Archive for December, 2008

How the OFAC Stole Christmas

Wednesday, December 24th, 2008
Santa Flanked by F-16

A spokesman for the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) told Export Law Blog this morning that discussions between OFAC and the North Pole over Santa Claus’s Christmas Eve itinerary had broken down and were not expected to be resumed before Santa’s scheduled departure on December 24 at 10 pm EST.

The dispute arose from a dilemma that the U.S. sanctions against Cuba posed for Santa’s planned delivery of toys to children in Cuba. If Santa delivers toys for U.S. children first, there will be toys destined for Cuba in the sleigh in violation of 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(b). That rule prohibits Santa’s sleigh from entering the United States with “goods in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest.” On the other hand, if Santa delivers the toys to Cuban children first, then 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(a) prohibits the sleigh from entering the United States and “unloading freight for a period of 180 days from the date the vessel departed from a port or place in Cuba.”

A press release from the North Pole announced that the OFAC rules left Santa no choice but to bypass the children of the United States this Christmas. A spokesman from OFAC warned that if Santa attempted to overfly the United States, his sleigh would be forced to land and his cargo seized. He continued:

We know that the outcome is harsh, but we cannot allow Fidel Castro’s regime to continue to be propped up by Santa’s annual delivery of valuable Christmas toys to Cuban children.

Congressional leaders had left for the holiday recess and could not be contacted for comment.

Aerospace Company Settles Charges of Aiding Chinese Rocket Program

Monday, December 22nd, 2008
Long March 3B Rocket
ABOVE: Chinese Long March 3B
rocket blasts off on July 6, 2007


As the end of the year approaches, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) has been busy releasing a flurry of settlement agreements for export violations. In the latest batch is a settlement agreement by Interpoint Corporation, a subsidiary of Washington-based Crane Aerospace and Electronics.

Crane agreed to pay BIS a $200,000 fine to settle charges that it engaged in 37 illegal exports of EAR99 items to China. In two instances, the exports were destined for the 13th Institute, an end-user in China on BIS’s Entity List. The remaining exports were alleged to violate section 744.3 of the Export Administration Regulation (“EAR”) because Interpoint had been informed that the items would be for use “in the PRC’s Long March [Chang Zheng] rocket program or in other commercial rocket programs.”

Section 744.3(a)(1) requires a license for any export to a country in Country Group D:4, which includes China, if the exporter knows that the item will be used for commercial (or other) rocket systems with a range in excess of 300 kilometers. The Chinese Long March rockets are designed to carry satellites into geosynchronous orbit, i.e. 35,786 kilometers above sea level on the Earth’s surface.

In instances in which the items weren’t destined for the Long March rockets, Interpoint knew that they were destined for other “commercial rocket programs,” although there is no allegation that Interpoint knew which rocket programs or that the rockets had ranges in excess of 300 kilometers. These exports were probably covered by section 744.3(a)(3), which requires a license for exports used in rocket systems by a country in group D:4 if the exporter is “unable to determine … [t]he characteristics (i.e., range capabilities) of the rocket systems.”

Although section 744.3(a) clearly embodies a knowledge requirement, the scope of that knowledge requirement is unclear, and the Settlement Agreement casts little light on this confusing issue. Was Interpoint required to know that the items were for use in the Long March rocket program and to know that the Long March rockets had a range in excess of 300 kilometers? Or was it enough that Interpoint knew that the items were destined for Long March rockets which, whether Interpoint knew it or not, had a range far in excess of 300 kilometers?

Section 744.3(a)(3) appears to answer part of this question by imposing a duty to investigate the range of the rocket: an export to a D:4 country requires a license if the exporter is unable to determine the range of the rocket. But that still doesn’t answer a more intransigent case. Suppose that the exporter is told falsely that the rocket is only designed to carry a payload to a Low Earth Orbit less than 300 kilometers? Of course, an exporter can avoid having to put itself in the uncomfortable position of answering that question by simply refusing to export parts without a license to a D:4 country if that part is to be used for a rocket of any range.

Blackwater Order Not As Bad As It Sounds

Thursday, December 18th, 2008

Blackwater BearLooking at the title of today’s notice from the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), which reads “Policy of Denial Regarding ITAR Regulated Activities of EP Investments, LLC (a/k/a Blackwater),” one might think it’s “Bye, Bye, Blackwater.” But the actual content of the notice isn’t quite so bad since it provides significant exceptions to this policy of denial, exceptions which seem designed to allow Blackwater’s contracts with the United States Government to proceed unimpeded as long as Blackwater files some additional paperwork for its new license applications.

In fact, the policy of denial doesn’t apply to applications that are in “direct support to the U.S. Government” and where certain conditions are met. Those conditions are the following:

  • The license application is accompanied by a letter from Blackwater’s celebrity export compliance committee (the “ECC”) certifying the accuracy of the information in the license application and certifying that necessary training and internal controls are in place
  • The ECC submits, for each application, follow-up letters thirty and sixty days later certifying that the necessary training and internal controls are still in place

Applications that are not in direct support of the U.S. government are subject to a policy of denial unless the license request “is based on overriding U.S. national security, foreign policy or law enforcement grounds or present other compelling reasons.” In cases found to meet that criteria, the ECC must submit the same certification letters, including the 30- and 60-day followups, as described above.

Finally, Blackwater isn’t allowed to use any ITAR exemptions from licensing, such as the spare parts exemption in section 123.16(b)(2). Instead, license applications must be filed for each exemption and those applications will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Outside of requiring a bundle of additional paperwork for each Blackwater license, the biggest effect of the new policy is probably that Blackwater won’t be able to follow through on its proposed pirate-chasing gig.

Validated End User Program Likely To Be Invalidated

Wednesday, December 17th, 2008

Chinese Military  PosterAccording to an exclusive story in today’s Washington Times, the Validated End User Program implemented by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) may be terminated before the end of the Bush administration on January 20. Under that program, five companies in China were permitted to obtain from U.S exporters certain dual use items without export licenses that otherwise would have been required. As reported earlier on this blog, the program had come under criticism because two of the five validated end users had links to the Chinese military. The program had also come under fire because the Chinese government was not allowing U.S. investigators to have access to the facilities of the approved companies to verify that the exported items were not being diverted to the Chinese military.

An unidentified spokesman for the Commerce Department, who spoke to the Washington Times on condition of anonymity, said that the program could only be saved if the Chinese agreed to on-site inspections:

“This program will either be fixed or ended before Jan. 20,” the official said, adding that a decision will be made “in days, not weeks.”

China could avoid a suspension of the program by agreeing to U.S. demands for on-site inspections. The official said, however, that it does not appear likely that Beijing will make concessions before the Bush administration leaves office.

You have to wonder why BIS ever thought it would be able to engage in official inspections in foreign countries. Not surprisingly, most foreign countries are just a little touchy about the sovereignty issues raised by allowing foreign law enforcement officials to inspect facilities located on the foreign countries’ soil. Indeed, the Chinese had a history of interfering with efforts by the U.S., even before the Validated End User program was adopted, to determine whether items shipped under export licenses were used in the manner described in the export licenses.

UPDATE: BIS has issued a press release disputing the Washington Times article. The release states, among other things, that BIS has been able to conduct site-checks in China and is simply trying to formalize procedures for future site checks. It does concede that suspension of the program is a possibility if those procedures are not formalized.

[h/t to commenter jd]

Three Men Busted for Night Vision Exports

Tuesday, December 16th, 2008

AN/PVS-7 Image IntensifierThree naturalized U.S. citizens, Dan Tran Dang, Liem Duc Huynh, and George Ngoc Bui were recently indicted and charged with conspiracy to export 55 third generation military night vision goggles to Vietnam without a license. According to the indictment, the men purchased ITT AN/PVS-7 night vision goggles from Win-Tron Electronics, an electronics wholesaler principally specializing in marine electronics. The head straps and helmet mounts were removed and shipped to defendant Bui in Vietnam. The remaining parts of the night vision were then carried by Huynh and Dang in their luggage on trips to Vietnam.

The three men were caught in large measure because of Win-Tron Electronics and what appears to have been its careful attention to export compliance issues. According to a story in the Tulsa World, Win-Tron tipped off the authorities when it became suspicious of the purchases by the three men. The defendants claimed to have a business called Protective Security, and yet the address for Protective Security turned out to be a private residence. This apparently led Win-Tron to suspect that Protective Security had no use for a large volume of night vision goggles and suggested that the goggles might be instead destined for export, likely to the defendants’ country of origin.

Knowing your customer means knowing where your customer lives; and if a business has a residential address, this certainly should be considered a red flag.

Syria Travel Leads Bank to Block U.S. Traveler’s Account

Monday, December 15th, 2008

ATM in DamascusEdward Hasbrouck, the author of the informative travel manual The Practical Nomad and of an entertaining and informative travel blog of the same name, left a comment to one of our earlier posts on the Syria sanctions:

Earlier this year, [my bank] froze my account (refused to honor checks, and refused to accept deposits, both paper and electronic) after I tried to check my balance on their Web site from a Syrian IP address. …

Only after I had left Syria (which [my bank] “verified’ by calling me at a Turkish land-line telephone number, which of course could have been forwarded to anywhere) was I able to get the account unfrozen. …

I had notified [my bank] in advance of my intent to travel to Syria. I had read their customer disclosures, which make no mention of any sanctions by [the bank] except those *required* by OFAC regulations, which this clearly wasn’t. I had gone to considerable lengths to avoid having any financial dealings with the government of Syria or government-owned entities (or any other “specially designated nationals” in Syria). And I had been able to withdraw funds from an ATM in Syria (of a private, non-Syrian — I was later told they route transactions via a private line to Lebanon, although my … Bank statement correctly showed the address of the ATM in Syria) without incident.

The prior post in question dealt with Google blocking downloads to Syrian IP addresses and wondered how widespread that practice is. Apparently, some banks are at least trapping IP addresses for queries to their websites, but apparently these banks don’t know what to do once they capture an IP address from a sanctioned country such as Syria.

The current Syria sanctions prohibit export of U.S. products to Syria. Food, medicine and informational products are exempted from the export ban. It’s not clear whether the bank’s response to a web-based balance inquiry was an export of a product to Syria and, even if it were, it arguably fell under the informational exception. Even if the informational exemption were not applicable, the bank’s obligation was simply not to return an answer to the Syrian IP address, not to block the account.

The remaining relevant segment of the Syria sanctions blocks the assets of approximately 20 individuals that have been determined to be involved in (a) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (b) destabilizing activities in Iraq and Lebanon; (c) associating with al Qaeda, the Taliban or Osama bin Laden; or (d) benefiting from public corruption. These sanctions would permit blocking a bank account. However, Hasbrouck’s bank certainly couldn’t conclude from the IP address alone of his web-based balance inquiry that he was one of those 20 individuals (he, of course, is not) or that he was acting on behalf of such individuals. Moreover, because the bank itself “unfroze” the account, it was never officially blocked in any event, because only OFAC can unblock such an account once the bank has blocked it.

It seems what likely happened here is that the bank’s compliance program, rather than focusing on the precise scope of U.S. sanctions against Syria, simply blocked all transactions with Syria whether required or not. There certainly are administrative advantages to such a broad brush approach to compliance; however, a bank using such an approach might wind up violating its own account agreement with the customer. In such a case, let’s say that the blocked accounts leave the customer stranded in Syria, or thrown in jail when he can’t pay his hotel bill, the liability to the customer could be significant.

Paddlefish Roe

Thursday, December 11th, 2008

PaddlefishIt’s easy to forget that there are things other than dual-use items, defense articles, and nuclear materials that are export-controlled. The recent conviction of Florida resident Max Moghaddam for the unlicensed export of paddlefish roe should serve as a reminder that plants and animals listed on Appendix II to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”) also require export licenses from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Paddlefish, a species found in the Mississippi River and related to sturgeon, produces a roe that is often sold as American caviar at around $17 per ounce, about one-tenth the cost of Iranian beluga.

One count of the three-count indictment in the Moghaddam case charges the defendant with unlicensed export of the paddlefish roe to Belgium in violation of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371 et seq.. Section 3372(a)(1) of the Act prohibits the transport of any fish or wildlife in violation of an U.S. treaty. Article IV of CITES requires member states to prohibit the unlicensed export of items listed on Appendix II of the treaty. And paddlefish are listed on Appendix II of CITES.

A second count charged Moghaddam with falsely labeling the paddlefish roe on export documents in violation of section 3372(d). According to the indictment, Moghaddam labeled the paddlefish row as bowfiin roe, amia calva (the scientific name for bowfin) and mia calva (a misspelling of amia calva). The false labeling, in addition to constituting a separate count, also provides evidence that the defendant was perfectly aware that his export required a license.

A review of the docket in the case provides no clear view of Moghaddam’s defenses against the charges. Most seem to have been procedural and directed at a third count of the indictment which charged Moghaddam with conspiracy to violate the export provisions of the Lacey Act. A motion to dismiss filed by the defense alleged that the indictment failed to provide sufficient details regarding the co-conspirators and the defendant’s alleged overt acts with these co-conspirators. I couldn’t determine what defenses Moghaddam offered with respect to the attempted export and false labelling charges. Perhaps he argued that the exports really were bowfin roe. Whatever he argued, the jury didn’t buy it.

BIS Announces New Designations to Entity List

Thursday, December 11th, 2008

BIS SealLast week, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) used section 744.11 of the Export Administration Regulations for a second time to designate sixteen more entities to the Entity List for activities by these entities that could be contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. The first round of designations under the section occurred on September 22, 2008. The effect of the designations in this instance is to require a license for all exports to the designated entities and to adopt a policy of denial for all such license requests.

Nine of the newly-designated entities are located in Iran. Since exports to these entities in Iran are already prohibited these new designations are of limited utility except, I suppose, inasmuch as the designation would prohibit exports made to these entities when they are located outside Iran. Additionally, the designation order states that no license exceptions are available for exports to the newly-designated entities, which means that gifts and humanitarian donations to these entities that might otherwise be eligible for license exceptions are now not eligible for export under these exceptions.

The remaining designations are entities in Singapore and the United Kingdom, including Brian Douglas Woodford, a U.K citizen and his Singapore-based company, Monarch Aviation. Woodford’s wife Laura Wang-Woodford was arraigned in February in connection with aircraft parts allegedly exported by Monarch Aviation and the Woodfords to Iran. Brian Woodford is still at large although he does have a LinkedIn Profile up which indicates that he’s interested in “getting back in touch.” I suspect that the DOJ is also interested in getting in touch with him. In the meantime, he’s not getting any Christmas presents sent to him from the United States.

The final designation is as brief as it is vague and reads — in its entirety — as follows: “MCES, London, United Kingdom.” A Google search reveals three companies named MCES in London here, here, and here. So which one is it? Come on, guys, at least give us a hint.

So Who’s Your Pirate Now?

Friday, December 5th, 2008

Pirate Want A Cracker?Private security company Blackwater is, apparently, pitching itself to shipping companies as their solution to all their pirate problems. They’ve even got a 183-foot ship that can carry two helicopters and a shipload, so to speak, of rigid-hull inflatable boats. The ship can carry 30 pirate hunters in addition to its crew of 15. No word yet of any takers.

Of course, Blackwater’s proposal may look better on parchment than it does in practice. This being a blog about export law, I can’t resist wondering initially if Blackwater needs any approval from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) before it sets off on the high seas. Certainly it will need licenses from DDTC for any weapons being taken on the boat, except for non-automatic firearms exempted by section 123.17 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). (I tend to doubt, however, that non-automatic firearms are much use in pirate-hunting). I also don’t think that a Technical Assistance Agreement with Blackwater’s foreign clients will need to be approved by DDTC, since Blackwater won’t be performing a defense service for it’s clients as that is defined by section 120.9 of the ITAR — namely, providing assistance in the design, maintenance and use of defense articles or the provision of military training.

But dealing with the DDTC seems to be the least of Blackwater’s worries here. Rather it seems that well-established principles of international law may result in Blackwater getting all dressed up and having no place to go. Worse yet, if Blackwater takes any actions against suspect pirates, that may well constitute itself an act of piracy and subject Blackwater’s employees and their craft to seizure on the high seas by foreign, or even U.S., military forces.

Articles 100 through 107 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) cover piracy. Most significantly, Article 107 would prevent Blackwater’s ship or its crew from seizing any suspected pirate craft as that right is reserved under that article to “warships and military aircraft,” i.e. vessels and aircraft under the control of the military service of a State. And if the Blackwater ship fired upon or attempted to board a suspected pirate craft that would likely constitute and act of piracy as defined by Article 101 of UNCLOS. That article defines “piracy” as

any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed … on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft.

Of course, once Blackwater’s attack on the other craft becomes an act of piracy, then, under Article 105 of UNCLOS, any State that is a member of UNCLOS can seize Blackwater’s ship and its crew and punish the crew under its own laws. Although the United States has not ratified UNCLOS it is still a party to the 1958 U.N. Convention on the High Seas which has virtually identical provisions governing piracy and which would permit the United States as well to seize Blackwater’s vessel and crew if Blackwater fired upon a suspected pirate craft.

Blackwater is free, however, to open fire on any pirate craft that fire on or try to hijack Blackwater’s ship under customary principles of international law that permit reasonable and proportionate acts of self-defense. But who is going to pay Blackwater to go put a ship in the Gulf of Aden that can only fire at the pirates when they try to hijack Blackwater’s ship and must sit and watch when the pirates go after its client’s ship? Perhaps the Blackwater ship could accompany its client’s ship and fire on a pirate vessel that attacked the client ship as an extension of the client ship’s right of self-defense, but the legality of that would be clearer if Blackwater employees were on the attacked vessel rather than on Blackwater’s own ship.

BIS Clarifies Aircraft Part Rules

Thursday, December 4th, 2008

Fish StoryThe saga over conflicts between the Department of State and the Department of Commerce regarding which agency has jurisdiction over exports of aircraft parts continues with the latest Final Rule issued by the Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security. The new rule amends section 770.2(i) of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”), which had otherwise been known as “Interpretation 9″ and which purported to describe, among other things, which aircraft parts and components were subject to regulation by the State Department and which were subject to regulation by the Commerce Department. The jurisdictional issue is concerned in particular with aircraft parts that can be used on both civil and military aircraft.

The new rule is prefaced with a detailed discussion of the Note that the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) added in August of 2008 to Category VIII(h) of the United States Munitions List (“USML”) in which it tried to clarify this jurisdictional conundrum. The touchstone for the Note was section 17(c) of the Export Administration Act which provided that “standard equipment certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in civil aircraft and is an integral part of such aircraft, and which is to be exported to a country other than a controlled country, shall be subject to export controls exclusively under” the Export Administration Act.

Under the Note, which is not necessarily consistent with section 17(c), DDTC states that parts that are “exclusively” designed for civil aircraft are covered by the EAR. Parts designed for military aircraft would be covered by the USML. Parts that can be used on both civilian and military aircraft are subject to the EAR if they meet the standards of 17(c). In the case of aircraft parts that are designated Significant Military Equipment but could be used on both civil and military aircraft, an exporter would be required to file a commodity jurisdiction request before availing itself of the benefits of section 17(c).

The new rule adopted by BIS attempts to bring Interpretation 9 and the Note to Category VIII(h) of the USML into harmony. The prior version of Interpretation 9 asserted jurisdiction over:

Parts, accessories and components (including propellers), designed exclusively for aircraft and engines described in paragraphs (i)(1), (i)(2), (i)(3) and (i)(4) of this section.

The aircraft described in those referenced sections are civil aircraft.

The new version of Interpretation 9 asserts jurisdiction over the following aircraft parts:

Any aircraft tires as well as any components, parts, accessories, attachments and associated equipment that are not specifically designed or modified for aircraft on the Munitions List and all components and parts not on the Munitions List by virtue of the criteria set forth in the note to Category VIII(h) of 22 CFR part 121.

Clearly the intent is to broaden EAR jurisdiction from parts “exclusively” designed for civil aircraft to parts “not specifically designed” for military aircraft, a subtle but important difference that brings Interpretation 9 into line with the Note to Category VIII(h) of the USML. But what’s up with the new reference to tires?

The language of Interpretation 9 could be read to commit all tires to EAR jurisdiction or only tires “not specifically designed” for military aircraft. There doesn’t seem any reason for the regulation to call out tires and then exclude tires “specifically designed” for military aircraft. The regulation could accomplish the same thing by excluding from the EAR all parts “specifically designed” for military aircraft. But one also has to wonder why tires were singled out for special treatment.

UPDATE: As Tom deButts pointed out in a comment left on another post, USML Category VIII(h) specifically excludes tires and propellers used with reciprocating engines even if they are specifically designed for military aircraft and can’t be used on civilian aircraft, something I should have noticed. The revised Interpretation 9 appears to reflect that although I still maintain it could have been more carefully worded.