Archive for December, 2006


Dec

11

Fallout from Finmeccanica Acquisition of BAE Avionics


Posted by at 10:17 pm on December 11, 2006
Category: DDTC

Finmeccanica AdvertisementIn April 2005, Finmeccanica acquired BAE Systems Avionics, Ltd. which it renamed SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems Limited. A notice posted on December 7 on the DDTC website reveals that DDTC’s Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (“DTCC”) is not entirely happy with how this acquisition was handled:

The Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (DTCC) conducted an extensive review of issues relating to the BAE Systems plc sale to Finmeccanica SpA of a majority interest in the stock in BAE Systems Avionics Limited, since renamed SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems Limited. As a result of that review, DTCC has received written acknowledgement from BAE Systems that it did not request prior authorization from the Department of State for the sale of stock in SELEX to Finmeccanica. BAE understands that this authorization should have been obtained to address those Department of State licenses and agreements (active and expired) to which BAE Systems Avionics was a party.

You may be scratching your head and wondering where does the ITAR require prior authorization of a merger or acquisition? Section 122.4 of the ITAR requires 60-day advance written notice to DDTC if there is a transfer of control of a registrant to a foreign person, but that’s not a requirement of prior approval.

Or is it? The regulation notes that the purpose for this notification is to provide DDTC “with the information necessary to determine whether the authority of section 38(g)(6) of the Arms Export Control Act . . . should be invoked.” And section 38(g)(6) provides DDTC with the authority to require a license “before any item on the United States Munitions List is sold or otherwise transferred to the control or possession of a foreign person.”

So, although this isn’t technically a prior approval requirement, it is quite close to one. Since BAE Avionics no doubt owned items on the USML at the time of the purchase of its stock by Finmeccanica, DDTC had the right to require a license and approval for the sale. And since apparently BAE and Finmeccanica must not have filed the section 122.4 notice, DDTC never had an opportunity to invoke its discretion to require a license. DDTC seems a bit miffed about this, but not sufficiently miffed to, say, consider a penalty. Perhaps Finmeccanica’s participation in the construction of the new Marine One helicopters for the White House had something to do with DDTC’s disinterest in any enforcement action for noncompliance with section 122.4.

The other interesting part of the Finmeccanica/BAE notice is this:

New Licenses Required: Valid State Department authorizations must be replaced by new licenses reflecting the new ownership structure. Requests for new licenses must be submitted to the Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing. Note that the transaction involves a change in ownership of an approved party and therefore a DSP-119 (amendment form) cannot be used.

The ITAR provides no guidance on the procedure to be followed with licenses after or merger or acquisition. The SIA Handbook on Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures, which was a cooperative effort between DDTC, the defense export industry and a number of export lawyers (including myself), tried to fill that gap. Various officials of DDTC reviewed and participated in the writing of the MAD Handbook, which was quite clear that a DSP-119 was to be used to amend licenses to reflect a change in ownership of the licensed company. That apparently has now changed, meaning that a new license, rather than a DSP-119 license amendment, must be filed for change of ownership.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

7

DDTC Gets Snippy With Exporters


Posted by at 12:16 pm on December 7, 2006
Category: DDTC

Returned Without ActionIn an announcement posted yesterday on its website, DDTC chides exporters for a recent increase in “low-quality” applications and says that it will no longer help exporters correct errors in applications but will simply return them without action. If true, this will be the final triumph of form over substance at the agency.

Many applications involve exports to our allies in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as to private contractors providing security services for our troops in both countries. These exports are crucial to the safety of our troops, the outcome of the conflicts in both countries, and the security of the nation. DDTC now says than an application will simply be “returned without action” if there is a discrepancy between “the value on the license application . . . [and] the value on the purchase order.” With the safety of our troops and national security at issue here, to do this without affording the applicant an opportunity to correct the minor discrepancy is nothing short of a scandal.

Further, when an agency finds a decrease in the quality of submissions, perhaps it should look inward to discern the cause rather than reflexively blaming the submitters. Has the agency provided adequate resources for the education of submitters? Are the agency’s rules and application forms clear? Are licensing officers available to assist applicants with respect to questions that they might have prior to submission of applications? We certainly know that, since the DDTC shut down the phone lines to its licensing officers, the answer to the last question is no.

Finally, DDTC singles out problems in “incomplete and deficient” registration applications. It is likely that many of these are now registration applications filed by foreign brokers as a result of DDTC’s widely criticized decision to expand the scope of its jurisdiction to include foreign sales representatives with no contacts with the U.S. other than their dealings with the exporter. For almost all of these brokers, English is not their first language. The registration form (DS-2032) and the instructions, and the accompanying guidance document and “Helpful Hints” are not models of clarity, particularly for someone whose grasp of English may be limited.

Question 7, for example, requires the broker to provide a social security number even though the overseas broker will not have one and will have no idea what is meant by this requirement. Question 8 asks for the foreign broker to list “U.S. Munitions Articles Manufactured and/or Exported and Defense Services Provided” along with requisite USML category numbers. The foreign broker will have no idea whether his brokering services are a “defense service” or what category they should be placed in. Question 12 refers the foreign broker to a complicated provision of the ITAR to determine if it is owned by a foreign person, a question which may be uniquely confusing to an individual (as opposed to corporate) foreign registrant. The Guidelines issued by the DDTC have a “Registration Checklist” which still requires the foreign broker to submit evidence of qualification to do business in the United States even though the regulations have been updated to permit the foreign broker to submit its foreign business license instead. The “Sample Transmittal Letter” in that same guidance document still requires the foreign broker to certify that it is not a foreign person, even though the registering foreign broker necessarily is foreign.

This is all a prescription for disaster that guarantees deficient registration applications from foreign registrants. It seems to me the fault here may well rest with the failure of DDTC to take the time to do its own job properly, not with a foreign broker who fails to understand this confusing morass.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

6

Daewoo Head Indicted for Illegal Exports


Posted by at 3:40 pm on December 6, 2006
Category: Arms ExportWassenaar

Lee Tae Yong at Myanmar Ministry of DefenseLt-Gen Khin Nyunt receiving visiting President of Daewoo International Corporation Mr Lee Tae Yong and party at the Myanmar Ministry of Defence

According to a news item in today’s Korea Times, Lee Tae Yong, the President of Daewoo International, was indicted by South Korea for illegal exports of military items to Myanmar (Burma). The indictment of the Daewoo chief was one of a group of multiple indictments which included indictments of seven companies and fourteen officials from those companies.

The indictment alleged the export of production facilities and weapons technology to Myanmar in violation of the law on exports of strategic goods. According to the prosecutor for the case, the companies had “made contracts with Myanmar to export plant facilities, machines and technology information which can be used to make various cannon weapons.” Apparently before the companies and officials were collared by Korean authorities, 90 percent of the weapons-making facilities had been completed and 90 percent of contract funds had been dispensed to the Korean companies.

South Korea is part of the Wassenaar Arrangement pursuant to which it is committed to restrict exports of military and dual-use items.

The South Korean authorities could have obtained their first hints of the illegal exports of Daewoo through a simple Internet search. On February 6, 2002, Mr. Lee visited the Myanmar Ministry of Defense. His visit was captured by Myanmar Television, and a picture (shown above) and a report of that visit were printed in The New Light of Myanmar, the official newspaper of the Myanmar government. That New Light news story and photograph were then made available on the government’s website. Next time Mr. Lee attempts to become an international arms dealer for sanctioned regimes, he might want to make his official visits to his customers a little more surreptitiously.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

5

OFAC Gives Two Thumbs Down to Oliver Stone Film


Posted by at 9:46 am on December 5, 2006
Category: OFAC

Fidel Castro and Oliver Stone in 2002Tucked away in the penalty notices released by OFAC last week was this typically terse and unhelpful entry:

IXTLAN Corporation and Four Individuals Settle Cuban Embargo Allegations: IXTLAN Corporation, Santa Monica, California (“IXTLAN”), and four individuals have agreed to a settlement for $6,322.20 to resolve allegations of violations of the Cuban embargo occurring between February 2002 and May 2003. OFAC alleged that IXTLAN and four individuals dealt in services in which the government of Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest incident to the making of a documentary film. This matter was not voluntarily disclosed to OFAC.

Film buffs (and only a few others) will immediately recognize IXTLAN Corporation as film-maker Oliver Stone’s production company. Stone aficionados (and probably no one else other than a few Cuba crusaders at OFAC) will probably also realize that the documentary involved was Comandante — Stone’s ill-fated 2003 homage to El Presidente Castro. A slated showing on HBO was cancelled by the network, and the film was never commercially released in the United States.

Figuring out what exactly Stone (presumably one of the four unnamed individuals) and IXTLAN were whacked for is not quite so easy. The penalty notice charged Stone and company with dealing “in services in which the government of Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest incident to the making of a documentary film.” If Stone went to Cuba without a general or specific license from OFAC, the violation should have simply been categorized as a travel violation. If he had a specific license or was covered under a general license (as a journalist perhaps), then he would have been permitted to obtain necessary and incidental services from Cuba or Cuban nationals.

Any speculation you have on what was going on here is welcome in the comments section. And saying that Comandante (the film or the dictator) is a stinker doesn’t count.

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Dec

4

Shake, Rattle and Roll


Posted by at 4:55 pm on December 4, 2006
Category: BIS

10, 9, 8, 7 . . .I was going to title this post “Exporter Temporarily Loses Export Privileges for Having Copy of the EAR in Its Offices.” However, after the uproar that a similar title (“BIS Fines Exporter for Filing Voluntary Disclosure“) created at BIS, I thought that a more anodyne title would be appropriate. The actual post title “Shake, Rattle and Roll” is a reference to the core business of Data Physics Corporation, a company which provides vibration testing equipment and which is in hot water with BIS for shipping that test equipment to the PRC.

BIS released today on its website an order, dated November 17, which renewed a previous temporary order denying export privileges against Data Physics based on its export of test shakers (and related equipment) to two end-users in the PRC in violation of section 744.3 of the EAR. Section 744.3 prohibits unlicensed exports to companies that are engaged in missile proliferation and that are located in countries, such as China, which are listed in the D:4 Country group set forth in Supplement 1 to part 740 of the EAR. Data Physics objected to the renewal of the denial order and a hearing was held. As a result, we have considerably more information than usual in the Order about the facts that led to the renewal of the temporary denial order.

Two exports of test shakers and related equipment were at issue. The first was an export of a vector vibration controller in September 2005 to Shanghai Xinyue Instrument Factory in the PRC. Shanghai Xinyue Instrument Factory is not on the Entity List. BIS contended that the export violated section 744.3 of the EAR because Data Physics knew that Shanghai Xinyue was engaged in the development of missile technology. BIS relied on an email that Data Physics received in 2002 from a BIS Special Agent in Charge and that identified Shanghai Xinyue as involved in missile proliferation.

When Data Physics responded that the email was three years before the export, BIS responded with evidence that investigators executing a search warrant had found a copy of part 744 in Data Physics offices. (Hence, what almost became the title of this post). BIS also noted that a manager for Data Physics attend a training session of part 744 where he would have learned, among other things, to do an internet search on proposed end-users. This latter argument is significant because the first result of a Google search on “Shanghai Xinyue Instrument Factory” is a page that clearly identifies Shanghai Xinyue as involved in missile development.

Although exporters should always do such Internet searches on end-users, the standard of section 744.3 is that the exporter knew that the end user in China was involved in missile proliferation, not that it “should have known” of such involvement. Frankly, BIS’s evidence here appears flimsy. Fortunately for BIS, and not so fortunately for Data Physics, the evidence on the second export is on much firmer ground.

The second export involved the shipment of a test shaker to China Hai Yang Electro-Mechanical Academy (a.k.a. “3rd Academy”). Here BIS produced evidence of internal emails instructing employees to use a false end-user name — 27th Locomotive — in place of 3rd Academy. That, of course, isn’t just a smoking gun, it’s a smoking locomotive, clearly suggesting that Data Physics was well aware of the missile proliferation concerns posed by a shipment to 3rd Academy.

One other point not raised by BIS but which seems significant to me. Companies that have pictures of rockets taking-off on their home page should pay careful attention to section 744.3 and know exactly what their customers are doing with exported items.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)