Author Archive


Jan

16

Tehran’s Tomcats


Posted by at 8:21 pm on January 16, 2007
Category: Arms Export

Iranian F-14 Sleeve PatchBack in the 1970s when the Shah was on his throne and Iran was our friend, the U.S. sold Iran a fleet of F-14 Tomcat fighter jets. Iran is still flying them and needs parts. In fact, F-14 parts were on the top of the list of the parts delivered to Iran as part of the Iran-Contra deal. So where is Iran getting parts today? From the Pentagon apparently.

Anyone familiar with the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) and its commercial partner Government Liquidation LLC will not find it surprising in the least that surplus F-14 parts sold by them are winding up in Iranian hands. All USML surplus parts are required to be sold with an End User Certificate that informs the buyer of export restrictions. Certain sensitive USML surplus parts are required to be demilitarized or “demilled” before sale. In more than a few instances the processing personnel at DRMS fail to do either.

According to an Associate Press story which hit the wires today, surplus F-14 Tomcat parts have been sold to middlemen acting on behalf of Iran:

In one case, convicted middlemen for Iran bought Tomcat parts from the Defense Department’s surplus division. Customs agents confiscated them and returned them to the Pentagon, which sold them again – customs evidence tags still attached – to another buyer, a suspected broker for Iran.

The AP report provides a number of other instances of military surplus winding up in the hands of the Iranians and the Chinese.

You may also wonder what happens if someone buys a surplus USML item that doesn’t have an EUC and then exports it. Well, the exporter could go to jail. The government can be mistaken about whether an item is USML; an exporter can’t.

(Hat tip to Kevin Wolf at Bryan Cave who pointed me to the AP story.)

Permalink Comments (1)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jan

15

NRC Loosens Libya Controls


Posted by at 12:39 pm on January 15, 2007
Category: NRC

General Qaddafi and his new American smoke detectorSix months after the State Department removed Libya from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission got around to changing its regulations to reflect this removal. In a Federal Register notice issued Friday the NRC amended its rules and changed Libya’s status from an “embargoed country” under 10 C.F.R. § 110.28 to a “restricted country” under 10 C.F.R. § 110.29.

The effect of that designation is that certain nuclear materials for which general export licenses are available under NRC rules may now be used to export those materials to Libya. For example, small quantities of americium-241 may now be exported to Libya under the general license provided in § 110.23.

Although exporting americium-241 sounds rather sinister, you should realize that small amounts of americium-241 are used in certain industrial applications such as equipment used to measure the rate of production of oil wells. Tiny amounts (less than 37 kBq) of americium-241 are also used in the ionization chambers of many residential and commercial smoke detectors. Ionization smoke detectors are, in fact, the principal use of americium-241.

People in Tripoli, however, shouldn’t expect to be getting American smoke detectors anytime soon. Under § 110.23 americium-241 can be exported under the general license to restricted countries such as Libya only when “contained in industrial process control equipment or petroleum exploration equipment.” I suppose we are still concerned that Qaddafi might dismantle a hundred million or so smoke detectors, extract the americium-241 and make a dirty bomb or two.

I suppose I should acknowledge that a terrorist cell that couldn’t shoot straight did try to make a dirty bomb from smoke detectors. A recently declassified intelligence report to Congress contained this statement:

British authorities announced the August 2004 arrest of members of an Islamic terrorist cell in the UK that may have attempted to produce an RDD [radiation dispersal device] using a radioactive isotope of americium taken from smoke detectors. The knowledge base and competence of this cell was low.

Uh, yeah. Do the math on how many smoke detectors it would take, at 37 kBq of americium-241 per smoke detector, to make a useful dirty bomb and saying that the competence of this cell was low is an understatement.

Permalink Comments (1)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jan

11

Ninth Circuit Overturns Jiang Conviction


Posted by at 7:45 pm on January 11, 2007
Category: BIS

Ouch!The Ninth Circuit Federal Court of Appeals in California yesterday overturned the conviction of Qing Chang Jiang, who had been convicted of making false statements to a BIS investigator in connection with an export investigation. In unusually harsh language, the Court criticized the investigator and the prosecution for seeking to prosecute Mr. Jiang based on ambiguous answers to poorly-phrased questions. “The consequences of imprecision,” said the appeals court, “in the language used to question a witness must be laid at the table of the questioner, not the questioned.”

Mr. Jiang entered into a contract with a Chinese company to ship them nine microwave amplifiers and applied for a BIS export license for them. Because the Chinese company shared the same address with a Chinese military organization, BIS opened an investigation to obtain further information concerning the proposed export. Before the license was granted, the manufacturer of the microwave amplifiers advised Jiang that no license was necessary for these exports, and Jiang exported four of the nine amplifiers to the Chinese end-user.

Thereafter, the Chinese company determined that the amplifiers did not meet specifications. It retained three of the amplifiers for another use, canceled its order for the nine amplifiers, and returned the fourth to Jiang. Jiang then sent back to the manufacturer the returned amplifier along with the other five amplifiers which Jiang had received in the interim but not yet exported.

Ultimately Jiang’s export license application was denied by BIS and a criminal action was instituted against Mr. Jiang for illegal export of the amplifiers. Almost two years later, a count was added to the indictment by alleging that Mr. Jiang had violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) when he told the BIS investigator that “that the product was returned to Narda [the manufacturer].” Jiang was acquitted by the trial court of the export violation but convicted of the false statement charge.

In overturning the trial court, the Ninth Circuit noted that Jiang’s response that “the product” was returned to the manufacturer could well have been a reference to his return of two-thirds of the amplifiers to the manufacturer. Further support was found for this interpretation from Jiang’s statement, in a second interview, that three amplifiers were shipped to China when he was asked whether any amplifiers had been shipped to China. The court also noted that Jiang’s command of the English language was limited.

As a result of these factors, the Court concluded as follows:

It does not escape our attention that the ambiguity could have been resolved easily had Spelce [the BIS investigator] simply asked whether any of the amplifiers had been shipped to China. In this vein, requiring agents to use a minimum “level of clarity and specificity is the appropriate remedy for imprecise questioning, not a [criminal] prosecution.

Although Jiang was ultimately acquitted, it was, no doubt, only after great personal expense, both financial and emotional. The lesson for exporters here is to remember that statements to BIS investigators, even if not “under oath,” can lead to criminal prosecution and possibly conviction. Worse, a prosecution can occur even where there is a significant dispute between BIS and the exporter over exactly what was said in the interview. Accordingly, when BIS knocks at your door, for any reason, you will certainly want your lawyer to participate in all meetings with BIS investigators.

Permalink Comments (9)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jan

10

Missing Link Found


Posted by at 11:21 pm on January 10, 2007
Category: BIS

BIS LogoOn Monday we complained about a broken link at the BIS website to its report of a settlement agreement entered into by Olympiad Line LLC, a Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier (“NVOCC”). The link had been broken for almost a month. Today the link was at last fixed, so we want to thank the diligent BIS employee who dropped by the site, saw our report, and fixed the link. In fact, we want to thank BIS for fixing the link even if we had nothing to do with it.

According to the fixed link, Olympiad was charged with exporting canning machinery to Iran without a license. As an NVOCC, Olympiad consolidated the shipment with cargo from other shippers and arranged for the consolidated shipment to be shipped by another carrier’s vessel. As a result of the shipment of the canning machinery to Iran, the Company agreed to a fine of $14,000.

The Company’s explanation for the illegal export was, well, a bit lame:

One of Olympiad’s co-owners informed BIS that he was aware of the embargo against Iran but that he forwarded the items anyway because the shipping company accepted the shipment.

I suppose this was a candid admission by the company of its erroneous assumption that if the ultimate shipping company accepted the cargo, the legality of the cargo’s destination was the other company’s problem.

Although only one export was involved, BIS claimed two separate violations, which explains why the agency sought a fine in excess of the $11,000 statutory limit. The first violation alleged was a violation of section 764.2(b) of the EAR by aiding and abetting the shipper in the illegal violation. The second violation alleged was a violation of section 764.2(e) by exporting with knowledge of the violation.

This piling on of violations on one export is somewhat arbitrary since BIS could also have charged, but did not charge, Olympiad with an illegal export in violation of 764.2(a), conspiracy in violation of section 764.2(c) and possession with intent to export in violation of 764.2(f), all from this one export. Call us literal-minded, but it seems to us that one export should simply be one violation.

Permalink Comments Off on Missing Link Found

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jan

9

All in a Name


Posted by at 4:54 pm on January 9, 2007
Category: OFAC

Bank SepahThe Treasury Department announced today the imposition of sanctions on Iran’s fifth-largest state-owned bank, Bank Sepah, because of its financial support of Iranian firms engaged in nuclear and missile proliferation. According to Treasury, Bank Sepah has been involved, among other things, in assisting Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) in arranging payments to North Korea for transfer of missile technology to Iran and in financing a sale of missile components from a Chinese firm to Iran.

Bank Sepah’s participation in these transactions shouldn’t be that surprising given its name. “Sepah” means “army” in Farsi making Bank Sepah, literally, the Army Bank.

Treasury’s action here against Bank Sepah is more saber-rattling than anything else. As a state-owned bank, Bank Sepah and its branches and subsidiaries are already subject to comprehensive restrictions on their dealings with U.S. persons and firms. The effect of the designation will be to restrict Bank Sepah from involvement in the few activities otherwise permissible to Iranian banks, e.g., involvement in non-commercial monetary remissions or the financing of licensed transactions.

In addition to designating Bank Sepah, the Treasury action also designated Ahmad Derakhshandeh, the bank’s managing director and chairman of the board. Why Mr. Derakshandeh was singled out for designation among the many officers and directors of the bank is not clear. Again the designation may be more symbolic than anything else, meaning simply that Mr. Derakshandeh will have to avoid staying in the Prince de Galles, the Intercontinental or any other American-owned hotel on his next trip Paris.

Permalink Comments (2)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)