

**SEALED**

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

**Holding a Criminal Term  
Grand Jury Sworn in on May 16, 2011**

<b>UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</b>	:	<b>CRIMINAL NO.</b>
	:	
	:	<b>Grand Jury Original</b>
	:	
<b>v.</b>	:	<b>VIOLATIONS:</b>
	:	
<b>AMIN RAVAN</b>	:	<b>18 U.S.C. § 371</b>
<b>and IC MARKET IRAN,</b>	:	<b>(Conspiracy)</b>
	:	
<b>Defendants.</b>	:	<b>18 U.S.C. § 554</b>
	:	<b>(Smuggling)</b>
	:	
	:	<b>22 U.S.C § 2778</b>
	:	<b>(Arms Export Control Act)</b>
	:	
	:	<b>22 C.F.R. Part 120</b>
	:	<b>(International Traffic in Arms</b>
	:	<b>Regulations)</b>
	:	
	:	<b>18 U.S.C. § 2</b>
	:	<b>(Aiding and Abetting, and Causing</b>
	:	<b>an Act to be Done)</b>
	:	
	:	<b>18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and</b>
	:	<b>28 U.S.C. § 2461(e)</b>
	:	<b>(Criminal Forfeiture)</b>

Case: 1:11-cr-00334  
Assigned To : Sullivan, Emmet G.  
Assign. Date : 11/16/2011  
Description: INDICTMENT (B)  
Case Related To: 10cr174 (EGS)

**INDICTMENT**

The Grand Jury charges that:

**COUNT ONE**  
**(Conspiracy to Defraud the United  
States by Dishonest Means)**

At all times material herein:

**A. Background**

1. Company B was located in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and was a manufacturer of antennas suitable for military applications. Company B manufactured two antennas that were relevant to this Indictment. Company B manufactured the 2010-1 antenna, which is light-weight, compact in size, and suitable for airborne or shipboard direction finding systems or radar warning receiver applications. The formal name of the 2010-1 antenna is a Cavity-Backed Spiral Antenna. Company B also manufactured the 3120 antenna, which is omnidirectional, sealed, and suitable for airborne and shipboard environments including in several military aircraft. The formal name of the 3120 antenna is a Biconical Antenna.

2. Conspirator B was a citizen of the United States and an officer of Company B located in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Conspirator B is an unindicted co-conspirator whose identity is known to the Grand Jury.

3. Corezing International Pte, Ltd. (“Corezing”), was a company that was based in Singapore and also maintained addresses in Hong Kong and in the People’s Republic of China.

4. Defendant AMIN RAVAN (“RAVAN”) was a citizen of the Islamic Republic of Iran. At various times, RAVAN acted as an agent of Corezing and a company called IC MARKET IRAN.

5. Defendant IC MARKET IRAN (“IMI”) was a company controlled by RAVAN and persons acting on his behalf. IMI had a business address of 8 Unite, No. 9, Mirzah Hasani Alley, Ghaem Magham St., Tehran, Iran.

6. Lim Kow Seng, a/k/a Eric Lim, a/k/a James Wong (“Eric Lim”) was a citizen of Singapore and an employee of Corezing.

7. Hia Soo Gan Benson, a/k/a Benson Hia, a/k/a Thomas Yan (“Benson Hia”) was a citizen of Singapore and an employee of Corezing.

8. Company C was located in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Conspirator C was the only employee of Company C.

9. Conspirator F was a citizen of the Islamic Republic of Iran and an associate of RAVAN.

**B. The Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations**

10. In furtherance of the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), 22 U.S.C. § 2778, regulated and restricted the sale of arms, munitions, implements of war, and other defense articles and services.

11. Pursuant to the authority granted in the AECA, the Defense Directorate of Trade Controls (“DDTC”) of the United States Department of State promulgated regulations, which were known as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”), 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130. The ITAR specifically governed the export of “defense articles” and also contained the United States Munitions List (“USML”), 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, which designates what items are “defense articles.”

12. “Defense articles,” as that term is used in 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2) and the ITAR, meant items, including technical data, designated for placement on the USML as weapons, weapons systems, munitions, aircraft, associated equipment, and other implements of war.

13. For articles designated by DDTC as “defense articles” on the USML, a person or governmental entity seeking to export that item from the United States must have received a

license or other approval to do so from the DDTC, located in the District of Columbia.

14. Pursuant to United States law and regulation, exporters and shippers or freight forwarders were required to file certain forms and declarations concerning exports of goods and technology from the United States. Typically, those filings were filed electronically through the Automated Export System (“AES”) administered by the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), Customs and Border Protection, which was headquartered in the District of Columbia. A Shipper’s Export Declaration (“SED”) was an official document submitted to DHS in connection with export shipments from the United States. Furthermore, it was unlawful to use any “export control document” containing a false statement or misrepresenting or omitting a material fact for the purpose of exporting any defense article for which a license or approval was required. 22 C.F.R. § 127.2(a). An “export control document” included invoices, declarations of destinations, SEDs, bills of lading, and air waybills.

15. The United States Department of State has certified that Company B’s Part Number 2010-1, Cavity-Backed Spiral Antenna, utilizing a frequency range of 1.7 to 17.5 Ghz, was a defense article.

16. The United States Department of State has certified that Company B’s Part Number 3120, Biconical Antenna, utilizing modified frequency range of 18.5 to 39 Ghz, was a defense article.

17. These determinations meant that licenses were required from the DDTC to export these items to end-users outside of the United States.

**C. The Iranian Transaction Regulations**

18. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C.

§§ 1701-1706, authorized the President of the United States (“the President”) to impose economic sanctions on a foreign country in response to an unusual or extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States when the President declared a national emergency with respect to that threat. Pursuant to the authority under the IEEPA, the President and the executive branch have issued orders and regulations governing and prohibiting certain transactions with Iran by U.S. persons or involving U.S.-origin goods.

19. Beginning with Executive Order No. 12170, issued on November 14, 1979, the President found that “the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and declare[d] a national emergency to deal with that threat.”

20. On May 6, 1995, President William Jefferson Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12959 prohibiting, among other things, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran of any goods, technology, or services from the United States or by a United States person. The Executive Order authorized the United States Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the Executive Orders. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated the ITR, implementing the sanctions imposed by the Executive Orders.

21. The ITR prohibited, among other things, the export, reexport, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of any goods, technology, or services from the United States or by a United States person, wherever located, to Iran or the Government of Iran, without prior authorization or license from the United States Department of the Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control, located in the District of Columbia. These regulations further prohibited any

transactions that evaded or avoided or had the purpose of evading or avoiding any of the prohibitions contained in the ITR, including the unauthorized exportation of goods from the United States to a third country if the goods were intended or destined for Iran.

22. The Executive Order and the ITR were in effect at all times relevant to this Indictment.

**D. Venue**

23. The conduct alleged in this Count began outside of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district and later occurred within the District of Columbia and elsewhere and was therefore within the venue of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, as provided by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3237(a) and 3238.

**E. The Conspiracy**

24. Between on or about September 22, 2006, and on or about September 24, 2007, defendant RAVAN, IMI, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury did knowingly and willfully conspire, combine, confederate, and agree together and with others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing, and defeating the lawful function of the United States in administering its export laws by exporting and attempting to export antennas from Company B in the State of Massachusetts by deceit, craft, trickery, and dishonest means.

**F. The Object of the Conspiracy**

25. The object of the conspiracy was for the co-conspirators to make money and to obtain property by procuring antennas from Company B in violation of United States laws through deceit, craft, trickery, and dishonest means.

**G. Manner and Means of the Conspiracy**

26. The conspirators would and did use the following manner and means, among others, to accomplish the object of the conspiracy:

A. Defendant RAVAN on behalf of IMI attempted to procure for shipment to Iran export controlled antennas manufactured by Company B through an intermediary – Conspirator F – but was unsuccessful because Conspirator F informed RAVAN that the antennas were export controlled.

B. Defendant RAVAN joined Eric Lim and Benson Hia at Corezing so that Corezing would contact Company B in Massachusetts and obtain the antennas on behalf of RAVAN for shipment to Iran. Eric Lim and Benson Hia were not able to purchase the antennas directly from Company B for export due to the licensing requirement.

C. When Corezing was unable to purchase export controlled antennas from Company B due to a license requirement, Corezing contacted Conspirator C with Company C in Massachusetts who, in turn, contacted Company B in Massachusetts to obtain these export controlled antennas on behalf of Corezing.

D. Conspirator C agreed with Eric Lim and Benson Hia to purchase export controlled antennas for export to Eric Lim and Corezing.

E. Conspirator B and Conspirator C agreed to slightly modify the frequency range of the antennas sold for export to Eric Lim and Benson Hia in Singapore so that the transaction would not be stopped by Company B's export compliance officer. This slight modification did not change the "defense article" designation for the antennas under the ITAR.

F. In arranging for the purchase of these antennas, Conspirator C coordinated

with and took directions from various employees of Corezing in Singapore, including Eric Lim and Benson Hia

G. Conspirator C obtained export controlled antennas, which were defense articles on the USML, for export to Corezing in Singapore and Hong Kong.

H. Corezing acting with and on behalf of RAVAN and IMI obtained goods from Company C, that is, export controlled antennas manufactured by Company B, that had been exported from the United States knowing that those antennas had been unlawfully obtained under false pretenses.

I. RAVAN on behalf of IMI planned to make payment to Eric Lim and Benson Hia for the antennas.

J. Each of the intermediary parties – Conspirator C, Eric Lim, and Benson Hia – profited by marking up the cost of the antennas to the next party who would receive the antennas.

K. No party to this transaction registered with the DDTC in the District of Columbia as an exporter of defense articles on the USML. And no party to this transaction obtained export licenses from the DDTC in the District of Columbia for export of defense articles.

**H. Overt Acts**

27. Beginning outside of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, and later within the District of Columbia, and elsewhere, in furtherance of the above-described conspiracy and in order to carry out the objects thereof, defendants RAVAN, IMI, and other co-conspirators committed overt acts, including but not limited to the following:



**Inquiry Through Conspirator F**

(1) On or about December 25, 2006, defendant RAVAN on behalf of IMI in Iran contacted Conspirator F in Iran and requested Conspirator F to obtain pricing information for 3120 and 2010-1 antennas manufactured by Company B.

(2) On or about January 3, 2007, Conspirator F in Iran contacted Company F in Germany and requested that Company F obtain a price quote from Company B for the purchase of 3120 and 2010-1 antennas.

(3) On or about January 4, 2007, after being provided a price quote through Company F for 3120 and 2010-1 manufactured by Company B and being advised that the antennas were “controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and require[d] a U.S. Department of State license for export” from the United States, Conspirator F in Iran communicated the pricing information and export license requirement to RAVAN in Iran.

(4) On or about January 13, 2007, Conspirator F contacted RAVAN in Iran and reported that the “best price” Conspirator F could find for the 2010-1 antenna was US\$2,394.80, through Company F, and in sum and substance that this price did not include any special costs or special charges for getting the license.

(5) On or about January 13, 2007, defendant RAVAN on behalf of IMI in Iran contacted Conspirator F to advise him that the “target price” for each antenna was US\$1,700 per antenna and in sum and substance that the price Conspirator F had found through Company F was too expensive.

(6) On or about January 25, 2007, after being advised by Company B through Company F that the export of Company B’s 2010-1 antennas from the United States required an

export license, Conspirator F reported to defendant RAVAN that an export license was required for such an export.

(7) At a time uncertain but on or after January 25, 2007, RAVAN on behalf of IMI decided not to purchase the antennas through Conspirator F.

**The Exports Via Corezing in Singapore**

(8) At a time prior to January 7, 2007, Conspirator B and Conspirator C discussed a plan to sell export-controlled antennas manufactured by Company B to Eric Lim in Singapore – whose recent attempt to purchase antennas from Company B for export had been blocked by the company’s export compliance officer – by slightly modifying the frequency range of the antennas to avoid detection by Company B’s export compliance officer; Company B would then sell the antennas to Conspirator C’s company who would repackage the same export-controlled antennas for export to Eric Lim in Singapore.

(9) On or about January 7, 2007, Conspirator C contacted Eric Lim in Singapore and offered to purchase the export controlled antennas on behalf of Eric Lim

(10) At a time uncertain but by no later than January 14, 2007, defendant RAVAN on behalf of IMI in Iran contacted Corezing in Singapore and requested that Corezing obtain a price quote for Company B’s antennas on RAVAN’s behalf.

(11) On or about January 14, 2007, Eric Lim with Corezing in Singapore requested from Company C a quote for thirty-eight (38) Company B 2010-1 antennas.

(12) On or about February 15, 2007, Conspirator C received a request for quote for fifty (50) Company B 2010-1 antennas from Eric Lim in Singapore with Corezing in Singapore.

(13) At a time uncertain but prior to on or about March 3, 2007, RAVAN requested that Corezing obtain fifty (50) 2010-1 antennas manufactured by Company B.

(14) Between on or about February 15, 2007, and on or about June 1, 2007, with previous knowledge that Eric Lim could not have the antennas exported out of the United States without a license from the United States Department of State, Conspirator C and Eric Lim negotiated the sale of fifty (50) 2010-1 and five (5) 3120 antennas to Corezing.

(15) On or about March 3, 2007, RAVAN and Eric Lim discussed, in sum and substance, plans to ship the 2010-1 antennas to a Singapore company other than Corezing after those antennas had been exported from the United States so that Corezing would not have to ship to Iran.

(16) On or about March 5, 2007, Eric Lim requested that Benson Hia seek payment from defendant RAVAN for the antennas Corezing planned to purchase from Company B in Massachusetts.

(17) On or about March 5, 2007, Eric Lim advised defendant RAVAN that Corezing would obtain the antennas and ship them to another Singapore company rather than shipping them directly to RAVAN in Iran.

(18) On or about March 5, 2007, defendant RAVAN, Eric Lim, and Benson Hia discussed terms of payment through which RAVAN and COREZING would share the cost of purchasing the 2010-1 antennas manufactured by Company B.

(19) On or about March 5, 2007, RAVAN, Eric Lim, and Benson Hia discussed their preferred terms and conditions for RAVAN to purchase the 2010-1 antennas manufactured by Company B.

(20) On or about March 6, 2007, Eric Lim, Benson Hia, and defendant RAVAN agreed on a purchase price of \$86,750 for fifty 2010-1 antennas manufactured by Company B.

(21) On or about March 6, 2007, Eric Lim, Benson Hia, and RAVAN, whose bank was in Iran, discussed structuring the payment made by RAVAN to Eric Lim and Benson Hia in an amount equivalent to U.S. dollars in a manner that would avoid transactional delays caused by the Iran embargo.

(22) On or about June 1, 2007, Company C sent Corezing in Singapore an invoice with number 12130602, modified by hand to 06010702, which was for the sale to Corezing of fifty (50) 2010-1 and five (5) 3120 antennas at a listed price of USD \$81,950.00 with a 10% deposit of USD \$8,195.00 due immediately.

(23) On or about June 5, 2007, Corezing in Singapore forwarded an international wire transfer to the United States bank account of Company C, in the amount of USD \$8,195.00, as a ten percent (10%) down payment on the antennas.

(24) Between July and September of 2007, Company C made shipments to Corezing's addresses in Singapore and Hong Kong as follows:

- July 25, 2007 shipment of four (4) 2010-1 antennas to Singapore;
- August 8, 2007 shipment of ten (10) 2010-1 antennas to Singapore;
- August 15, 2007 shipment of eleven (11) 2010-1 antennas to Singapore;
- September 10, 2007 shipment of twelve (12) 2010-1 antennas to Singapore;
- September 24, 2007 shipment of thirteen (13) 2010-1 antennas to Hong Kong.

All of these antennas had a frequency of 1.7 to 17.5 Ghz. In addition, five 3120 antennas with a

frequency of 18.5 to 39 Ghz were included with the shipment dated September 24, 2007.

(25) In response to a request from Benson Hia and Corezing, on or about the following dates, Conspirator C undervalued all shipments to Corezing on air waybills prepared by Conspirator C and falsely stated the value of the antennas exported to Corezing: July 25, 2007, August 8, 2007, August 15, 2007, September 10, 2007, and September 24, 2007.

(26) No party to these transactions – including defendants RAVAN and IMI – ever applied for or received a license from the DDTC to export any antennas manufactured by Company B from the United States to Singapore or to Hong Kong.

**(Conspiracy to Defraud the United States by  
Dishonest Means, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371)**

**COUNT TWO**  
**(Smuggling)**

28. The Grand Jury re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 27 as if specifically set forth herein.

29. On or about the dates listed below, beginning outside of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, and later within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, defendants RAVAN, IMI and others did knowingly and fraudulently export and send, and attempt to export and send, from the United States, merchandise, articles, and objects, to wit, antennas manufactured by Company B, contrary to laws and regulations of the United States, specifically the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 127.1-127.2:

	<b>DATE</b>	<b>QUANTITY</b>	<b>STATED DESTINATION</b>	<b>OVERT ACT (Count One)</b>
A	July 25, 2007	4	Singapore	24
B	August 8, 2007	10	Singapore	24
C	August 15, 2007	11	Singapore	(24
D	September 10, 2007	12	Singapore	24
E	September 24, 2007	18	Hong Kong	24

**(Smuggling, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554; Aiding and Abetting,  
and Causing an Act to be Done, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2)**

**COUNT THREE**  
**(Illegal Export of Defense Articles and  
Attempted Illegal Exports of Defense Articles)**

30. The Grand Jury re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 27 as if specifically set forth herein.

31. On or about the following dates, beginning outside of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, and later within the District of Columbia and elsewhere, defendants RAVAN and IMI did knowingly and willfully export and attempt to export, and caused to be exported, United States Munitions List items, without having first obtained the required licenses or authorizations from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, United States Department of State, located in the District of Columbia, in the following quantities:

	<b>DATE</b>	<b>QUANTITY</b>	<b>DESTINATION</b>	<b>OVERT ACT (Count One)</b>
A	July 25, 2007	4	Singapore	24
B	August 8, 2007	10	Singapore	24
C	August 15, 2007	11	Singapore	24

	DATE	QUANTITY	DESTINATION	OVERT ACT (Count One)
D	September 10, 2007	12	Singapore	24
E	September 24, 2007	18	Hong Kong	24

**(Illegal Exports and Attempted Illegal Exports, in violation of  
22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2), and 22 C.F.R. § 127.2; Aiding and Abetting, and  
Causing an Act to be Done, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2)**

**FORFEITURE ALLEGATION**  
**(As to Counts Two and Three)**

32. The allegations contained in Counts Two and Three are re-alleged as though set forth fully herein and incorporated by reference for the purpose of alleging forfeiture to the United States of America pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).

33. As a result of the offenses alleged in Counts Two and Three of this Indictment, defendants RAVAN and IMI, shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable directly or indirectly, to the commission of the offenses alleged in Counts Two and Three of this Indictment, including, but not limited to:

Money Judgment:

Judgment in favor of the United States of America for the sum of at least \$86,750, which is equal to the value of the property constituting or derived from, any proceeds the defendants obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of the offenses alleged in Counts Two and Three of this Indictment.

34. If any of the above-described forfeitable property, as a result of any act or omission of defendants:


- (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
- (b) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
- (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
- (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or
- (e) has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided without difficulty;

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), to seek forfeiture of any other property of said defendants up to the value of the above forfeitable property.

**(Criminal Forfeiture, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c))**

A TRUE BILL

FOREPERSON

  
Attorney of the United States in  
and for the District of Columbia