Archive for the ‘Economic Sanctions’ Category


Jun

24

A Brief Brexplanation of Brexit and Brexport


Posted by at 11:37 am on June 24, 2016
Category: BrexitEconomic SanctionsEUOFAC

Boatleave-12 by Gary Knight [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/J5K8dc [cropped]

Although Brexit is unlikely to be in effect for almost two years or more, there are some questions as to what impact Brexit might have on British export controls and economic sanctions.  Any prediction here is risky beyond my speculation that the UK will be unlikely to alienate the U.S. and other allies by significantly altering its export and sanctions regimes.

At this point, and in the wake of the vote last night, you may find it useful to understand the legal background under which Brexit will affect U.K. export controls and sanctions.   Given that all your Facebook friends have suddenly become experts on Brexit (soon to be known as Brexperts), you can now impress them as a Brexport Brexpert.

Let’s start with the Wassenaar Arrangement.  The European Union is not a party to the Wassenaar Arrangement.  Rather all member states of the E.U. (other than Cyprus) are individual members of the Wassenaar Arrangement.   Accordingly, Brexit will have absolutely no impact on Britain’s obligations under Wassenaar.   The Wassenaar Agreement is the source, via Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 (and associated legal amendments) of the UK Control Lists.  Although the intermediate authority for the lists will go away on Brexit, no alteration in those control lists will occur by virtue of Brexit alone.

This brings us to Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009, which establishes the E.U. framework for export controls. Here it is important to understand that the regulation did not create a centralized EU export control regime. Rather it left principal authority with Member States to implement their own control regimes in accord with principles set forth in the regulation. Britain’s Export Control Order of 2008 implements 428/2009 and related EU authorities. Although it will become untethered from 428/2009 on Brexit, there is no reason that it should not remain in place post-Brexit.

The situation with sanctions is somewhat more complicated and depends on the particular EU sanction. The JCPOA, which lifted many international sanctions on Iran, for example, will not be affected because the U.K. is an independent signatory to the JCPOA.  Other E.U. sanctions, such as the Russia/Ukraine sanctions, have direct legal effect in the U.K., although it is up to the member state to establish and enforce penalties. In these instances, there is no independent legal authority in the U.K. for that sanction, and its status after Brexit becomes uncertain. It is, of course, likely that Britain will not seek to alienate its allies by walking away from these sanctions, but it will have to enact domestic legislation to implement them before or after Brexit.

Photo Credit: Boatleave-12 by Gary Knight [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/J5K8dc [cropped]. Copyright 2016 Gary Knight

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Copyright © 2016 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

7

Save the Fokkers


Posted by at 11:40 pm on April 7, 2016
Category: Burma SanctionsCriminal PenaltiesEconomic SanctionsGeneralIran SanctionsSudan

Fokker Services Building in Hoofddorp via http://www.fokker.com/sites/default/files/styles/carousel_innovations/public/media/Images/Services/Contact_Fokker_Services_Location_Hoofddorp_637x286.jpg?itok=NYP0cc2k [Fair Use]

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit just reversed the decision of a lower federal district court which tossed out the deferred prosecution agreement between the Department of Justice and Fokker Services B.V.  Fokker had admitted, in a voluntary disclosure to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), that  it had obtained U.S. origin aircraft parts which it then re-exported to Iran, Sudan and Burma without the required licenses. This blog has previously criticized both the highly unusual decision of the DoJ to turn a voluntary disclosure to OFAC into a criminal prosecution and the district court’s decision to toss aside the DPA as too lenient, apparently in the belief that Iran was somehow involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The Court of Appeals decision, which restores the DPA and reverses the lower court, is based simply on its interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act. Because a DPA starts the Speedy Trial Act’s seventy-day clock running, the Act provides, in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), that a DPA can turn off this clock “with the approval of the court.” Otherwise, of course, the defendant could escape prosecution after seventy days, despite provisions of the DPA that prosecution would be avoided only upon good behavior by the defendant during a longer period, typically one to three years.

The Court of Appeals held that this requirement of approval did not give the district court the authority to question the leniency of the DPA, the charges brought by the government or the parties prosecuted under those charges. Rather the court reviewing a DPA is limited to determining if the DPA is

geared to enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the law, and is not instead a pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial Act’s time constraint.

The only other authority of the lower court, according to the Court of Appeals, would be to reject “illegal or unethical provisions” of the DPA, noting that the District Court had not argued that anything in the DPA was either illegal or unethical.

The Court of Appeals opinion is, thus, good news and bad news. The bad news is that a court can’t refuse to approve a DPA on the grounds that it was unfair for the government to turn a voluntary disclosure to an administrative agency into a criminal prosecution. The good news is that if the exporter does agree to a DPA, it can have a high degree of certainty that the district court cannot condition approval of the DPA on the insertion of more onerous provisions.

Photo Credit: Fokker Services Building in Hoofddorp via Fokker http://bit.ly/23bmktC [Fair Use] [cropped]

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Copyright © 2016 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

2

White House Fires First Salvo at Chinese Government Hacking Activities


Posted by at 12:47 pm on April 2, 2015
Category: ChinaCyber WeaponsEconomic SanctionsOFAC

By Poa Mosyuen (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HK_%E7%9F%B3%E5%A1%98%E5%92%80%E5%B8%82%E6%94%BF%E5%A4%A7%E5%BB%88_Shek_Tong_Tsui_Municipal_Services_Building_%E9%9B%BB%E8%85%A6%E9%8D%B5%E7%9B%A4_Chinese_input_keyboard_Jan-2012.jpgYesterday the Office of Foreign Assets Control published an executive order and accompanying FAQs under which the White House establishes the circumstances under which it will add certain persons and entities engaged in hacking computers and networks in the United States to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. U.S. persons would be prohibited from engaging in any transactions with any of the designated cyberviolaters and all property of the cyberviolaters that comes into the United States or under the control of U.S. persons would required to be blocked.

Unlike most executive orders of this type, no parties have been designated yet under its authority; it is purely prospective in nature. This suggests that the order is, for the moment, mostly a diplomatic salvo and that its likely target is China. The numerous cyber attacks on the United States by China, including the recent Anthem breach, have been well documented and just as vociferously denied (in a clear methinks the lady doth protest too much” fashion) by the Chinese government.

Whether this will be effective in deterring China remains to be seen. One response by China to any future designation might be to double down and engage in cyber retaliation. Given the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare between the U.S. and China, due to the fact that the U.S. is more connected and more vulnerable than China, such retaliation cannot be discounted.

An additional point should be made on these new sanctions. I have seen some popular tech media and bloggers suggest that the sanctions might be applied to domestic hackers, even relatively benign ones doing things similar to what got Aaron Schwartz in trouble. It is important to remember, however, that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, under which the executive order was issued, restricts the scope of the order to blocking “any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,” thereby preventing purely domestic application of these sanctions. A domestic hacker would have to be working on behalf of a foreign country or foreign national to be designated under the new cyber sanctions.

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Copyright © 2015 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

10

Sen. Landrieu Attempts to Clarify the Record … But Doesn’t


Posted by at 8:28 pm on September 10, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsOFACSDN ListVenezuela

Sen. Landrieu [Official Portrait, Public Domain]

On Sunday, in Lafayette, LA, The Advertiser printed an opinion from Sen. Mary Landrieu entitled, “Sanctions, as written, will hurt La. workers.”  While we hoped Sen. Landrieu was writing to clarify the record in response to our post last week, she was writing instead to respond to an earlier opinion in The Advertiser written by Sen. Marco Rubio and Rep. Bill Cassidy.

Sen. Landrieu began by referring to the Lake Charles, LA oil refinery as “owned by Citgo, a Venezuelan company with a strong and respected reputation in Louisiana.”  Citgo, however, is quite clearly a U.S. company, founded and incorporated in the United States over a hundred years ago.  It became wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela, the Venezuelan national oil company, in 1990, but remained a U.S. company.  The hawkish view on U.S. sanctions is, of course, that Citgo, even though a U.S. company employing U.S. persons, is not immune from the conduct of its foreign parent if, in this case, Petróleos de Venezuela’s conduct were found to be at variance with U.S. economic sanctions and was added to the SDN List, its subsidiary Citgo would be equally blocked and unable to employ U.S. workers.

In her opinion, Sen. Landrieu continued to defend her opposition to the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014 because she believed that “the legislation as written was too vague” and “will continue to oppose it unless the language of this resolution makes crystal clear that there will be no threat to the [Lake Charles] refinery.”  But, as we pointed out last week, Sen. Landrieu’s references to amending the Act have led to no clear (crystal or otherwise) suggestions on how to do so.  We think we can help her out.

The Act, like other sanctions bills, already permits the President to waive the application of sanctions against a person if he determines that such waiver is necessary for the “national security interests of the United States.”  The amendment we recommend to Sen. Landrieu is to rewrite the waiver in Section 5(c)(1) to read, “The President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (b) with respect to a person if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national security or economic interests of the United States.”  By adding simply “or economic” to the waiver condition, the President has another avenue to defend not imposing sanctions against otherwise sanctionable foreign persons.  Again, as we pointed out last week, the President would not take lightly a decision to block Citgo’s assets in Louisiana or anywhere else in United States.  Congress, moreover, would be hard-pressed to oppose a waiver if the President were able to show that imposing sanctions would have tremendous economic ramifications.

If Sen. Landrieu wants to take the position that U.S. economic sanctions against human rights violators can’t come with a cost that significantly harms the U.S. economy, there is a way to protect that interest.  Whether or not her position wins the day on the Senate floor, we think the only practical way to do so is to give the President more discretion in how he may choose not to impose sanctions.  A tidy addition of the two words “or economic” should do the trick and put to bed another odd episode of “How a Bill Becomes a Law.”

 

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

6

Bizarre Sanctions Battle Brews in the Bayou


Posted by at 9:34 am on September 6, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsOFACSanctionsSDN ListVenezuela

By User:Lunarsurface (Own work) [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or CC-BY-SA-2.5-2.0-1.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ACitgo_sign_and_Yawkey_way.jpg

With the calendar turning to September, Sen. Mary Landrieu will be displayed prominently in election media coverage as an incumbent in the proverbial hot seat.  The most intriguing fodder her opponents have used against her has been her curious opposition to the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.  The House passed its version by voice vote in May, but the Act has stalled in the Senate principally because Landrieu’s opposition has derailed others from bringing the Act to vote through unanimous consent.

The Act includes sanctions against individuals and entities associated with the Venezuelan government that the President determines committed, directed or “materially assisted, sponsored, or provided significant … support for” those who have committed or directed human rights abuses against anti-government protestors in that country.  Like many similar sanctions bills, Congress would give the President wide discretion in determining whether persons meet standards like “materially assisted” or provided “significant” support.  The Act would certainly not require the President to designate any company affiliated with the Venezuelan government as an SDN and, as a result, block their U.S. assets.

Sen. Landrieu, however, has opposed the bill out of fear that 2,000 workers at a Citgo oil refinery in Louisiana may be at jeopardy.  She has said that “once a simple sentence that protects these hard working Louisianans is added to the bill, I will be happy to support the legislation.”  So, what would Sen. Landrieu’s “simple sentence” look like?  It can’t possibly be a carve out for 2,000 workers at a Louisiana Citgo refinery; then every member of Congress with a Citgo presence in their state would want similar protection for their constituents.  It can’t possibly be a carve out to protect any U.S. companies owned by a Venezuelan parent, like Citgo is; then the sanctions would be bereft of any heft to affect possible change in Venezuela.

This week, Sen. Marco Rubio entered the fray in a letter to Sen. Harry Reid to ensure the Act is brought to the Senate floor for a vote over Sen. Landrieu’s opposition.  In his letter, Sen. Rubio described the Act as “target[ing] individuals only and pose[] no threat to American jobs or Venezuelan firms.”  Not so fast, Marco, the Act includes sanctions against “persons.”  Someone forgot to tell Sen. Rubio that every OFAC sanctions regime defines persons to mean individuals and entities.  Someone also forgot to tell him about the three Citgo storage facilities, hundreds of gas stations and thousands of affiliated jobs the company has in Florida.

One upshot of this situation is that members of Congress don’t understand how U.S. economic sanctions work.  It is odd that Sen. Landrieu has stuck her political neck out in a situation where the President would be the one under the Act who would have to designate Petróleos de Venezuela, Citgo’s Venezuelan parent, as an SDN if he determined it met the conditions under the Act.  Doing so would not be a decision taken lightly and would have repercussions beyond just Louisiana (ask any Boston Red Sox fan about what would happen to the Citgo sign above left field).  It is also odd that Sen. Rubio would put his name to a letter that declares no U.S. jobs would be threatened by these sanctions.  The fact is that threat remains under the Act, no matter how unlikely, and the President, not Congress, would be in control of imposing sanctions.

A simple moral to this story is a classroom adage: Read Carefully and Think Critically.  Here’s hoping politicians start doing a little bit more of both.

Clif adds: In my somewhat more cynical view, the likelihood that members of Congress will ever “Read Carefully and Think Critically” is exactly equal to the likelihood that I will ever debut as Wotan in a production of The Ring Cycle at the Met.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)