Archive for July, 2009

U.S. Envoy to Sudan Criticizes Sanctions

Thursday, July 30th, 2009

Sudan"The day after Susan Rice, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., threatened new sanctions on Eritrea, Jonathan S. Gration, the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, in testimony given today before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called for the sanctions against Sudan to be lifted. According to this report in the Christian Science Monitor, Gration questioned whether genocide is ongoing in Sudan and stated that there was no evidence to support Sudan’s continued designation as a “state sponsor of terrorism.” Instead, that designation and the sanctions only hindered efforts, he claimed, to rebuild the country and to help dislocated Sudanese living in camps.

Interestingly, not one word of this was in Gration’s prepared remarks which had been submitted in advance to the Committee. The remarks about genocide in Sudan and the call for lifting the current sanctions appeared to have been delivered off-the-cuff. This probably reflects the internal debate at the White House about the Sudan Sanctions. Ambassador Rice was said, according to the same story in the Monitor, to have become furious over Gration’s remarks earlier this month about the “remnants of genocide” in Sudan.

If Sanctions Fell on Eritrea, Would Anyone Feel Them?

Wednesday, July 29th, 2009

Eritrean StampIn testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Susan Rice, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, rattled the sanctions saber against Eritrea, saying that the Eritrean government had only a “short window of time” to improve its relationship with the United States or be subject to sanctions. Rice did not specify what sanctions she had in mind.

The U.S. has accused Eritrea for quite some time of supporting Al-Qaeda linked groups in neighboring Somalia. Based on these allegations, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo in October 2008. That embargo was largely symbolic because in the prior year no military sales had been made from the United States to Eritrea.

If the United States unilaterally attempts to impose restrictions on imports and exports to Eritrea, these restrictions are likely to be just as symbolic as the arms embargo. In 2008, U.S. exports to Eritrea totaled just under $15 million, which is about 3% of Eritrea’s annual estimated imports of approximately $500 million. U.S. imports from Eritrea are even less significant, coming in at a whopping $129,000 in 2008. And whether or not the U.S. could enlist the U.N. or other countries in imposing new sanctions remains to be seen.

Syrian Sanctions Relief Announced

Tuesday, July 28th, 2009

Syrian Arab Airlines 747According to this article in the New York Times, the Obama administration announced today more easing of the sanctions against Syria, stating that it would begin expedited case-by-case consideration of export licenses to Syria:

The move will particularly affect “requests to export products related to information technology and telecommunication equipment and parts and components related to the safety of civil aviation,” said a State Department spokesman, Andrew J. Laine.

Sanctions on Syria were imposed by Congressional mandate pursuant to the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. Section 5 of that Act required the President to block exports of all items on the United States Munitions List and the Commerce Control List to Syria. It also required the President to impose at least two of six specific sanctions set forth in the legislation. The two that he selected were, first, the ban on all exports to Syria other than food and medicine and, second, a prohibition on Syrian aircraft landing in, or overflying, the United States (with the exceptions of aircraft carrying Syrian government officials on government business in the United States).

In implementing the Act and the Executive Order, BIS had considered, on a case-by-case basis license applications to export medical devices, aircraft parts and telecommunications equipment. In February of this year, BIS approved the export of aircraft parts to put two mothballed Syrian Arab Airlines 747s back in service.

Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act permits the President to waive any of the acts required export controls if the President finds that such a waiver is in the interest of national security and reports those reasons to the relevant Congressional committees. Although Andrew Laine’s statement re-affirms the more liberal policy towards aircraft parts and telecommunications, the White House’s statements also suggest that the waiver power may be exercised outside the pre-existing categories of medical devices, aircraft parts, and telecommunications equipment.

One area the the White House should consider further liberalizing would be medical devices and the elimination of a license requirement for exports to Syria of medical devices. Under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”), medical devices could be exported to Syria without a license. Because the Syria Accountability Act only referred to exceptions for “food and medicine,” the prior administration had interpreted this as over-ruling TSRA and as requiring licenses for medical devices, even though it seems likely that the phrase “food and medicine” was simply a sloppy reference to TSRA and not intended to affect the status of medical devices. Use of the waiver procedure under section 5(b) would allow the President to correct this mistake.

Riddle of the Day

Thursday, July 23rd, 2009

Iranian AccountThe Office of Foreign Assets Control issued today a Final Rule, without notice or public participation, which, effective immediately, amends the Iranian Transactions Regulations to amend the definition of “Iranian Account” found in § 560.320 of those Regulations. Prior to the amendment, “Iranian accounts” were defined as:

accounts of persons located in Iran or of the Government of Iran maintained on the books of either a United States depository institution or a United States registered broker or dealer in securities.

Under the amended rules the phrase “persons located in Iran” has been replaced by “persons who are ordinarily resident in Iran, except when such persons are not located in Iran.”

The definition is important to exporters because an “Iranian account” can’t be debited in connection with sales to Iran of agricultural products, medicines or medical devices under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. The definition is also important to banks which are forbidden to service “Iranian accounts.”

OFAC claims that, without explaining why, the new defintion will “facilitate compliance by U.S. financial institutions” and, presumably compliance by TSRA exporters by extension. And that’s the riddle of the day: how exactly does the amendment accomplish that?

The old rule was certainly somewhat ambiguous. How does one determine exactly whether a person is “located in Iran.” Probably simply by looking at the address of the account holder. That’s at least a bright line rule. But the new rule seems even harder to apply. How do you define ordinarily resident? A person could have a U.S. or non-Iranian address where they are sometimes resident even though they ordinarily reside in Iran. When the account is opened under that non-Iranian address, what due diligence can establish that the person is not “ordinarily resident” in Iran. How does my bank know where I ordinarily reside?

Worse, if someone who’s ordinarily resident in Iran, the account is not Iranian while they are not in Iran, but immediately becomes an Iranian account the moment that person sets foot on Iranian soil. How on earth can a financial institution or a TSRA exporter assure that the account holder is outside Iran at the time of the transaction involving the account?

OFAC clearly has something in mind in thinking that this is an improvement, but for the life of me, I can’t tell what. If an Export Law Blog readers have an idea, please share it with the rest of us in the comments section.

Cuba Tourist Files Suit Over OFAC Questionnaire

Wednesday, July 22nd, 2009

BrukerZachary Sanders, a Brooklyn attorney, filed* suit in federal district court against the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) in connection with a $9,000 fine imposed on him by OFAC for failing to respond to a Request for Information (“RFI”) that the agency sent to him in 2000. The RFI sought information about suspected travel by Sanders to Cuba in 1998.

Although courts have tossed out challenges to the constitutionality of the travel embargo, this case presents a different issue. OFAC was not charging Sanders with travelling to Cuba but only with failing to answer questions OFAC asked about whether he had traveled to Cuba. In this case, the issue is whether penalizing Sanders for failing to answer the RFI violates the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

The story begins with Mr. Sander’s return to the United States on July 6, 1998. Customs officials became suspicious because Mr. Sander’s passport and travel papers showed that he had visited Mexico and then returned to the United States through the Bahamas on a transit visa. That, apparently, is a good indication that the traveler likely travelled to Cuba. Mr. Sander’s case wasn’t helped when Customs found a box of Cuban cigars in his luggage that weren’t listed on his customs declaration.

Almost two years later, on March 1, 2000, OFAC finally got around to sending the RFI at issue, which asked Sanders, among other things, whether he had travelled to Cuba, what he had done there and how much he had spent there. On February 13, 2002, OFAC sent a pre-penalty notice relating to Sander’s failure to respond to the RFI. The complaint for failure to answer the RFI was filed with the assigned ALJ on March 2, 2000. By the time that the administrative complaint was filed in 2005 by OFAC, the five-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S. § 2462 prevented the agency from including any charges based on the alleged 1998 trip.

A one-day hearing was held before the ALJ on June 27, 2005. It took the ALJ more than three years to write and to issue his five-page opinion, which he finally released on September 4, 2008. Such a lengthy gestation did not prevent the ALJ’s opinion from being an utter mess. Among other things, the ALJ wondered, even though no party argued this, whether OFAC could effectively extend the statute of limitations by simply filing RFIs and starting the five-year limitations period all over again. But after raising this issue, he never bothered to answer it.

More oddly, the ALJ acknowledged that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to the RFI because of the possibility of criminal prosecution for travel to Cuba. But he nonetheless imposed a $1,000 penalty assessment against Sanders, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), Baxter held that an adverse inference could be drawn in a civil proceeding based on a refusal to testify. Thus, if OFAC had charged Sanders with Cuba travel, it could draw an adverse inference from his refusal to say whether he had been to Cuba and could, in conjunction with other evidence, such as the smoking Cuban cigar box, find him guilty of travelling to Cuba. But the Baxter court did not say, and no court that I am aware of has said, that an agency could impose a civil penalty based solely and directly on a proper assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.

Upon review of the ALJ’s recommended decision and order, OFAC accepted everything in it, except the proposed penalty, which it increased to $9,000. Sanders’s district court complaint followed on July 16, 2009, more than 11 years after the alleged trip at issue, making this matter OFAC’s own version of Jarndyce and Jarndyce.

As an interesting detour in this case, Mr. Sander’s application for admission to the New Jersey Bar was denied over the alleged 1998 trip to Cuba and its aftermath, as well as two other Cuba trips not raised by the OFAC proceedings. But the decision ultimately appeared to be based on Sanders failure to declare the Cuban cigars in his baggage which occurred on his first two trips and not on the travel itself or the refusal to answer the RFI. Apparently Sanders finally wised up and, on the third trip, he didn’t pack any Cuban cigars in his luggage.


*PACER subscription required. I haven’t uploaded the large pdf file of the complaint to avoid undue bandwidth costs. If you don’t have a PACER subscription and want a copy of the complaint, email me and I’ll send it to you

BIS Makes A List, Bruker Doesn’t Check It Twice, Or Even Once.

Monday, July 20th, 2009

BrukerThe Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) just published a settlement agreement with Bruker AXS, the Wisconsin-based manufacturer of precision X-ray systems. The settlement, under which Bruker agreed to pay a fine of $7,500, arose from Bruker’s voluntary disclosure that it exported an EAR99 X-ray system to the Karachi CBW Research Institute University of Karachi’s Husein Ebrahim Jamal Research Institute of Chemistry (“HEJRIC”) in Karachi, Pakistan. HEJRIC is on BIS’s Entity List which means that a license is required for all exports of U.S.-origin items to HEJRIC.

It’s pretty clear what happened here. Bruker never bothered to look at or even check the entity list. This wasn’t an effort to export something that couldn’t be exported to HEJRIC because the entry for HEJRIC on the entity list notes that there is a presumption of approval for license applications for EAR99 items to HEJRIC. The lesson here is that your compliance program should make sure that all lists are checked — particularly since BIS has kindly compiled them in one place here.

UPDATE:
As commenter SParis pointed out, HEJRIC was just today removed from the Entitly List.

Export Law Grab Bag: Middle East Edition

Wednesday, July 15th, 2009

Grab BagNo big news today, so it’s time for another Export Law Blog grab bag, this time with an emphasis on some Middle East stories:

  • Saudi Arabia: This news report discloses that immigration officials in Saudi Arabia are scanning incoming electronic devices in search of pornography and pirated software. Before moving this to the “this won’t be a problem for me” column, remember that the Saudis have a more expansive view of pornography than you or I might and that it could include pictures that the puritanical Wahabbi inspector finds provocative. Electronic devices are said to include laptops, mp3 players, cell phone memory cards, flash drives, external hard drives and any other device that could harbor morally pernicious images. If such material is found, the device will be confiscated. You might try to claim that a genie put the images there, but I can’t guarantee that will be a successful defense. (UPDATE: A reader emails me to tell me that he knows of instances where Saudi immigration/customs seized Disney films on the grounds that talking animals were offensive.)
  • UAE: A software update pushed to Blackberry users in the UAE apparently contained spyware from California-based SS8. The spyware was a java application designed to intercept emails and text messages sent and received by the Blackberry user and then forward them to a central server where they could be examined more closely by UAE authorities. We assume that SS8 had a license for this since such software is classified under ECCN 5D980, which requires licenses to all destinations. The licensing policy set forth in section 742.13(b) indicates that licenses will ordinarily be given to telcom companies and their contractors. Of course, one wishes that the UAE spent as much time enforcing its own export controls as it does worrying about what its subjects are texting one another.
  • Syria: This blog reported last week on the sad fortunes of Orionair as a result of a Temporary Denial Order (“TDO”) issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) once it learned that the company had entered into a wet lease with Syrian Pearl airlines of two BAE aircraft with U.S. engines. The report was based on a story in Madrid’s Spanish-language daily CincoDías, which reported that BAE informed Orionair that it couldn’t return the aircraft that it was servicing to Orianair even before the TDO had been published. Apparently the CincoDías story was inaccurate in two minor respects. First, BAE didn’t take any action until it received a signed copy of the TDO. Second, BAE’s only communication was with Flybe, the maintenance provider, and not directly with Orionair. BAE, further did not advise Flybe that the aircraft had to remain in the United Kingdom, although the terms of the TDO clearly required that the aircraft not be exported back to Orionair in Spain. One other thing bears mention. In the TDO, BIS claimed that Orionair agreed not to export the BAE aircraft to Syria, although Orionair’s account seems to differ from this, particularly inasmuch as Orionair says it told BIS, in the words of Dorothy Gale, that it “had no power here.”

Company Files Chapter 11; Blames Export Investigation

Tuesday, July 14th, 2009

Thermal OpticsColorado-based Rocky Mountain Instruments, a manufacturer and distributor of optical components for lasers and imaging devices, filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. An affidavit by a company executive that is part of the filing also blames a 2007 raid by the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (“DCIS”) for at least part of the company’s financial woes, even though the raid has not yet resulted in any formal charges being filed against the company.

The affidavit went on to claim that the raid was triggered by an employee whistle-blower who reported that the company exported product specifications without a necessary export license. The product involved was not specified by the affidavit. As a result of the tip, DCIS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and the local constabulary surrounded the business on October 11, 2007, with fifty cars. Yes, you read that correctly: not five, but fifty, “five-zero,” five times ten, or, for any latinists out there, “L” cars. The company claims that the raid triggered a 15 percent decline in business, although it’s not quite clear how it derived that figure. In all events, it’s hard to imagine that a convoy of fifty police cars didn’t have at least some temporary impact on business.

Two compliance lessons can be learned here. First, there’s always a disgruntled employee who will happily turn your company in for export violations. Second, the ensuing theatrics from law enforcement might have a negative impact on a company’s future sales.

Air Shunt Settles Export Charges; Former Exec Still at Large

Monday, July 13th, 2009

John NakkashianLast week the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) posted a charging letter, a consent agreement, and an order relating to alleged export violations by Air Shunt, a California-based distributor of aircraft parts. Under the settlement, Air Shunt agreed to a $100,000 fine which was suspended provided that $70,000 had been spent on past compliance measures and $30,000 will be spent on future remedial actions specified in the consent agreement. Specifically, Air Shunt agreed to conduct an audit of its compliance procedures as well as to facilitate on-site inspections by DDTC with minimal advance notice.

The charges set forth in the charging letter consist of three exports which were previously recounted in an indictment filed against John Nakkashian, a former Vice-President of Shunt and a current fugitive from justice. These consisted of unlicensed exports of a J85-GE-21B engine actuator to the UAE, a J85-GE-21B engine ignition exciter to the UAE, and an Ametek military helicopter gyroscope to Thailand. The indictment alleged a fourth export of a Hamilton Sundstrand Generator Control to the UAE which is not recited in the charging letter but is undoubtedly referenced when that letter mentions “additional violations” that might have been charged but for Air Shunt’s adoption of remedial measures. A fourth count in the charging letter re-iterates a charge, previously set forth in a criminal information filed against Air Shunt that arose from Nakkashian having falsely marked export documents for the gyroscope export with “NLR” meaning “No License Required.” Air Shunt paid a $250,000 fine as part of a plea agreement in the criminal matter.

It doesn’t take much speculation to figure out why Nakkashian’s exports led to criminal charges. The J85-GE-21B engine is used on the F-5 Freedom Fighter. The largest fleet outside the United States is in Iran, having been sold to the Shah prior to the revolution. (Smaller fleets are flown by Ethiopia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia). I seriously doubt any regular reader of this blog will object when I surmise that the F-5 engine parts exported to the UAE were on their way to neighboring Iran.

A DOJ press release states that Nakkashian disappeared during the investigation of Air Shunt. His surname is a common Armenian surname and that could provide at least one clue as to where he might be.

[Thanks to reader HB for pointing out the F-5 connection.]

Chinese Spy Arrested for Export Violations During Atlanta Layover

Thursday, July 9th, 2009

KG-175 Taclane EncryptorChi Tong Kuok, a citizen of the PRC, was indicted earlier this week for violations of the Arms Export Control Act in connection with an attempted export of a General Dynamics KG-175 Taclane Encryptor to Kuok at his address in Macau. Kuok became the subject of an undercover investigation in 2006 after he sought to buy from a defense industry employee a device used for encrypted satellite communications between military aircraft and satellites. That defense industry contact referred Kuok to an undercover agent, who ultimately negotiated with Kuok to sell him the KG-175 Taclane Encryptor for export.

There doesn’t seem to be much question that the Taclane Encryptor is in Category XIII(b)(3) of the United States Munitions List. Although the General Dynamics web page describing the product doesn’t explicitly state that the item is USML, it is clear that the item was designed for, and primarily used for, military applications. Kuok also seemed to be quite aware that the export of the device was illegal. In the affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint, Kuok allegedly expressed concern that the undercover agent was FBI and allegedly indicated he preferred to pay by Western Union rather than through PayPal because the U.S. government monitored PayPal transactions.

Several interesting background details to the indictment are provided in this article in Wired. First, since Kuok was operating out of Macau, the federal agents running the investigation had to lure him back into the United States. The undercover agreed to deliver the encryption device in Panama. Kuok flew to Panama . . . through Atlanta. Oops. Kuok was arrested in Atlanta and is now being held without bail.

Second, Kuok told federal investigators after his arrest that he was acting on behalf of the government of the PRC. According to Kuok, the PRC government was seeking the encryption device, and other similar devices he had obtained or tried to obtain, to eavesdrop on U.S. military and government communications.

Third, after Kuok was arrested investigators were able to examine Kuok’s eBay account. This examination allegedly revealed that Kuok had purchased export-controlled items over eBay for export to China starting in 2005.

Once again, eBay seems to be developing as a major source of leakage of sensitive export-controlled items. Sellers on eBay are not likely to be very sophisticated about the export-status of the items they are selling and are unlikely to be concerned about much more than guaranteeing that they are paid for items before they ship them. And the Chinese government seems well aware of vulnerabiity and is all too willing to exploit it. At some point eBay and Craig’s List will be forced to address this issue on their own or risk possible government intervention to correct the problem.