Archive for the ‘Iran Sanctions’ Category


May

30

I’d Like to Teach Iran to Sing


Posted by at 12:34 am on May 30, 2008
Category: Iran SanctionsSudan

Iranian Coca-ColaThis article in the International Herald Tribune explores the prevalence of American brand name products in Iran and Sudan notwithstanding sanctions that prohibit most exports to the two countries. As we’ve noted before, much of these products are re-exported from other countries, with large quantities of American products being exported from Dubai to Iran.

Two products that are ubiquitous in both countries make it through another route:

Leaving the airport at Khartoum, one of the first things you see is the ultimate symbol of American capitalism: the classic form of a Coca-Cola bottle printed on multicolored banners, next to a huge billboard for its rival, Pepsi.

Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have both secured export licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Treasury, using legislation that allows blacklisted states to buy U.S agricultural commodities, medicines and medical equipment.

Coca-Cola said the syrup on which the company’s beverages are based qualified as an agricultural product. Pepsi said that its brands were produced in Sudan under “an OFAC license,” but declined to comment on the Iranian arrangement.

Although Coke syrup doesn’t immediately seem to be an “agricultural product,” the list of eligible products is quite broad and includes a broad number of prepared food products, including coffee and tea extracts. Although soft-drink extracts aren’t explicitly mentioned, they probably fall under USHTS classification 2106.90 — “food preparations not elsewhere specified” — which is included on the list of agricultural products covered under the Trade Sanctions Reform Act which permits agricultural exports to sanctioned countries.

Interestingly Coca-Cola relies on an OFAC license for agricultural products rather than the exemption under OFAC regulations for Iran and Sudan which would permit activities in Iran and Sudan by foreign subsidiaries of Coca-Cola as long as no U.S. persons aren’t involved in the foreign subsidiaries activities in the sanctioned country. That is, I think, a smart move given the difficulty of proving that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies act without any involvement by U.S. persons.

Pepsi’s refusal to comment on how it dispenses Coke its soft drinks in Iran, suggests that it may be relying on the foreign subsidiary exception. As long as cola syrup is seen by OFAC as an agricultural product, it’s hard to see why Pepsi relies on the foreign subsidiary exception rather than simply getting an OFAC license to export the syrup to Iran for bottling.

Even if activities in Sudan and Iran might be legal under OFAC licenses, these activities might be magnets for public criticism, particularly in Sudan. Coke seems to have cleverly sidestepped even this issue:

A Coca-Cola spokesman, Dana Bolden, said the primary motive for operating in Sudan and Iran was “to ensure quality control and protect our trademarks with the independent bottler.”
… Bolden also said the company was reinvesting all the proceeds from its sales in Sudan into programs that benefit the country. “We have committed more than $5 million over the next three years for programs aimed at building communities in Sudan.”

This, of course, doesn’t respond to the issue that Coke products in Iran might provide just the caffeine boost that its nuclear scientists need to build the bomb. Word is, however, that the average Iranian nuclear scientist prefers Austria’s Red Bull energy drink to Coca-Cola.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

28

An American in Rio


Posted by at 8:35 pm on May 28, 2008
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Ipanema BeachNelson S. Galgoul, the Brazilian distributor for software company Engineering Dynamics, who sold the company’s software to customers in Iran was sentenced to 13 months in jail, a fine of $100,000 and a forfeiture of $109,291 for violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Iranian Transaction Regulations. We’ve previously posted on this case here, here and here.

Two things are of particular interest about this sentence. First, how did Mr. Galgoul, a Brazilian distributor, wind up in U.S. jail for violation of the U.S. embargo against Iran. An Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) press release suggested that Mr. Galgoul was an American living in Rio, so that serves as a pretty solid basis for criminal jurisdiction. Certainly its a much better basis than the oft-asserted basis that the exported product was a U.S.-origin item.

But even if the U.S. courts had jurisdiction over Mr. Galgoul, they have to get their hands on him. The extradition treaty between Brazil doesn’t provide for extradition in the case of violation of U.S. export laws. Furthermore under the dual criminality principal embodies in Article III, even if it did, extradition wouldn’t be possible unless exports to Iran were a violation of Brazilian law, which they are not. Mr. Galgoul was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which could only occur on U.S. soil, so obviously he came to the U.S. voluntarily, although the possibility can’t be dismissed that ICE and the FBI said that they just wanted to “talk” to him. I can imagine that he sure wishes he stayed home now.

Second, the DOJ apparently aware that 13 months might seem harsh for selling software to Iran, larded its press release with a whopper:

According to court documents, Galgoul is the director of SUPORTE, a Brazilian consulting engineering firm which acted as an agent for Engineering Dynamics, Inc. (EDI), a Kenner, Louisiana engineering company that designed, produced, marketed, and supported Structural Analytical Computer Software (SACS), an engineering software program intended to assist in the design of offshore oil and gas structures. Due to the product’s sophistication and its potential use, SACS is a controlled product under various United States laws and regulations.

The cite to “various” laws should be the first indication that something is amiss. Computer assisted design (“CAD”) software for offshore oil and gas rigs isn’t controlled under any laws due to its “sophistication and its potential use,” much less “various” laws. The Commerce Control List covers CAD software for the design of semiconductors under ECCN 3D003. Software for the design of nuclear power plants is probably covered under ECCN 0D001. But the CAD software here seems to be EAR99 and only controlled for destinations such as Iran because it is a U.S.-origin product.

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May

9

Man Bites Dog? (Part 2)


Posted by at 12:26 pm on May 9, 2008
Category: Iran Sanctions

Poor PoochMr. Sasan Azodi, mentioned in yesterday’s post, called me just a few minutes ago to give me his side of the dispute between him and Dräger Safety as to who was at fault for the export of the VisioWave security monitoring software to Iran. As you may recall, I questioned why he would be buying the expensive software for Dräger in the first place.

According to Mr. Azodi, the project managers at Dräger for the Irasco security system claimed that they had been blind-sided by the new requirement that the security system would be tested at Dräger’s facilities in Germany. They alleged that they would get in trouble with the company if they now had to buy a second copy of the software for testing in Germany after already having told Irasco it would have to procure the software on its own for the final system. The factory acceptance testing would now require two copies of the software and, according to Azodi, the managers said that they hadn’t factored that into their planning for the project.

I’m guessing that Mr. Azodi’s commission on successful completion of the Irasco project must have been significant if he was willing to dig so deeply into his own pocket to make sure that the project was a success. Yet even if people at Dräger swore a hundred times on their geliebten Mütter’s honor that they would never, ever export the software from Germany to Iran, surely one might have been a bit credulous in the circumstances involved that they could resist the temptation to ship the software to Tehran and be done with it. Even so, Mr. Azodi says he has that promise in writing and that should at least count for something.

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May

8

Man Bites Dog?


Posted by at 8:32 pm on May 8, 2008
Category: Iran Sanctions

Dräger SafetyWhen companies wind up with products in Iran, they usually claim that they were hoodwinked by their overseas sales reps or agents. In a case involving the German security firm Dräger Safety, the situation appears reversed. According to this article in Deutsche Welle, Dräger’s agent is claiming that he was hoodwinked by the company.

Dräger had been contracted by Italian-based Irasco to build and deliver a security system for an Iranian pipeline. The security system used GE Security’s VisioWave monitoring software. Initially Dräger, apparently concerned the the U.S embargo on exports to Iran, told Irasco that it would have to obtain and install the software on its own and install the software itself in Iran. Irasco made some unsuccessful efforts to obtain the software and then, allegedly, demanded a full test of the system at Dräger’s facility in Lübeck, Germany.

Dräger then tasked Sasan Azodi, its intermediary with Irasco, to obtain the software and ship it to Lübeck. Oddly enough, what happens in Lübeck, doesn’t stay in Lübeck and, for reasons that Dräger can’t fully explain, the software miraculously wound up in Irasco’s hands in Iran. Sometime thereafter, Dräger filed a voluntary disclosure with U.S. government authorities revealing the problem.

Now let the finger-pointing begin. Azodi has this to say:

Azodi acknowledges that he arranged for the delivery of the software, via the US, to Luebeck, but claims he only sent it for test purposes. Upon learning that the software had been delivered to Iran, Azodi said, “that’s when I realized I had probably been conned.”

Dräger, for its part, apparently is trying to blame everything on Azodi and has refused to pay Azodi for the software, which costs approximately $125,000. Azodi has filed lawsuits, in both the United States and Europe, seeking the money that he claims is owed for the software and seeking recovery of the damages caused to his business by the allegation that he violated the Iranian embargo.

Of course, one has to wonder why Azodi didn’t see red flags all over the field when Dräger asked Azodi to purchase and export the expensive GE software to Germany. Why couldn’t Dräger do that itself? Why would it ask its Iranian intermediary to ship the software from the U.S. to Germany?

It should be interesting to see how this plays out. Pass the popcorn, as they say.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

30

Engineering Dynamics Agrees to $132,791.39 Penalty for Sales to Iran


Posted by at 5:46 pm on April 30, 2008
Category: BISIran Sanctions

Iranian Offshore Oil RigThe Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) released yesterday a Settlement Agreement with Engineering Dynamics, Inc., a Louisiana-based company that writes and distributes computer-assisted design software used for the design of oil and gas drilling platforms and rigs. Under the Settlement Agreement, Engineering Dynamics admitted to a one-count charge that it had conspired with an individual in Brazil who would sell the company’s software to customers in Iran. Engineering Dynamics agreed to pay $132,791.39.

As we reported in a prior post, two officers of Engineering Dynamics are currently subject to criminal charges in connection with the same sales of the software to Iran. A copy of the criminal information filed against them can be found here, and it provides considerably more information on what happened than the BIS Settlement Agreement and related materials.

Upon my initial review of the criminal information, I expressed some skepticism in my earlier post that the two individual defendants — and, by extension, the company — should be held liable for the actions of their “distributor” in Brazil. Upon re-reading the criminal information, it seems to me that there is ample evidence here to support a conspiracy charge, at least if the facts alleged in the information are true.

To begin with, the company’s Brazilian distributor was really more a commissioned agent than a distributor, and that is significant. If a U.S. company sells its products to a distributor, who then resells those products without the U.S. company’s knowledge to a proscribed destination, it may be difficult to prove that the U.S. company was aware of the resale. However, in this case the Brazilian agent was paid a commission and then directly remitted the funds back to Engineering Dynamics. Additionally, the criminal information alleges a number of instances of communications between the U.S. company and the Brazilian agent about the customers in Iran.

This is also the second reported case subject to the new $250,000 penalty provision. Interestingly, BIS charged only one violation of the rules — a conspiracy count — even though multiple counts could have been charged for the various shipments to Iran through Brazil. Various BIS officials have said that under the new penalty scheme they will be less likely to pile on counts, and this provides some confirmation of that.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)