Apr

3

The Export Control Nightmare Act of 2018 (UPDATED)


Posted by at 6:08 pm on April 3, 2018
Category: BISExport Control ProposalsExport Reform

Ed Royce via https://royce.house.gov/uploadedphotos/mediumresolution/320ee60e-b83a-4f74-9767-a0e68f3095f6.png [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Rep. Ed Royce

When the Export Administration Act lapsed years ago, it meant that every year the President had to issue an executive order under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) resurrecting the Export Administration Regulations for another year.  (Declarations of emergency, the premise for any IEEPA resuscitation of the EAR, can only last one year under the National Emergencies Act.)  The proposed bi-partisan Export Control Reform Act of 2018, sponsored by Rep. Ed Royce (R-Ca) is mostly designed to give the President the authority to re-promulgate the Export Administration Regulations on a more permanent basis.  He or she will still have to renew annually the Executive Orders that impose economic sanctions on people, places, and things (mostly boats).

Nobody can really argue with the elimination of the annual renewal requirement for the EAR.  Presumably the President has better things to do, like Easter Egg rolls, Thanksgiving turkey pardons and the such.  But Congress took the opportunity to meddle with the definition of a U.S. person to create a whole new class of exports that are certain to cause headaches, if not nightmares.  Under the proposed new definition, a U.S. business entity is not a U.S. person for export purposes if foreign citizens or corporations own 50 percent or more of the corporation.  Under the old definition, a business entity was a U.S. person if  it was organized under the law of any jurisdiction in the United States.

If you previously thought that “deemed exports”  already were the stuff of nightmares, well, as they say, you ain’t seen nothin’ yet.  Here are some scenarios that I’m optioning to start a new horror series on Netflix.

  • Company A in Chicago wants to sell some microprocessors classified as ECCN classified as 3A001 to Company C, a U.S. corporation, in Detroit.  It can’t do that until Company C gives it information on foreign ownership and, if Company C is owned 51% by Chinese corporation, then Company A cannot send the items from Chicago to Detroit without a [bad word] export license.  Scared yet?
  • Company D, a manufacturer of computers in Seattle wants to use Company F in Boston to manufacture certain components specially designed for its computers.  The computers and the specially designed parts are classified as ECCN 4A001.  In order to do that, Company D must transfer 4E001 technology relating to the production of these parts to Company F.   Company F is owned 60 percent bought by a Russian-Italian joint venture.  Is Company F Russian or Italian?  If the latter, no license is required; if the former, it is.  This gives Freddie Kruger a run for his money.
  • Company G, which is 60 percent French owned, creates designs for a CNC-machine.   That technology can be exported without license to France.  Can the French parent build the machine and ship it to China without license?  That will depend on whether the designs created by the U.S. company that is now a foreign person in the United States are U.S. technology or foreign technology.  Warning: violent ending for mature audiences only.

You have to imagine that these nightmare scenarios never crossed the minds, such as they were, of the drafters of this legislation.  Nor did they focus on the numerous compliance questions and problems that the new definition would create.  But not to worry:  section 108 is designed to provide “compliance assistance.”   Whew.  In fact, in section 108(c)(1), Congress mandates that the President “shall develop and submit to Congress a plan to assist small- and medium-sized United States [sic] in export licensing and other processes under this title.”  I always thought we were a big, indeed great, United States, so I’m not so sure who are the small- and medium-sized United States that Congress hopes to help.

UPDATE: Kevin Wolf, who you may remember was running export control reform at BIS during the Obama administration, points out, in the comments, that the definition of U.S. person which resulted in the nightmares described above was, ahem, a mistake:

Everyone should relax. The definition of US person in the bill was a drafting error. The title I export definition got combined with the title II antiboycott definition. Committee staff is aware of the issue and will fix it during mark-up to get it back to the EAR status quo. You were not wrong in pointing out the absurdities as written, btw. When things seem weird though, it is good to ask the drafters if that is what they really meant. They did not in this case. Reg and leg writers do make mistakes.

That’s good news. It also goes to show that we all would have been better off if the antiboycott regulations had been left to die a deserved death. Those regulations never put even a dent in the Arab boycott but instead merely enriched lawyers (myself included) who had to decipher their ridiculously byzantine complexity and seventeenth-century syntax to advise clients on what language could and could not appear in letters of credit.

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Mar

27

Indictment of Iranian over Housing Project in Venezuela Raises Questions


Posted by at 9:49 am on March 27, 2018
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran SanctionsOFAC

Ali Sadr Hasheminejad via http://www.prweb.com/releases/2017/07/prweb14531762.htm [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Ali Sadr Hasheminejad

Last week, Iranian national Ali Sadr Hasheminejad was arrested at Dulles Airport outside Washington DC in connection with a Venezuelan housing construction project undertaken by his family’s business in Iran. According to the indictment, the governments of Venezuela and Iran in 2005 agreed that Iran would cooperate in the building of new housing in Venezuela. Under the agreement, the parties would sign “commercial contracts” to complete the project. Thereafter, the Stratus Group, a private Iranian conglomerate, assumed the construction project.

Stratus incorporated Iranian International Housing Corporation (“IIHC”), an Iranian company which was responsible for carrying out and completing the housing project in Venezuela. IIHC then entered into an agreement with a Venezuelan company to construct the housing for $475,000,000 dollars. Mr. Hasheminejad, the defendant, was a member of the family that controlled the Stratus Group and its subsidiary IIHC.  He was responsible for overseeing the projects finances. Pursuant to Mr. Hasheminejad’s direction, the Venezuelan company transferred funds to IIHC to pay for the project. These funds, because they were to be in US Dollars, transited various unnamed banks in New York. As a result, the indictment alleges that Mr. Hasheminejad caused these banks to export financial services from the United States to Iran in violation of the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, the indictment does not provide any information as to where those wire funds ended up. As IIHC was engaged in a construction project in Venezuela it seems likely, indeed almost certain, that it had accounts in Venezuela and the funds in question were wired to that Venezuelan account so that materials and labor costs for the housing project could be met. There is no reason to believe that the Venezuelan company wired funds to Iran for the Venezuelan project and the indictment never even alleges that this happened.

The destination of the funds is a crucial piece of information. The Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”) prohibit exporting financial services (e.g. transferring funds) from the United States “to Iran or the Government of Iran.” The wire transactions at issue allegedly caused the U.S. banks to provide financial services, according to the indictment, “to Iran.” But, as those familiar with the ITSR know, the transfer to funds to an Iranian company or individual outside Iran is not a transfer of those funds “to Iran” and is not a violation of those rules. If the funds at issue went ultimately, as it seems they must have, to an IIHC account in Venezuela there would be no violation. Yet the indictment, in tracing the funds transfers, stops at bank accounts in the British Virgin Islands with the exception of some funds that went to the United States to buy property in California.

Perhaps the prosecution does have evidence that some of this money wound up in Iran but, if it does, it oddly chose to leave it out and instead wound up presenting an indictment that does not adequately allege a violation of law.

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Mar

20

OFAC Doesn’t Understand How Digital Currencies Work


Posted by at 1:50 pm on March 20, 2018
Category: CryptocurrenciesOFACVenezuela

Nicolas Maduro via https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicolas_Maduro_February_2017.png [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Nicolas Maduro

Yesterday the White House issued an executive order prohibiting U.S. persons from transactions in the Petro, the new Venezuelan digital currency. As you might recall, OFAC initially suggested that dealings in the Petro would violate restrictions on providing debt financing to the Venezuelan government, an idea that I said was a foolish misunderstanding of the difference between debt and currency.

The new executive order does what it should have done to begin with: restrict the digital currency directly. Of course, as the only current and guaranteed use for the Petro is to pay Venezuelan taxes and government fees, it is doubtful that the Petro will be of interest to U.S. persons and, as a result, it is hard to see that the new executive order will have much impact, other than, I suppose, preventing U.S. persons  or persons in the U.S. from operating nodes in the P2P network for the Petro.

In addition to banning U.S. persons, the new order gave OFAC the opportunity to wade into digital currencies again and shows fundamental misconceptions about how digital currencies work. Astonishingly, the new FAQs on digital currencies issued with the executive order propose to add digital currency addresses as identifiers on the SDN List:

To strengthen our efforts to combat the illicit use of digital currency transactions under our existing authorities, OFAC may include as identifiers on the SDN List specific digital currency addresses associated with blocked persons.

Oh. My. Goodness. They really said that. Next OFAC will be adding an SDN’s favorite unicorn name as identifiers on the SDN List.

Here’s what’s wrong with this idea of using  digital currency addresses as identifiers on the SDN List: they are only used once (unless you’re particularly clueless). For each payment request, the requester generates a unique public and private key pair. The digital address is a hash of that key pair. The payment request is signed with the private key and sent with the public key, allowing the authentication of the request. When the individual wants to make another payment request, a new key pair and address is generated.

So, if OFAC puts an address on the list, hoping to prevent U.S. persons from sending digital currency to that address, it is a waste of time because it is highly unlikely that address will ever be used again for a payment request (particularly once the address is on the SDN List). Nor will it prevent U.S. persons from receiving money from that address, because  the digital currency can be transferred to a newly-generated address prior to sending the currency. (And this problem is not solved by looking at the last-sent-to address in a blockchain explorer, because that will not establish that the new address is controlled by the same, presumably blocked person. If sent by the blocked person to an address of an unblocked person, the transferred digital currency is no longer blocked because the blocked person no longer has any interest in it.)

Of course, in the unlikely event that the SDN is not savvy enough to use a different address for all of his/her digital currency transactions (or to use wallet software preventing address reuse), then he will get caught by listing his reused address as an identifier. But, I’m guessing the only people re-using the same address for all their digital currency transactions are working at OFAC.

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Mar

13

White House Sides with Qualcomm and Tries to Block Broadcom Hostile Takeover


Posted by at 9:26 pm on March 13, 2018
Category: CFIUS

Broadcom HQ by Coolcaesar [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Broadcomheadquarters.jpg [cropped]Late yesterday, the White House issued an order forbidding Broadcom from continuing with its efforts to takeover Qualcomm. The surprise move by the White House seems to have been designed to prevent Broadcom from playing its, er, trump card by reincorporating in the United States. This would block the power of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) from reviewing the transaction and prevent the President from prohibiting or setting the transaction aside. Under the Defense Production Act, CFIUS and the President may only rely on national security considerations to block a “covered transaction,” which is defined as “any merger, acquisition, or takeover … by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” If Broadcom, a Singapore corporation traded on NASDAQ, reincorporated in the United States, as it announced that it intended to do after the tax bill was passed, it would no longer be a foreign person as defined in section 800.216 of the CFIUS regulations. At that point, both the President and CFIUS would have no power to block the takeover.

The timeline here is informative. On March 4, CFIUS issued an order to Qualcomm to delay its annual shareholders meeting from March 6, 2018, to April 5 to give it time to investigate the transaction. Then on March 12, Broadcom announced that it would complete its re-domiciliation in the United States by April 3, giving it plenty of time to continue its efforts to acquire Qualcomm at the April 6 shareholders meeting, except not as a foreign person but as a U.S. person immune from CFIUS review. A few hours later that day, the White House released its order blocking the Broadcom bid.

The most interesting part of that order is Section 2(g), which states:

Any transaction or other device entered into or employed for the purpose of, or with the effect of, avoiding or circumventing this order is prohibited.

Both the timing and language of this section clearly suggest that it is intended to prohibit Broadcom from re-domiciling in the United States for the purpose of continuing its hostile takeover campaign. In addition, section 2(d) orders Qualcomm to hold its annual meeting 10 days after shareholder notice is given, which notice is to be given as soon as possible. Ten days is the shortest notice period permissible under section 222 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. This, of course, is clearly designed to have the meeting before the date, April 3, by which Broadcom announced it would no longer be a foreign person.

Can the White House get away with this? Although section 721(e) says that the actions by the President under section 721(d) are not reviewable by any court, the actions here still have to be taken under section 721(d). The actions permitted by section 721(d) are those that “the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction.” But here the President is clearly trying to prohibit a transaction that is not covered. If Broadcom completes its transition to a U.S. person before Qualcomm can hold its annual shareholders meeting, nothing — and that includes section 2(g) of the order — can stop Broadcom from pursuing its takeover bid.

As they say praise the Lord, pay the lawyers, and pass the popcorn.

Photo Credit: Broadcom HQ by Coolcaesar [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Broadcomheadquarters.jpg [cropped]. Copyright 2007 Coolcaesar

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Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

8

The Norky Horror Picture Show: Let’s Do The UNPA Warp Again


Posted by at 4:13 pm on March 8, 2018
Category: North Korea SanctionsOFAC

The House of Leaves - Burning 4 by Learning Lark [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/7iW4zL [cropped]On March 5, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) released a completely revised and revamped version of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations. The intent of the revision was to catch up with Executive Orders 13687, 13722, and 13810, as well as with the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 and Title III of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, all of which came into force since the regulations were originally promulgated in 2010.

Not surprisingly, OFAC continues its war on the Congressionally mandated travel and information exemptions in 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3) and (4), apparently worried that someone might give a copy of the Declaration of Independence or The Federalist Papers to a Nork SDN. Section 510.213 of the new regulations contains the normal travel and informational materials exemptions but section 510.213(a) says this:

(a) United Nations Participation Act. The exemptions described in this section do not apply to transactions involving property or interests in property of persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the authority of the United Nations Participation Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c(b)) (UNPA).

And the note to that section says this:

Persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the authority of the UNPA include those listed on both OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) and the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List (see https://www.un.org) as well as persons listed on the SDN List for being owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, such persons.

Of course, to add extra unnecessary confusion, the introductory text to the new rules in the Federal Register says this:

The exemptions described in this section do not apply to any transactions involving property or interests in property of certain persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the provisions of E.O. 13551, E.O. 13722, or E.O. 13810 and that are blocked pursuant to the authority of the UNPA in addition to IEEPA.

This pretty much renders the Note to section 510.213 useless. The list of persons blocked under the UNPA includes everyone designated under those three orders and given program tag listing of DPRK2, DPRK3 and DPRK4. The problem is that is a much bigger list than those on the Consolidated United Nations Security Council Sanctions List. There are 133 North Korean individuals and entities on the UN List, whereas there are 314 North Korean individuals and entities designated on the SDN List under DPRK2, DPRK3 and DPRK4.

The UNPA gives the President the power “whenever the United States is called upon by the Security Council to apply measures which said Council has decided are to be employed to give effect to its decisions under said Charter” to issue executive orders “to the extent necessary to apply such measures.” Without question, when a Security Council Resolution requires member states to block particular entities and individual, the President has the power to block them under UNPA.  So OFAC can, if it wants, forbid U.S. persons from giving copies of The Interview, The Bible or John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty to any party on the UN List, no matter how silly and pointless such a restriction would be.

But the Security Council Resolutions at issue here under which the Executive Orders were issued do not say block these particular individuals and whoever the heck else you want to block while you’re at it. So individuals blocked by OFAC that aren’t also blocked under UN Security Council Resolutions are not lawfully blocked under the UNPA and the full extent of the travel and informational materials exemptions in section 1702(b) of IEEPA have to be applied by OFAC to those individuals not also on the UN Sanctions List. Don’t bet on that ever happening.

Photo Credit: The House of Leaves – Burning 4 by Learning Lark [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/7iW4zL [cropped]. Copyright 2009 Learning Lark

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Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)


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