Archive for the ‘General’ Category


Apr

16

MTCR Celebrates The Big Twenty-Five


Posted by Clif Burns at 5:28 pm on April 16, 2012
Category: General

Happy 25!The State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Non-Proliferation released today a fact sheet celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a multilateral initiative to control the export and dissemination of certain missile related technology. The MTCR was initially adopted by the G-7 countries in 1985 and now boasts 27 additional member countries.

Instead of breaking out the cake and the champagne to fête the MTCR, we have decided at Export Law Blog to use this opportunity instead to ask why the State Department, instead of sending a birthday card to the MTCR, does not spend the time more productively to fix section 121.16 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. That section bears the misleading header “Missile Technology Control Regime Annex,” even though it bears as much resemblance to the current MTCR Annex as Ron Howard does to Opie Taylor. Since that section was added to the USML in 1993 items have come and gone on the MTCR annex like rock singers in rehab clinics and yet nary an amendment has been made to that section.

This, of course, opens up plenty of possibilities for confusion and unintentional hilarity (if you think that sloppy regulations are humorous). Recently, I had a client notice that a rather ubiquitous item was listed in section 121.16 which the client (and many others) had been exporting freely and without even thinking of a license for quite some time. The item had been removed from the MTCR Annex when the Annex was a mere toddler and only taking its first steps. The client had a legitimate query: is this item on the USML or not?

The answer to that question is far from clear at least based on the actual language of the ITAR. The only part of the ITAR even bearing on the question is section 120.29(c) which I think says — your guess is as good as mine — that the items in section 121.16 are the list of all items on the MTCR which aren’t on the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Commodity Control List, although that statement is, now, patently untrue.

So more for amusement than anything else, I called the DDTC Response Team to ask the simple question: if an item listed in section 121.16 is no longer on the MTCR is it still export controlled? You would have thought that I posed Bishop Berkeley’s famous question: “If a tree falls in a forest and there is no one to hear it, does it make any sound?” After a stretch of silence, and some mutterings, the Response Team member finally solemnly informed me, somewhat tentatively, that it was. Oh dear. If that’s true, everybody now exporting that item is going to be in for some fun times, I thought.

I was fairly convinced that the best, and only, way to read 121.16 was that it was intended to state what things that were on the Annex in 1993 were controlled by BIS and what things were controlled by DDTC and that it was the Annex which determined what was controlled and what was not. So I escalated the question up through DDTC and I did receive that answer ultimately from the agency: if an item is no longer on the MTCR, it does not require a license from DDTC simply because it is still referenced in section 121.16.

So, Happy 25th Birthday, MTCR! Here’s to hoping that before you turn 30 somebody will finally fix section 121.16.

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Apr

11

Bird Flu Research Flies Into Export Laws, Crashes, Then Burns


Posted by Clif Burns at 10:43 pm on April 11, 2012
Category: BISGeneralTechnical Data ExportWassenaar

Bird FluApparently international research on how best to prevent, contain and treat bird flu is now threatened by international laws restricting export of information relating to potential agents of biological warfare according to this report on NPR. The problem concerns research conducted by researchers in the United States and the Netherlands which resulted in a controversial paper concerning alterations in the virus that would make it more contagious. There was some concern that this information might be useful to terrorists and rogue states interested in biological warfare agents.

To address this concern, the decision was initially made to restrict publication of the study and related materials and to make them available only to designated researchers and government officials with “a need to know.” What apparently no one realized was that this would prevent the research from falling within the fundamental research exception and would, therefore, prevent cross-border discussions or transfer of the information without specific governmental authorization.

Once this was realized, the decision was made to eliminate the “need to know” restrictions and simply to publish the materials so that the research could be considered fundamental research and could be shared freely with researchers in other countries. But the government of the Netherlands is arguing that the publication of the research could not undo the effect of the earlier decision to restrict dissemination and that therefore the research could not be exported from the Netherlands without approval of that government.

This situation illustrates the difficulty in applying the fundamental research in practice. To begin with, there is no easy way to determine what is or is not fundamental research. Export lawyers and export professional at universities have tried to strengthen the case that research is eligible for the fundamental research exception by pointing to whether research was published or, even if not published, was permitted or required to be published under applicable grant contracts or university rules.

The conundrum here is whether sensitive material can be transformed into fundamental research simply by publication. If one group of researchers decides to release the information, does this act of a few individuals instantly transform the information into fundamental research? But if publication isn’t the standard for deciding what is fundamental research, what other standards are available and who should be able to apply those standards? What these questions without answers demonstrate more than anything else is the slippery slope that we head down when we try to apply export controls to information. Rather we should rely on classification rules and procedures to control dissemination of truly sensitive information.

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Mar

8

No Boats To Cuba


Posted by Clif Burns at 8:38 pm on March 8, 2012
Category: General

Havana HarborThe Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has nixed plans to start passenger ferry between Miami and Havana, Cuba. According to a letter sent to a company requesting such service, OFAC said that, after consulting with the State Department, such service would be “beyond the scope of current policy.”

It’s not clear what it means to say that ferry service is beyond the scope of current policy. Certainly, current policy permits passenger service, although only air carriers are currently licensed to provide service to Cuba. Nor does the Cuban Democracy Act, which imposes restrictions on vessels traveling to and from Cuba, prohibit the authorization of ferry service. It specifically permits such traffic if authorized by OFAC.

So the only conclusion that can be drawn is that only people who can afford air fare should be permitted to travel to Cuba. We wouldn’t want ordinary riffraff to travel to Cuba on a low-cost ferry.

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Feb

8

The Third Deadly Sin


Posted by Clif Burns at 11:45 pm on February 8, 2012
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesDDTCGeneral

Space CircuitryA California man has been indicted in connection with his attempt to export radiation hardened, space qualified chips to the People’s Republic of China without an export license. The indictment, if true, tells an interesting tale.

According to the indictment, which was unsealed on Monday, the defendant Philip Chaohui He owned and operated a company called Sierra Electronic Instruments, of which he was the only employee. Estimated sales revenues for 2010 were $110,000. I was unable to locate any website for the company, and the company’s web footprint consisted of two sparse directory entries.

Even so, He and Sierra got their hands on $549,654 worth of radiation hardened, space qualified memory chips from Aeroflex, a Colorado Springs chip designer and manufacturer. Seven months later, He drove his car to the Port of Long Beach and to a PRC-flagged ship there which had recently arrived from Shanghai and was scheduled to return in a week. The chips in question were in the defendant’s trunk concealed “in several plastic infant formula containers placed inside five boxes which were sealed and labeled as “milk powder” written in Chinese.

The indictment doesn’t describe what happened next, but it’s pretty clear. The federal agent that had been tailing Mr. He informed his buddies who swooped down on Mr. He, waving guns and shouting typical law enforcement stuff at him before dragging him away in handcuffs. The indictment suggests that before the dockside bust, the feds had snooped into his bank account and phone records and identified numerous phone calls to the PRC and, more ominously, two wires from the PRC to Mr. He totaling just under $500,000. As a result, Mr. He’s careful concealment of the goods in baby formula was a waste of time.

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to guess what happened here. Obviously, Aeroflex smelled a rat when this one-man storefront operation wanted to lay his hands on a half-million dollars worth of highly specialized space-qualified circuitry, so they alerted the authorities. All the while Mr. He was agonizing over whether it was safest to hide the goods in baby formula, cans of dog food or boxes of knitting needles, he was already a marked man. Had he gone in for a smaller amount (for which he certainly would have been paid less) he might be basking in the Southern California sun. Indeed, he reminds me of the would-be bicycle thief who tried to walk out of my condo building’s parking garage with two bicycles rather than racing off swiftly on one bicycle.

He went down too.

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Feb

2

Russkies No Longer Bullish on Dual Use . . . Cows


Posted by Clif Burns at 8:17 pm on February 2, 2012
Category: BISGeneral

Virginia P. HolsteinWell, who would have thought that a Google news search on “dual use exports” would turn up a WaPo story on the export of bulls from Virginia to Russia? Or that the story would talk about “dual use cows”? I certainly did not, which is what mooo-ved me to write this post.

According to the story, twenty-nine Holstein bulls have already been exported to Russia and another thirty are to follow. The bulls are set to, er, revitalize (at least that’s what the kids call it now) Russian Holstein dairy herds. The need for bulls with that certain American panache was explained as follows in the story:

Russian farmers want American bulls to improve dairy-herd genetics in a land hampered first by collective farming, then by the collapse of the Soviet Union. …

Instead of raising dairy cattle for milk and beef cattle for meat, Soviet collective farms had “dual-use” cattle, which would be milked for a while, then killed for meat, Osipenko said. Those one-size-fits-all cattle may have embodied an egalitarian ideal, but both milk and meat were mediocre, said Osipenko, a native of Ukraine who recalled his mother boiling beef for hours in a fruitless attempt to tenderize it.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, many dairy herds were all but wiped out as hungry Russians consumed them for food.

“There was a terrible crisis, apparently, and they pretty much ate their seed stock,” said Patrick Comyn, a large-animal veterinarian with the private Virginia Herd Health Management Services who worked on the deal.

And that’s where the exported bulls come in. I am sure that the Virginia bulls will be delighted, to the extent that bulls can be delighted in the first place, that they are fulfilling both a carnal and a patriotic duty.

Of course, these mail-order American husbands may never have seen their wealthy Russian wives if they had been horses because, as all export geeks know, export of horses by sea (ECCN 0A980) requires a license from the Department of Commerce. Personally, I think this is another example of wanton discrimination against American cows in favor of American horses which are spared from both the dinner table and long ocean voyages.

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