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Mar

24

Fly The Friendly Blue Sky of Mahan


Posted by at 8:59 pm on March 24, 2008
Category: BISIran Sanctions

Blue Sky 747-400The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued a Temporary Denial Order on March 17, 2008, against Balli Group PLC and other related U.K. companies, the Armenian air carrier Blue Airways (a/k/a Blue Sky), and Iranian air carrier Mahan Air (which BIS erroneously calls “Mahan Airways”). The TDO arises out of the apparent lease (or sub-lease) of Boeing 747s to Mahan. These aircraft, which had once been in the United Airlines fleet, had been leased by Balli Group subsidiaries initially to Blue Airways and then sometime in 2006 had been leased by the Balli subsidiaries (or subleased by Blue Airways) to Mahan.

The TDO states that Balli had told BIS that the aircraft were not going to be leased or subleased to Mahan, although “open sources” showed that the aircraft, “identifiable by serial number and tail number were under the control of Mahan Air. The TDO also noted that Balli had refused to comply with an order to return the aircraft to the United States pursuant to section 758.8(b) of the Export Administration Regulations. (I can imagine the bemusement of the British companies when a U.S. agency demanded that they should return aircraft owned by them without compensation to the United States. I don’t think they said “no,” rather they probably said “not bloody likely.”)

Although the TDO doesn’t describe the “open sources” that it refers to, it appears that the arrival of the Blue Sky 747s in Tehran was first noted by Iranian “plane spotting” website www.iraviation.com, and then picked up on a large U.S. aviation-enthusiast forum www.airliners.net. The website www.airfleets.net also picked up the transfer of the aircraft. All this goes to show what should be fairly obvious: it’s really hard to hide a 747.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

20

Praise the Guidelines, and Don’t Pass the Ammo


Posted by at 6:54 pm on March 20, 2008
Category: Criminal Penalties

Black Talon AmmoThe Second Circuit issued an opinion on March 19 interpreting the sentencing guidelines applicable to violations of the Arms Export Control Act. That case, United States v. Sero, involved an appeal by a defendant that had entered a guilty plea to charges that he unlawfully exported gun parts and ammunition to the Philippines without a license. The District Court sentenced the defendant to 40 months followed by a three-year period of supervised release.

The defendant argued that the District Court erred when it interpreted the applicable sentencing guidelines and held that the lower sentence available under Sentencing Guidelines § 2M5.2 did not apply. A lower sentence is available under that guideline where “the offense involved only non-fully automatic small arms (rifles, handguns, or shotguns), and the number of weapons did not exceed ten.” Since the defendant’s exports included 2 boxes of .40 caliber Black Talon DP cartridges, the court held that the defendant was not eligible for the lower sentencing guideline. Interpreting that language literally, the Second Circuit held that the lower guideline is applicable only for exports that are restricted to small arms and do not include ammunition for those small arms.

The defendant also argued that a downward departure from the guidelines was warranted because he was selling the parts and ammunition to the alleged good guys. Section 2M5.2 permits a downward departure where the offending conduct posed no “security or foreign policy interest of the United States.”

The Second Circuit rejected this argument noting, first, that this downward departure is committed to the unreviewable discretion of the lower court unless the lower court mistakenly believed it had no authority to permit a downward departure. In this case, the Second Circuit noted, the lower court considered the security impact:

It explained that “it is not a good defense to say that the defendant sold to the right side or that he was not selling directly to the insurgents. There is no indication that he was.” Moreover, it found that a “citizen cannot pick and choose the firearm vendees that he will wish to deal with to the detriment of the policies of the State department” and that Sero had made no good faith attempt to receive an export license, suggesting that Sero knew that his gunrunning activity was potentially harmful.

The Court’s reasoning here is somewhat suspect. The language quoted by the Second Circuit suggests that the lower court was holding that all violations of the export laws necessarily pose a risk to security interests because the State Department says so. That comes perilously close to a holding by the lower court that it has no authority to make a downward departure by evaluating whether the conduct posed any risk to the security or foreign policy of the United States.

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Mar

19

Failed Negotiations with Iranian Company Lead to Guilty Plea


Posted by at 7:24 pm on March 19, 2008
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Dubai Court House
ABOVE: Allied Telesis iMAP


Allied Telesis Labs, the Raleigh-based subsidiary of Japanese conglomerate Allied Telesis Holdings K.K., yesterday pleaded guilty to charges that it conspired to violate the U.S. sanctions against Iran. The interesting wrinkle in this case is that the charges are based simply on unsuccessful negotiations that Allied Telesis Lab employees had with Iran’s Information Technology Company to rebuild telecommunications facilities in Tehran and other cities in Iran.

Allied Telesis Labs designs high-capacity “multiservice access platforms,” known as iMAPs, and similar products. Such iMAPs, which can route a large volume of telecommunications traffic, were a central component of the redesign and had been designed in Raleigh. In anticipation of concluding the contract, $2 million worth of iMAPs for the Iranian project had already been manufactured for Allied Telesis at facilities in Singapore.

Court documents, however, indicated that:

The contract negotiations [with Iran’s Information Technology Company] eventually collapsed, the telecommunications system was not installed and the iMAPs were sold elsewhere at a loss.

The only public comment from Allied Telesis on the guilty plea was that the employees involved in the contract negotiations had been fired.

Since the charges here were conspiracy to violate the Iran sanctions, the prosecution would not have needed to prove any exports or attempted exports to Iran. It would only need to prove sufficient overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. Certainly the negotiations with the Iranian company, the design of the iMAPs, and, most significantly, the actual manufacture of those iMAPs in anticipation of the award, would be sufficient overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

18

Dubai Prosecutes Export Violation; Hell Freezes Over.


Posted by at 4:54 pm on March 18, 2008
Category: General

Dubai Court House
ABOVE: Dubai Court House


According to a recent report in Gulf News, the English-language daily newspaper based in Dubai, a man who was attempting to export zirconium from the UAE was referred to the Dubai court for prosecution.

Judge Esam Eisa Al Humaidan, Attorney General, … told Gulf News the suspect was referred to court last week and a hearing will be held today. He said this is believed to be one of the very few cases of its kind, if not the first ever.

We’ll put our money on “first ever.”

Humaidan, no doubt aware that his country’s first tiny baby-step into the world of export control is being careful watched by certain people at the Department of Commerce, made clear that he’s doing everything he can not to screw it up:

“We have conducted thorough investigation in the case, to guarantee the complete and accurate implementation of the law,” he said. All procedures were done according the highest levels of accuracy, including ordering the arrest of the suspect, searching him, interrogating him and the other witnesses and the examination of the seized metal, he added

We’re not so sure what the “highest levels of accuracy” in interrogation means in the UAE, but we will take the Attorney General at his word and simply hope that the application of water wasn’t involved.

The background to all of this is, of course, an earlier threat by the Department of Commerce to put the UAE on a special list of countries of “diversionary concern,” which would have made exports of dual-use items to the UAE more difficult. The Department later retracted that threat after noting that the UAE had passed a new export law.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

17

What’s the Penalty for Violating the “Spirit” of the Iran Sanctions Act?


Posted by at 7:05 pm on March 17, 2008
Category: Iran Sanctions

Natural Gas Pipeline in IranSwiss energy company EGL issued a press release today announcing that it had inked a contract to buy natural gas from Iran over the next 25 years. Most of the natural gas purchased by EGL under the contract is destined to Italy via the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which EGL is building with Norway’s StatoilHydro ASA.

The United States was not amused:

Lisbeth Keefe, spokeswoman for the U.S. Embassy in Bern, said Washington had told the Swiss that “major new oil and gas deals with Iran send precisely the wrong message at a time when Iran continues to defy U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring it to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” She said Washington was studying whether the deal actually violates the Iran Sanctions Act.

Actually it shouldn’t take much studying. Section 14(9) of the Iran Sanctions Act specifically excludes from the Act “entry into, performance, or financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods.” My guess is that Keefe knew that because she also said:

“But we believe the deal in any case violates the spirit of the sanctions,” Keefe said.

This is the first time I’ve heard anyone argue — presumably with a straight face — that the “spirit” of a U.S. law should have extraterritorial application.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)