Archive for September, 2006

Shrimp Exporter Peeled, De-veined and Fried

Friday, September 29th, 2006

ShrimpToday is Friday, and we have shrimp on the menu.

Last Monday Pacific Shrimp Company pleaded guilty to various charges arising from its exports of shrimp to Mexico. The company pleaded guilty to two counts of falsifying a government document, which is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3). In order to obtain NAFTA’s tariff-free treatment from Mexico, the company falsely certified that the shrimp originated from the United States even though it had been purchased from India and was being re-exported to Mexico. Specifically, the company admitted that it falsified the Department of Commerce’s NAFTA Certificate of Origin. (In addition to the Certificate of Origin, the company also admitted that it falsified health and inspection certificates related to the exports.)

What is significant here for exporters is that even though Mexico was injured by the exporter’s actions, the exporter was still prosecuted in the United States. Further, the U.S. prosecution would not curtail any remedies that Mexico might have against the exporter for violation of Mexican law.

Pacific Shrimp also pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful exports of wildlife in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A), which prohibits exports of fish, shellfish or wildlife in violation of any state or foreign law. Presumably this statute was violated because the export of the shrimp to Mexico with a false certificate of origin violated Mexican law.

The Company, as part of a plea deal, agreed to a fine of $120,000 and five years probation.

Congress Passes New and Diluted Sudan Sanctions

Thursday, September 28th, 2006

SudanOn Tuesday Congress finally passed the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, which broadens somewhat the existing sanctions scheme in place against Sudan.

Under the existing scheme, U.S. companies and individuals may not engage in transactions with senior officials of the government of Sudan that have been named as Specially Designated Nationals and all the assets of such officials in the United States have been blocked. Under the new legislation, beginning 30 days after its enactment, the President may name as SDNs (in addition to senior government officials of Sudan) any individual who the President determines is responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in Sudan. As with designated senior government officials, no U.S. individual or company may engage in any transactions with the named individuals, and their assets in the United States will be blocked.

Additionally, the new legislation provides that these newly named individuals will be denied visas to enter the United States. Finally, the new legislation gives the President the power to deny access to U.S. ports to oil tankers or cargo ships involved in the Sudanese oil trade or involved in shipment of arms for the use of the Sudanese military.

These new sanctions are not likely to have much effect on the on-going crisis in Darfur. The provision denying visas to people guilty of genocide is, frankly, somewhat risible. It is hard to imagine that someone intent on committing crimes against humanity will reconsider that course of action if he realizes that it might prevent him from taking his family to Disneyland or Sea World.

A prior version of the legislation had a provision that would have permitted state pension funds to divest from companies doing business in Sudan. That provision was eliminated at the request of the National Foreign Trade Council that is involved in litigation with the state of Illinois over its divestment provision.

OFAC’s Heroic Struggle Against the Cuban Menace

Wednesday, September 27th, 2006

Cuban Travel PosterIn its relentless quest to keep America safe from terrorism, OFAC recently fined a group of Baptists missionaries $34,000 who were on licensed travel to Cuba and who stayed in a hotel near the beach and visited Old Town Havana. Under OFAC rules, American missionaries must devote every single moment in Cuba to their mission and are subject to fine if they engage in any activity that might be considered a tourist activity. I am certain that we will all sleep better tonight knowing that OFAC has a watchful eye on Baptist missionaries in Cuba.

OFAC has also been doing its share to make sure that traveling Cuban officials stay at Le Meridien instead of the Intercontinental. The Chicago Tribune reported yesterday that a meeting between Cuban officials and U.S. oil executives in Mexico City in February was disrupted after OFAC forced the American-owned hotel (which may or may not have been the Intercontinental) to evict the Cuban officials. The meeting between the Cubans and the oil interests had been prompted by the U.S. Geological Survey’s recent estimate that Cuba’s northern offshore basin contains 4.6 billion barrels of oil.

NRC Agrees To Reveal Export Quantities in License Applications

Tuesday, September 26th, 2006

Highly Enriched UraniumA license is required from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to export certain nuclear materials. Those license applications are typically printed in the Federal Register for comment. After 9/11 the NRC deleted certain information from the Federal Register Notice, including the precise quantity to be exported, such as it did in this Federal Register notice of an application for a license to export highly enriched uranium to France.

In response to these restrictions the Nuclear Control Institute wrote a letter to the NRC in February 2006 complaining that the omission from the public notice of the quantity of nuclear material to be exported deprived the public of meaningful comment on the license application. The NCI letter cited an instance where public comment on an export of HEU to Belgium’s BR-2 reactor revealed that Belgium had no immediate need for the HEU and the license application was withdrawn. According to NCI, limitation of export of excess quantities reduces the risk of diversion of the material to weapons use.

The NRC responded to the NCI letter on August 31 by agreeing to reveal the quantity in future proposed export applications. In a letter to NCI, NRC Chairman Dale Klein noted:

[T]he NRC intends to disclose quantity information for enriched uranium above 6% U-235, mixed oxide materials, and certain other radionuclides absent an NRC determination of a compelling reason for nondisclosure. Federal Register notices for proposed HEU exports will also include quantities requested. However, the NRC will continue to withhold information on projected or actual shipment schedules, delivery dates, date required, mode of transport, storage arrangements, or any other related logistical information provided by either the applicant, the licensee, other parties to the transaction or added by NRC, as this information could be useful to a potential adversary.

“Hat tip” on this item to Secrecy News, a blog maintained by the Federation of American Scientists

DDTC Chief: “D-Trade is De-Lovely”

Monday, September 25th, 2006

Robert MaggiIn response to industry complaints about increased processing times for license applications at DDTC, Robert Maggi, the Managing Director of DDTC, said last week to an industry group that D-Trade would soon make everything better:

Robert Maggi, DDTC chief, agreed with many of the complaints, and promised that improvement is at hand. A computer-based system called D-Trade should speed up and increase consistency in the licensing process, Maggi told an audience of defense company representatives and congressional staffers Sept. 22.

Although the D-Trade system has been in operation for more than two years, it is only gradually making a dent in DDTC’s workload, Maggi said.

By Christmas, D-Trade will have processed about 7,000 arms export license applications. That’s out of about 70,000 the directorate receives each year, he said.

The system has developed “way more slowly” than expected, Maggi conceded, but “I’m pretty optimistic” it will improve the licensing process.

Mr. Maggi admits that almost three years in D-Trade, only 10 percent of all license applications are filed through the system. This should be considered an admission that D-Trade, by any conceivable measure, is an abject failure. Rather than continuing to “happy-talk” the system and hope that things will improve, DDTC needs to try to figure out why the system doesn’t work and why 90% of applicants, when given the choice, file their licenses on the “dead tree” forms.

I know of at least one reason many applicants don’t use D-Trade: the digital signature requirement is burdensome and unwieldy. When the procedure for obtaining digital certificates is explained to potential applicants, I know a number who have opted instead to file paper forms with old-fashioned ink signatures. In case you don’t believe that the process of getting a certificate is cumbersome, take a look at this 15-page instruction sheet provided by one of DDTC’s approved vendors of digital certificates.

What makes this all the more baffling is that there is no need for a digital certificate to sign D-Trade applications. The digital certificate verifies that the signature on the electronic document is authentic, but DDTC has never required any proof of authenticity for signatures on paper licenses. If D-Trade applications could be signed by submitting a certification letter in pdf format, I suspect that more applicants would use the system.

Al-Mashan’s Long Road to the BIS Denied Parties List

Friday, September 22nd, 2006

Uncooled Infrared CameraOn September 18, BIS entered an order against Mohammad al-Mashan and and order against the Mohammad al-Mashan Group denying both of them export privileges for ten years. The Mohammed al-Mashan Group is a Kuwait-based exporter of molds made from recycled plastics.

The denial arises from allegations that on two occasions al-Mashan and his company, both located in Kuwait, transferred an uncooled infrared camera to an individual in the U.A.E. in violation of the conditions of the BIS export license under which the camera had been shipped to al-Mashan and the al-Mashan Group. That license had a condition prohibiting re-transfer or export of the item without a further license from BIS.

The extended time line of this proceeding is interesting. The re-exports in question occurred in October 1999 and February 2000. The charging letter didn’t issue until October 25, 2004. A default judgment on the charging letter was not issued by the ALJ until August 30, 2006. The denial order was signed on September 18. As of today, however, BIS has yet to add al-Mashan and the al-Mashan Group to the Denied Parties list.

Some of the delay was consumed by the three unsuccessful attempts by BIS to mail the charging letter to al-Mashan in Kuwait. Still it seems that if al-Mashan were truly of significant concern to BIS the agency could have been more diligent.

The failure to add al-Mashan and the al-Mashan group to the Denied Party list is equally baffling. When OFAC announces a new SDN, that entity is usually added immediately to the SDN list. Given the BIS delay in adding parties to the Denied Parties list, exporters should probably also check the list of recent orders found in the BIS Electronic Reading Room as well as the Denied Parties list.

Clarifying the Obvious

Thursday, September 21st, 2006

Foggy BottomDDTC released today on its website a “clarification” of the off-shore procurement rules that had been requested during the April 21, 2006 meeting of DTAG. Under § 124.13 of the ITAR, DDTC can, by means of a license, authorize transfer of technical data to foreign persons for an offshore procurement of defense articles if the various conditions of that regulation are met. DTAG requested clarification as to whether a license applicant was required to submit with the DSP-5 the procurement contract with the foreign party.

The DDTC’s “clarification” of DTAG’s question simply cites subsection (d) of § 124.13, which clearly answers DTAG’s question. Under subsection (d) that contract is submitted “at the time that it is accepted” which would be normally after the DSP-5 is granted. Indeed, it is hard to see how the parties could enter into an overseas procurement agreement for a defense article without some disclosure of technical data relating to that defense article. Thus it seems obvious — at least to me — that the license needs to precede the procurement contract.

Japan and Australia Sanction North Korea

Wednesday, September 20th, 2006

North Korean Propaganda PosterJapan and Australia announced new sanctions today against North Korea. Under the new sanctions, Japan and Australia will block fund transfers to and from 11 North Korean companies deemed to be essential to the North Korea’s weapons program.

These actions were based on U.N. Resolution 1695 passed by the U.N. Security Council on July 15. The resolution, which condemned missile tests by North Korea on July 5, called on U.N. member states “to exercise vigilance and prevent . . . the transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK’s missile or WMD programmes.”

Japan and Australia included the Swiss firm Kohas AG and its President Jakob Steiger in the newly-announced sanctions. Kohas was sanctioned by the United States in March of this year based on its procurement of weapons-related goods for Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, a North Korean trading company sanctioned by the U.S. and included today in the new Japanese and Australia sanctions. Almost half of Kohas’s shares are owned by Korea Ryonbong.

In response to the sanctions imposed today on Kohas, a Swiss official responded: “Federal authorities are regularly in contact with this firm and have yet to find any evidence that the company violated Swiss exporting rules.” That is perhaps more a reflection of the fact that the Swiss aren’t looking very hard than it is evidence that no violations have occurred.

Supermicro Pays the Price for Illegal Exports to Iran

Tuesday, September 19th, 2006

MotherboardSupermicro, Inc., a computer hardware manufacturer based out of San Jose, California, pleaded guilty on Monday to a criminal export violation and agreed to pay a criminal penalty of $150,000. Supermicro admitted that on or about December 28, 2001, it shipped 300 motherboards, worth just under $30,000, to a company in the U.A.E. knowing that the motherboards would be immediately re-exported to Iran. At the time of the export, the motherboards were subject to National Security controls and required a license for export to Iran.

Previously, on September 7, Supermicro and BIS agreed to settle claims made by BIS in a charging letter alleging violations arising out of other exports by Supermicro that were destined to Iran. The charging letter lists exports by Supermicro of motherboards, superservers and computer chassis. Supermicro settled these allegations in the charging letter by an agreement to pay a civil penalty of $125,400.

Interestingly, the exported computer chassis referred to in the BIS charging letter are EAR99, i.e. not subject to a BIS license requirement. BIS premised the violations for the exports of the chassis on EAR § 746.7 which notes that OFAC authorization is required for shipments to Iran under the Iranian embargo. Failure to obtain that authorization for an EAR99 item was then viewed by BIS as a violation of EAR § 764.2(a).

UPDATE: Richard Pettler, a partner at Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy in San Francisco and counsel to Supermicro, contacted me to provide additional details that were not in the press accounts that I relied on. This post has been updated to reflect his comments.

Foreign Cows Moo a Sigh of Relief

Monday, September 18th, 2006

Cattle ProdNebraska-based Springer Magrath Co. pleaded guilty to criminal export violations and agreed to pay a $50,000 fine for its shipment of cattle prods to South Africa in 2002 without a license. Cattle prods and other discharge type arms such as stun guns are controlled by ECCN 0A985 and require a license for all destinations except Canada.

Springer Magrath is an agricultural supply house for cattle ranchers, selling such products as calf feeders and calf adoption powder, so it is safe to assume that the people there had never heard of the Commodity Control List prior to their visit from federal authorities. Frankly, many people who have heard of the Commodity Control List might be equally surprised that cattle prods appear on the list. And with good reason. Although cattle prods are, admittedly, often used as devices of torture, they are widely available from sources outside the U.S.