Archive for the ‘Criminal Penalties’ Category


Jul

25

U.S. Extradites Russian From Lithuania on Export Charges over Russian Objections


Posted by at 6:01 pm on July 25, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesExtradition

By Iulius at en.wikipedia (Transferred from en.wikipedia) [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], from Wikimedia Commons http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4e/Vilnius_view.jpgYesterday the Russian Foreign Ministry pitched a fit over a Lithuanian court decision permitting the United States to extradite a Russian citizen alleged to have broken U.S. export laws. The case involves Dmitry Ustinov, a 46-year-old Russian, who is alleged to have caused the unlicensed export of “hundreds of thousands” of military items from the United States.

Ustinov was nabbed during a trip he made to Vilnius to meet with a buyer interested in purchasing military night vision. Chances are quite good, of course, that the buyer was a U.S. agent. Since the U.S. and Russia do not have an extradition treaty (see, e.g., Edward Snowden), the U.S. would have had to lure Ustinov out of Russia to a friendly state. It doesn’t hurt that Lithuanians generally do not have warm and fuzzy feelings about their former Russian/Soviet overlords.

The Russian Foreign Ministry’s beef was that the U.S. extradition of Ustinov

“brusquely ignores the corresponding legal procedure,” including a 1999 treaty in which Russia and the United States promised to cooperate on criminal cases

That reference to the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between Russia and the United States is a bit puzzling. Like other MLATs, the treaty provides that the parties shall assist each other in the investigation of criminal activity that constitute crimes in both states. Assuming that the unlicensed night vision exports were crimes in Russia, the type of cooperation envisaged by the treaty involves the production of documents, the seizure of the proceeds of criminal activitiy, the identification and location of persons and things, and the execution of search and seizure requests. Nothing in the treaty, by any stretch of the imagination, requires one party to obtain the consent or cooperation of the other in the extradition of their citizens from third countries.

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Jul

18

Crime and Punishment and Punishment and Punishment


Posted by at 9:56 pm on July 18, 2013
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

MicroPilot AutopilotFour years ago, this blog reported on the case of Harold and Nina Hanson, a Maryland couple accused of exporting autopilot devices to China without a license. The Hansons ultimately pleaded to felony false statement charges in connection with statements they made to BIS investigators. Nina was sentenced to 105 days in jail and one year of supervised release. Harold was sentenced to two years of supervised release. Both were required to attend an export training class conducted by BIS, which some wags will suggest was the severest punishment meted out to the Hansons.

Of course, criminal sentencing is never the end of the matter with federal regulators normally hanging around the doors of the jail to pile on more punishments when the defendants are ultimately released. And the same thing has happened here with BIS announcing two days ago that it was imposing a 15-year export denial order on Nina and Harold Hanson to settle charges that they made false statements to BIS investigators. Am I the only one who sees the irony in ordering the Hansons to go to export training school and then ordering them not to export anything for fifteen years? It seems not too far removed from forcing a convicted killer to go to anger management classes before executing him.

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Jun

17

FCPA Totally Useful As a Secondary Sanctions Program


Posted by at 6:14 pm on June 17, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDoJEconomic SanctionsFCPAIran SanctionsOECDSEC

Total Gas Station in France http://www.total.com/MEDIAS/MEDIAS_INFOS/1564/FR/station-service-morinvilliers-France-media.jpg [Fair Use]

The U.S. Department of Justice recently announced that Total, S.A., the French oil and gas company, agreed to pay $245.2 million to resolve charges that it paid bribes to an Iranian government official by way of purported consulting agreements from 1995 to 2004 in order to secure, among other things, oil and gas rights in Iran. The Justice Department described the case against Total as “the first coordinated action by French and U.S. law enforcement in a major bribery case.” The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission also reached a settlement with Total pursuant to which Total agreed to pay $153 million to resolve related FCPA allegations.

There is a lot to be said about Total’s settlement. At almost $400 million combined, Total’s payments are in the pantheon of largest payments ever for FCPA matters, along with Siemens, KBR and BAE. Another interesting component to the Total case, however, is its potential effectiveness for economic sanctions enforcement vis-à-vis Iran.

In the past few weeks, Congress and the White House have been busy expanding U.S. economic sanctions against foreign persons for their dealings with Iran. We reported recently on the current House bill that would expand sanctions against foreign banks engaging in certain transactions with Iranian banks. The President last week issued an executive order expanding secondary sanctions against, for example, foreign banks’ rial-based transactions as well as certain dealings by anyone with most persons on the SDN List pursuant to sanctions against Iran.

These secondary sanctions, however, provide U.S. enforcement authorities with a great deal of discretion on if and when to designate foreign persons to the SDN List. Pushing the bounds of secondary sanctions beyond those against foreign persons with substantial ties to the Iranian government, of course, runs the risk of offending other countries who continue to permit their companies to do business with Iran.

Given these limitations, the FCPA would appear to be an effective tool the United States can use in applying pressure against foreign persons doing business with Iran. Although the FCPA carries its own extraterritorial criticisms, corruption is a global issue that many countries have committed itself to address whether by national law or membership to groups like the OECD.

While the United States differs with other countries on precisely what sanctions policies to adopt against Iran, Sudan, Syria or North Korea for current conflict or human rights concerns in those countries, there would seem to be a common allegiance to combat corruption there. It just so happens all four countries are among the most corrupt countries in the world as annually ranked by Transparency International. The Total case at least sends the message to foreign companies that business as usual in Iran can result in significant FCPA penalties and possible cooperation from authorities in the companies’ home countries in bringing them about.

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Jun

4

Nice Work If You Can Get It


Posted by at 8:26 pm on June 4, 2013
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

Toray Carbon Fiber http://brooknewmaterial.com/english/proshow.asp?articleid=609 [Fair Use]Lisong Ma, a Chinese national, pleaded guilty last week to charges that he attempted to export carbon fiber from the United States without a license. Carbon fiber meeting certain technical qualifications is classified as ECCN 1C010 and would require a license from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) before it could be exported to China. Reading the DOJ press release announcing the plea suggests that the defendant was either incredibly stupid or that something else was going on.

According to the DOJ account, the defendant contacted an undercover agent online and inquired into the purchase of a large amount of Toray T800 carbon fiber. What is strange is that the defendant actually came to the United States to close the deal. And, of course, the rest is history.

But what make this strange is that the Toray carbon fiber is made in Japan and appears to be readily available in China. Either the defendant was just dumber than the carbon fiber he was trying to buy or, possibly, the agents proposed an incredibly attractive price to lure him into the United States. Admittedly the failure to recognize a price “too good to be true,” if that is what happened here, is probably also a form of stupidity

As is typical with press releases of this kind, the government agencies involved spare no effort to pat themselves on the back for nabbing this dangerous criminal through “covert cyber operations.” Although “covert cyber operations” sounds intriguing, what it means, ultimately, is having a bunch of federal agents surf the net and hang out at alibaba.com looking for exporters to nab by dangling sweet deals in front of them. As they say (or sing sometimes): nice work if you can get it.

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May

23

Honey Dumping Case Dumped After ICE Flunks Test


Posted by at 11:51 pm on May 23, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesCustomsICE

Med u saću by akarlovic http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Med_u_sacu_karlovic1.jpg [CC-BY-SA 3.0]In November 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement breathlessly announced that it had broken a honey dumping scheme and had indicted three Chinese nationals for trying to avoid dumping duties on Chinese honey by importing mislabeled Chinese honey as rice fructose. In its press release, ICE patted itself on the back for its good work in protecting domestic honey producers and expressed outrage that these miscreant importers had deprived the United States of more than $1,150,000 in anti-dumping duties.

“HSI agents and CBP officers working together at our nation’s ports of entry provide an important safeguard against those seeking to break the law for their own enrichment,” said Susan McCormick, ICE HSI special agent in charge in Tampa. “This type of criminal behavior poses serious dumping risks to domestic U.S. honey producers who are in danger of being run out of the market because of this fraud.”

And then last month, the Assistant U.S. Attorney filed a motion with the court requesting leave to dismiss its case against the defendants, cryptically stating that “newly discovered evidence makes it unlikely that the government will be able to prove” its case, a motion that the judge promptly granted. And today we learned what that newly discovered evidence was and why ICE was hiding in the corner hoping that no one would notice.

According to a press release issued today by the attorney for one of the defendants, the government had sent a sample for testing to an independent laboratory in Germany after the court had ruled that the test results from the Customs lab in Savannah allegedly proving that the imports were honey were unreliable and inadmissible. Those independent test results proved what the defendants had been claiming all along: they were importing rice fructose, not honey.

Oddly, there has been no press release from ICE on this development in the case.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)