Archive for December, 2009

Top 10 Export Stories of 2009

Thursday, December 31st, 2009

Happy New Year!After seeing that CNN was doing a feature on the top ten YouTube videos of 2009, the staff at Export Law Blog decided that we no longer had an excuse not to recount the top 10 export stories of 2009. However, we can’t guarantee anything quite as awesome as the YouTube video of the toddler dancing to Beyoncé’s Single Ladies (Put A Ring On It). But here goes anyway, in reverse order:

10. Nobody really knows what Part 129’s definition of arms broker includes but it certainly included a website from a Portland yacht broker trying to find customers for an armed hovercraft being sold by somebody in Eastern Europe for $60 million. Several days after the web page appeared, it was yanked.

9. BIS amended its rules to control the export of tonfas and sjamboks. And, no, these are not menu items found in Asian restaurants.

8. Canada actually prosecuted someone for an export violation.

7. Iran used eBay to buy military aircraft parts from eBay dealers who, apparently, thought that DDTC stands for Dauphin Dog Training Club.

6. OFAC and BIS amended the rules implementing the Cuba sanctions to allow more exports of cellphones, computers, peripherals and digital devices to Cuba. Three months later Cuba arrested a U.S. citizen distributing laptops and cellphones in Cuba to Cuban citizens.

5. French export control officer for Luxembourg-based Qioptiq SARL urged company employees not to consult U.S. export lawyers because they “play by the book” and will “push you to” disclose export violations. DDTC briefly abandoned its distaste for export lawyers and fined Qioptiq $25 million dollars.

4. DDTC finally released its amended brokering regulations. The entire world wished it hadn’t.

3. OFAC and the State Department finally discovered the Internet and realized that letting ordinary people in sanctioned countries use Twitter, Facebook and YouTube might actually be good for world democracy.

2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit smacked down the DOJ’s outrageous (and routine) assertion that courts can’t review DDTC’s determination that a particular item fits in a particular USML category. The money quote:

A designation by an unnamed official, using unspecified criteria, that is put in a desk drawer, taken out only for use at a criminal trial, and immune from any evaluation by the judiciary, is the sort of tactic usually associated with totalitarian régimes.

1. U.S. authorities liberated $536 million from Swiss bank vaults after Credit Suisse was caught lying to U.S. banks in order to clear U.S. dollar transactions for Iran. “Neutrality,” the Swiss learned yet again, isn’t free.

How the OFAC Stole Christmas

Thursday, December 24th, 2009
Santa Flanked by F-16

A spokesman for the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) told Export Law Blog this morning that discussions between OFAC and the North Pole over Santa Claus’s Christmas Eve itinerary had broken down and were not expected to be resumed before Santa’s scheduled departure on December 24 at 10 pm EST.

The dispute arose from a dilemma that the U.S. sanctions against Cuba posed for Santa’s planned delivery of toys to children in Cuba. If Santa delivers toys for U.S. children first, there will be toys destined for Cuba in the sleigh in violation of 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(b). That rule prohibits Santa’s sleigh from entering the United States with “goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest.” On the other hand, if Santa delivers the toys to Cuban children first, then 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(a) prohibits the sleigh from entering the United States and “unloading freight for a period of 180 days from the date the vessel departed from a port or place in Cuba.”

A press release from the North Pole announced that the OFAC rules left Santa no choice but to bypass the children of the United States this Christmas. A spokesman from OFAC warned that if Santa attempted to overfly the United States, his sleigh would be forced to land and his cargo seized. He continued:

We know that the outcome is harsh, but we cannot allow Fidel Castro’s regime to continue to be propped up by Santa’s annual delivery of valuable Christmas toys to Cuban children.

Congressional leaders did not return our calls.


This post is an annual Christmas Eve tradition and appeared previously in 2007 and 2008 in slightly altered form. Export Law Blog would like to take the opportunity of this post to extend its best holiday wishes to all of its readers. Posting will be light between now and the end of the holidays due as much to the holidays as to a heartless clerk at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals who established a briefing schedule that requires me to file a brief on December 30.

America’s First Arms Broker

Monday, December 21st, 2009

Unlikely AlliesWith the federal government closed by snow, it’s a slow day for export news, which gives me the opportunity to plug “Unlikely Allies” by Joel Richard Paul. The book which reads like a novel of eighteenth-century intrigue recounts the true story of America’s first arms-broker, Silas Deane. Professor Paul, who teaches at UC-Hastings Law School, has written a book about arms-smuggling, intrigue in the Court of Versailles, duplicity, espionage and the most-unlikely cast of characters you might encounter outside of, say, a Mozart opera.

In fact, one of the key characters, Beaumarchais, is best known to history as the playwright of The Barber of Seville and The Marriage of Figaro. He also, it seems, dabbled in arms-smuggling, hatching a plot to smuggle French weapons to the Continental Army by transshipping them through a Caribbean island. Another unlikely character in the tale is the Chevalier d’Eon, a French military hero rumored to be a woman. And finally there is Silas Deane, a plain-spoken Connecticut merchant and delegate to the Continental Congress, who spoke not a single word of French but was sent to Versailles to solicit armaments and aid from the French.

So, if you’re looking for a good read over the holidays, pick-up Unlikely Allies, either in dead tree format or for your eBook reader of choice (Sony Reader, Nook, or Kindle).

(Note: the links in this post are not affiliate links and I don’t receive anything if you click through and buy the book at any of them. This is just another value-added service of Export Law Blog for its loyal readers.)

@Ahmadinejad: Twitter Is Coming to Town. #IranElection

Thursday, December 17th, 2009

Twitter Keeps Iran AfloatThe Department of State sent on Tuesday, December 15,  a report to Congress under section 1606 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note)(“IIANPA”). Under section 1603 of  IIANPA, no items on the Commerce Control List can be exported to Iran. However, section 1606 gives the President the authority to waive that restriction 15 days after a report to Congress explaining in detail why the waiver is in the interest of U.S. national security.

The report set forth the national security rationale as follows:

Personal internet-based communications are a vital tool for change in Iran as recent events have demonstrated. However, U.S. sanctions on Iran are having an unintended chilling effect on the ability of companies such as Microsoft and Google to continue providing essential communications tools to ordinary Iranians. This waiver will authorize free downloads to Iran of certain nominally dual-use software (because of low-level encryption elements) classified as mass market software by the Department of Commerce and essential for the exchange of personal communications and/or sharing of information over the internet. The waiver will enable Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control ["OFAC"] to issue a broader general license covering these downloads and related services.

The report leaves open several interesting questions. First, what services does it cover? Just Microsoft and Google’s instant messaging services or other communications services such as Twitter and YouTube? The State Department report talks about export of certain software to Iran (assuming apparently that allowing the download of software is an export rather than a provision of a service). However, it says nothing about services not involving downloads.

Twitter and YouTube don’t require any downloads. Twitter and YouTube both provide services to Iranians by providing a unique URI to each Iranian Tweeter (n., from geekspeak, a person who uses Twitter; a Twitterer) or YouTuber. But the IIANPA only requires a sanction on exports of goods, not services, so OFAC is presumably free to issue a general license allowing access to the Twitter and YouTube services to ordinary Iranians, and it seems reasonable to suppose that is about to happen given the State Department letter’s reference to a “broader general license covering these downloads and related services.” (Compliance question: how is Twitter to know that “tedintehran” isn’t actually Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s twitter ID?).

The second question is what about other sanctioned countries? Shouldn’t their ordinary citizens have access to these communications technologies as well? This is a more complicated question and depends on the extent to which those countries are subject to legislatively imposed sanctions. The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 has similar provisions as the IIANPA relating to exports of dual-use items to Syria and also provides a mechanism for a Presidential report to Congress to waive application of those mandatory sanctions. Without a similar report from the State Department on Syria, the restrictions on instant messaging and internet communications technologies such as Twitter and YouTube will remain in place, although there doesn’t seem to be any good reason to treat ordinary Syrians any differently from ordinary Iranians in this regard.

Guilty Pleas for Violating the “There Oughta Be A” Law

Wednesday, December 16th, 2009

Border StationTwo men, one in Texas and one in New Jersey, have pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 554 in connection with a scheme where the New Jersey man provided false NAFTA certificates of origin to the Texas man, who then used them to export non-U.S. textiles to customers in Mexico. Obviously, the purpose of this scheme was to defraud Mexico of duties that otherwise would have been due on the textile imports if it had been disclosed that they weren’t U.S.-origin goods.

This, of course, is a very, very, very bad thing. Particularly so far as the Mexicans are concerned. And there ought to be a law, as they say. But that law isn’t 18 U.S.C. § 554. Since nobody involved in the prosecution or investigation of the two men appears to have read the law, let’s do something novel and actually read it:

Whoever fraudulently or knowingly exports or sends from the United States, or attempts to export or send from the United States, any merchandise, article, or object contrary to any law or regulation of the United States, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise, article or object, prior to exportation, knowing the same to be intended for exportation contrary to any law or regulation of the United States, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

I’ve added the emphasis to the statutory text so that you can easily see that section 554 cannot be violated on its own but requires that another federal law or regulation be violated. So what U.S. statute is violated when the fake NAFTA certificate is presented to Mexican customs officials? Nothing on the CPB form for the NAFTA Certificate of Origin references any laws that would be broken by false statements on the form.

Certainly, there was no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592 because that statute only applies to false statements to U.S. Customs made in connection with imports into the United States. Even if somehow or another section 1592 applied in this case, violation of the statute results in civil penalties but does not make the exportation itself contrary to law as required for a violation of section 554. That argument applies as well to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 which criminalizes certain material misrepresentations in certain government documents: that statute doesn’t make the export of the goods illegal.

Nor is the identity of the other law required for a violation of section 554 revealed in the court documents released in this case. That other necessary law isn’t mentioned or referred to in the criminal information, in the plea agreement for the New Jersey defendant, or in the plea agreement for the Texas defendant. Only 18 U.S.C § 554 is mentioned in those three documents. In short, the two men were prosecuted for, and plead guilty to, violating a law that they simply didn’t violate and couldn’t legally have violated.

One has to wonder whether the attorneys for the two defendants did anything in this case other than take their fees and assure the defendants that they got a good deal from the prosecution. The lesson here, for defense attorneys and prosecutors alike, is that just because something ought to be against the law doesn’t mean that it actually is against the law. That’s one of the things you were supposed to have learned in law school.

UPDATE: Stu Seidel now at Baker & McKenzie (and before that having a long and distinguished career at Customs) points out in comments that the fake certificate would in fact violate 19 U.S.C § 1592(f) which prohibits false statements in NAFTA certificates on exported goods. However, like section 1592(a) the provision doesn’t make the exportation illegal, rather it imposes civil penalties for violations. Since it doesn’t make the export unlawful but only the certification unlawful it cannot stand as a predicate statute for a violation of section 554. Similarly 19 C.F.R. § 181.81, cited by Stu, can support a penalty for the false certification but not a finding that the export is illegal. Neither section 1592(f) nor 19 C.F.R. § 181.81 were cited by the information or the plea agreement as the predicate statutes for the charged violation of section 554.

Maybe the Shoe Is on the Other Foot

Tuesday, December 15th, 2009

Free The HikersOn Monday, a U.S. Federal District Court Judge in Delaware sentenced Amir Hossein Ardebili, who was the subject of this earlier post on Export Law Blog, to five years in prison, less time served and credit for good behavior, based on Ardebili’s guilty plea to U.S. charges arising out of attempted exports of military goods to Iran. During Ardebili’s statement at the sentencing hearing, he frequently burst into tears, even at one point crying so much that a break was taken.

Iran immediately denounced the sentence and announced that it would try three American hikers that wandered into Iran last summer, implicitly linking Ardebili’s fate to that of the three U.S. hikers now held in Iranian prisons According to an Iranian press agency, Iran Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, said that the jail sentence handed down yesterday was “illegal.” Tehran has also argued that under international law officials in Georgia were obliged to return Ardebili to Iran rather than giving him to U.S. agents, reports Iran’s Press TV network.

Iran’s claim of a requirement to return Ardebili under international law is not quite on the mark since there really isn’t such a recognized right in extradition matters. As generally understood, international law holds that no country is obliged to extradite anyone. This understanding of international law explains why there are a hundreds of bilateral extradition treaties, although the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Georgia. That doesn’t mean that a country, such as Georgia, cannot voluntarily hand over someone in the absence of a treaty. However, that is normally only done after a representation of reciprocal treatment by the country requesting extradition.

U.S. law does permit, in limited circumstances, extradition from the United States in the absence of a treaty with the country requesting extradition. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) the U.S. will allow such extradition from the United States of foreign persons but only for violent crimes that are not deemed political offenses. Certainly the crime that Ardebili was alleged to have committed was not a violent crime and so an extradition of a person from the U.S. on export charges by a country without an extradition treaty would be illegal under U.S. law. This means that the U.S. couldn’t really make a commitment of reciprocal treatment to Georgia to support its request for a non-treaty extradition of Ardebili. If the situation were reversed, U.S. law would actually prohibit the extradition

The problem created here is that the shaky grounds for U.S. jurisdiction over Ardebili detract from our own country’s argument that Iran should return the hikers. After all, Iran’s claim of jurisdiction to hold the hikers is stronger than the U.S. claim of jurisdiction over Ardebili even if Iran’s substantive claim that the hikers broke the law is dubious. After all, the hikers were captured in Iran whereas Ardebili was lured into Georgia and arrested there.

Defense Trade Treaties Slouching Towards Ratification

Thursday, December 10th, 2009
Andrew Shapiro
ABOVE: Andrew Shapiro testifying
today before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee


The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today held a hearing on the Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties between the United States and the United Kingdom and between the United States and Australia. Both treaties, the text of which can be found here, would permit certain defense items to be exported without a license from the United States to certain users in the United Kingdom and Australia. Signed in June and September 2007, the two treaties have since languished in the Senate approval process.

Senator Kerry, the Chairman of the committee, indicated in his opening statement his intent to draft and pass a resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of both treaties, although no time frame was given. Senator Lugar, the Ranking Member, used his opening statement to whine about the Implementing Arrangements for the treaty which, he said, weren’t subject to the advice and consent of the Senate and could be changed at any time by the White House and its counterparts in the United Kingdom and Australia. So much for our special relationship with those countries. Whether Lugar’s vote will ultimately be needed for an advice and consent resolution remains to be seen.

Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs at the State Department testified in favor of ratification of the treaties signifying that the Obama administration will take the same position on the treaties as did his predecessor in the White House. Perhaps to allay the concerns of Lugar and others on the Committee, Shapiro emphasized that items exported under the treaties would be subject to stringent controls on their use and export from the United Kingdom and Australia. He also cited two examples of areas in which cooperation among the U.S, the U.K, and Australia would be useful: forensic technology to investigate IED explosions and development of “non-lethal capabilities for counter-piracy and maritime counter-terrorism.” Frankly these seem odd areas to highlight but perhaps Shapiro was responding to some specific Committee concerns

Associate Deputy Attorney General James Baker ended the hearing with testimony underlining the Department of Justice’s belief that the two treaties would not need implementing legislation. Baker argued that because the treaties were “self-executing” they could legally be put into force by the current administration through minor amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the “ITAR”).

And If The Shoe Were on the Other Foot?

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009
Amir Ardebili
ABOVE: Amir Ardebili captured on
surveillance video in Tbilsi, Georgia


Amir Hossein Ardebili, an Iranian national, engaged in extensive negotiations from Iran and apparently on behalf of the Iranian government to export defense items from the United States to Iran. The U.S. companies, however, were sting operations set up by U.S. undercover agents. When the agents lured Ardebili from Iran to Tbilsi, Georgia, they arrested him in October 2007 and, seemingly with the cooperation of Georgian authorities, brought him back to the United States where he was secretly imprisoned and held under a sealed indictment.

Ardebili has pleaded guilty to charges, among other things, that he violated the United States Arms Export Control Act. In preparation for his sentencing on December 14, some of the sealed documents, including a redacted version of the indictment have been unsealed. Prior to the unsealing, the identity of the city where Ardebili was snatched had been undisclosed but it’s now clear that, as had been rumored, Ardebili had traveled to Georgia to meet with the agents.

The government’s sentencing memorandum, in an effort to obtain the maximum term of imprisonment possible, provides further details of the undercover investigation. Significantly, the memo stresses that the Ardebili was engaged in procurement activities for his sole customer, the government of Iran, which was seeking the items because it believed it was going to go to war with the United States.

Ardebili’s attorney has filed a motion for a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines, arguing that the 22 months already served in solitary confinement caused Ardebili to become clinically depressed. The motion further noted that all of Ardebili’s activities were legal in Iran, where they took place, and that he was acting “indirectly on behalf of the Government of Iran.”

What are we to make of the fact here that the defendant was acting in Iran on behalf of the Iranian government and was later taken by U.S. agents from Georgia to stand trial in the United States? After the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), abduction of defendants from foreign countries in order to bring them to the United States to stand trial is legal. The doctrine of functional sovereign immunity from prosecution for acts taken on behalf of foreign governments is basically confined to high officials of those countries. And the U.S. takes the controversial position that it has criminal jurisdiction over anyone located in foreign countries trying to export items from the United States.

Of course, if the shoe were on the other foot, if an American businessman had been abducted by Iranian agents from a hotel in, say, Russia and then secretly held in solitary confinement for two years in Iran, you can bet your you-know-what that we would be screaming bloody murder. I am not a fan of the Government of Iran or its nuclear aspirations, but we really have to understand that if we employ extraordinary means such as were employed here then we will have no cause to complain when those same methods are used against U.S. citizens abroad.

Here is some of the surveillance video of the meeting between the U.S. agents and Ardebili in Georgia:

Exporter and Former Exec At Odds Over Export Charges

Tuesday, December 8th, 2009

WhistleblowerFor any exporters who may be thinking of ignoring prior export violations hoping that no one will find out, this SEC filing and its tale of a whistleblower might give them an occasion for pause. Law Enforcement Associates just disclosed in an 8-K filed with the SEC that a former executive that the company had dismissed had charged the company with export violations.

The charges by the former executive, Mr. Paul Feldman, are contained in a letter that Feldman filed with the Department of Labor in connection with his dismissal. According to that letter, Law Enforcement Associates appears to have sold items to a company called Safesource for export to the Dominican Republican. Thereafter, Feldman learned that John Carrington, a former owner of Law Enforcement Associates, was a 50 percent owner of Safesource. That was problematic, according to Feldman’s letter, because Carrington was subject to a BIS denial order.

Feldman, another company director and company counsel then contacted the BIS agent that had investigated Mr. Carrington to inform the agent of the exports and its discovery that Carrington was involved in the exports. A week later federal agents raided Safesource.

Three other directors at Law Enforcement Associates, who Feldman alleges were friends of Carrington, became upset about the disclosures to federal authorities. They fired the company’s general counsel who had met with the BIS agent and replaced him with the personal attorney of one of the three Board members. The three directors also sought to have Feldman tell them what he had said to the BIS agent. When Feldman refused, claiming that the three other directors were leaking information about the matter to Carrington, the newly-appointed general counsel, according to Feldman’s letter, called the BIS agent “demanding” that he reveal what Feldman had told the government. Not surprisingly, the BIS agent is said to have told the new general counsel to “tread lightly.” (Practice note to budding export lawyers: this was not a good move by the new general counsel.) Feldman was later fired by a vote of the three directors.

Notwithstanding the ill-advised board-room theatrics — it’s generally a bad idea to try to shut down a company official trying to report export violations — it’s not clear that an export violation by the Company even occurred here. Of course, as regular readers are aware, I do not believe that BIS has the authority to impose general denial orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, BIS’s current governing statute. Even if BIS did have that authority, the portion of the Denial Order that deals with actions by third parties, such as Law Enforcement Associates, would prohibit Law Enforcement Associates from assisting the Denied Person from acquiring any item to be exported from the United States. Here, the items exported were acquired by Safesource, which was not a Denied Person, and not by Carrington, who was.

Law Enforcement Associates disputes the claims made in the Feldman letter and states its belief that the allegations are simply an “attempt by a disgruntled former executive to seek retribution from the Company.”

Stay tuned. I don’t think this show is over yet.

New Processing Time Exception Announced by DDTC

Monday, December 7th, 2009

Stopped ClockThe Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) published today in the Federal Register a Notice indicating that it was adding a sixth exception to National Security Presidential Directive–56 which mandated a 60-day processing time for export license applications. According to the Notice, the 60-day time frame will not apply

[w]hen a related export policy is under active review and pending final determination by the Department of State.

Of course, this announcement makes me wonder whether a significant number of export policies have been under review by DDTC. Has the new administration begun a significant review of DDTC’s export polices? More importantly, is this new exception good or bad for exporters? Will the delay result in more applications being granted because the DDTC review winds up eliminating a denial policy? Or will it result in more applications being refused because DDTC’s review results in a new denial policy? Both actual experience and rampant speculation welcomed in the comments as answers to these questions.