Archive for June, 2014


Jun

26

How Not To Smuggle Guns To Nigeria


Posted by at 8:38 pm on June 26, 2014
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

Mugshot of Sheriff Olaleran Mohammed [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Sheriff Mohammed


A federal jury in Minnesota, on June 16, convicted a naturalized U.S. citizen on charges that he illegally exported guns to Nigeria without a license. At issue were eight handguns that Sheriff Olaleran Mohammed stuffed into brown paper bag and placed between the seats of a 1998 Mercury that was being shipped via a cargo ship container to Nigeria. Spanish police discovered the guns when the ship called in Valencia, Spain, on its way to Lagos.

The trial brief filed by Mr. Mohammed’s lawyers before the jury trial gives a pretty clear idea why he was ultimately convicted. First, the brief tries to rely on the exemption in section 123.17(c) of the ITAR for temporary exports of not more than three nonautomatic weapons for personal use. Since there were eight guns in the paper bag in the Mercury, I guess the idea here was that the defendant could invoke the exemption three times to cover his eight guns, or something like that.

The other argument forwarded by the defendant’s trial brief on the export charge is that Mr. Mohammed had no idea whatsoever that it was illegal to export firearms for personal use to Nigeria without a license. Which is, of course, why he stuffed them in a paper bag and hid them in a 1998 Mercury he was sending to Nigeria.

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Jun

24

It’s Good To Be The King


Posted by at 11:15 pm on June 24, 2014
Category: DDTCITARUSML

Intersil Low Dose Irradiator via http://www.intersil.com/en/applications/rad-hard/eldrs.html [Fair Use]Last week the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) announced that it had fined Intersil Corporation, a California-based manufacturer and developer of semiconductors and integrated circuits, $10,000,000 of which $6,000,000 goes to Uncle Sam and the remaining $4,000,000 goes to Intersil’s compliance program and remedial measures. Along with the fines, DDTC has required Intersil to jump through a number of now-typical compliance and re-education hoops, including appointing an ombudsman, hiring a special compliance officer, rewriting its compliance programs, engaging in audits, making frequent reports to DDTC and writing “I will not violate the ITAR” three million times on a blackboard after school. Well, of course, only the last item was not actually required.

According to the Proposed Charging Letter, Intersil incurred the ire of DDTC by classifying certain of its products as ECCN 3A001.a.1, 3A001.a.2, and EAR99 even though the items were radiation hardened and space qualified and, therefore, covered instead by USML Category XV(e). Why Intersil made this mistake is not revealed in the documents but since Intersil was applying for BIS licenses for the goods when required, it is hard to imagine that it was anything other than a good faith mistake (which is, probably, the reason why this information is omitted.) As a result, there were 3,152 unauthorized exports of Intersil’s products, although, due to the statute of limitations, only 339 exports were actually charged, with DDTC swearing left and right that although it couldn’t help mentioning the 3,152 exports it was paying absolutely no attention whatsoever to those in formulating the $10 million penalty.

But here is the most interesting part of the charging documents:

Several of the unauthorized exports were subsequently re-exported or retransferred without authorization due in part to the misclassification of the ICs.On August 20, 2010, a DDTC official misinformed Intersil that for any ICs that “HAVE already been exported under EAR jurisdiction, these [ICs] ARE NOT retroactively subject to the retransfer provisions of 22 CFR 123.9.: Intersil was further misadvised that Intersil did not need to inform its foreign customers to submit ITAR re-export authorization for these items and that this “decision to not retroactively aply USML controls for these already exported [ICs] will continue to be applicable even if a future formal CJ determination asserts USML controls apply.”

Interestingly, notwithstanding this bad advice, Intersil is charged with causing various unauthorized re-exports from, and retransfers in, foreign countries due to its misclassification of the integrated circuits. Whether or not any of these were the result, at least in part, of DDTC’s admittedly bad advice that the retransfer provisions would not apply to items exported under the EAR is not clear, but let’s give DDTC the benefit of the doubt and assume that these were all unrelated.

Even so, there is still an interesting moral to this story. Exporters who make mistakes have to pay large fines and engage in burdensome remediation activities. DDTC officials who make mistakes have to do, er, well, nothing at all because, well, you know, mistakes happen. As they say, it’s good to be the king.

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Jun

23

Seeing Through the Smoked-Filled Rooms of Sanctions


Posted by at 6:37 pm on June 23, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsGeneralOFACRussia SanctionsSanctionsSDN List

By Erifnam at en.wikipedia [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], from Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AK_Street_NW_at_19th_Street.jpg

The Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail reported last week that lobbying records made public this month show the CEO and a lobbyist for Kinross Gold Corp., a Canadian gold mining company and one of the world’s largest, “have had numerous communications” with Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s foreign affairs policy adviser, Canada’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and the Canadian ambassador to Russia in order to discuss “policies and regulations related to the imposition of economic sanctions.”

With almost a third of Kinross’s global gold production reportedly coming from its two mines in Russia, Kinross has good reason to to try to find out, to the best extent possible, whether the Canadian government plans to impose sanctions relating to Russia that may affect Kinross business in that country.

Canadian sanctions against Russia, like U.S. and EU laws, involve prohibitions on dealings with targeted persons and give government authorities wide latitude to designate individuals and entities with essentially no public notice or consultation.  Under U.S. law, for example, OFAC can designate an SDN at any time without having to comply with public notice and review requirements imposed on almost all government agencies so long as the person meets the often broad criteria of a sanctions target under an executive order.

Moreover, OFAC deems any entity owned 50% or more by an SDN to be treated as an SDN itself.  As we previously reported, the so-called 50% rule has caused a variety of compliance conundrums relating to Russia as a few individuals, like Gennady Timchenko, Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg, own major companies in many sectors of the Russian economy.  To boot, Kinross may have gotten understandably skittish when, south of the border, President Obama issued his latest Russian sanctions-related executive order in late March permitting imposition of sanctions on those operating in various sectors of the Russian economy, including metals and mining.  Under that criteria, Kinross itself might later be designated an SDN.

Sanctioning governments have, of course, reasons for their secrecy.  Intended targets can’t be announced prior to sanctions being imposed and, therefore, given a head start in transferring their property and money to safe haven countries.  But with little guidance and a lot at stake, Kinross has every reason to reach out to government officials to gain any clarity possible and do one’s best to make sure business can continue as usual or, if not, how to adjust its operations to comply with applicable laws.

Kinross is not alone.  U.S. federal lobbying records for this year’s first quarter are now publicly available.  For example, Coca-Cola, Xerox and Citgo are among the variety of companies that have reported lobbying efforts relating to sanctions against Russia.  Because sanctions against Russia weren’t imposed until the end of the first quarter in March, we expect to see disclosures in subsequent quarters from more companies involved in such efforts.

If there are smoke-filled rooms in economic sanctions, the smoke is mostly from government cigars (and maybe Cuban-origin for the Canadians).  The smoke arises where statutes, regulations and executive orders give government agencies dangerously broad discretion in identifying the sanctions targets and enforcing sanctions laws in ways that are not readily apparent from the laws themselves.

Future economic sanctions laws are not likely to be written any clearer.  Much of their effectiveness lies in not knowing who will be targeted and, as a result, the better chance there is that companies and individuals will police themselves in order to avoid possible violation.  In such an uncertain environment, finding people who can get as much information as possible from government officials enforcing sanctions will always be an invaluable resource.

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Jun

20

New Russia/Ukraine Designations (June 20, 2014)


Posted by at 11:10 am on June 20, 2014
Category: Russia Designations

OFAC just announced new Russia/Ukraine additions to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List:

BOLOTOV, Valery (a.k.a. BOLOTOV, Valeri; a.k.a. BOLOTOV, Valeriy); DOB 1970; alt. DOB 1971 (individual) [UKRAINE].

GIRKIN, Igor Vsevolodovich (a.k.a. STRELKOV, Igor Ivanovich; a.k.a. STRELKOV, Ihor; a.k.a. STRELOK, Igor), Shenkurskiy Passage (Proyezd), House 8-6, Apartment 136, Moscow, Russia; DOB 17 Dec 1970; citizen Russia; Passport 4506460961 (individual) [UKRAINE].

KAUROV, Valery Vladimirovich (a.k.a. KAUROV, Valerii Volodymyrovych; a.k.a. KAUROV, Valeriy; a.k.a. KAUROV, Valery); DOB 02 Apr 1956; POB Odessa, Ukraine (individual) [UKRAINE].

MENYAILO, Sergei Ivanovich (a.k.a. MENYAILO, Sergei; a.k.a. MENYAILO, Sergey); DOB 22 Aug 1960; POB Alagir, North Ossetia, Russia; Acting Governor of Sevastopol (individual) [UKRAINE].

PONOMARYOV, Vyacheslav (a.k.a. PONOMAREV, Vyacheslav; a.k.a. PONOMARYOV, Vachislav); DOB 02 May 1965 (individual) [UKRAINE].

PURGIN, Andrey Yevgenyevich (a.k.a. PURGIN, Andrei; a.k.a. PURGIN, Andrej; a.k.a. PURGIN, Andriy; a.k.a. PURGYN, Andriy; a.k.a. PURHIN, Andriy); DOB 26 Jan 1972 (individual) [UKRAINE].

PUSHILIN, Denis (a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denis; a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denis Volodymyrovych; a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denys); DOB 09 May 1981; POB Makeevka, Ukraine (individual) [UKRAINE].

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Jun

19

The Unverified List Rises Again


Posted by at 7:01 pm on June 19, 2014
Category: BISRussia SanctionsUnverified List

By Daderot (Own work) [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APatent_quote_-_United_States_Department_of_Commerce_-_DSC05103.JPGAs we reported back in January of this year, in a sort of Christmas amnesty, the Bureau of Industry and Security(“BIS”) freed all current prisoners on the Unverified List (“UVL”) and announced that it was building a bigger and more uncomfortable jail for the next set of UVL inmates. Under the rules of the new jail, all exports to parties on the UVL, regardless of the value of the export, would require an AES filing. If the export to the UVL party required a license, no license exceptions could be used. And, most importantly, UVL parties would have to sign a lengthy statement promising to obey the Export Administration Regulations, revealing the end use and end user of the item (including the address,  favorite ethnic food and Facebook password for each end user), committing to cooperate in all future end use checks and swearing on a religious book of choice that they would be home and in bed by 9:00 p.m. every night, no exceptions. (I exaggerate, of course, but the required statement is lengthy, contains most of the things I’ve listed and must be signed even if the U.S. exporter is planning to send a set of steak knives or other EAR99 item to the UVL party.)

On Monday, the gates of the new prison opened and 29 new UVL inmates were welcomed to the new and improved UVL correctional facility. I scanned the list and did not see any former entities on the UVL on this new list, although it’s possible I might have missed a few. The announcement of the new list does not reveal the particular crimes committed by each entity on the list but under BIS rules they would have had to have failed an end-use check in one way or other, either by not submitting to it, not being where they were supposed to be, or not being able to explain what happened to an item previously exported to them.

Five Russian companies were added to the UVL, and this was probably unconnected to recent sanctions on Russia over the Crimea and Ukraine issues. Given that BIS has suspended issuing licenses for Russia, being on the list may be somewhat more burdensome for the Russian parties.  Although licenses might in theory be available as a fall-back option to UVL parties outside Russia who could no longer use license exceptions, this fall-back option will not be available to the Russian entities on the UVL.

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(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)