Archive for the ‘DDTC’ Category

Now You See It, Now You Don’t

Thursday, March 4th, 2010

Poof!I thought I was seeing things. First, I read a notice on the website of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) saying that DDTC was putting a temporary hold on export licenses where BAE Systems was an applicant or manufacturer while the agency studied BAE’s recent guilty plea to charges that it paid bribes in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and violated the Arms Export Controls Act by failing to report these bribes as “commissions” in export license applications.” Then the notice was gone.

According to this article in Defense News Daily, I wasn’t hallucinating:

In an Internet notice posted after BAE pleaded guilty on March 1, the State Department said the hold applied to license applications where BAE Systems PLC “or any of its subsidiaries is an applicant, consignee, end user, manufacturer or source.”

In the notice, the department advised export license applicants to determine whether they could modify their applications to remove BAE products. If they could, the notice instructed license applicants to withdraw their applications and amend them. That notice was withdrawn within a day and replaced by one that did not offer advice to license applicants hoping to export BAE products.

And that notice, in turn, was withdrawn and not replaced.

Notwithstanding the confusing impressions left by these disappearing web notices, a State Department spokesman, according to the article, asserted that DDTC was considering whether to debar BAE from exports. Meanwhile a BAE spokesman said that the company interpreted the removal of the web notices to indicate that no hold was currently in place.

Whatever is going on here, DDTC’s continually shifting public position doesn’t permit much confidence in its decision-making process on this issue.

ITT Debarment Lifted Two Months Early

Wednesday, February 24th, 2010

Red TapeOn Monday the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC) published a notice in the Federal Register that the three-year statutory debarment of ITT Night Vision, scheduled to end on March 26, 2010, was ended effective February 4, 2010. DDTC noted, in justifying the early termination, noted that

ITT Corporation has taken appropriate steps to address the causes of the violations and to mitigate any law enforcement concerns.

While the denial order was in effect, ITT Night Vision products could be exported by ITT and by resellers but only pursuant to a specific transaction exception from DDTC. Such transaction exceptions were granted only with respect to exports for end-use by the U.S. government or for end use by certain allies. As a result of DDTC’s actions, license applications to export ITT night vision products will no longer need to contain information supporting a transaction exception.

If Only They Gave Darwin Awards for Export Violations

Tuesday, February 9th, 2010

Interturbine HeadquartersThe Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) has posted the settlement documents for the case involving Interturbine Aviation Logistics GmbH and its Texas subsidiary which was reported by this blog last week. And — now, don’t faint from shock — an overeager business development executive and one of his employees appear to have been the source of Interturbine’s problems.

According to the Proposed Charging Letter, the $1 million penalty was premised on one shipment of 400 kilograms (880 pounds) of Dow Corning Ablative 93-104 Ablative Material and Sealant. The substance can be used to provide heat-protective coatings on missile tips and is controlled under Category IV(f) of the United States Munitions List.

In 2004 Dow Corning notified its customers that DC 93-104 was a USML item and could no longer be shipped outside the United States. On of Dow Corning’s former customers, Bayern-Chemie, began to look for a new supplier and contacted Interturbine’s German office. A business development employee of Interturbine thereafter met with GmbH. The employee then prepared a report stating that DC 93-104 couldn’t be sold outside the United States and that this presented an “excellent opportunity” to acquire a “profitable new customer.”

The Interturbine employee instructed an intern to prepare a purchase order. When the intern noted that the material was export-controlled the business development employee falsely told the intern that the export had been cleared. The intern then ordered DC 93-104 from Dow Corning for shipment to Interturbine’s Texas office.

Once the shipment from Texas to Germany had been made, the Vice-President of Business Development in Interturbine’s German office altered records to show that the 400 kilograms of DC 93-104 were still in Texas. He also created a delivery note indicating, falsely, that the material had been shipped to Bayern-Chemie from Interturbine’s facility in Germany.

Things went downhill rapidly after that. Bayern-Chemie questioned the absence of a U.S. export license, quarantined the shipment and refused to pay Interturbine for the shipment. Interturbine conducted an internal investigation and requested Bayern-Chemie to return the shipment to Texas. U.S. Customs seized the shipment on its way back to Texas. And the rest is now history.

Even though the Interturbine employees were selling missile products, it’s safe to say they weren’t rocket scientists. Trying to make an illegal export to Bayern-Chemie without having everyone at Bayern-Chemie in on the scheme is a little bit like writing a bank robbery demand note on the back of your own business card.

Breaking News from the Registration Front

Friday, February 5th, 2010

Big News!The biggest news today was the announcement by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) of a U.K. company’s agreement to pay a $15 million fine, the largest fine ever collected by BIS. I’ll write about that when the charging and settlement documents are released.

In the meantime, however, I want to share with you a bumper crop of company press releases over the past few days announcing registration under Part 122 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. And, as always, these press releases are a never-ending source of amusement.

New-Hampshire-based Ion Beam Milling’s announcement perpetuates the myth that ITAR registration represents some kind of certification by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”):

Upon verification of a company’s ITAR compliance, an ITAR Registration Code is assigned and certifies the company’s clearance to work in conjunction with the US military and its counterparts.

Ion Beam also wins the award for the most original spin ever on ITAR registration:

ITAR Registration enhances Ion Beam Milling’s existing Intellectual Property and Document control policies.

A free subscription to this blog will be awarded to any reader who figures out just what the heck this means.

California-based Lenthor Engineering scores a first by issuing a press release announcing that it has renewed its registration. I can just imagine someone in the company saying that they’ve paid $2,250 and will be darned if they’re going to let that money go to waste.  Don’t be surprised if Lenthor announces next week that the company added another copy of the Pocket ITAR to the company’s library.

Munich-based computer hardware manufacturer Kontron AG’s announcement notes that the company

has registered and is in compliance with International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) administered by the United States Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls who [sic] controls the export and import of defense articles and services.

Obviously Kontron didn’t have to take the legendary DDTC certification test or it would have known that DDTC only controls temporary imports of defense articles.

At Least Self-Debarment Beats Ritual Seppuku

Wednesday, February 3rd, 2010

Interturbine HeadquartersEarlier this afternoon, the State Department issued a press release announcing a settlement it had reached with Interturbine Aviation Logistics GmbH, Germany, and its Texas branch office, Interturbine Aviation Logistics GmbH, LLC, for alleged violatons of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”). Under the agreement Interturbine agreed to a $1 million dollar fine, $900,000 of which would be suspended provided that these amounts were applied to Interturbine’s ITAR-related compliance programs and measures.

One part of the press release deserves particular attention:

$400,000 [of the suspended $900,000] will be suspended on the condition that Interturbine maintains its self-initiated exclusion from all ITAR regulated activities.

I suspect that I am not alone here in wondering how voluntary or “self-initiated” Interturbine’s self-debarment was. Although I’m certain that the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) didn’t resort to rubber truncheons, heavy volumes of the phone book, bright lights and sleep deprivation, it wouldn’t surprise me if this self-debarment was strongly urged by DDTC officials while asking Interturbine officials how they thought they would look in orange. This is, after all, the first time I’ve seen a company adopt a lengthy self-debarment as the result of export violations.

The best part of the press release, however, is this:

The Department has determined that an administrative debarment of Interturbine is not appropriate at this time.

That seems to me not far removed from saying that, in light of the defendant’s suicide, the prosecution has decided not to seek the death penalty.

UPDATE: A source for Interturbine contacted me and said that the State Department’s reference to “self-initiated exclusion from ITAR activities” isn’t entirely accurate. The company says that none of its products are ITAR-controlled and that the company was simply continuing its existing policy of not dealing in ITAR-controlled products. The re-sale of the Dow Corning product was atypical and not a result of any intention by the company to deal in ITAR-controlled products.

BIS Is from Mars and DDTC Is from Venus

Monday, January 25th, 2010

Locked HornsThere has never been a seriously-advocated rational reason for the U.S., unlike most other countries, to have one export agency regulating exports of weapons and a separate export agency regulating exports of dual use items. A new regulation adopted by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) last May, and which I hadn’t noticed at the time but which was pointed out today by an astute reader, is a perfect example of the confusion sown by this split personality approach to export regulation.

The regulation created a new, and frankly obtuse, ECCN designated as 0A919 which, to the extent any sense can be made of it, covers military items produced outside the United States which incorporate certain thermal imaging devices and which are “not subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.” Don’t go rushing now to your copy of the ITAR to find a definition of items “subject to the ITAR,” because you won’t find it. The Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) administered by BIS talks about “items subject to the EAR” but the ITAR at times focuses instead on what people are subject to its jurisdiction, particularly in respect to Part 129’s brokering regulations which intersect uncomfortably with the new ECCN.

Let’s now look at a specific example and see what happens. Consider a military vehicle which incorporates a thermal imaging camera controlled by BIS and which was manufactured outside the United States. If a U.S. person sought to export that vehicle from its country of manufacture to another country, that person (depending on the value of the vehicle and its export destinations) could be required to get permission from the Directorate of Defense Controls (“DDTC”) which regulates brokering in Part 129 of the ITAR. And given the new ECCN, that person might also require an export license from BIS (depending, of course, on the destination of the exported vehicle).

BIS tries unsuccessfully to avoid this overlapping jurisdiction with an awkwardly worded note to the new ECCN:

Brokering activities (as defined in 22 CFR 129.9) of military commodities that are subject to the ITAR are under the licensing jurisdiction of the Department of State.

That note doesn’t work because under part 129 all defense articles, irrespective of U.S. content, “are subject to the ITAR.” The brokering regulations in part 129 cover U.S. persons and foreign persons in the United States or otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction if they engage in brokering a defense article even if not one single component of that article was produced in the United States.

The note, and indeed the entire ECCN, only makes sense if whether something was subject to the ITAR depended on U.S. content in the same way that “subject to the EAR” under the EAR’s definition depends on the amount of U.S. content. And that’s apparently what somebody at BIS was thinking. If we had one export agency handling both dual use items and military items, this kind of basic confusion would be much less likely to occur.

DDTC Updates Firearms and Ammunition Export Guideline

Thursday, January 21st, 2010

Guns and AmmoOn Tuesday, the website of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls announced that it had updated its “Guidelines for the Permanent Export, Temporary Export and Temporary Import of Firearms and Ammunitions.” Although DDTC did not identify or explain the changes in the guidelines, the changes appear to be restricted to one paragraph marked in red. That paragraph, which can be found on page 7, reads:

Where the exporter uses an in–transit point (or points) in a country other than that of the ultimate destination, an authorization issued by the foreign government of the transit country authorizing the transit of the specified items must also accompany each application to export. Where items are temporarily imported into the U.S. for the purposes of transit or transshipment to other OAS countries, an Import Authorization, comprised of either a permit or a certificate issued by the foreign government authorizing the import of specified items, must accompany each application to import.

This paragraph requires that temporary import of firearms through the United States for another member of the Organization of the American States (“OAS”) be accompanied by an import authorization from the destination state. This is clearly an effort to conform to the requirement of Article IX(2) of the OAS Firearms Convention.

The other requirement, that an export license application for firearms that transit another country prior to the ultimate destination must be accompanied by a transit permit from the transiting country, is not restricted to OAS members, although that requirement conforms to Article IX(3) of the OAS convention. It also conforms to the requirement of Article 10(2)(b) of the U.N. Firearms Protocol which hasn’t been signed or ratified by the United States, largely based on fears, unfounded by the text of the Protocol, that the Protocol is an effort by the U.N. to regulate purely domestic sales of firearms in the United States.

Even so, it’s a sensible requirement because failure to obtain a transit license for countries that have signed the U.N. Protocol or which otherwise require transit permits can result in seizures of the firearms as they transit those countries. For other countries that have not signed the U.N. Protocol and which don’t require transit licenses, the provision is a bit more problematic in that it would appear to require obtaining a transit license from countries that don’t issue them. In the case of exports to countries that don’t require import authorizations, the guidelines permit the applicant to submit a statement from the end user or the country of import that no import authorization is required. It’s not clear why a similar procedure doesn’t appear to be available in the case of countries without transit license requirements.

The Pentagon Will Get to It When It Gets to It.

Monday, January 11th, 2010

Stopped ClockWe previously reported a change announced by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) adding a sixth exception to National Security Presidential Directive–56 which mandated a 60-day processing time for export license applications. Sharp-eyed reader Robin noted that there was more in that notice than meets the eye, or at least met my eye.

Although the notice announcing the change characterized the change as simply adding a sixth exception, in fact the notice also changed, without any mention, the fourth exception to the processing guidelines. Previously, the fourth exception read as follows:

(4) Department of Defense has notified the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls that an overriding national security exception exists.

But now take a look at exemption 4 in the DDTC notice announcing the sixth exception:

(4) The Department of Defense has not yet completed its review.

Sneaky. I suppose DDTC didn’t really want to highlight that the Pentagon feels that it’s above such silly civilian nonsense as processing deadlines. Or that the last time DDTC asked the Pentagon about where it was on an application, the Pentagon told DDTC to “take a hike” although it likely did so using somewhat more “colorful” terms.

DDTC Tells Exporters To Maintain Outdated Computer Systems

Thursday, January 7th, 2010

IBM XTFor reasons known only to the IT folks at the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), the agency’s electronic export licensing system (D-Trade) adopted the quirky, non-standard PureEdge Viewer as the software required to fill out and digitally sign export license applications forms rather than the industry standard (and widely installed) Adobe Acrobat. It’s probably safe to assume that no one had ever heard of PureEdge before it became a mandatory part of D-Trade.

Well, an interesting notice that appeared at the end of December should have raised a few eyebrows about DDTC’s choice of PureEdge Viewer. It seems that PureEdge isn’t compatible with Windows 7 and that PureEdge forms can’t be digitally signed by exporters who have upgraded their computers to Windows 7. And, as you may know, if you can’t digitally sign a license application, you can’t submit it to DDTC. (Can you sign an Adobe form in Windows 7? You bet your bippy you can.)

DDTC’s solution would make a Luddite, but not anyone else, smile:

Industry is strongly encouraged to maintain a Windows XP system with Internet Explorer versions 6 or 7 to use for all DTrade transactions at this time.

Another solution that DDTC says might work is to upgrade to IBM’s Lotus Forms Viewer 3.5.1. IBM bought PureEdge in 2005, so that Lotus Forms Viewer 3.5.1 is, in essence, the newest version of the PureEdge Viewer. Of course, Lotus Forms Viewer, although it has a trial version that can be used for free for 60 days, comes at a hefty price. The price is particularly hefty since Lotus Forms largely duplicates the functionality of Adobe Acrobat which most companies have already purchased.

Prior to Adobe Acrobat becoming the standard solution for filling out government agency forms, many companies kept a sad-looking IBM Selectric hidden away for those few forms that could still only be typewritten. Well, move over typewriter and make way for a new neighbor — an XP computer that’s being kept around for filling out DDTC export licenses, including, ironically, licenses to export cutting-edge technology.

DDTC Imposes Pseudo-Embargo on Niger

Wednesday, January 6th, 2010
Mamadou Tandja
ABOVE: Mamadou Tandja

The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) announced today that applications for exports of defense items and services to Niger might be delayed, possibly for a really, really long time:

In response to recent events in the Republic of Niger (Niger), DDTC wishes to inform exporters that although there is no current U.S. or UN arms embargo on Niger, the final decision of license applications for the export of U.S. Munitions List (USML) items to Niger received from this date or currently in the review process may be delayed. License applications will continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but approval should not be assumed. We encourage exporters to take the current situation into account and if applying for a new license to export or re-export USML items to Niger, that the license application provide detailed information on the end-use and end-user of the USML items.

The recent events referred to in the DDTC announcement were actions taken last August by Niger’s President Mamadou Tandja (or Tandja Mamadou, there seems to be some dispute as to the correct order) to amend his country’s constitution to give himself the right to run for a third term. The action was taken after a disputed referendum that was boycotted by the opposition and that Tandja pushed through by dissolving the parliament and the constitutional court.