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Sep

25

DDTC Chief: “D-Trade is De-Lovely”


Posted by at 5:02 pm on September 25, 2006
Category: DDTC

Robert MaggiIn response to industry complaints about increased processing times for license applications at DDTC, Robert Maggi, the Managing Director of DDTC, said last week to an industry group that D-Trade would soon make everything better:

Robert Maggi, DDTC chief, agreed with many of the complaints, and promised that improvement is at hand. A computer-based system called D-Trade should speed up and increase consistency in the licensing process, Maggi told an audience of defense company representatives and congressional staffers Sept. 22.

Although the D-Trade system has been in operation for more than two years, it is only gradually making a dent in DDTC’s workload, Maggi said.

By Christmas, D-Trade will have processed about 7,000 arms export license applications. That’s out of about 70,000 the directorate receives each year, he said.

The system has developed “way more slowly” than expected, Maggi conceded, but “I’m pretty optimistic” it will improve the licensing process.

Mr. Maggi admits that almost three years in D-Trade, only 10 percent of all license applications are filed through the system. This should be considered an admission that D-Trade, by any conceivable measure, is an abject failure. Rather than continuing to “happy-talk” the system and hope that things will improve, DDTC needs to try to figure out why the system doesn’t work and why 90% of applicants, when given the choice, file their licenses on the “dead tree” forms.

I know of at least one reason many applicants don’t use D-Trade: the digital signature requirement is burdensome and unwieldy. When the procedure for obtaining digital certificates is explained to potential applicants, I know a number who have opted instead to file paper forms with old-fashioned ink signatures. In case you don’t believe that the process of getting a certificate is cumbersome, take a look at this 15-page instruction sheet provided by one of DDTC’s approved vendors of digital certificates.

What makes this all the more baffling is that there is no need for a digital certificate to sign D-Trade applications. The digital certificate verifies that the signature on the electronic document is authentic, but DDTC has never required any proof of authenticity for signatures on paper licenses. If D-Trade applications could be signed by submitting a certification letter in pdf format, I suspect that more applicants would use the system.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

22

Al-Mashan’s Long Road to the BIS Denied Parties List


Posted by at 3:01 pm on September 22, 2006
Category: BIS

Uncooled Infrared CameraOn September 18, BIS entered an order against Mohammad al-Mashan and and order against the Mohammad al-Mashan Group denying both of them export privileges for ten years. The Mohammed al-Mashan Group is a Kuwait-based exporter of molds made from recycled plastics.

The denial arises from allegations that on two occasions al-Mashan and his company, both located in Kuwait, transferred an uncooled infrared camera to an individual in the U.A.E. in violation of the conditions of the BIS export license under which the camera had been shipped to al-Mashan and the al-Mashan Group. That license had a condition prohibiting re-transfer or export of the item without a further license from BIS.

The extended time line of this proceeding is interesting. The re-exports in question occurred in October 1999 and February 2000. The charging letter didn’t issue until October 25, 2004. A default judgment on the charging letter was not issued by the ALJ until August 30, 2006. The denial order was signed on September 18. As of today, however, BIS has yet to add al-Mashan and the al-Mashan Group to the Denied Parties list.

Some of the delay was consumed by the three unsuccessful attempts by BIS to mail the charging letter to al-Mashan in Kuwait. Still it seems that if al-Mashan were truly of significant concern to BIS the agency could have been more diligent.

The failure to add al-Mashan and the al-Mashan group to the Denied Party list is equally baffling. When OFAC announces a new SDN, that entity is usually added immediately to the SDN list. Given the BIS delay in adding parties to the Denied Parties list, exporters should probably also check the list of recent orders found in the BIS Electronic Reading Room as well as the Denied Parties list.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

21

Clarifying the Obvious


Posted by at 1:56 pm on September 21, 2006
Category: DDTC

Foggy BottomDDTC released today on its website a “clarification” of the off-shore procurement rules that had been requested during the April 21, 2006 meeting of DTAG. Under § 124.13 of the ITAR, DDTC can, by means of a license, authorize transfer of technical data to foreign persons for an offshore procurement of defense articles if the various conditions of that regulation are met. DTAG requested clarification as to whether a license applicant was required to submit with the DSP-5 the procurement contract with the foreign party.

The DDTC’s “clarification” of DTAG’s question simply cites subsection (d) of § 124.13, which clearly answers DTAG’s question. Under subsection (d) that contract is submitted “at the time that it is accepted” which would be normally after the DSP-5 is granted. Indeed, it is hard to see how the parties could enter into an overseas procurement agreement for a defense article without some disclosure of technical data relating to that defense article. Thus it seems obvious — at least to me — that the license needs to precede the procurement contract.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

20

Japan and Australia Sanction North Korea


Posted by at 4:52 pm on September 20, 2006
Category: U.N. Sanctions

North Korean Propaganda PosterJapan and Australia announced new sanctions today against North Korea. Under the new sanctions, Japan and Australia will block fund transfers to and from 11 North Korean companies deemed to be essential to the North Korea’s weapons program.

These actions were based on U.N. Resolution 1695 passed by the U.N. Security Council on July 15. The resolution, which condemned missile tests by North Korea on July 5, called on U.N. member states “to exercise vigilance and prevent . . . the transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes.”

Japan and Australia included the Swiss firm Kohas AG and its President Jakob Steiger in the newly-announced sanctions. Kohas was sanctioned by the United States in March of this year based on its procurement of weapons-related goods for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, a North Korean trading company sanctioned by the U.S. and included today in the new Japanese and Australia sanctions. Almost half of Kohas’s shares are owned by Korea Ryonbong.

In response to the sanctions imposed today on Kohas, a Swiss official responded: “Federal authorities are regularly in contact with this firm and have yet to find any evidence that the company violated Swiss exporting rules.” That is perhaps more a reflection of the fact that the Swiss aren’t looking very hard than it is evidence that no violations have occurred.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

19

Supermicro Pays the Price for Illegal Exports to Iran


Posted by at 3:48 pm on September 19, 2006
Category: BIS

MotherboardSupermicro, Inc., a computer hardware manufacturer based out of San Jose, California, pleaded guilty on Monday to a criminal export violation and agreed to pay a criminal penalty of $150,000. Supermicro admitted that on or about December 28, 2001, it shipped 300 motherboards, worth just under $30,000, to a company in the U.A.E. knowing that the motherboards would be immediately re-exported to Iran. At the time of the export, the motherboards were subject to National Security controls and required a license for export to Iran.

Previously, on September 7, Supermicro and BIS agreed to settle claims made by BIS in a charging letter alleging violations arising out of other exports by Supermicro that were destined to Iran. The charging letter lists exports by Supermicro of motherboards, superservers and computer chassis. Supermicro settled these allegations in the charging letter by an agreement to pay a civil penalty of $125,400.

Interestingly, the exported computer chassis referred to in the BIS charging letter are EAR99, i.e. not subject to a BIS license requirement. BIS premised the violations for the exports of the chassis on EAR § 746.7 which notes that OFAC authorization is required for shipments to Iran under the Iranian embargo. Failure to obtain that authorization for an EAR99 item was then viewed by BIS as a violation of EAR § 764.2(a).

UPDATE: Richard Pettler, a partner at Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy in San Francisco and counsel to Supermicro, contacted me to provide additional details that were not in the press accounts that I relied on. This post has been updated to reflect his comments.

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Copyright © 2006 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)