Author Archive


Jan

13

California Man Sentenced to Three Years for Export Violations


Posted by at 6:14 pm on January 13, 2014
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTCITAR

Philip He Family Photo via http://news.yahoo.com/special-report-china-39-weapon-snatchers-penetrating-u-150652962.html [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Philip Chaohui He


Last February, this blog reported on the indictment of Philip Chaohui He, who had been indicted on charges that he attempted to export to China $549,654 worth of ITAR-controlled, radiation hardened, space qualified memory chips to China without the required export license. On December 19, Mr. He, who had entered a guilty plea to the charges, was sentenced to three years in prison.

Since our original post, several interesting details have emerged with respect to Mr. He and his attempted export to China. The first relates to the potential involvement of the Chinese government in these exports. The San Francisco Chronicle tells an interesting story as to the ship on which He tried to load the memory chips. The ship was owned by ZPMC, a Chinese state-owned enterprise that was fabricating steel towers for the San Francisco Bay Bridge renovation, a project on which Mr. He was working as an engineer. Mr. He told Jim Yang an employee of ZPMC that one of their employees had left behind in San Francisco a package of personal effects and that he would like to return the package to the employee via a ZPMC ship that was soon departing from the port in Long Beach, California.

Yang said he wondered why He would want to drive seven hours to make the delivery, but he had replied, “Fine.”

“So he drove down by himself with a couple of boxes in his vehicle,” Yang said. “And we had dinner together because he was doing us a favor.”

The next morning, Yang said, He followed him in his car to the Port of Long Beach, where they entered the ZPMC dock site using Yang’s security badge.

Mr. He was immediately arrested on the dock. Yang denies that he knew what was in the package or that ZPMC was in cahoots with He. The red flag here is not just the one flying over Beijing. Why was He driving seven hours with a package of personal effects as a favor to a ZPMC employee he met on the Bay Bridge Project? He couldn’t figure out any other easier way to return the box? Then Yang uses his badge and let’s He on the dock with a package of completely unknown contents that could have been a dirty bomb for all Yang knew. Uh huh. Sure. And if you believe that I’ve got a Bay Bridge to sell you.

The second detail relates to the participation of the memory chip manufacturer, Aeroflex, in the apprehension of Mr. He. We speculated in the original post that He’s large order of stuff he had little demonstrated need for set off alarm bells in Aeroflex and that they set the law on him. This lengthy investigative report on the case by Reuters confirms that this was the case.

People and companies who buy these kinds of rad-chips are usually well-established, repeat customers – more multinational corporation than mom & pop. Aeroflex salesmen had never heard of “Philip Hope” or his company, “Sierra Electronic Instruments.”

Most suspicious of all, just days after placing the order, Hope sent Aeroflex a certified check for the full amount, $549,654. That was rare. Buyers were expected to make a deposit, but nobody paid up front.

Of course, being alert to red flags and lending a helping hand to the government did not result in any expression of gratitude from the Government which, not long after, fined Aeroflex $8 million for export violations that Aeroflex voluntarily disclosed to the Government. My guess is that in the future Aeroflex will simply decline to make sales like this one that are suspicious and won’t feel particularly motivated to pick up the phone and tell the feds about it.

Permalink Comments Off on California Man Sentenced to Three Years for Export Violations

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jan

9

Be Careful What You Post on Facebook


Posted by at 6:58 pm on January 9, 2014
Category: BISIran Sanctions

Pouya Airlines IL 76 at Antalya Airport via https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.546519808709147.135602.240207326007065&type=1 [Fair Use]We’ve all heard the story of exuberant youngsters who find their career hopes dashed because they posted on Facebook pictures of themselves half-clothed and glassy-eyed with a margarita in one hand and a bong in the other. It’s a cautionary tale, for sure, and has certainly meant that many people have realized that they perhaps should confine pictures of their latest bacchanalian orgy to a more discrete mode of distribution among friends than Facebook. If you wouldn’t send it to your grandmother, don’t post it on your Facebook page, right?

So, you’re wondering, what does this have to do with export law? Well, believe it or not, it relates to a possible explanation of a recent temporary denial order issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) on January 3 against 3K Aviation and others related to the planned export on January 7 of U.S.-origin aircraft engines by 3K from Turkey to Iran via the Iranian cargo carrier Pouya Airline. Many people have expressed surprise that a TDO would be issued that forbade all export related activity by 3K rather than an order forbidding the export of the engines at issue given that the order was issued before the export at issue had even taken place. Typically, as in the Mahan Air case, the TDO is issued after the forbidden export has occurred and prohibits all export-related activity during the effective period of the TDO.

On 3K’s Facebook page, you can (still) find a photo gallery titled “IL 76 Engine Loading” and dated December 27. 2012, long before the TDO. The IL 76 is the Ilyushin cargo aircraft operated by Pouya Airlines. Here is a screen capture of the Facebook page showing the Pouya IL 76 sitting at the Antalya Airport in Turkey. And here is a screen capture from the page of the happy pilots in the IL 76 about to carry their engines back to Iran. (You can easily find images of the IL 76 cockpit on-line if you want to verify that this is an IL 76 cockpit.) In other words, the planned January 7 shipment of U.S aircraft engines to Iran was possibly not the first time that 3K had exported U.S. items to Iran.

For its part, 3K is saying that it’s now planning to ship the engines back to the seller in Germany. Of course, under the denial order they can’t export the engines back to Germany without BIS authorization. And here’s a Catch-22: under the TDO they can’t even store the engines without violating the order.  Whatever 3K does, it will violate the order.

Permalink Comments Off on Be Careful What You Post on Facebook

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jan

8

The Never-Ending Balkan Wars Continue in Court


Posted by at 6:51 pm on January 8, 2014
Category: Balkan SanctionsOFACSDN List

Ante Gotovina http://rudebutgood.blogspot.com/2012/11/ante-gotovina.html [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Ante Gotovina from Croatian
Propaganda Poster


Ante Gotovina, who is currently designated on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, filed suit on Monday in federal court in the District of Columbia seeking his removal from that list. Gotovina is a Croatian military officer widely believed to have been implicated in war crimes committed during Operation Storm which involved the “ethnic cleansing” of Serbs from certain territories by the Croatian Army.

Gotovina was added to the SDN list by Executive Order 13304 in 2003. That order designated a number of individuals involved in the Balkan conflicts that arose upon the dissolution of Yugolavia, including all parties who were “under open indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,” which Gotovina was at the time.

Gotovina’s complaint is premised upon the 3-2 decision of the Appeals Panel of the ICTY in November 2012 overturning Gotovina’s earlier conviction for war crimes by the ICTY in April 2011. Since he is no longer under indictment by the ICTY, Gotovina claims that he should be removed from the list and alleges that OFAC has refused to respond to his request for removal.

Not surprisingly, Gotovina glosses over the reason for the Appeals Panel decision and argues that it is a complete exoneration of claims that he was a war criminal. In fact, the Appeals Panel decision was more procedural than substantive, setting aside the ICTY decision based on its finding that the “200 meter rule” used by the ICTY was arbitrary. The 200-meter rule excluded arguments that shelling targeted military rather than civilian targets when the shells fell more than 200 meters from legitimate military targets. According to the Appeals Panel, there was no evidence to support 200 meters as a measure rather than, say, 220 meters or 180 meters. As such, the Appeals Panel overturned the decision entirely.

Of course, OFAC is not bound by the Appeals Panel decision and is free to determine on its own whether Gotovina is a war criminal or not. Executive Order 13304 not only permits sanctioning ICTY indictees but also covers persons determined by Treasury “to have committed … acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of … diminishing the stability or security of any area or state in the Western Balkans region.” Treasury could still believe it has evidence that Gotovina committed war crimes and that these crimes threatened stability in the Western Balkans even if the Appeals Panel even if the Appeals Panel had affirmatively decided that Gotovina hadn’t committed war crimes (rather than more narrowly deciding that the 200 meter rule was flawed.) In that regard, there is no reason OFAC cannot, in its discretion, believe that the 2 dissenters on the Appeals Panel are more credible as to Gotovina’s participation in war crimes than were their majority colleagues.

Permalink Comments (4)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Dec

23

How the OFAC Stole Christmas


Posted by at 1:07 pm on December 23, 2013
Category: OFAC

Santa Flanked by F-16

A spokesman for the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) told Export Law Blog this morning that discussions between OFAC and the North Pole over Santa Claus’s Christmas Eve itinerary had once again broken down and were not expected to be resumed before Santa’s scheduled departure on December 24 at 10 pm EST.

The dispute arose from a dilemma that the U.S. sanctions against Cuba posed for Santa’s planned delivery of toys to children in Cuba. If Santa delivers toys for U.S. children first, there will be toys destined for Cuba in the sleigh in violation of 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(b). That rule prohibits Santa’s sleigh from entering the United States with “goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest.” On the other hand, if Santa delivers the toys to Cuban children first, then 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(a) prohibits the sleigh from entering the United States and “unloading freight for a period of 180 days from the date the vessel departed from a port or place in Cuba.”

A press release from the North Pole announced that the OFAC rules left Santa no choice but to bypass the children of the United States this Christmas. A spokesman from OFAC warned that if Santa attempted to overfly the United States, his sleigh would be forced to land and his cargo seized. He continued:

We know that the outcome is harsh, but we cannot allow the Cuban regime to continue to be propped up by Santa’s annual delivery of valuable Christmas toys to Cuban children.

Congressional leaders did not return our calls.


This post is an annual tradition and appeared previously in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 in slightly altered form. Export Law Blog would like to take the opportunity of this post to extend its best holiday wishes to all of its readers. Posting will be light between now and the end of the holidays.

Permalink Comments (3)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Dec

18

Name That Country!


Posted by at 6:31 pm on December 18, 2013
Category: BISDoJSanctionsSyria

Dell HQ http://www.dell.com/downloads/global/corporate/imagebank/hq/hq_rr1.jpg [Fair Use]The Securities and Exchange Commission just released on Monday, according to this article, correspondence that it had with Dell regarding an on-going  investigation by Dell, the DOJ, and the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) regarding sales of Dell computers to Syria.  These sales were made by a Dell distributor based in the U.A.E. In that correspondence, Dell indicated that it was conducting an internal investigation with outside counsel into sales by one of its Dubai-based distributors, was regularly communicating with the U.S. Attorney regarding that investigation, and had responded to a BIS subpoena requesting information about the sales in question. The company said that the investigation was not yet complete so that the company could not yet respond to the SEC’s questions as to whether Dell had any liability under U.S. export and sanctions law arising from the distributor’s sales to Syria.

The company, however, did try to suggest that it might not be liable because of a clause it cited in its distribution agreement:

Distributor acknowledges that Products licensed or sold hereunder or in respect of which services (including Dell Branded Services) are provided, which may include software, technical data and technology, are subject to the export control laws and regulations of the USA, the European Union, the Territory in which Distributor operates and the territory from which they were supplied, and that Distributor will abide by such laws and regulations. Distributor confirms that it will not export, re-export or trans-ship the Products, directly or indirectly, … to … any countries that are subject to the USA’s or those other relevant territories’ export restrictions or any national thereof … .

To paraphrase someone else, I guess you go to war with the language you have — that is to say, this language is hardly ideal. It relies on the distributor to know what countries are subject to U.S. export restrictions. Do you really think that a distributor in the U.A.E. is aware of the details of U.S. sanctions programs or even which countries are on the current U.S. bad country list? Probably not.

I certainly do not mean to imply that Dell has criminal or civil liability because of this drafting issue. Rather, my point only is that companies should be explicit in these clauses about which countries are subject to sanctions and to affirmatively advise distributors in writing when those countries change. Don’t count on your distributor to know who the U.S. has sanctioned anymore than you would count on him to know the name of last year’s winner of American Idol.

Permalink Comments (2)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)