Agents of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) raided the Washington state facilities of Aerospace Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., and walked away with thirty-two workers that ICE alleges were illegal immigrants working at the facility. Those workers are now in ICE custody in Tacoma, Washington, and are being processed for deportation.

According to the article reporting the raid, the ICE action was part of its “Worksite Enforcement” initiative. This initiative, which has its own enforcement unit, targets critical infrastructure and sensitive sites. AMT manufactures parts for civilian and military aircraft and is registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.

Assuming that the workers are ultimately determined to be illegal and undocumented aliens, AMT might be expecting, sooner rather than later, a visit from the enforcement staff of DDTC. After all, if there were thirty-two foreigners working in a facility that manufactures military aircraft parts, there will certainly be a reasonable suspicion that AMT may have transferred technical data on these military parts if, by no other reason, allowing them to see certain of the military parts. Exports under section 120.17 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations includes “visual disclosure.”

A major topic of discussion in the deemed export area has been the possible ramifications of having legal and or illegal foreign workers on cleaning crews and in IT departments. There hasn’t been real discussion of illegal foreign workers actually involved on production crews because, I suppose, it was thought that this wasn’t a very likely possibility. Until now.

The folks at iRobot not only make the Roomba, which will robotically vacuum your floors and drive your dog insane, but also they make military iRobots, which will chase down and, er, vacuum up terrorists, enemy combatants, and other assorted malefactors. I, for one, would not like to see the bad boy pictured on the right chasing me down some hallway or alley. Not every iRobot, however, packs heat, and many perform certain defensive military missions such as handling and disabling IEDs, detecting chemical and biological warfare agents, and other cool stuff.

According to this recent post at Planetary Gear, the iRobot is attracting as much foreign interest as the iPhone and the iPod. And that, of course, raises a few export issues. Depending on how the robot is decked out, it can either be a killer robot of doom or WALL-E, the trashbot. The iRobot can be just as useful to first responders as to military troops.

A review of the iRobot product literature indicates that the company has played it safe and simply takes the position that the tactical iRobot is USML whether or not it’s been given the naughty or nice accoutrements. But technology is quickly outpacing the creaky old United States Munitions List, and it’s not very clear what is the correct USML category for the robot. Of course, there’s always Category XI: “electronic equipment . . . which is specifically designed, modified or configured for military application.” Or “catch-all” Category XXI for an article not enumerated in the other categories “which has substantial military applicability” and “which has been specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted or modified for military purposes.” But that seems rather unsatisfying, doesn’t it? Shouldn’t something this deadly have its own category?

And suppose that iRobot took a hard line position that a robot not outfitted with military gear but capable of being so outfitted wasn’t USML, what would be the ECCN of the robot?

(For those confused about the title, go here.)

Earlier this week, Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-NY) introduced H.R. 6361, or the “Stop Business with Terrorists Act of 2008,” which was introduced into the Senate earlier this year as S.1234 by Senators Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Clinton (D-NY). The purpose of the bill is to reverse current law which permits, in limited circumstances, dealings by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms with Iran.

Under current law, a foreign subsidiary could do business with Iran in the following circumstances. First, it must be a foreign subsidiary incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction, not a branch operation of a U.S. company. Second, the transactions with Iran cannot involve any U.S. persons. Third, some have argued that in order not to be seen as a device to evade the sanctions, the foreign subsidiary must have some business other than dealing with Iran.

Under the Stop Business with Terrorists Act of 2008, a parent company will be liable for acts of its foreign subsidiaries with respect to Iran that violate Executive Order 12959 and Executive Order 13059 notwithstanding its incorporation in a foreign jurisdiction and the absence of U.S. involvement in the transaction at issue. Those Executive Orders prohibit, among other things, exports and reexports of U.S. origin goods, services and technology to Iran.

Although this legislation doesn’t fall directly within the purview of the European Union’s blocking legislation, Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, one has to wonder whether yet another effort by the U.S. to extend the scope of its sanctions regulations outside its own borders will provoke any countermeasures or retaliation by Europe. Of course, the extraterritorial scope here is more limited than it was in the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act because only the U.S. parent is penalized under the proposed legislation. Still, the legislation will have a direct impact on the operations of E.U. companies insofar as their U.S. parents prohibit them from dealings with Iran.

Back in 1997, the folks at Omega Engineering were very bad. They applied to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) for a license to ship laboratory equipment to Pakistan. The license was denied. The appeal of the license denial was denied. They shipped the goods anyway with an intermediate stop in Newport, Germany. BIS was not amused. Omega agreed to a $187,000 fine and an order, entered in November 2003, forbidding it from being involved in any exports to Pakistan for five years.

Fast forward to 2008. Omega is no longer an export scofflaw. Indeed, Omega helps BIS obtain a criminal indictment against an individual who was trying to export U.S.-origin goods to Iran without a license. The reward? BIS agreed last week, in consideration of the “extraordinary cooperation” of Omega, which helped BIS obtain “crucial” evidence, to suspend the reminder of the export denial order which otherwise would have remained in effect until November 2008.

And who says you never get a second chance?

A Florida man and a California man who ran separate aviation parts businesses have been arrested and charged, in a criminal complaint unsealed yesterday, with violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the U.S. embargo on Iran in connection with alleged exports to Iran of spare parts for F-14s and other military aircraft. According to the criminal complaint (not yet available on Pacer but as described by the Miami Herald), orders for the parts were received by email and then shipped to Dubai — that’s a huge surprise!! — for re-export to Iran.

One of the defendants is represented by Robert Abreu, a Miami criminal defense attorney who appears to have made the mistake of speaking to the New York Times before actually reading the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations that govern the case:

Robert Abreu, a lawyer for [one of the defendants], said in an interview that based on his initial reading of the case: “It does not deal apparently with any weapons or munitions. As far as I know, it was simply dual-use aircraft parts, and I think this is being trumped up to an arms violation where it’s not.”

Perhaps Mr. Abreu was misquoted, but this seems to suggest that he thinks that aircraft parts can’t be the predicate of an Arms Export Control Act prosecution because they aren’t “weapons or munitions.” Aircraft parts “specifically designed or modified for” military aircraft fall under Category VIII(h) of the United States Munitions List, and their exports are controlled by the Arms Export Control Act. One of the parts mentioned in the criminal complaint was an F-14 harness, and this is clearly a part specifically designed for the F-14 and not usable in any other craft.