Archive for the ‘DDTC’ Category


Apr

30

Danger, Danger, Will Robinson! Deemed Exports Ahead!!


Posted by Clif Burns at 6:51 pm on April 30, 2012
Category: BISDDTCDeemed Exports

Medical LabA long article published today on the Bloomberg News website tells the story of a voluntary disclosure by Georgia Tech after one of its instructors inadvertently posted some export-controlled data on the Internet. The article follows this anecdote up with a ton of (virtual) ink about how universities are giving away all of our military secrets and how we shouldn’t be surprised when this results in the U.S. becoming a satellite province of China or Iran.

First, here’s what the story reveals about the Georgia Tech voluntary disclosure. According to the story, a research scientist at the university wanted to put course materials and videos of his lectures for his course “Infrared Technology and Applications” on a DVD because he was planning to retire and he wanted to use these materials to train his successor. When the university’s media staff encountered problems putting the video and materials on DVD, they suggested making the information available by a link. The research scientist approved this idea, thinking that it was an internal link, whereas it was an ordinary Internet link. The material was available online for about three weeks before the mistake was discovered and the materials were taken down. Although the video received hits only from the United States, some of the Powerpoint slides that were posted received hits from foreign countries, including 33 from China and one from Iran. The university disclosed this lapse to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls which issued a warning letter but imposed no penalties, something which appears to have scandalized the Bloomberg reporter.

Above and beyond the description of the Georgia Tech voluntary disclosure, the article takes a Chicken Little approach to the dangers posed to national security by university research:

Eager to preserve their culture of openness and global collaboration, campuses are skirting — and even flouting — export-control laws that require foreigners to hold government licenses to work on sensitive projects.

To support this startlingly broad conclusion, the reporter humps the Roth case for all it is worth and cites some voluntary disclosures by several universities. That doesn’t much sound like “flouting” export rules to me, but perhaps Bloomberg has a different definition of that word.

For those familiar with the sorts of information which may be export-controlled (but not classified), it is hard to get too worked up about the national security implications of this. After all, business proprietary information about how to make handcuffs is controlled under the Commerce Department’s rules. Suffice it to say, things that are of real concern are classified. Accordingly, I am not scandalized when voluntary disclosures by universities relating to deemed exports result in warning letters rather than jail time for everyone involved as the reporter seems to think is appropriate. And because “fundamental research,” which is exempted from export controls, is an incredibly vague term that is difficult to apply in many contexts, overzealous enforcement of export rules to university research would have an unwarranted chilling effect on that research given the number of foreign students at almost every college and university. Well, I suppose colleges could adopt an American-only admissions policy, and I wouldn’t be surprised if there weren’t certain advocates of deemed export controls who secretly wish for such national homogeneity at our institutions of higher learning.

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Apr

4

Seized Weapons “Contraband” Despite Arms Export Act Charges Dismissal


Posted by Clif Burns at 6:56 pm on April 4, 2012
Category: Arms ExportDDTC

Customs Destroys Seized MerchandiseA memorandum opinion of the Ninth Circuit, filed on March 30, 2012, reaches a somewhat paradoxical conclusion. It held that a party that had been indicted for violations of the Arms Export Control Act had no right, even though the indictment was dismissed, for compensation resulting from the destruction of the seized merchandise by U.S. Customs. The merchandise in question consisted of weapons parts imported from Vietnam in violation of the U.S. arms embargo against Vietnam. The opinion pointed out that the goods were still contraband because the claimant did not have a license from ATF required for permanent imports or a license from the Department of State required for temporary imports.

Of course, the back story — why were the indictments dismissed for the illegal arms import? — is the most interesting part of this story and can be found in the district court opinion dismissing the arms charges. The charges in question were dismissed because the court found that the defendant (and claimant) had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. That happened because — get this — U.S. Customs destroyed the central evidence in the case, the seized weapons parts, because it was costing too much to store them. Repeated calls by Customs to the AUSA prosecuting the case weren’t returned and so Customs simply torched the goods. The prosecution was somewhat loathe to reveal this blunder to the defense and so it kept dawdling on complying with the defendant’s discovery request. Interestingly, the district court held that the destruction of the evidence, although that constituted “gross negligence” by the government, did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause because the evidence was not exculpatory.

My favorite part of the district court decision is this little nugget explaining how the evidence wound up being destroyed:

SA Bench followed SA King’s suggestion and made several telephone calls to AUSA Schaeffer at the San Francisco United States Attorney’s Office, leaving voicemail messages, asking for return calls, and stating that unless he (Schaefer) authorized continued retention of the evidence, [Customs] would destroy it. At SA Bench’s request, his Group Supervisor Jerry Barnett also called one or two times and left the same voicemail messages for AUSA Schaefer. … AUSA Schaefer testified that he never received the voicemail messages, that he always returned his telephone calls and that he had no information that the weapons parts were in jeopardy of being destroyed. Numerous present and former government employees, however, testified that Schaefer had an extremely poor reputation for returning phone calls. SA Bench did not receive any return call from AUSA Schaefer and Bench advised Ms. Mower in July of 1999 that the evidence could be destroyed, which occurred on September 28, 1999. …

AUSA Schaefer had a reputation among law enforcement agents, defense attorneys and members of the United States Attorney’s Office in San Francisco, for extreme dereliction regarding returning telephone calls. SA Stoltz testified that when he wanted to contact Schaefer, it would typically require 50-60 calls and voicemail messages

[Record citations omitted.]

The amazing thing here is that someone would actually leave 50-60 messages in such a situation. I think that’s often referred to as the triumph of hope over experience.

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Mar

14

Export Reform on a Slow Boat to China


Posted by Clif Burns at 6:52 pm on March 14, 2012
Category: Arms ExportChinaDDTCExport Reform

Gregory Schulte
ABOVE: Gregory Schulte

The House Armed Services Committee last week held a hearing on whether the Thales sale of an ITAR-free satellite to the Chinese had, in fact, leaked U.S. space technology to the Chinese. During that hearing, Gregory L. Schulte, deputy assistant defense secretary for space policy, tried to allay concerns by the Committee that export reform would be a boon to the Chinese.

And we are not proposing removing the Tiananmen Square sanctions that would remain in place even with export-control reform, meaning that items still on the Munitions List could not be exported to China. And, also meaning, that we would not allow the launch of satellites from Chinese launch vehicles.

He went on to say that although some space items would, as part of export reform, be moved to the less restrictive Commerce Control List, those would only be “space items that are already widely available.” Even then, according to Schulte, such space items that were moved to the CCL would still be subject to strict controls with respect to licensing exports to China.

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Mar

1

Loose Lips: Do They Sink Ships or Just Annoy DDTC?


Posted by Clif Burns at 6:23 pm on March 1, 2012
Category: DDTCPart 122

Top SecretWe all know about exporters who, having spent the money to register with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), can’t resist crowing about it, with some even implying in press releases that registration is a certification from DDTC that the registered exporter has passed some test and is now certified as ITAR-compliant, which, of course, is untrue.

But here’s another response to the giddy euphoria that follows on the heels of a successful registration: post the registration code and the DDTC registration letter on your website! That is exactly what E.R. Precision Optical did. Of course, the folks at E.R. were probably not aware that DDTC says

The code is proprietary to the registrant and should be handled as such. Company registration codes should not be posted online or given out freely to the public.

Of course, that raises the more interesting question: why should this registration number be confidential? It’s not like I can take E.R.’s number from the web and use it to start applying for export licenses in my own name. Further, DDTC spokespeople have said that exporters should make sure that they only deal with registered subcontractors even though DDTC refuses to answer inquiries as to whether particular parties are even registered or not. And arguably using an unregistered manufacturer is a violation of section 127.1(d) of the ITAR.

So how do you find out if someone who manufactures defense articles is registered? The best way is to ask that company for a copy of the registration letter which, of course, the DDTC says is “double secret.*” Otherwise, you just have to take their word for it. At least when companies like E.R. post the registration letter and code online, you can be fairly certain, Photoshop forgeries aside, that they are registered.

[h/t to Chris Adams for pointing out the E.R. website to me.]


*Naughty language alert if you click this link and view the video. May not be safe for certain workplaces.

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Feb

24

And the Ugly Rumor Becomes a Hideous Fact


Posted by Clif Burns at 5:24 pm on February 24, 2012
Category: Arms ExportDDTC

FacepalmIn yesterday’s post, I discussed the ramifications of the debarment of six freight forwarders — Bax Global, Inc.; Ceva Logistics LLC; EGL, Inc.; Kuhne and Nagel International AG; Panalpina, Inc. (including its Swiss affiliate Panalpina Welttransport Holding AG); and Schenker AG — from government contracting. The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) has today issued a guidance indicating that these parties are indeed ineligible to participate in any transaction involving the export of defense articles.

First, for the good news. Existing authorizations that include any of the six freight forwarders will be unaffected. Exporters can ship under licenses now in their hands even if the license refers to one of the six freight forwarders at issue.

Now for the bad news. Licenses received by DDTC after February 18, 2012, that name one of these freight forwarders and which do not contain a transaction exception request will be returned without action, unless a transaction exception request is filed with DDTC within three days of the issuance of the guidance. Those days apparently include this weekend, so unless you get a transaction exception request to DDTC by this Monday, February 27, your license application will be returned. (Have a nice weekend!)

It is not clear what will happen to pending applications received before February 18, 2012. The guidance says that they will be “reviewed by DDTC in the normal course,” whatever that means. Probably that means that the license will be granted with provisos or amendments excluding the six freight forwarders.

And although the guidance does not say this directly, you can be certain, indeed you can bet the farm, that no transaction exception requests are going to be granted. The guidance says that the transaction request should explain

why the generally ineligible entity should be part of the transaction (i.e., why the applicant is unable to utilize a different freight forwarder), and how the inclusion of the ineligible entity is in the interests of U.S. foreign policy or national security.

In other words, don’t waste your time because I do not see how you can ever demonstrate that no other freight forwarder is available.

It bears repeating that, as I said yesterday, the Arms Export Control Act does not require DDTC to do this. DDTC has the discretion not to do this. Where there is no reason to believe that the antitrust plea is evidence that these freight forwarders are now more likely to violate the ITAR in connection with their shipments, there is absolutely no reason to exclude these freight forwarders from all ITAR-related exports. Indeed, DDTC is removing from the pool of freight forwarders companies with substantial ITAR experience. This will force exporters to use smaller, less experienced companies who are more likely to violate the ITAR precisely because of their inexperience. DDTC foot, meet bullet. Bullet, meet DDTC foot.

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