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Jun

26

How Not To Smuggle Guns To Nigeria


Posted by at 8:38 pm on June 26, 2014
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

Mugshot of Sheriff Olaleran Mohammed [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Sheriff Mohammed


A federal jury in Minnesota, on June 16, convicted a naturalized U.S. citizen on charges that he illegally exported guns to Nigeria without a license. At issue were eight handguns that Sheriff Olaleran Mohammed stuffed into brown paper bag and placed between the seats of a 1998 Mercury that was being shipped via a cargo ship container to Nigeria. Spanish police discovered the guns when the ship called in Valencia, Spain, on its way to Lagos.

The trial brief filed by Mr. Mohammed’s lawyers before the jury trial gives a pretty clear idea why he was ultimately convicted. First, the brief tries to rely on the exemption in section 123.17(c) of the ITAR for temporary exports of not more than three nonautomatic weapons for personal use. Since there were eight guns in the paper bag in the Mercury, I guess the idea here was that the defendant could invoke the exemption three times to cover his eight guns, or something like that.

The other argument forwarded by the defendant’s trial brief on the export charge is that Mr. Mohammed had no idea whatsoever that it was illegal to export firearms for personal use to Nigeria without a license. Which is, of course, why he stuffed them in a paper bag and hid them in a 1998 Mercury he was sending to Nigeria.

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Jun

24

It’s Good To Be The King


Posted by at 11:15 pm on June 24, 2014
Category: DDTCITARUSML

Intersil Low Dose Irradiator via http://www.intersil.com/en/applications/rad-hard/eldrs.html [Fair Use]Last week the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) announced that it had fined Intersil Corporation, a California-based manufacturer and developer of semiconductors and integrated circuits, $10,000,000 of which $6,000,000 goes to Uncle Sam and the remaining $4,000,000 goes to Intersil’s compliance program and remedial measures. Along with the fines, DDTC has required Intersil to jump through a number of now-typical compliance and re-education hoops, including appointing an ombudsman, hiring a special compliance officer, rewriting its compliance programs, engaging in audits, making frequent reports to DDTC and writing “I will not violate the ITAR” three million times on a blackboard after school. Well, of course, only the last item was not actually required.

According to the Proposed Charging Letter, Intersil incurred the ire of DDTC by classifying certain of its products as ECCN 3A001.a.1, 3A001.a.2, and EAR99 even though the items were radiation hardened and space qualified and, therefore, covered instead by USML Category XV(e). Why Intersil made this mistake is not revealed in the documents but since Intersil was applying for BIS licenses for the goods when required, it is hard to imagine that it was anything other than a good faith mistake (which is, probably, the reason why this information is omitted.) As a result, there were 3,152 unauthorized exports of Intersil’s products, although, due to the statute of limitations, only 339 exports were actually charged, with DDTC swearing left and right that although it couldn’t help mentioning the 3,152 exports it was paying absolutely no attention whatsoever to those in formulating the $10 million penalty.

But here is the most interesting part of the charging documents:

Several of the unauthorized exports were subsequently re-exported or retransferred without authorization due in part to the misclassification of the ICs.On August 20, 2010, a DDTC official misinformed Intersil that for any ICs that “HAVE already been exported under EAR jurisdiction, these [ICs] ARE NOT retroactively subject to the retransfer provisions of 22 CFR 123.9.: Intersil was further misadvised that Intersil did not need to inform its foreign customers to submit ITAR re-export authorization for these items and that this “decision to not retroactively aply USML controls for these already exported [ICs] will continue to be applicable even if a future formal CJ determination asserts USML controls apply.”

Interestingly, notwithstanding this bad advice, Intersil is charged with causing various unauthorized re-exports from, and retransfers in, foreign countries due to its misclassification of the integrated circuits. Whether or not any of these were the result, at least in part, of DDTC’s admittedly bad advice that the retransfer provisions would not apply to items exported under the EAR is not clear, but let’s give DDTC the benefit of the doubt and assume that these were all unrelated.

Even so, there is still an interesting moral to this story. Exporters who make mistakes have to pay large fines and engage in burdensome remediation activities. DDTC officials who make mistakes have to do, er, well, nothing at all because, well, you know, mistakes happen. As they say, it’s good to be the king.

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Jun

20

New Russia/Ukraine Designations (June 20, 2014)


Posted by at 11:10 am on June 20, 2014
Category: Russia Designations

OFAC just announced new Russia/Ukraine additions to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List:

BOLOTOV, Valery (a.k.a. BOLOTOV, Valeri; a.k.a. BOLOTOV, Valeriy); DOB 1970; alt. DOB 1971 (individual) [UKRAINE].

GIRKIN, Igor Vsevolodovich (a.k.a. STRELKOV, Igor Ivanovich; a.k.a. STRELKOV, Ihor; a.k.a. STRELOK, Igor), Shenkurskiy Passage (Proyezd), House 8-6, Apartment 136, Moscow, Russia; DOB 17 Dec 1970; citizen Russia; Passport 4506460961 (individual) [UKRAINE].

KAUROV, Valery Vladimirovich (a.k.a. KAUROV, Valerii Volodymyrovych; a.k.a. KAUROV, Valeriy; a.k.a. KAUROV, Valery); DOB 02 Apr 1956; POB Odessa, Ukraine (individual) [UKRAINE].

MENYAILO, Sergei Ivanovich (a.k.a. MENYAILO, Sergei; a.k.a. MENYAILO, Sergey); DOB 22 Aug 1960; POB Alagir, North Ossetia, Russia; Acting Governor of Sevastopol (individual) [UKRAINE].

PONOMARYOV, Vyacheslav (a.k.a. PONOMAREV, Vyacheslav; a.k.a. PONOMARYOV, Vachislav); DOB 02 May 1965 (individual) [UKRAINE].

PURGIN, Andrey Yevgenyevich (a.k.a. PURGIN, Andrei; a.k.a. PURGIN, Andrej; a.k.a. PURGIN, Andriy; a.k.a. PURGYN, Andriy; a.k.a. PURHIN, Andriy); DOB 26 Jan 1972 (individual) [UKRAINE].

PUSHILIN, Denis (a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denis; a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denis Volodymyrovych; a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denys); DOB 09 May 1981; POB Makeevka, Ukraine (individual) [UKRAINE].

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Jun

19

The Unverified List Rises Again


Posted by at 7:01 pm on June 19, 2014
Category: BISRussia SanctionsUnverified List

By Daderot (Own work) [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APatent_quote_-_United_States_Department_of_Commerce_-_DSC05103.JPGAs we reported back in January of this year, in a sort of Christmas amnesty, the Bureau of Industry and Security(“BIS”) freed all current prisoners on the Unverified List (“UVL”) and announced that it was building a bigger and more uncomfortable jail for the next set of UVL inmates. Under the rules of the new jail, all exports to parties on the UVL, regardless of the value of the export, would require an AES filing. If the export to the UVL party required a license, no license exceptions could be used. And, most importantly, UVL parties would have to sign a lengthy statement promising to obey the Export Administration Regulations, revealing the end use and end user of the item (including the address,  favorite ethnic food and Facebook password for each end user), committing to cooperate in all future end use checks and swearing on a religious book of choice that they would be home and in bed by 9:00 p.m. every night, no exceptions. (I exaggerate, of course, but the required statement is lengthy, contains most of the things I’ve listed and must be signed even if the U.S. exporter is planning to send a set of steak knives or other EAR99 item to the UVL party.)

On Monday, the gates of the new prison opened and 29 new UVL inmates were welcomed to the new and improved UVL correctional facility. I scanned the list and did not see any former entities on the UVL on this new list, although it’s possible I might have missed a few. The announcement of the new list does not reveal the particular crimes committed by each entity on the list but under BIS rules they would have had to have failed an end-use check in one way or other, either by not submitting to it, not being where they were supposed to be, or not being able to explain what happened to an item previously exported to them.

Five Russian companies were added to the UVL, and this was probably unconnected to recent sanctions on Russia over the Crimea and Ukraine issues. Given that BIS has suspended issuing licenses for Russia, being on the list may be somewhat more burdensome for the Russian parties.  Although licenses might in theory be available as a fall-back option to UVL parties outside Russia who could no longer use license exceptions, this fall-back option will not be available to the Russian entities on the UVL.

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Jun

16

It’s A Small World After All, Even For Economic Sanctions


Posted by and at 8:02 pm on June 16, 2014
Category: ChinaEconomic SanctionsEURussia SanctionsSanctionsSudan

It's A Small World by Darren Wittko https://www.flickr.com/photos/disneyworldsecets/2767829714/ CC BY 2.0 [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/] (cropped)G-7 countries recent meeting in Brussels understandably grabbed global headlines for their unified message that they “stand ready to intensify targeted sanctions and to implement significant additional restrictive measures to impose further costs on Russia should events so require.”

While sanctions imposed by G-7 countries, as well as the EU, drive the engine of global sanctions enforcement, there are almost 200 other countries in the world and many of them want to have their position on sanctions known.  Last week, for example, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić surprised no one on Earth (or anywhere else for that matter) when he told Serbian media, “It’s impossible to imagine Serbia imposing sanctions on Russia.”  Of course, Nikolić’s pronouncement is hardly going to cause the E.U. to rethink, even for a fraction of a nanosecond, its position on Russian sanctions.  On the other hand, the E.U. sanctions may cause Serbia, given that Russia is one of it’s largest trading partners, to rethink the wisdom of its application to become a member of the E.U.

Besting Serbia’s population by over a billion, China is emerging as a critical Russian ally and the most important country that is not imposing sanctions against it.  As with Serbia, economic self-interest and the volume of China’s trade with Russia may be at the heart of this.  In fact, reports on the recent $400 billion, 30-year deal for Gazprom to supply natural gas to China suggest the deal would be based on a ruble-yuan exchange and bypass Western financial systems altogether.

With developed countries like China and Serbia using economic self-interest to justify trading with Russia despite its shenanigans in Ukraine, some developing countries may be acting against their own economic self-interest in imposing sanctions to deal with regional conflicts.  Reuters reported this week, for example, that members of the Intergovernmental Agency for Development, an East African trade group made up of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, have threatened sanctions against South Sudan if warring factions do not cooperate to end conflict in that country.  The United States imposed sanctions in early May against military leaders involved in the conflict, but they likely will provide no meaningful impact.  However, when everyday trade with your neighboring countries starts to become restricted, sanctions are far more likely to achieve the goal of ending conflict.  If East African sanctions succeed against South Sudan while E.U and U.S. sanctions have no impact on Ukraine,  then we will certainly have a situation where it’s the mice that roar while the elephants squeak.

Sanctions news runs on the front page when it involves the United States and Europe but also on the back pages as it involves the rest of the world.  You have to read the whole paper to make sure you have the full story.

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(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)