Archive for the ‘Iran Sanctions’ Category

GAO Report on Iran Sanctions Blasts OFAC’s Dead Tree Licensing System

Wednesday, March 10th, 2010

Piles of PaperThe Government Accountability Office released a report last Thursday on the Iran Sanctions and there is, you might say, good news, bad news and old news in the report.

First, the good news. The GAO’s audit of the licensing process of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) found that all of the licenses that OFAC had granted for exports of food, medicine and medical devices to Iran under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”) were properly granted. The 58 licenses examined by GAO all involved exports of items authorized under TSRA for export to Iran. Additionally, none of the licenses involved exports to anyone on the SDN list.

Next, the bad news.

Treasury cannot provide other agencies or Congress with complete and timely information concerning the licenses it has issued. It cannot do so because it relies on paper-based information systems that cannot be searched to identify licenses for the export of goods to Iran. … In January 2009, an internal Treasury budget request characterized the TSRA information system as a “largely paper-based” system that hinders “the speed, efficacy, reliability, and security of [Treasury’s] licensing, enforcement and compliance activities.” Treasury officials must manually review all TSRA licensing data for Iran to identify licenses that authorize the export of goods. Because the TSRA system is not integrated with Treasury’s primary licensing information system, TSRA licensing officials must manually enter the same data into both systems.

Finally, the old news. GAO discovered that U.S. goods were being successfully exported to Iran through the use of intermediary companies and transshipment of U.S. goods through other countries to Iran.

More than 50 percent of the cases listed involved use of intermediaries in the UAE for transshipment. About 20 percent involved the use of Malaysia and Singapore

Regular readers of this blog will be forgiven if they can’t suppress a yawn while reading these shocking revelations, particularly with regard to the diversion of exports to the U.A.E. Still, GAO’s report should emphasize for exporters that exports to UAE, Malaysia and Singapore deserve extra scrutiny to assure that items aren’t merely transiting those countries on their way to Iran.

Some Things Change; Some Things Don’t

Tuesday, March 9th, 2010

Twitter Keeps Iran AfloatHere’s what has changed at OFAC. Yesterday OFAC announced a general license for Iran and Sudan that would permit export of

certain services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging.

To be eligible the services must be offered free of charge and any software must be EAR99, not subject to the EAR, or mass market software classified under ECCN 5D992. Also, the exporter must not have any reason to believe that the services or software is destined to be used by the government of Sudan or Iran. A similar license was announced for Cuba but it only covered services since BIS controls exports of software to Cuba. Any bets on how long it will take for BIS to act to permit these software exports to Cuba? BIS action will also be necessary for similar exports to Syria.

And here is what hasn’t changed at OFAC. Today OFAC announced that it spent untold tens of thousands of taxpayer dollars to fine some poor schlub $575 for buying Cuban cigars over the Internet. I have to assume that this single cigar purchase will provide funds to the current Cuban government that will keep it in power for about five minutes longer than otherwise would have been the case thereby justifying all the government expense involved in imposing the fine.

Iran Obtains Centrifuge Equipment from Swiss Firm

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

centrifugesA fascinating AP story, which so far has not been picked up by any AP affiliate newspapers, provides detailed information about how 103 pressure transducers made their way from Inficon, a Swiss firm, to Iran where, presumably, they will be used in Iran’s allegedly peaceful uranium enrichment program. The story, not surprisingly, involves a lot of looking the other way by the firms involved followed by numerous declarations that they were shocked, shocked to learn where the transducers were headed.

The transducers’ journey started with an order placed by a Shanghai-based company with a Taiwanese agent for Swiss firm Inficon. The equipment was supposed to be destined to the Shanghai company itself but after it made an initial payment had been made to the Taiwanese agent and the order had been placed by the agent with Inficon, the Shanghai company said that the equipment should be shipped instead to Tehran. When the Taiwanese agent received the shipment from Inficon, it dutifully forwarded the merchandise to Tehran.

The allegedly-neutral Swiss have, of course, denied any responsibility in the matter. The CEO of Inficon calmly told reporters that all the papers were in order:

“The end-user certificate we got did not say Iran,” he said. “The deal was done via a Chinese company. And we have a certificate with the name of a Chinese end-user on it.”

In the next breath he admitted, and most proliferation experts will confirm, that the size of the order was, er, suspicious:

[He] said that before the goods were sent, Inficon reported the transaction to Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, because the number of transducers raised its suspicions. “We always have the goods checked when it is a big order,” he said. “If someone wants one single device it’s not delicate. But if someone wants 100 at once, that’s very unusual for this type of product.”

The Swiss Government approved the export because, notwithstanding these suspicions, Inficon didn’t “know” that the goods were headed to Iran and therefore the export was legal under Swiss law. It seems to me that this is not the first time that the Swiss have defended weapons exports that went to the bad guys by claiming that they weren’t absolutely one-hundred and twenty percent certain that the goods were headed to the bad guys.

As a cautionary note to U.S. readers and exporters: we don’t live in Switzerland. Burying your head in the sand is not a viable export compliance strategy.

Balli Exec Tells Alma Mater His Defense to Iran Export Charges

Thursday, February 25th, 2010
Vahid Alaghband
ABOVE: Valid
Alaghband


Valid Alaghband, Chairman of the Balli Group, which just agreed to a $17 million fine to settle charges that it exported U.S.-origin commercial passenger aircraft to Iran, took to the pages of the daily student newspaper of his alma mater Cornell University to present his side of the story. Frankly, his story isn’t very convincing, and I doubt that regular readers of this blog or others familiar with U.S. export laws will be swayed by Alaghband’s story. Some may, in fact, chuckle that Alaghband would publicly mount the defense that he does.

The confusion arises from the use of the term “export” which, to a layman, signifies a sale and purchase (or physical trade) of goods across international borders. That is not how the U.S. regulations necessarily define exports and our settlement with the U.S. authorities does not remotely suggest that Balli Aviation sold its aircraft to Iran. Balli Aviation legally and beneficially owned its fleet of aircraft at all material times.

Epic fail, as the kids on the blogs say nowadays. Anybody with even a smidgen of familiarity with U.S. export laws is aware that you can export stuff to Iran which hasn’t been sold to Iran. To begin with, the aircraft in question were flown in an out of Iran carrying commercial passengers. Balli was charged with re-exporting the aircraft to Iran and the Export Administration Regulations, in section 734.2(b), provide a pretty unambiguous definition of re-export:

“Reexport” means an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country

Hmm. I don’t see anything in that restricting an export to a cross-border purchase and sale, do you? I didn’t think so.

What happened here was that Balli leased the aircraft to an Armenian airline, Blue Sky, that then operated the aircraft in and out of Iran under a code-sharing arrangement with Mahan Airways. Or as Mr. Alaghband admits:

Balli Aviation … [leased] three of the aircraft to an Armenian operator which serviced the civilian passenger traffic under arrangements with a local operator.

The “local operator, which Alaghband can’t bring himself to name, was the Iranian carrier Mahan.

Alaghband also claims that Norton Rose, a prominent U.K. law firm, told him that this scheme would comply with U.S. export laws. If Norton Rose did indeed provide such profoundly awful advice, and I have no evidence of this other than Alaghband’s claim that they did, this would underline what I might have thought obvious: a firm of British solicitors with not even a single office in the United States might not be the best choice for obtaining advice on complying with U.S. export laws.

U.S. Extradition Request for Export Defendant Heard by French Court

Wednesday, January 20th, 2010
Majid Kakavand
ABOVE: Majid Kakavand


Amir Ardebili, who we posted on here and here, is not the only Iranian being chased by U.S. prosecutors for activities he committed entirely outside the United States and which were legal in the country where they took place. Majid Kakavand, on whom we previously posted here, used a company of his in Malaysia to order electronic components from U.S. companies and then transshipped those components to Iran. He was provisionally arrested in France in March 2009 at the request of the United States and is currently in France, out of jail but unable to leave France, awaiting the French court’s decision on the U.S. extradition request.

According to this article in the New York Times, a hearing was held last week by a French court on the extradition request. Kakavand’s lawyers argued that Kakavand’s activities did not violate any laws of France or the European Union and that the items were innocuous items that were not useful in the defense industry. Because these items could be legally shipped to Malaysia without an export license and because the U.S. criminal information against Kakavand did not allege that the items in question were on the Commerce Control List or the United States Munitions List, this argument seems to have some force. Another hearing has been scheduled by the French court for February 17.

And as with the Ardebili case, the Iranians were quick to link the fate of Kakavand with an Iranian trial. In this case, the trial in question is a prosecution brought by Iran against a 24-year-old French academic, Clotilde Reiss, in connection with her alleged participation in opposition protests following the Iranian elections last June. Apparently, the concept of a fair trial is so foreign to Iran that it hasn’t occurred to the Iranian government that a French court might actually listen to defense arguments and make a decision based on the rule of law.

@Ahmadinejad: Twitter Is Coming to Town. #IranElection

Thursday, December 17th, 2009

Twitter Keeps Iran AfloatThe Department of State sent on Tuesday, December 15,  a report to Congress under section 1606 of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note)(“IIANPA”). Under section 1603 of  IIANPA, no items on the Commerce Control List can be exported to Iran. However, section 1606 gives the President the authority to waive that restriction 15 days after a report to Congress explaining in detail why the waiver is in the interest of U.S. national security.

The report set forth the national security rationale as follows:

Personal internet-based communications are a vital tool for change in Iran as recent events have demonstrated. However, U.S. sanctions on Iran are having an unintended chilling effect on the ability of companies such as Microsoft and Google to continue providing essential communications tools to ordinary Iranians. This waiver will authorize free downloads to Iran of certain nominally dual-use software (because of low-level encryption elements) classified as mass market software by the Department of Commerce and essential for the exchange of personal communications and/or sharing of information over the internet. The waiver will enable Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control ["OFAC"] to issue a broader general license covering these downloads and related services.

The report leaves open several interesting questions. First, what services does it cover? Just Microsoft and Google’s instant messaging services or other communications services such as Twitter and YouTube? The State Department report talks about export of certain software to Iran (assuming apparently that allowing the download of software is an export rather than a provision of a service). However, it says nothing about services not involving downloads.

Twitter and YouTube don’t require any downloads. Twitter and YouTube both provide services to Iranians by providing a unique URI to each Iranian Tweeter (n., from geekspeak, a person who uses Twitter; a Twitterer) or YouTuber. But the IIANPA only requires a sanction on exports of goods, not services, so OFAC is presumably free to issue a general license allowing access to the Twitter and YouTube services to ordinary Iranians, and it seems reasonable to suppose that is about to happen given the State Department letter’s reference to a “broader general license covering these downloads and related services.” (Compliance question: how is Twitter to know that “tedintehran” isn’t actually Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s twitter ID?).

The second question is what about other sanctioned countries? Shouldn’t their ordinary citizens have access to these communications technologies as well? This is a more complicated question and depends on the extent to which those countries are subject to legislatively imposed sanctions. The Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 has similar provisions as the IIANPA relating to exports of dual-use items to Syria and also provides a mechanism for a Presidential report to Congress to waive application of those mandatory sanctions. Without a similar report from the State Department on Syria, the restrictions on instant messaging and internet communications technologies such as Twitter and YouTube will remain in place, although there doesn’t seem to be any good reason to treat ordinary Syrians any differently from ordinary Iranians in this regard.

Maybe the Shoe Is on the Other Foot

Tuesday, December 15th, 2009

Free The HikersOn Monday, a U.S. Federal District Court Judge in Delaware sentenced Amir Hossein Ardebili, who was the subject of this earlier post on Export Law Blog, to five years in prison, less time served and credit for good behavior, based on Ardebili’s guilty plea to U.S. charges arising out of attempted exports of military goods to Iran. During Ardebili’s statement at the sentencing hearing, he frequently burst into tears, even at one point crying so much that a break was taken.

Iran immediately denounced the sentence and announced that it would try three American hikers that wandered into Iran last summer, implicitly linking Ardebili’s fate to that of the three U.S. hikers now held in Iranian prisons According to an Iranian press agency, Iran Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, said that the jail sentence handed down yesterday was “illegal.” Tehran has also argued that under international law officials in Georgia were obliged to return Ardebili to Iran rather than giving him to U.S. agents, reports Iran’s Press TV network.

Iran’s claim of a requirement to return Ardebili under international law is not quite on the mark since there really isn’t such a recognized right in extradition matters. As generally understood, international law holds that no country is obliged to extradite anyone. This understanding of international law explains why there are a hundreds of bilateral extradition treaties, although the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Georgia. That doesn’t mean that a country, such as Georgia, cannot voluntarily hand over someone in the absence of a treaty. However, that is normally only done after a representation of reciprocal treatment by the country requesting extradition.

U.S. law does permit, in limited circumstances, extradition from the United States in the absence of a treaty with the country requesting extradition. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) the U.S. will allow such extradition from the United States of foreign persons but only for violent crimes that are not deemed political offenses. Certainly the crime that Ardebili was alleged to have committed was not a violent crime and so an extradition of a person from the U.S. on export charges by a country without an extradition treaty would be illegal under U.S. law. This means that the U.S. couldn’t really make a commitment of reciprocal treatment to Georgia to support its request for a non-treaty extradition of Ardebili. If the situation were reversed, U.S. law would actually prohibit the extradition

The problem created here is that the shaky grounds for U.S. jurisdiction over Ardebili detract from our own country’s argument that Iran should return the hikers. After all, Iran’s claim of jurisdiction to hold the hikers is stronger than the U.S. claim of jurisdiction over Ardebili even if Iran’s substantive claim that the hikers broke the law is dubious. After all, the hikers were captured in Iran whereas Ardebili was lured into Georgia and arrested there.

And If The Shoe Were on the Other Foot?

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009
Amir Ardebili
ABOVE: Amir Ardebili captured on
surveillance video in Tbilsi, Georgia


Amir Hossein Ardebili, an Iranian national, engaged in extensive negotiations from Iran and apparently on behalf of the Iranian government to export defense items from the United States to Iran. The U.S. companies, however, were sting operations set up by U.S. undercover agents. When the agents lured Ardebili from Iran to Tbilsi, Georgia, they arrested him in October 2007 and, seemingly with the cooperation of Georgian authorities, brought him back to the United States where he was secretly imprisoned and held under a sealed indictment.

Ardebili has pleaded guilty to charges, among other things, that he violated the United States Arms Export Control Act. In preparation for his sentencing on December 14, some of the sealed documents, including a redacted version of the indictment have been unsealed. Prior to the unsealing, the identity of the city where Ardebili was snatched had been undisclosed but it’s now clear that, as had been rumored, Ardebili had traveled to Georgia to meet with the agents.

The government’s sentencing memorandum, in an effort to obtain the maximum term of imprisonment possible, provides further details of the undercover investigation. Significantly, the memo stresses that the Ardebili was engaged in procurement activities for his sole customer, the government of Iran, which was seeking the items because it believed it was going to go to war with the United States.

Ardebili’s attorney has filed a motion for a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines, arguing that the 22 months already served in solitary confinement caused Ardebili to become clinically depressed. The motion further noted that all of Ardebili’s activities were legal in Iran, where they took place, and that he was acting “indirectly on behalf of the Government of Iran.”

What are we to make of the fact here that the defendant was acting in Iran on behalf of the Iranian government and was later taken by U.S. agents from Georgia to stand trial in the United States? After the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), abduction of defendants from foreign countries in order to bring them to the United States to stand trial is legal. The doctrine of functional sovereign immunity from prosecution for acts taken on behalf of foreign governments is basically confined to high officials of those countries. And the U.S. takes the controversial position that it has criminal jurisdiction over anyone located in foreign countries trying to export items from the United States.

Of course, if the shoe were on the other foot, if an American businessman had been abducted by Iranian agents from a hotel in, say, Russia and then secretly held in solitary confinement for two years in Iran, you can bet your you-know-what that we would be screaming bloody murder. I am not a fan of the Government of Iran or its nuclear aspirations, but we really have to understand that if we employ extraordinary means such as were employed here then we will have no cause to complain when those same methods are used against U.S. citizens abroad.

Here is some of the surveillance video of the meeting between the U.S. agents and Ardebili in Georgia:

Monsieur Monsieur Cops Cops Plea Plea

Monday, November 23rd, 2009
Jacques Monsieur
ABOVE: M. Jacques
Monsieur


Monsieur Jacques Monsieur, international arms dealer and man of mystery who, I previously reported, once tried to excuse his arms dealing by claiming to be working for U.S. and French intelligence services, pleaded guilty today in a federal court in Mobile to charges that he had illegally attempted to export aircraft parts to Iran. Amazingly neither the CIA nor it’s French counterpart the DST rode into the courtroom at the last minute to save Mr. Monsieur.

According to an article in the Mobile Press Register, the plea agreement offers Monsieur a chance to reduce his penalty by providing helpful information in his own case and others. It may well be the case that the U.S. is more interested in Monsieur’s Iranian contacts than in Monsieur himself.

In my original post on Monsieur Monsieur, I expressed more than a small amount of skepticism that Monsieur would, during the middle of a deal to export jet engines from New York to Iran, casually show up in New York where he could be, and was, arrested by U.S. officials. A commenter on my original post says that “a little birdie” told him that Monsieur was nabbed in Panama by U.S. officials then taken to New York for his arrest, a credible, if still unverified, story.

Wednesday Export Law Grab Bag

Wednesday, November 18th, 2009

Grab BagNo big news today, so it’s time for another Export Law Blog grab bag:

  • Failed state Solomon Islands wanted Iran to pay for transportation of Solomon Islands students to Cuba to attend medical school. Australia-based ANZ Bank refused to transfer $100,000 from Iran to pay for the transportation. The Solomon Islands High Commissioner to Australia complained that the banks actions weren’t based on international sanctions. The bank responded that it simply doesn’t engage in financial transactions involving Iran or Cuba. Presumably ANZ doesn’t want to cough up another $5.75 million fine to OFAC. Sometimes OFAC can successfully use fear as a means of asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction
  • Looks like that Iranian communications satellite that’s been kicking around for a while is going to remain earthbound for the forseeable future. The Russians sat on the satellite since 2005, leading the Iranians to claim that Italy would be launching it “soon.” Carlo Gavazzi Space said today that an Italian launch of the satellite wasn’t likely to happen since there were no launch platforms in Italy, that the satellite is currently in Italy and that no export license had been requested or would be requested for the satellite to be exported to another country for launch.
  • The Miami Herald published a bipartisan letter on Tuesday from Republican Richard Lugar and Democrat Howard Berman urging an end to the U.S. ban on travel to Cuba, noting that Cuba was the only country in the world to which Americans couldn’t travel and that the ban had prevented contact between “Cubans and ordinary Americans, who serve as ambassadors for the democratic values we hold dear.” The ink on the Miami Herald letter was hardly dry before José R. Cárdenas at Foreign Policy shot back, arguing that there was no reason to end the hugely successful travel ban and taking a swipe at ordinary Americans, who he claimed wouldn’t be ambassadors for democratic values but just a few more drunks on the beaches in Cuba.