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Feb

20

House Bill Targets Multinationals in Iran, Misses


Posted by at 4:31 pm on February 20, 2007
Category: Sanctions

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Reacts to New U.S. Sanction ProposalsLast week the House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously approved legislation that would expand the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Under the proposed legislation (H.R. 957), sanctions provided under the Iran Sanctions Act could also be imposed on U.S. companies based on business activities of their foreign subsidiaries in Iran.

The Iran Sanctions Act requires the President to impose sanctions on companies that make an investment of $40 million or more that “directly and significantly contributed to the enhancement of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources of Iran.” The sanctions that can be imposed on such a company include denial of export privileges, debarment from government contracting and prohibitions of loans to the sanctioned company from U.S. financial institutions.

The proposed legislation increases the scope of the Iran Sanctions Act by modifying the definition of person to include “foreign subsidiaries.” It also modifies the definition of petroleum resources to include “petroleum by-products [and] liquified natural gas” for purposes of the Act.

As is usually the case with unilateral sanctions proposals, very little thought was apparently given as to whether this bill would accomplish anything other than to make it easier for non-U.S. companies to invest in Iran. This lack of analysis extends even to the language of the provision which erroneously cites each of the provisions it is attempting to amend. The definition of “person” is in section 14(14) of the Act, not section 14(13) which H.R. 957 references. Similarly, the definition of “petroleum resources” is in section 14(15) of the Act, not in section 14(14) which H.R. 957 references.

Moreover, H.R. 957 inserts language in the wrong place in the Iran Sanctions Act. It states that “, petroleum by-products, liquified natural gas” should be inserted “after ‘petroleum’ the second place it appears” in the amended section. That would make the provision read as follows:

PETROLEUM RESOURCES.—The term ‘‘petroleum, petroleum by-products, liquified natural gas resources’’ includes petroleum and natural gas resources.

Oops. Clearly the bill’s drafter meant the third place petroleum appears rather than the second place.

That’s a lot of mistakes for a bill that is exactly one page and eighteen lines long.

This bill needs to go back to the drafting table, both for technical and substantive reasons.

UPDATE: As pointed out in the comments, the Iran Freedom Support Act, changed the numbering of the definitions section, so that the sections referenced in the proposed bill are in fact referenced by the correct section numbers. The bill’s placement of the phrase “petroleum by-products, liquified natural gas,” however, remains incorrect.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Feb

16

Spare Parting is Such Sweet Sorrow


Posted by at 6:44 pm on February 16, 2007
Category: BISDDTC

Spare PartsOne of the things that SCP Global Technologies got in trouble for according to the Settlement Agreement released today by BIS was shipping spare parts without a license that were not eligible for License Exception RPL. According to the charging letter, one set of spares was not eligible for License Exception RPL because “the items were maintained in a bonded warehouse in China rather than being exported as one-for-one replacements.” The other set of spare parts were not eligible because “the items were maintained in consignment at the customer’s site in Israel rather than being exported as one-for-one replacements.”

As is often the case, the BIS charging letter is far from a model of clarity. The parts might have been held in a bonded warehouse or on consignment as “one-for-one replacements.” What BIS means to say, even if unable to articulate it clearly, seems to be that the parts were not for “immediate repair” as required by section 740.10(a)(2) of license exception RPL. Additionally, holding the parts in a warehouse or at the customer’s site probably also ran afoul of section 740.10(a)(3)(ii) which provides: “No parts may be exported to be held abroad as spare parts or equipment for future use.”

I’ve always thought that License Exception RPL makes little sense from a policy perspective. If BIS finds no objection to exporting a dual use item to a particular end user, why should it inject itself again into the process each time the unit needs to be repaired. That certainly makes the U.S. item less competitive, particularly since it is often not practical to ship every conceivable spare part under the original license. If the item is subject to the CCL, a repair may take a month or more while a license for the spare part is being obtained.

DDTC’s rules on spare parts seem eminently more sensible. Under section 123.16(b)(2) of the ITAR, components or spare parts can be exported without a license in support of a defense article previously authorized for export as long as the value is under $500, the parts are going to the end user and not a distributor, and no more than 24 shipments are made per year to the end user. This doesn’t require an immediate use for the exported part but allows the exporter to ship parts that may be needed to repair or maintain the defense article — a much more commercially reasonable result.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Feb

15

Prison Address: Probably a Red Flag


Posted by at 8:29 pm on February 15, 2007
Category: BIS

Chain GangBIS will send you, if you ask, an email notifying you of updates to the BIS website. Today I received one of the odder of such notices:

In the matter of the denial order of Ihsan Elashi, et. al., the inmate numbers for the following related parties have been corrected: Bayan Elashi, Basman Elashi, and Hazim Elashi.

The Elashi brothers were put on the Denied Parties List after conviction for shipping computer equipment and other goods to Syria and Libya and, it seems, BIS gave them all the same inmate numbers:

Denied Parties List

The current list gives the three their own, and presumably correct, inmate numbers. BIS probably had little choice other than to spend our tax dollars fixing this error, but, frankly, it could have also saved the money. If you have a proposed exporter with an address at a federal correctional institution, it’s probably a good idea not to go forward with the transaction.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Feb

14

Chattanooga Boo-Boo


Posted by at 2:46 pm on February 14, 2007
Category: BISOFAC

Chattanooga Group's MagnacizerOFAC just released its monthly exercise in non-disclosure, recounting — in as little detail as possible — penalty actions undertaken by OFAC in the previous month. A Cuba vacationer, a guy who purchased a few Cuban stogies over the Internet, and four companies got whacked, among them the Chattanooga Group, a leading manufacturer of physical therapy equipment and a subsidiary of Encore Medical Corporation.

The OFAC penalty is the second act of Chattanooga’s run-in with BIS back in 2001. A disgruntled fired manager tipped off BIS about three exports in April 2000 worth approximately $7500 to Iran through Chattanooga’s office in Australia. The company ultimately settled the matter for $101,000. (Your guess is as good as mine as to how BIS came up with that figure).

After the settlement with BIS, an executive of parent company Encore offered some dangerously frank opinions about the settlement:

We agreed (to pay the fine) because it’s worth that much to eliminate a nuisance,” Mr. Henley said. “We make medical devices that are used for orthopedic rehabilitation. We certainly don’t make anything that is involved with what could be considered a weapon and we never knowingly shipped our products to Iran.

Mr. Henley also maintained that it was nearly impossible to prevent any of the company’s 6,000 independent distributors from improperly shipping goods to countries where exports are banned.

With that background, it is a little surprising that OFAC agreed to settle its part of the case for a mere $3,421.00.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Feb

13

OFAC Lassos El Paso


Posted by at 2:18 pm on February 13, 2007
Category: OFAC

Not El Paso's New LogoIn all the hubbub about the SEC fining El Paso for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act through bribes paid in connection with the Oil for Food program, there has been little mention that OFAC was also part of the hunting party that bagged El Paso. And an examination of the facts that led to El Paso’s settlement of the OFAC charges shows a violation premised on an extremely broad reading of the sanctions regimes administered by OFAC.

According to the settlement agreement:

From June 2001 until May 2002, EL PASO purchased Iraqi oil for which third-party intermediaries and/or allocation holders paid approximately $5.48 million in illegal surcharges to the former Government of Iraq.

Obviously unlicensed payments to Saddam Hussein’s government violated the Section 575.210 of the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations in place at the time. However, notice that there is no allegation that El Paso made those unlicensed payments, only that El Paso purchased oil from third-parties that had made such payments.

The settlement agreement attempts to link El Paso to the third-party payments as follows:

Other oil market participants and officials of the former Iraqi Government informed EL PASO that surcharges were being demanded on Iraqi oil allocations in the Oil-for-Food program. . . . Although EL PASO took steps designed to prevent the purchase of Iraqi oil from third parties on which illegal surcharges had been paid, such procedures proved inadequate.

For these third-party payments to Saddam’s government to give rise to liability by El Paso under the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations, they would need to be seen as a transaction which had the purpose or effect of evading the regulations or which facilitated the evasion of the regulations in violation of section 575.211 of the Iraqi Sanctions Regulations. Somehow it seems a stretch to assert that an ineffective program to prevent third-party payments to the Hussein government can be deemed an effort to evade the sanctions regulations. That argument might have had some force if El Paso knew of the payments and purchased the oil without making any effort to avoid purchasing oil on which such unlicensed payments had been made. But that was not the case.

It’s hard to see where this theory of liability ends. Does a company violate the SDN regulations if it purchases goods that the seller had bought from an SDN? What additional due diligence should a company conduct on its overseas vendors to assure that they are not violating any of OFAC’s sanctions regulations? After El Paso, the answers to these questions no longer seem very clear.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)