original period of validity of the license under which the medical device for which the parts are destined was exported.

N.J. Pol Nixes N.Y. Philharmonic Gig in Cuba

Tuesday, October 6th, 2009

Empty StageLast week the New York Philharmonic announced that it had been forced to cancel its planned concert in Cuba at the end of October. Although the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) granted licenses to let the instrumentalists travel to Cuba, it declined to permit the orchestra’s patrons who were footing the bill for the trip to tag along.

This decision seems at odds with current initiatives by the White House to ease travel restrictions to Cuba. It now appears that the outcome was the handiwork of New Jersey Senator Bob Menendez, who threatened to vote against health reform if a single note of Gershwin was heard in a Havana concert hall. Menendez was reportedly infuriated by the recent success of a concert by a Colombian pop-star in Cuba, and didn’t want such a horrifying event to recur if the New York orchestra traveled to the island. Apparently for every note of Beethoven that a Cuban hears, Raúl Castro gets another week in office and Fidel draws another thousand breaths.

The Firefox in the Win House?

Thursday, September 24th, 2009

firefox_iranLast week an obviously confused reporter at internetnews.com reported what he thought were the details of a letter from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) received by Mozilla, the open-source project responsible for Firefox, Thunderbird and other Internet applications, relating to downloads of the program by computer users in Iran. The article seemed to suggest that Mozilla had filed a voluntary disclosure with BIS that it had allowed downloads of its open-source encryption source code by Iranians. The article seemed to suggest further that Mozilla had received a letter from BIS stating that this was not a violation.

But that’s not what happened. BIS released yesterday an Advisory Opinion that, although identifying details have been removed, clearly addresses the situation described in the internetnews.com article. And, significantly, the advisory opinion doesn’t address exports of source code but instead addresses export of compiled source code and, specifically, compiled source code including mass market encryption software. Under section 746.7(a)(1) of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) exports of compiled mass market encryption software (or any other compiled encryption software) to Iran would require a BIS license. The Advisory Opinion held that as long as the IP address of the party downloading the software in Iran (or other sanctioned country) was logged by Mozilla’s server but not otherwise used by Mozilla (say, for example, to serve to the user a web page in Farsi), the company did not have sufficient knowledge of an export of encryption software to Iran to be liable under the regulations.

Even though I don’t believe that, as a matter of policy, downloads of web browsers with encryption features ought to be subject to export controls, the reasoning of the Advisory Opinion is, to say the least, a bit odd. It seems fairly well-established that knowledge is not a required to establish a violation of the EAR. Specifically, section 764.2(a), which defines violations of the EAR, doesn’t contain a knowledge requirement, nor does General Prohibition No. 1 which would be the predicate to a violation of section 764.2(a). Perhaps this signals a retreat by BIS from its traditional concept of strict liability for violations of the EAR.

Even so, the final sentence of the Advisory Opinion may nullify, as a practical matter, any significance the opinion may have with respect to software downloads in sanctioned countries:

Please note that this advisory opinion is confined to interpretation of the EAR, and does not address the sanctions regulations implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control ["OFAC"]

And, as we all know, other major software companies, such as Google and Microsoft, have prohibited downloads in sanctioned countries due to fears of OFAC penalties.

Australian Bank Agrees to Pay $5.75 Million to OFAC

Wednesday, August 26th, 2009

ANZ BranchANZ Bank, Australia’s third largest bank, recently agreed to pay to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) a fine of $5.75 million to settle allegations that the bank had engaged in transactions in Sudan and Cuba in violation of the U.S. embargo on those two countries. The OFAC announcement of the settlement noted that ANZ manipulated the SWIFT messages related to the Sudan transactions by removing all references to Sudan. ANZ was liable for these violations as a result of its banking office in New York City.

According to the announcement, 31 transactions with a total value of $106 million were involved. Given the size of the agreed penalty, it is clear that the applicable penalty to this case was not the penalty applicable before the International Economic Powers Penalty Enhancement Act (or $50,000 per transaction) but the enhanced penalties of $250,000 per violation or twice the value of the transaction imposed by that legislation. Under the enhanced penalties, ANZ was theoretically liable for $212 million. [UPDATE: Actually the maximum liability was $57,040,000. The Cuban transactions were subject to a maximum fine of $65,000 each. Thanks to Jim Slear in the comments for catching my mistake]

OFAC cited a number of mitigating factors justifying the reduced penalty including ANZ’s cooperation in the investigation, its voluntary disclosure of the Cuba violations, its adoption of revised compliance procedures, and its agreement to engage in, and report to OFAC, further audits of its activities to insure that it doesn’t process financial transactions involving embargoes countries through U.S. financial institutions. Australian banking authorities have agreed to review these examinations. The $5.75 million paid by ANZ is substantially less than the fines paid by Lloyds, ABN Amro and USB for similar violations which were, respectively, $350 million, $80 million and $100 million.

An article in the Brisbane Times provides more background on ANZ’s dealing with embargoed countries:

ANZ initially became aware of the issue in late 2006 when regulators last year blocked a $US15,000 transaction involving the import of stone from Iran.

ANZ appointed Deloitte to conduct an independent investigation of more than 330,000 trade finance transactions for Australian and international clients going back five years. This ultimately turned up 42 deals found to have breached US economic bans on 13 countries. However the fine from the US Treasury only relates to 31 trade finance transactions involving parties in Sudan and Cuba.

The OFAC announcement states that ANZ didn’t voluntarily disclose the Sudan transactions. That is somewhat hard to reconcile with this report of the Deloitte investigation unless ANZ kept the Deloitte investigation internal until OFAC independently uncovered the Sudan transactions.

The Man from Del Monte, He Says “Yes!”

Friday, July 3rd, 2009

Peaches 'n FlagsLast week, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit issued its slip opinion in Del Monte Fresh Produce Company v. United States. The appeals court reversed a lower court ruling that had dismissed a case filed by Del Monte against the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) alleging that OFAC was taking too long to process a license application Del Monte had filed to export agricultural commodities to Iran.

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7211, authorizes exports of agricultural products, medicine and medical devices to sanctioned countries such as Iran. Section 906 of TSRA provided that the licenses for exports to Iran were to be no more restrictive than license exceptions for agricultural products administered by the Deparment of Commerce. Pursuant to that section, OFAC published an interim rule that followed Commerce’s “nine-day” rule and which provided, in effect that licenses to Iran would be granted if no objections had been received from the State Department within nine days of the referral of the application to State and if the application was otherwise in conformity with OFAC’s rules. In March 2007, OFAC issued a policy statement that it would no longer comply with the 9-day rule.

Del Monte’s application to export agricultural products to Iran was filed with OFAC on August 8, 2007, and referred by OFAC to State on August 17. On September 13, State replied that it had no objection. After the OFAC Help Desk advised Del Monte on November 27 that the application was still pending, Del Monte filed suit the following day, November 28, in federal district court. On November 29, Del Monte filed a motion for preliminary injunction, the court scheduled a status conference and OFAC granted Del Monte’s license, which it appears had been signed on November 23, i.e., before Del Monte had filed suit. Because OFAC had issued the license, the District Court dismissed the complaint and the motion for preliminary injunction as moot.

In the opinion released by the Court of Appeals, the court ruled that the district court had jurisdiction over the otherwise moot claim under the exception for claims “capable of repetition but evading review.” As a result, the decision is instructive more on arcane issues of federal jurisdiction than it is on anything else.

But since the case was remanded for further proceedings before the district court, the district court will now be forced to confront several issues of immense interest to exporters. First, how long does OFAC have to act on a TSRA application under the terms of section 906 of TSRA? Must the agency act within 9 days of referral to State if State raises no objections and the license is otherwise grantable? Or could the agency, by its action in March 2007, defer action on applications for a much longer period? If the District Court reinstates the nine day rule, can OFAC effectively avoid it by waiting for long periods before referring the license application to State?

MTN-Bharti Deal Scares Some OFAC-Wary Bankers

Tuesday, June 30th, 2009

MTNA report on Reuters today raised some interesting issues with respect to the MTN-Bharti deal. The merger, which would create the world’s third largest wireless telephone company, is creating some heartburn for U.S. bankers who’d like to get a piece of this action. The reason for the heartburn: South African wireless operator MTN derives 13 percent of its revenue from Iran, Syria and Sudan.

As usual, OFAC isn’t saying anything about the propriety of U.S. banks financing or advising this deal, which is, of course, consistent with OFAC’s standard policy of regulation through ambiguity, a policy that utilizes fear of substantial penalties to keep U.S. firms from engaging in activities that are arguably permissible under the rules

A U.S. Treasury official declined to comment on the MTN-Bharti advisory work by U.S. banks, but said there was some room within OFAC rules for U.S. companies to deal cautiously with situations involving deals with foreign firms that have subsidiaries in the sanctioned areas — as long as they are not facilitating transactions with the sanctioned countries.

“U.S. persons are not necessarily prohibited from dealing with third-country firms that do business in sanctioned countries, although they should approach such dealings carefully,” said the official, who was not authorised to speak publicly about OFAC’s enforcement of sanctions.

Ah yes, the facilitation bogey-man rears his ugly head. That should scare not just bankers but lawyers, CPAs, PR firms and anyone else even tangentially involved with the deal, including the limo drivers that take the bankers and lawyers to work and the chefs that cater their working lunches.

A DC lawyer tries to pooh-pooh the concerns:

[A lawyer] who often deals with OFAC compliance, said the sanctions are not intended to kill off opportunities for U.S. banks to do work on foreign mergers that involve some business in foreign countries.

“If you had a rule that no U.S. investment bank could advise a merger between non-U.S. companies that is one scintilla related to a sanctioned target country, there would be no cross-border advisory business done at all by U.S. banks. It would all move to London,” he said.

I think that’s what might be called hyperbole. Some business might go to London, but all? I don’t think so. And even if it did, I’m not so sure that would sway OFAC.

[The lawyer] says he believes there could be a strong risk of running foul of OFAC restrictions if revenue from sanctioned countries is 25 percent or more — a level that some lawyers use as a rule of thumb to determine a safe level of business in sanctioned countries for the foreign firms.

Twenty-five percent is a nice number as far as numbers go. Certainly it’s much easier to remember than, say, thirty-two percent. But even if that number is used by some as a “rule of thumb,” it is, politely put, a completely made-up number.

This would be a great area for OFAC to clarify, but I’m not holdng my breath.