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Dec

11

Iranian “Supercomputer” Made with U.S. Parts


Posted by at 6:04 pm on December 11, 2007
Category: Iran Sanctions

Amirkabir University of TechnologyAccording to a piece published yesterday in Information Week, the Amirkabir University of Technology in Tehran announced that it had used 218 AMD microprocessors to build a supercomputer with a theoretical peak performance of 860 gigaflops. The fastest supercomputer in the world currently is ranked for 478 teraflops, more than 500 times faster than Amirkabir’s computer.

Of course, the point here isn’t the paltry performance of the Iranian kinda-supercomputer, but rather that such a computer could be built with U.S. components despite the U.S. sanctions on Iran. Obviously U.S. sanctions, despite their purported reach against re-exports, can’t always stanch the flow of mass-produced products to sanctioned countries.

AMD’s response was, not surprisingly, both predictable and believable:

AMD fully complies with all United States export control laws, and all authorized distributors of AMD products have contractually committed to AMD that they will do the same with respect to their sales and shipments of AMD products. Any shipment of AMD products to Iran by any authorized distributor of AMD would be a breach of the specific provisions of their contracts with AMD.

Lesson to be learned here: make sure all your contracts have a clause dealing with illegal exports. That way when you read in the newspaper that your product was found in Iran, you can say the same thing AMD did.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

7

California Man Sentenced to Two Years for Brokering Violations


Posted by at 12:18 am on December 7, 2007
Category: DDTCPart 129

Panther Thermal Imaging CameraOn December 3, Philip Cheng from Cupertino, California, was sentenced to a two-year prison term for his involvement in a scheme to export night vision equipment to China. Cheng, an export broker, had been involved in a transaction in which Night Vision Technology, a U.S. company, agreed to sell Panther thermal imaging cameras to two Chinese companies — North China Research Institute of Electro-Optics and the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation. As a result, Cheng was indicted in 2004 for illegal exports, illegal defense brokering activities and money laundering. After a hung jury, Cheng pleaded guilty to the brokering charges under 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(III) and 22 C.F.R. § 129.6.

The DOJ press release on the guilty plea concentrates on the Department’s proof that the night vision exports to China were illegal. But, of course, that doesn’t demonstrate why Cheng’s activities were violations of the requirements of Part 129 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) to obtain licenses or provide prior notification for certain brokering activities. The evidence seems clear that Cheng was involved in brokering under Part 129. But not all brokering activities require a license. Nor does brokering of illegal exports violate the brokering rules, even though such activity would support a conviction for conspiracy.

Section 129.7 of the ITAR sets forth those situations in which a broker must obtain a license. First, of course, the brokering must involve significant military equipment (“SME”), and it seems clear that the night vision in question was SME under the ITAR. Additionally, in order to require a license, a brokering transaction must meet one of four criteria: (1) the value of the transaction must exceed $1 million; (2) the same significant military equipment had not been license for export to the armed services of the country involved; (3) the agreement would require the manufacture of SME abroad; or (4) the items involved were being sold to non-governmental entities. Alternatively, prior notification might be required under section 129.8 for transactions involving SME valued at less than $1 million.

It seems likely that at least the notification requirement was breached. Arguably, the license requirement was also breached on the grounds that the Panther thermal imaging camera had never been licensed to the Chinese military. Even so, the DOJ press release on the conviction seems not to have understood that more than an illegal export is required to support a conviction for illegal brokering.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Dec

4

Freight Forwarders: Export Cops or Counselors?


Posted by at 6:24 pm on December 4, 2007
Category: BISOFAC

Proclad PipelinesThere has been some discussion here at Export Law Blog about the proper role of freight forwarding companies in export enforcement. If a customer of a freight forwarder proffers a package addressed to Iran without an OFAC license, should the freight forwarder decline the package and tell the customer that shipments to Iran must be licensed? Or should the freight forwarder accept the package and call the authorities? The recent settlement agreement entered into between Kuwaiti-owned Proclad International Pipelines and the Bureau of Industry and Security shows, I think, a freight forwarder that struck exactly the right balance.

At issue were attempted exports by Proclad of nickel alloy pipes classified as EAR99 to Iran without a license. The company attempted to export the pipes to Iran by transshipping them through the UAE. In the recitation of the various counts with which Proclad was charged is this interesting language:

Proclad altered markings for use on the crates of nickel alloy pipes that it was attempting to export to Iran. The altered markings were provided to the U.s. manufacturers in lieu of markings previously provided indicating that pipes were being exported to Iran. Proclad altered the markings to conceal the true ultimate destination of the items after it had been informed by a freight forwarder of the applicable licensing requirements during a previous attempt to export the pipes to Iran.

What apparently happened was that once the freight forwarder said the pipes couldn’t be shipped to Iran, Proclad simply slapped on new labels saying that the pipes were going to the UAE. I suspect the freight forwarder then called the authorities.

The freight forwarder did the right thing by initially telling the exporter that exports to Iran required licenses. Clearly any exporter that hands documents to the freight forwarder showing Iran as the ultimate destination is clueless about U.S. law. Proclad Pipelines is located in Scotland, so it’s a reasonable assumption that they may not have been familiar with U.S. export restrictions.

But what initially might be seen as an innocent mistake quickly became an illegal undertaking when Proclad decided that the appropriate response wasn’t to decline to export items to Iran but to pretend to export the Iranian-bound goods elsewhere. And a freight forwarder who saw that a package previously bound for Iran now had on shipping labels for the UAE would have to be well-aware that the exporter was attempting some shenanigans. And that, in my view, fully-justified the freight forwarder ratting out Proclad.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Nov

29

Legislation Introduced To Improve DDTC Processing Times


Posted by at 7:52 pm on November 29, 2007
Category: DDTC

Brad ShermanRepresentative Brad Sherman (D-CA) recently introduced, with one other Democrat and two Republicans, a bill to “improve the performance of the defense trade controls functions of the Department of State.” The proposed legislation is a clear response to mounting exporter frustration over increasing delays by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) in processing licenses and other export-related requests.

The centerpiece of the proposed legislation is the imposition of mandatory average processing times. For transactions not subject to Congressional notification requirements, for example, licenses to NATO members, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Israel must be processed, on average, within 20 days; 30 days for exports to major non-NATO allies; and 60 days to everyone else. Commodity jurisdiction requests would be required to be acted upon by DDCTwithin 60 days on average.

DDTC’s average processing times for Technical Assistance Agreements (“TAAs”) would need to be 120 days. It’s not clear why the proposed legislation would permit a significant delay in processing TAAs when license requests are put on such a short string. Further, the time limit doesn’t cover approving amendments to TAAs, even though the most significant delays currently being experienced are with respect to such amendments.

The proposed legislation would also significantly change the current provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) relating to exports of spare parts. Under the proposed changes, a DDTC license would not be required for exports of spare and replacement parts to NATO members, Australia, New Zealand and Japan in specified circumstances, including that the parts and components are one-for-one replacements for parts and components for an item previously exported pursuant to a DDTC license. Under section 123.16(b)(2) of the ITAR, components or spare parts can be exported without a license in support of a defense article previously authorized for export as long as the value is under $500, the parts are going to the end user and not a distributor, and no more than 24 shipments are made per year to the end user. If this proposal is adopted, spare parts can be exported even if their value exceeds $500 and more than 24 shipments are made per year.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Nov

28

SEC Seeks Comments on Disclosure of Corporate Activity in Terrorist States


Posted by at 5:57 pm on November 28, 2007
Category: General

SEC SealThe Securities and Exchange Commission released (on Black Friday of all days) a document requesting public comment on whether the SEC should develop mechanisms to facilitate greater access by investors and the public to corporate disclosures concerning that corporation’s activities in or with countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism. This request for comments is related to the ill-fated and short-lived web listing that the SEC’s Office of Global Security put up last July, and which we discussed here and here. That list purported to help identify companies that had been doing business in sanctioned countries such as Iran, Cuba, Sudan, North Korea and Syria.

The SEC document maintains an agnostic tenor on whether it will reinstitute the Office of Global Security’s list. Instead it asks for comment as to whether the public needs an enhanced tool for this purpose other than the existing mechanisms to search corporate filings with the SEC. The release further notes that the tool might not be useful without constant updating, a task that it states might unduly strain the SEC’s staff and resources. Finally, the SEC document suggests that the disclosure issue might best be handled by having corporate filers include searchable tags with their filings disclosing activities in sanctioned states.

One part of the SEC’s discussion of the Office of Global Security’s list is intriguing. The SEC states that the list was not simply a product of keyword searches but that these searches were further refined by staff analysis of the significance of the activity revealed by the search:

[The list] was not based on a simple keyword search of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system. The web tool was the result of a staff review of company disclosure including any reference to a State Sponsor of Terrorism. This disclosure review allowed the web tool to exclude disclosure unrelated to a company’s activities in or with any of these countries (e.g., generic references to a country; references to a State Sponsor of Terrorism in the context of an executive officer’s or director’s experience and educational background; or generic descriptions of risk associated with the possibility of war). It also permitted the web tool to exclude companies whose disclosures stated that they did not conduct business in or with State Sponsors of Terrorism.

But these filters were apparently narrowly applied. As we noted in our initial post on the SEC list, Cadbury Schweppes appeared on the list because it disclosed that it had divested its operations in Syria. Obviously, this meant that the the last filter was applied to exclude only companies that never conducted business in a sanctioned state and not those that at some prior time had done business with a sanctioned state.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)