Archive for May, 2008


May

17

Hacked!


Posted by at 12:41 pm on May 17, 2008
Category: General

The ScreamSome enterprising pornographer — from Sweden judging by my server logs — hacked the site sometime yesterday in an unsuccessful attempt to strew porno links everywhere. As a result the site was down last night and this morning.

We’ve updated WordPress to plug any security holes in WordPress that might have been exploited. The email notification function may be a little quirky since it doesn’t look like the one that I’m using is completely compatible with the new version of WordPress. We’ll try to get any issues on that worked out over the next several days

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

15

Florida Man Charged With “Brokering” His Own Defense Exports


Posted by at 4:47 pm on May 15, 2008
Category: Criminal PenaltiesPart 129

38 caliber jacketed soft point ammunitionThis recently unsealed criminal complaint against a Florida man shows that the FBI agents and the federal prosecutors haven’t a clue as to the correct reading of the definition of a “broker” in Part 129 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the “ITAR”). In fact, it appears that the prosecutors and investigators have charged the defendant as an unlicensed broker merely because he had begun to negotiate for the export of a shipment of ammunition before getting the export license. If that’s a criminal offense, there are certainly lots of people who better get their affairs in order and contact a criminal defense attorney.

The defendant, Lance Brooks, had been awaiting sentencing after pleading guilty to the unauthorized export of defense services arising out of a trip he made to the UAE to train customers in the use of a grenade launcher. While Brooks was awaiting sentencing, the FBI obtained a warrant to search a DHL package to Brooks from the Firearms Coastal Security Branch in Jamaica. Inside the package was an End Use Certificate (DSP-83) from Jamaica’s Ministry of National Security pertaining to 270,000 rounds of jacketed soft point ammunition, most of it .38 caliber.

The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force contacted the Jamaican government to obtain further details about the transaction. According to the Jamaican government, Brooks had bid in response to a government proposal to purchase the ammunition, had won that bid, had faxed an invoice for the ammunition to the government, provided banking information for payment for the ammunition, and requested and received an End User Certificate (DSP-83) from the Jamaican government for the ammunition. The FBI inquired with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) to determine if Brooks had a license to export the ammunition. When it learned that Brooks had not yet applied for the license, it charged him with engaging in unlicensed brokering activities without first having registered as a broker with DDTC.

Significantly there is no evidence alleged in the complaint that Brooks had attempted to export the ammunition without a license or that he had no intention of applying for the license. Indeed, his request that the Jamaican Government execute and send to him the End User Certificate (DSP-83) — a document that had to be obtained before a license could be granted — suggested that Brooks had every intention of obtaining a license prior to export. Lacking any evidence of an attempted export or a conspiracy to export, it would appear that the FBI and prosecutors cooked up the brokering charge.

The definition of “broker” in section 129.2 of the ITAR doesn’t cover Brooks’s activities with respect to the contemplated sale of ammunition to the Jamaican government. The key part of that definition is that a broker is someone who acts “as an agent for others” in arranging for the sale of defense articles “in return for a fee.” The allegations of the criminal complaint do not provide any evidence that Brooks was acting for anyone other than himself in arranging this contract or that he was going to receive any fee from that other person. Instead, it appears that Brooks was engaged in a transaction on his own behalf and expected a sales profit on the deal rather than a third-party fee or commission.

If what Brooks did — namely, negotiating a contract for a defense article prior to receiving an export license — is brokering, than almost every exporter will be subject to criminal penalties if they haven’t registered as a broker. Worse, those exporters may need to obtain brokering licenses from DDTC before even talking to potential customers with respect to transactions that fall within the brokerage licensing requirements of section 129.6.

Exporters that had such a poor understanding of the ITAR as these federal enforcement officials would likely be fined or worse when their misunderstandings led to rule violations; no such negative consequences, however, await these enforcement officials who appear not to have even a rudimentary understanding of Part 129 or the definition of a “broker” under that Part. One can only hope that Brooks’s public defender reads Part 129 with slightly more care and gets these charges dismissed.

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May

14

Weatherford in Cuba


Posted by at 9:35 pm on May 14, 2008
Category: Cuba SanctionsSudan

Weatherford SignAn article in today’s CNN Money contains some interesting tidbits about Weatherford’s operations in sanctioned countries, which we first reported here, and which have been the subject of a governmental investigation.

First, the article notes that Weatherford’s divestment of its operations in Sudan allowed it to donate its many assets in Sudan to Thirst No More, an organization seeking to drill water wells in Sudan.

Among the most valuable items it received was Weatherford’s Nissan truck, which hauled oil-drilling equipment in Sudan, and which will now pull water rigs and pipes in parched Darfur. And most of the furniture and office equipment from Weatherford’s Khartoum villa will be shipped to the Thirst No More base in North Darfur’s capital El Fasher.

All though such a donation is not a traditional basis for mitigation of penalties owing as a result of doing business in sanctioned countries, I certainly hope that it might be so considered here, assuming that there is any basis for penalizing Weatherford’s operations in Sudan through a foreign subsidiary.

Second, the article points to a SEC Form 8-K, filed last September, where Weatherford said it was discontinuing its business through its foreign subsidiaries in “Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria.” The reference to Cuba more or less jumps off the page of Weatherford’s 8-K and certainly explains the most serious problem Weatherford may have with respect to the governmental investigation of its operations in sanctioned countries.

The reporter who wrote the CNN article missed the significance of this revelation, apparently under the mistaken impression that there’s a loophole that permits U.S. companies to operate in embargoed countries through their foreign subsidiaries:

The company used a loophole in U.S. sanctions laws – used also until recently by Halliburton … in Iran – which allows U.S. companies to operate in embargoed countries, so long as no U.S. citizens are involved, and it operates under a foreign subsidiary.

This exception applies only to operations in countries sanctioned under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, like Iran and Sudan, for example, but not to operations in countries sanctioned under the Trading With The Enemy Act, like Cuba and North Korea. Operations by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in those two countries is a violation of the Trading with the Enemy Act and can give rise to civil and criminal penalties. Once Weatherford admitted it was doing business in Cuba, it had, as they say, a situation on its hands.

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May

13

Is There A Secret United States Munitions List?


Posted by at 5:54 pm on May 13, 2008
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTC

Leupold Rifle ScopeA magistrate hearing pretrial motions in the criminal export case against Doli Syarief Pulungan wondered in a recently issued Report and Recommendation1 whether there might be a secret version of the USML which lists actual items rather than categories of items. Of course it’s impossible for me to say whether or not there is a “secret” list of that sort with any certainty, since if I knew about it, it wouldn’t be so secret. I don’t think such a list exists, however, but I do think its useful to see what caused the magistrate to wonder about such a list.

As we reported in an earlier post, Pulungan is charged with conspiring to export 100 Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T Rifle Scopes to Indonesia without a license. One of Pulungan’s pretrial motions was for a bill of particulars describing “the specifications to which the subject riflescopes were manufactured that make them defense articles on the Munitions List.” According to the magistrate’s report:

The government’s initial response is that its expert will testify at trial that Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T Riflescopes are on the Munitions List. Pulungan rejoins with an obvious observation: the list itself does not specify any brand or model of riflescope, nor does it list the specifications that would make the scopes defense articles; so what relevant testimony could this ostensible expert possibly provide? Pulungan wants a breakout of the implied syllogism: a riflescope that possesses characteristics x, y and z is deemed to be manufactured to military specifications; a Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T Riflescope possesses characteristics x, y and z; therefore, a Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T Riflescope is manufactured to military specifications. What, asks Pulungan, are x, y and z?

Of course the answer to that question is hardly a deep, dark secret. Leupold’s web site reveals that the scope was designed for the M16. Rather than saying this, however, the prosecution tried to be cute, and that’s where the trouble begins. The magistrate continues:

The government responds that it doesn’t work this way. There is no x, y or z factor that lands a riflescope on the Munitions List in Category I(f). The only logical way to interpret the government’s response is that there is another list, prepared by the DDTC, which determines whether any particular item is a defense article included on the Munitions List as part of ITAR.

The magistrate goes on to note that the government in its pleading says that an item “is designated as a ‘defense article’ on the United States Munitions List” or “defined by the ITAR as a ‘defense article’ covered by Category I(f)”:

If I am interpreting Count 1’s passive-voice declaration and the government’s explanation correctly, then some person or committee within the DDTC has declared that the Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T Riflescope is a “defense article” because it fits within Category I(f) of the Munitions list. But this doesn’t answer Pulungan’s actual complaint: how did it get there? Where, precisely, might a potential exporter actually find this ITAR designation of the Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T Riflescope? What is the foundational basis for the testimony of the government’s trial witness from the DDTC? Does the DDTC have some other real list by make and model? Is there a memo specific to the Leupold scope’s I(f) designation? If so, where is it and why hasn’t it been provided to Pulungan as pretrial discovery?

Following this logic to its end, the Magistrate ordered the prosecution to provide the who, how and why of the designation:

[T]he government promptly must explain in detail who designated the Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T Riflescope a “defense article,” how they did it (the procedural mechanisms) and why they did it (the actual and specific reasons for the designation).

To which we can anticipate the government will respond: nobody designated the Mark 4, there was no procedure that designated it, and no specific reasons were given. The scope is a USML item because it was manufactured to be used on the M16.

You can easily see how the government’s loose language got it into this silly predicament. Items aren’t on the USML; just categories are on the USML and items are either in a USML category or not. The Mark 4 scope isn’t designated on the USML. “Riflescopes manufactured to military specifications” are designated category I(f) on the USML and the Mark 4 either is or isn’t a “riflescope manufactured to military specifications.”

And the issue before the court is not the designation of milspec rifle scopes as category I(f), a designation which is not reviewable under section 38(h) of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h), but simply whether the Mark 4 is or is not a “riflescope manufactured to military specifications.”

It is only a semantic distinction to note that the category not the scope itself is on the USML, but failing to observe that distinction clearly resulted in the magistrate issuing an order that he might not have otherwise issued.


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May

9

Man Bites Dog? (Part 2)


Posted by at 12:26 pm on May 9, 2008
Category: Iran Sanctions

Poor PoochMr. Sasan Azodi, mentioned in yesterday’s post, called me just a few minutes ago to give me his side of the dispute between him and Dräger Safety as to who was at fault for the export of the VisioWave security monitoring software to Iran. As you may recall, I questioned why he would be buying the expensive software for Dräger in the first place.

According to Mr. Azodi, the project managers at Dräger for the Irasco security system claimed that they had been blind-sided by the new requirement that the security system would be tested at Dräger’s facilities in Germany. They alleged that they would get in trouble with the company if they now had to buy a second copy of the software for testing in Germany after already having told Irasco it would have to procure the software on its own for the final system. The factory acceptance testing would now require two copies of the software and, according to Azodi, the managers said that they hadn’t factored that into their planning for the project.

I’m guessing that Mr. Azodi’s commission on successful completion of the Irasco project must have been significant if he was willing to dig so deeply into his own pocket to make sure that the project was a success. Yet even if people at Dräger swore a hundred times on their geliebten Mütter’s honor that they would never, ever export the software from Germany to Iran, surely one might have been a bit credulous in the circumstances involved that they could resist the temptation to ship the software to Tehran and be done with it. Even so, Mr. Azodi says he has that promise in writing and that should at least count for something.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)