People looking for an up-to-date version of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) on the web might be tempted to rely on the “Consolidated ITAR” on the website of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), the agency that promulgates those regulations. The preface to the “Consolidated ITAR” says that it “integrates the text of the annual April 1 publication in the CFR with subsequent amendments made via Federal Register notices.” Unfortunately, that is simply not the case. The “Consolidated ITAR” does not incorporate the text of the last three amendments.

Those amendments are:

• The amendment of May 16, 2011, effective August 15, 2011, which created an exemption for certain transfers by foreign end users to their employees who were dual nationals or third country nationals of countries other than the country in which the end user is located;
• The amendment of May 24, 2011, effective on the same date, which broadened the arms embargo against Libya by eliminating the case-by-case consideration for licenses for certain non-lethal defense items and services destined for Libya; and
• The amendment of August 8, 2011, effective on the same date, which made a number of revisions to section 126 to update country policies regarding Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Fiji, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, North Korea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, and to correct various technical errors.

Given that DDTC insists that exporters be familiar with and comply with the ITAR, it should either update the “Consolidated ITAR” or remove it from the web site.

Alternatively, I suppose DDTC could file a voluntary disclosure with exporters that it failed to update a version of the rules which it represented to be complete and up-to-date. I’m sure that exporters would be happy to provide the agency with a no action letter, conditioned, of course, on DDTC adopting and providing to exporters a compliance program which would guarantee that these regulations be kept up to date.

According to this article, the Armenian National Committee in America (“ANCA”) has demanded that the Department of State, presumably through the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), investigate arms export violations it alleges are revealed in connection with an Azerbaijani drone that was shot down by the disputed region of Nagorno Karabakh (“NKR”). NKR is ethnically Armenian but claimed by Azerbaijan as part of its own territory, a claim disputed by Armenia.

According to ANCA, a video of the drone wreckage taken by the NKR Ministry of Defense shows that the drone contained a part, pictured on the right, made by Novatel, a Canadian company with a presence in the United States. The part is a compact GPS antenna which can be found by following this link. More detailed specs for the antenna can be found at this link.

As you can see, it is far from clear that a violation of the Arms Export Control Act is implicated by the inclusion of this part in the Azerbaijan drone. First, the part does not appear to be covered by Category XV of the USML system which covers GPS receivers and components. The item does not look like it was designed for military use and is instead an item designed principally for civilian use. Nor does it appear to meet the alternate performance characteristics specified in that category. For example, even though the spec suggests that the antenna can operate at an altitude over 60,000, it is not clear that it can operate at a speed of 1,000 knots. Finally, it seems questionable that this item was manufactured by Novatel in the United States and/or exported from the United States.