Author Archive


Jun

14

Two Packages to Sudan Net $5k Fine for KLM


Posted by at 7:59 pm on June 14, 2010
Category: OFACSudan

Khartoum AirportWhile I was traveling earlier this month, I missed the latest release of civil penalty information by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). Both KLM and Geico were fined. We’ll look at the KLM case today and GEICO tomorrow because both penalty cases raise interesting issues.

KLM was fined $5,336.26 in connection with two cargo shipments it carried between KLM’s cargo facilities at O’Hare Airport in Chicago and the Khartoum International Airport. One shipment consisted of oil field equipment and the other contained hydraulic hoses. The offending shipments were not voluntarily disclosed to OFAC.M

OFAC’s initial nastygram to KLM (or “Prepenalty Notice” in OFAC-speak) proposed a $6,277.95 penalty. KLM’s reply admitted that its compliance program didn’t mention embargoed destinations but sought clemency from OFAC on the grounds that it had now circulated a notice to all U.S. operations reminding them about “bookings that cannot be accepted.” That delayed stab at compliance, however, did net KLM a savings of $941.69 or about 15% of the originally proposed penalty.

What is interesting here is that it now appears that KLM has circulated a bulletin to all of it’s cargo operations instructing them not to take any packages to Sudan or other embargoed destinations. That, of course, is an excessive, but understandable, response to the OFAC penalty proceeding. Yet, as we all know, not all cargo to Sudan is prohibited. A box of books would be fine under the information exemption. But KLM doesn’t want to have to inspect cargo and determine whether an export license is or isn’t required. And who can blame them?

Yes, yes, KLM broke the rules here, and it’s hard to muster up an abundance of sympathy for a carrier whose compliance program didn’t even mention that whole business of embargoed countries. Yet, yet, busting an airline for something like this (even if the fine is less than a first-class transatlantic ticket) will necessarily result in the airline doing exactly what it did here: overreact. This will make it difficult for shippers to send perfectly legal cargo to the country, violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the Berman Amendment, which established the exception for informational materials.

If OFAC needed a couple of whipping boys here, the shippers were better targets. They, of course, knew what they are shipping and should have known it wasn’t exempt.

Permalink Comments (5)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jun

10

Crime and Even More Punishment


Posted by at 8:34 pm on June 10, 2010
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

PunishmentThe last four items posted by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) — and which are linked here, here, here, and here) on its list of reported export violations — all involved impositions of export denial orders on individuals already convicted of crimes. Two of the four are currently languishing in federal correctional institutions and one served a two-year sentence of incarceration.

Needless to say, there is nothing (other than, of course, the lapse of the Export Administration Act) prohibiting BIS from piling more punishments on these individuals, even though arguably incarceration, as the harshest penalty short of execution, really should be seen as sufficient punishment. (By the way, I am not suggesting to the export hawks on the hill, who seem to increase penalties every time they get a chance, that the death penalty might be a proper punishment for exporting a teflon-lined valve without a BIS license.) But I think that these add-on, johnny-come-lately penalties ought to be put in proper context by noting that unconscionable breadth of the standard denial order as currently drafted.

For example, after the individual subject to the denial order is released from prison, it is fair to say that employment opportunities are already restricted because of his or her incarceration or conviction. But the denial order, which prohibits the individual from “directly or indirectly” “benefiting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States” further limits those employment possibilities. Taking a job with any company that is involved in any exports would seem to violate the denial order even if the job was a menial job with no connection to the company’s export activities. And what company doesn’t export? Well, I suppose the individual subject to the order could always work for a shoe shine stand or iron shirts in a laundry.

Additionally, the Denial Order effectively prohibits the subject individual from travelling abroad. Travel abroad would result in an export of the individual’s baggage and personal effects (unless, of course, the individual travels in, er, a state of nature). The standard denial order even explicitly denies the subject individual the ability to use the BAG license exception which ordinarily covers personal effects carried with a traveler oversea. The prohibition on using an item that has been exported from the United States arguably prohibits the subject individual from using airplanes, boats and automobiles even for domestic travel if they’ve ever left the United States. Of course, since the person subject to the denial order is working for a shoe shine stand or a shirt laundry, travel of any kind won’t really fit in his or her budget

The standard denial order doesn’t incorporate any of the routine export exemptions, such as those for informational materials. Sending a birthday card to a relative abroad could wind up costing about $250,000 more than the cost of the card or the postage. Arguably the Berman Amendment applies even if the standard denial order doesn’t say so, but by not explicitly exempting informational materials, the order at a very minimum deters the individual from trading information with relatives and friends abroad.

Finally, a person subject to a denial order might wind up with a BIS charging letter as thanks for his or her contributions to U.S. charities sending food, aid, medicine, medical supplies and relief to Haiti or other scenes of catastrophic natural disaster.

Export denial orders may well have a legitimate administrative purpose (assuming that they are subsequently permitted by authorizing legislation), but current export reform efforts provide an opportunity to rewrite the standard denial order to eliminate its excessively broad scope. It also provides an opportunity to consider whether anything is really gained by routinely and automatically imposing a denial order on parties already subjected to substantial criminal penalties.

Permalink Comments (1)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jun

9

Who Is Nigel Howard Malpass? UPDATED


Posted by at 8:30 am on June 9, 2010
Category: Iran Sanctions

Nigel Malpass
ABOVE: Nigel Howard Malpass


[See update at the end of this post.]

Who is Nigel Malpass? Well, for starters, he was elected in 2008 as a local authority commissioner for Ramsey, a hamlet on the Isle of Man, the rogue tax haven and Internet casino situated in the Irish Sea. In May, he was elected Chairman of the local commission, which is why he’s wearing that odd necklace in the photograph illustrating this post. And on Monday, he was fingered by an article in the New York Times as one of the chief architects of a scheme to set up shell companies used by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”) to skirt U.S. sanctions imposed against the company.

This blog has previously reported that almost as soon as these sanctions were imposed, IRISL began to take steps to evade them. We noted that IRISL began changing the names of its ships from the names shown on the SDN list to new, and less Iranian-sounding, names. The Iran Bojnoord became the Uppercourt, adding, no doubt, a daily tea service on board, complete with scones, crumpets and a stiff upper lip. Back in April of this year, we discussed a report from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control that found that IRISL, in addition to re-christening ships in its fleet, was transferring ownership of individual vessels to shell companies organized outside of Iran but ultimately owned by IRISL or its affiliates.

The New York Times article treats this old news as a journalistic scoop, which it isn’t, but the story does supply many interesting details on how this shell game is being played. According to the article, all but 73 ships now have had a change in name and ownership. But most interestingly the article fingered Malpass, a Manx “marine consultant,” as a major facilitator of Iran’s efforts to avoid the sanctions on IRISL. The Times pointed to a

network set up with the help of Nigel Howard Malpass, a British shipping consultant who serves on the boards of Smart Day and companies connected to 43 other ships previously registered to [IRISL], records show.

Understandably, now that Malpass’s role has become public, he’s busy trying to run away from it as fast as he can.

“I did used to be involved with [IRISL],” Mr. Malpass said in a telephone interview, adding that while he had set up companies at the company’s behest, he had since “disassociated” himself.

But the Times article says Malpass is still on the Board of 43 of the IRISL shell companies. That’s not normally what anyone would call disassociation.

If OFAC wants to make an end of IRISL’s shell game here, it seems that putting Mr. Malpass on the SDN list might be a good first step. This measure could be easily defended if the Times is indeed correct that Malpass admits to setting up companies for IRISL and that he still serves on the Board of 43 of the shell companies.

Often these designations of third-country nationals might pose some issues of diplomacy, but here I think those considerations are largely absent. What is the Isle of Man going to do to the United States if Malpass is designated? Cut off access by U.S. nationals to its online gambling empire?

Update (4:26 p.m.): Mr. Malpass could be targeted under the terms of the newly proposed Iran sanctions, a draft of which was released today. Paragraph 19 states that asset blocking and travel restrictions shall apply to “any person or entity acting on [IRISL’s] behalf or at [its] direction.” This would require U.N. members to block any of Malpass’s assets in their territory and to implement a travel ban against Malpass assuming, as noted above, that he organized (as the Times article says he admits) the IRISL shell companies and served or serves as directors of those companies.

Although the Isle of Man is not a member of the United Nations or the European Union, the Island has in the past independently implemented Iran sanctions once they were implemented by the E.U. The Isle most recently did this with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747. This could put Mr. Malpass in an awkward financial position if the U.N. passes this latest round of U.N. sanctions, as it is expected to do.

Permalink Comments (7)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jun

7

Export Reform Boulder Moves Further Up Mountain


Posted by at 3:56 pm on June 7, 2010
Category: BISDDTCExport ReformOFAC

Export ReformAn article (subscription required) in the latest issue of Inside U.S. Trade describes an interview the publication held with a “senior administration official” on the White House’s proposed export control reforms. According to the official, an interagency agreement should occur shortly that will allow the agencies to move forward in implementing one export license application form for BIS, OFAC and DDTC and to paring down the various export control lists to one list of critical items and technologies.

Probably the most significant of the contemplated reforms is the paring down of the United States Munitions List to a “positive list” of items. Currently, the list has both positive listings of items that are controlled (e.g., firearms or the specific chemical agents listed in Category XIV) and indirect (dare I say “negative”?) listings which cover unspecified items with certain attributes, such as electronics “designed, modified or configured for military application.” This latter category of listings creates conflicting interpretations, confusion and uncertainty about which items require export licenses and which do not.

Other highlights of the interview included the following:

  • The single IT system will be the Department of Defense’s IT system
  • The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which licenses nuclear exports, will not be part of the single export agency.
  • There will be common definitions of terms, including “U.S. Person” and “export.”
  • The single list will be the United States Munitions List. Dual use items will be added to the list and the Commerce Control List will disappear
Permalink Comments (4)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jun

4

BP Oil Spill Prompts Cuba Embargo Exception


Posted by at 11:06 am on June 4, 2010
Category: Cuba SanctionsOFAC

Cuban oil rig
ABOVE: On-shore Cuban oil
rig


An article in the National Journal reveals that OFAC recently granted a license to permit the International Association of Drilling Contractors to send a U.S. delegation to Cuba to train the Cubans on proper off-shore drilling techniques. The exception to the embargo was prompted by concerns that an oil spill by the Cubans could be carried by currents in the Gulf of Mexico to U.S. waters and the U.S. coastline. The same request by IADC had been denied in December by OFAC, but recent events obviously led to a change of heart by the agency. The thinking, of course, was that since the Cubans are going to drill in any event, we ought to do our best to prevent collateral damage when they botch things up.

The same concerns motivated a provision in the Domestic Energy Security Act which would have amended the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”) to permit U.S. companies to drill in Cuban coastal waters. That legislative proposal is now pretty much dead on arrival given that it is unlikely that anyone will think it is a good idea to ban U.S. companies from drilling anywhere in the Gulf except for off the coast of Cuba.

Permalink Comments (2)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)