Author Archive


Mar

28

Robot Attack!


Posted by at 3:36 pm on March 28, 2011
Category: General

Robot Attack!This morning I received a curt email from my web-hosting provider that Export Law Blog was being crawled by a number of robots making so many file requests that they had to shut down my site temporarily and then add robot blocking code to my system files. Apparently the volume was sufficient that they were worried that the out-of-control robots would not just take down my site but all the other sites on the shared server.

So I asked my web host where the robots were coming from. Get this: one group of them was coming from the Department of State. Judging from some activity I saw on my logs, the State robots were trying to scrape the entire site with simultaneous requests. Bad robot! (Brownie points to anyone on whom that last reference is not lost.) The hosting administrators have now blocked all access from that IP address from the State Department.

As the people at the State Department are our friends, it seems harsh to impose this permanent time out on them just because one of their robots ran amok this morning. If someone from State knows how the robots got loose this morning and swarmed the blog, please let me know and I’ll try to get the IP address unbanned by the folks at my web host. (I could go in an change the commands they put in the .htaccess file, but if I do, and there’s another recurrence of an early morning unsanctioned State Department robot party at my site, I’m likely to rendered homeless and in search of a new web host.)

The other robot(s) came from JPMorgan. Any word from JPMorgan on what caused their robots to go into a feeding frenzy at my site this morning, would also be welcome.

We now return you to your regularly scheduled programming.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

24

Software Engineer Caught in Export Sting Pleads Guilty


Posted by at 11:50 pm on March 24, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

satelliteNotwithstanding an apparent slip-up by undercover agents in a sting which caught a Seattle-area software engineer in a plan to export ITAR-controlled radiation-hardened semiconductor chips to China, the target of the sting, Lian Yang, pleaded guilty today to charges that he violated the Arms Export Control Act. This blog reported on this case back in December when the criminal complaint filed by the government in the case was unsealed.

The criminal complaint suggested some convincing evidence that Yang knew he was breaking the law with these proposed exports. Apparently he had contemplated effacing the part numbers on the chips. He also proposed shipping them under false invoices that concealed the names of the parts.

However, at one point the undercover agents, who were posing as the suppliers of the parts, told him that there would be a delay in shipping the parts. The delay, they said, “is with the government,” further stating that the “compliance paperwork” was “waiting to be reviewed and signed.” That certainly seems like an implication by the undercover agents that the transaction was legal and was being approved by the government, which would certainly complicate the government’s proof that Yang had the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of the crime. In the end, however, with the defendant’s guilty plea, this slip-up had no impact on the case.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer also reported on Yang’s plea. Its online report deserves both an award for the most obnoxious online advertisement I’ve ever seen (click the link at your peril) and the worst description of the AECA I’ve ever seen. Here’s the description of the AECA:

In charging information filed Monday in U.S. District Court, federal prosecutors accuse Yang of conspiring to violate the U.S. Arms Export Control Act, which bars the sale of potentially sensitive technologies.

You have to wonder where the reporter came up with that. There is quite the difference between a statute that requires government licenses for the sale of goods and technologies versus one which “bars” the sale of those goods or technologies, not to mention that the AECA involves the sale of military items and technologies, which is not really co-extensive with “potentially sensitive technologies.” The Post-Intelligencer reporter apparently didn’t even take the time to read the Wikipedia entry on the AECA which, at least, accurately describes the act as “control[ling] the import and export of defense articles and defense services.”

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

23

Oh, The Things You Can Buy on the Internet


Posted by at 8:40 pm on March 23, 2011
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Iran's Saegeh JetU.S. prosecutors announced today that four members of a Colombian family were indicted by a grand jury on charges that the family attempted to export J85 jet engines from Miami to Iran in violation of the U.S. embargo on Iran.

The criminal complaint filed earlier this month provides a good deal of detail on the case against the four defendants. Apparently, an Internet advertisement offering to sell twenty-two J85-CAN-15 jet engines led an undercover agent to contact the seller Felipe Echeverry and to indicate that he wanted to purchase the engines for shipment to Iran. The engines in question can be used on the F-5 fighter jets still used by Iran and by the Saegeh fighter jet (pictured right) built by Iran on the F-5 platform. The agent also indicated that he wanted the sellers to handle shipping the engines to Iran.

The transaction proceeded smoothly until the agent first mentioned to the sellers that the U.S. had an embargo on Iran, at which point the sellers began to get cold feet. At first, the sellers said that they would not be involved in shipping the engines, but would only sell them to the agent for pickup in Miami. The agent insisted that this was unacceptable and that the family would at least have to ship the engines as far as Panama. Again, the sellers refused, after which the agent said he was walking from the deal. Later that afternoon, the sellers agreed to ship the items to Panama and the rest, as they say, is history.

The prosecution’s main problem here is that to prove a violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705, the law alleged to have been violated, the government will need to prove scienter, i.e., that the defendants knew that their actions were a violation of law. Coincidentally, this blog reported yesterday on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in US v. Guo which relied on the scienter requirement of § 1705 to rebut a constitutional challenge that the statute was vague.

In this case, it is reasonable to assume that the defendants believed that they would violate the law only if the shipped the items to Iran, which explains their refusal to ship the items at all when advised of the Iran embargo and later only agreed to ship the items as far as Panama. This is particularly true for defendants that are not even citizens of the United States and are unlikely to be familiar with U.S. law.

It seems to me that the better target of the government’s efforts would be to investigate the circumstances under which military jet engines in the United States were sold to Colombians, likely without a license and likely in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

22

Ninth Circuit Upholds Export Statute against Vagueness Challenge


Posted by at 10:17 pm on March 22, 2011
Category: Criminal Penalties

FLIR ImageLast week the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction of Zhi Yong Guo for unlicensed exports of thermal imaging cameras in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. According to the facts recited by the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Zhi was a Chinese citizen who enlisted a friend, Tai Wei Chao, a United States citizen working in China, to assist him in the purchase of the thermal imaging cameras. Mr. Tai, in turn, enlisted the help of a printing business in California which ordered the cameras and had them shipped to its address in California. The printing company then exported the camera to Tai in China, who thereafter delivered the cameras to Zhi in exchange for a commission.

The court then notes:

[Tai’s] order aroused the suspicions of FLIR’s export compliance staff. They thought it strange that a printing company needed highly developed thermal imaging cameras. FLIR alerted the Department of Commerce to [Tai’s] order, and agents from the Department of Commerce began to track [Tai’s] activities

Thereafter Zhi and Tai travelled to the United States to pick up more cameras that had been ordered from the printing company. Both men packed the cameras in their luggage and then were arrested at the airport by the friendly folks from ICE. The lower court convicted Zhi for the exports, and the appeal to the Ninth Circuit followed.

Zhi’s lawyers appealed on the ground that the statute under which Zhi was convicted was unconstitutionally vague. The basis of the vagueness argument was that a number of sources needed to be consulted to figure out that the export was a crime:

To understand the crime with which Defendant was charged, one must look at four sources and read them together: the statute, § 1705(a); Executive Order No. 13,222; and two implementing regulations, the Commerce Control List in 15 C.F.R. Part 774 and the Commerce Country Chart in 15 C.F.R. Part 738.

The court easily dismissed Zhi’s efforts to confuse complexity with vagueness:

But a statute does not fail the vagueness test simply because it involves a complex regulatory scheme, or requires that several sources be read together, and Defendant has not directed us to a single case in which we have held otherwise.

The final blow to Zhi’s vagueness argument was the scienter requirement for conviction

The requirement that [the statute] places on the government to prove Defendant’s knowledge of the law ‘mitigate[s] a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.

Although the court’s opinion does not discuss the evidence used by the lower court to find that the defendant knew that the exports were illegal, that criminal intent was likely inferred from Zhi’s numerous prior unsuccessful efforts to obtain the cameras from the United States. The court also notes that Zhi concealed the cameras in shoes that he packed in his suitcase.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

16

First Let’s Make Sure We’ve Got the Name Right


Posted by at 10:05 pm on March 16, 2011
Category: Part 122

Yippee!It’s been a while since this blog has seen one of the infamous press releases from a company announcing that the company has registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”). A reader today brought to my attention a press release from Rave Computer announcing that it is now “ITAR registered.”

As is normal in these cases, the company does its best to try to leave the impression that registration is a certification or endorsement by DDTC of the company’s compliance policies:

Rave Computer developed and implemented ITAR policies, procedures and employee training.

But in the previous sentence, Rave says:

The Office of Defense Trade Controls in the State Department interprets and enforces ITAR. Its goal is to safeguard U.S. national security and further U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Oops. DDTC hasn’t called itself the Office of Defense Trade Controls for almost a decade. Do you think Rave may be using ten-year old copy of the ITAR as the basis for certifying its compliance with the regulations and obtaining registration?

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)