Archive for May, 2014


May

14

The Case of the Missing FLIR


Posted by at 11:23 pm on May 14, 2014
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

HRC Series Flir Camera via http://www.flir.com/uploadedImages/CS_EMEA/Products/HRC_series/HRC.png [Fair Use]Last week a federal grand jury in Illinois indicted Bilal Ahmed on charges that he attempted to export a FLIR HRC-U thermal imaging camera, classified as ECCN 6A003.b.4.b, to Pakistan without the required license from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”).

Reading the criminal complaint, which is the most detailed statement of facts in the case, reveals a few somewhat strange holes in the government’s case. Basically, the only evidence that the government has that Bilal Ahmed exported or even attempted to export anything was a box that they searched at a UPS store addressed to a company in Pakistan that had an invoice for the camera and, apparently, nothing else.

The complaint starts by describing the negotiations between Ahmed and a used-goods seller to buy an HRC-series thermal imaging camera. After payment was made, the camera was shipped to the address of Ahmed’s company Trexim Corporation, in Schaumburg, Illinois. Federal agents then followed Ahmed from his home in Bolingbrook, Illinois, to a FedEx office in Bolingbrook, Illinois. The complaint does not indicate what, whether a box or a letter or anything else, Ahmed took the FedEx store and there is absolutely no indication of what he might have shipped from there. Going to a FedEx store can hardly constitute evidence of an illegal export

Subsequently Ahmed contacted the seller and indicated that he had received the camera, that it was in bad condition, and that he wanted a case for it. An agreement was made to send him the case. The case was shipped to Schaumburg and agents then followed Ahmed again, this time from his office in Schaumburg to a UPS store in Elk Grove village. After Ahmed left, the agents inspected the contents of the box, which was addressed to Pakistan and labeled NLR, and found an invoice for the HRC camera. No other contents of the box were mentioned in the criminal complaint beyond the invoice. If the camera case was in there, you would think that the criminal complaint would, perhaps, mention it since it would be the only solid evidence that the camera, for which the case would have been destined, had been shipped to Pakistan.

So, you may wonder, where is the camera or any evidence that it was exported? The agents apparently failed to inspect the package at the Bolingbrook FedEx, and when they did get around to looking at the box at the Elk Grove Village UPS all they found of any interest was an invoice. That is apparently why Ahmed is charged only with attempted export, but there doesn’t seem to be any evidence of any attempted export of the camera either. I guess the idea is that sending the invoice alone was an attempted export, a far-fetched notion at best.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

13

Russian Sanctions Creep


Posted by at 6:39 pm on May 13, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsEURussia SanctionsSanctionsSDN List

By President of Russia [CC-BY-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Volodin_V_V.jpeg?uselang=ru
ABOVE: Vyacheslav Volodin


The EU yesterday added new names to its sanctions list.  The latest additions include Russian President Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Vyacheslav Volodin, and Vladimir Shamanov, the commander of the paratroop unit that allegedly took part, despite Russian denials, in the annexation of Crimea.

Also added were a number of Crimean companies:  One is Chernomorneftegaz, a Crimean gas company; another is Feodosia, a Crimean oil supplier.

Volodin but not Shamanov and Chernomorneftegaz, but not Feodosia, are on the U.S. sanctions list. Differences like these suggest incoherence and, at the least, create compliance challenges for multinationals.

Being on a U.S. or EU sanctions list means that the assets of the listed person are frozen and dealings with them by those subject to U.S. or EU jurisdiction are prohibited.

Whether these sanctions will deter further Russian involvement in the Ukrainian crisis is anyone’s guess.  The reluctance to impose so-called sectoral sanctions, that is, prohibitions on dealings with anyone in a given sector like oil and gas, exposes concerns about the double-edged sword of sanctions:  They truly cut both ways.

Individuated sanctions are, nonetheless, a headache for companies subject to U.S. and EU law because of the broad-based shadow lists of those subject to sanctions under the U.S. rule freezing the assets of any company that is 50% or more owned by a designated person and the EU rule  freezing any assets “controlled by” a designated person.

Shadowing the shadow list means that simple screening of listed persons is not enough.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

May

8

“Too Big” May Be the Perfect Size for U.S. Sanctions Enforcement


Posted by at 5:09 pm on May 8, 2014
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDoJEconomic SanctionsOFACSanctions

By Laurent Vincenti (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ALaurent_Vincenti_BNP_Paribas.jpg

The Washington Post this week reported on U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s Monday video message reiterating that no company can be “too big” to be “immune from prosecution.”  The Post went on to report, as others have, that the Justice Department, in keeping with its own edict, is “getting closer to wrapping up an investigation” of French bank BNP Paribas, “which allegedly allowed millions of dollars from [Cuba, Iran, Sudan and other countries] to illegally move through the U.S. financial system.”

As the Post partially excerpts, BNP’s 2013 annual financial report stated that BNP “identified a significant volume of transactions that could be considered impermissible under U.S. laws and regulations including, in particular, those of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).”  The report went on to state the following:

The Bank has presented the findings of this review to the U.S. authorities and commenced subsequent discussion with them.  Although the amount of financial consequences, fines or penalties cannot be determined at this stage, the Bank has, in accordance with [International Financial Reporting Standards] requirements, recorded a provision of USD 1.1 billion (EUR 0.8 billion) in its financial statements for the fourth quarter of 2013.

Because BNP claims there “have been no discussions” with U.S. authorities as to the amount of any penalty, “[t]he actual amount [of a penalty] could thus be different, possibly very different, from the amount of the provision.”  (I am sure BNP hopes “different” means “less.”)

A set-aside of $1.1 billion is, of course, remarkable for costs associated with a sanctions penalty, but BNP’s situation should sound very familiar as OFAC, in partnership with the Justice Department, has not shied away from going after “too big” banks for sanctions violations.  Banks that have settled OFAC enforcement actions with significant penalties chronologically over the last few years is a who’s who in the global banking community: Royal Bank of Scotland (over $33 million), HSBC ($375 million), Standard Chartered ($132 million), ING ($619 million), JP Morgan Chase (over $88 million), Barclays ($176 million), Lloyds TSB ($217 million) and Credit Suisse ($536 million).

What must not be lost in any action against BNP or other banks is what this means for everyone else.  With credit to OFAC, the global banking system has become an effective deputy for U.S. sanctions enforcement.  Banks hawkishly review activity transiting through it with sophisticated software and a discretion erring on the side of caution if anything, in the words of BNP, “could be considered impermissible.”  The trickle-down effect is that any company thinking about a U.S. dollar transaction, which will almost certainly transit a U.S. correspondent account, has to ensure itself that its transactions are free and clear of U.S. sanctions violations unless it is willing to risk having funds blocked in the United States.

Although it is right to observe that OFAC has preferred of late to hunt big game, OFAC has astutely turned the game into successful hounds.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

7

Incorporating in Delaware Leads to Huge OFAC Fine for Argentinian Company


Posted by at 11:51 pm on May 7, 2014
Category: Cuba SanctionsOFAC

By Almonroth (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AU.S._Treasury-3.jpgYesterday the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced that it had imposed a $2,809,800 fine on Argentina-based Decolar.com, Inc. Decolar is an online travel agency and attracted the ire of OFAC for booking trips by non-U.S. persons to Cuba, trips for 17,836 people to be precise. This made OFAC very, very angry:

Decolar demonstrated reckless disregard for U.S. sanctions requirements when it failed to ascertain the U.S. sanctions requirements applicable to its business operations, relying instead upon a third party’s oral assurances that Decolar’s conduct did not require an OFAC license. With the exercise of appropriate due diligence, Decolar’s senior
management reasonably should have been aware of the applicable prohibitions under the CACR. Based upon the number of apparent violations and the length of time over which they occurred, the apparent violations also appear to have resulted from a pattern or practice of conduct

So, you’re no doubt wondering where OFAC gets the right to fine a company based in Argentina for violating the U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Simple. Even though the company was based in Argentina, it was incorporated in Delaware. This was probably the most expensive incorporation in Delaware ever.

One thing that  is odd about the OFAC release is its coy reference to the “third party” that told Decolar that it had nothing to worry about. My guess, particularly due to OFAC’s reluctance to identify this party, is that it was likely a lawyer. Saying that relying on a lawyer is “reckless” is harsh, even by OFAC standards, but it seems that if this mysteriously anonymous third party had been, say, the company janitor, OFAC could not have resisted mentioning that. After all, that would indeed be reckless. And, of course, the company was even more reckless for not ignoring their legal counsel and doing the research themselves. You know, by looking at the Spanish version of the Cuba sanctions which OFAC keeps on its website. Oh wait, there isn’t a Spanish version.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)