Archive for the ‘DDTC’ Category


Nov

30

Maybe There’s a Good Idea Lurking in Tom Fox’s Stealth Advertorial


Posted by at 4:44 pm on November 30, 2016
Category: BISCivil PenaltiesCompliance Programs and ProceduresCriminal PenaltiesDDTCFCPAOFAC

Internet Email by twitter.com/mattwi1s0n [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/75rLY [cropped and processed]

Over at the excellent FCPA Compliance & Ethics Blog, Tom Fox has a plug for email monitoring software disguised as a blog post.  He’s even doing a “webinar” with the software developers — completely free, of course —  presumably to push the sales of this product.

Notwithstanding what might not be his completely objective take on this software product, Fox raises a good issue that might warrant consideration for incorporation into your export compliance program.  I assume everyone reading my blog and this post is acutely aware that a robust compliance plan is the best insurance against getting taken to the cleaners by the DoJ and the export agencies after it is discovered that an employee in your Hamburg office has been shipping  your U.S. origin night vision to Iran.  But what does your compliance program do proactively to ferret out such problems?  Fox suggests that companies should consider periodic email sweeps for keywords

The concept is straightforward; at regular intervals you can sweep through your company email database for identified key words that can be flagged for further investigation, if required.

So, should you consider sweeping all emails for keywords such as “Iran” or “Syria”? What other keywords might help pinpoint export compliance problems? “Jail”? “Orange Jumpsuit”? “Export License,” as in “let’s avoid fussing with that stupid export license requirement”? Are there keywords that can identify times when employees say something like “Call me, since we shouldn’t put this in writing”?

While I think such an approach is a nice shiny bauble that can be dangled in front of prosecutors and enforcement agencies and therefore is worth considering, I also wonder whether such sweeps will actually be effective in detecting violations. First, in my experience, most of the problems come from sales employees outside the United States who don’t think U.S. laws should interfere with their commissions. Foreign privacy laws, particularly in the E.U., often pose barriers to rifling through foreign employees’ emails. Second, in my experience, employees, particularly those with mischief in their hearts, are much too savvy to talk openly in emails about their transshipment schemes. They almost always use code of some kind to conceal what they are up to. These employees and their code words are normally not clever enough to fool prosecutors, but those code words — like “the country we discussed” or “Middle Earth” — will easily evade keyword email sweeps.

Any thoughts on this? Share your experiences (anonymously if you wish) in the comments section.

Photo Credit: Internet Email by twitter.com/mattwi1s0n [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/75rLY [cropped and processed]. Copyright 2003 twitter.com/mattwi1s0n

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Oct

12

DOJ to Exporters: Confession Is Good for the Soul


Posted by at 9:40 pm on October 12, 2016
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesDDTCOFACVoluntary Disclosures

Department of Justice by Ryan J. Reilly [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/76Kjf9 [cropped]Apparently the National Security Division at DOJ had a bunch of interns this summer with nothing to do, because this is the only conceivable explanation for the mostly risible “Guidance Regarding Voluntary Disclosures” which the NSD released on October 2. To set the tone for a further discussion of the substance of this Guidance, let’s start with a howler in the Guidance itself. Even if this guidance was written in large part, as it must have been, by eager interns, one would think that a grown-up lawyer would have reviewed this for substance. And, presumably, that grown-up lawyer whose job is to send real people to real jails would understand the laws that he or she is enforcing, right? So how do you explain this statement in the Guidance?

U.S. sanctions regimes and the Department of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations are currently enforced through IEEPA.

Apparently, no one in the NSD has ever heard of the Trading with the Enemies Act which, as most of this blog’s faithful readers will know, is the statutory basis for the Cuba sanctions and their enforcement.  This is pretty embarrassing mistake about pretty elementary facts.

The thrust of the Guidance is an interagency power grab by which DOJ wants to take away the first responsibility for review of voluntary disclosures from OFAC, DDTC and BIS. The guidance states that voluntary disclosures should be made to the Counterintelligence and Export Section of NSD when the exporter learns that a violation “may have been willful.” Specifically, the Guidance says:

Ordinarily, when an organization voluntarily self-discloses violations of U.S. export controls and sanctions, it presents its VSD to the appropriate regulatory agency under the procedures set forth in the agency’s regulations. … It is not the purpose of this Guidance to alter that practice. However, as discussed further below, when an organization, including its counsel, becomes aware that the violations may have been willful, it should within a reasonably prompt time also submit a VSD to CES.

Actually the purpose is precisely to alter that practice. Remember that the criminal violations involved are violations of the agency regulations themselves. That gives the relevant agencies, and not the DOJ, the principal expertise in determining if a violation has occurred and if it was willful.

The practice until now has been to disclose violations to the relevant agency or agencies with the understanding that the agencies could, if warranted, refer the matter to the DOJ. Once the referral was made,  the prior agency disclosure and continued cooperation with the DOJ investigation would be the basis for credit by the DOJ. No longer. A separate disclosure to DOJ must be made without regard to an agency referral and, if not, the agency disclosure becomes irrelevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion if a subsequent referral occurs.

One of the hypotheticals discussed in the Guidance provides ample reason as to why DOJ, which clearly does not understand many of the basics of export control law, should not be usurping the primary role of OFAC, BIS, and DDTC, in export enforcement. In that hypothetical a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation exports U.S. origin items in violation of BIS regulations. Without any suggestion of U.S. participation, the Guidance suggests that the parent would be offered an NPA by DOJ premised on payment of a criminal fine.

However, BIS rules, which have to be the basis of any prosecution in such a case, do not support a theory of vicarious liability by parent corporations. If the parent company did not export the items it could only be held liable, under section 764.2, for causing, aiding or abetting the export. That’s why in the recent Alcon Laboratories case, BIS held the U.S. parent liable for its exports to Iran but not for the exports of its Swiss subsidiary; those exports served only as a basis for a penalty against the Swiss subsidiary.

One last knee-slapper from the Guidance deserves mention. In another hypothetical, the Guidance says this:

Alert customs officers notice a bulky package within a container on a ship at a U.S. port bound to leave on a lengthy voyage overseas. The package contains ITAR-controlled commodities …

Because, you see, all bulky packages are suspicious and probably contain export controlled items. Just remember that when you send a birthday present to your aunt in Slovenia — make sure its just a small package in order to avoid scrutiny by CBP on the way out.

Photo Credit: Department of Justice by Ryan J. Reilly [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/76Kjf9 [cropped]. Copyright 2009 Ryan J. Reilly

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Oct

6

The Strange Case of Marc Turi


Posted by at 8:18 am on October 6, 2016
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTCPart 129

Marc Turi via http://a57.foxnews.com/images.foxnews.com/content/fox-business/politics/2015/06/27/exclusive-arming-benghazi/_jcr_content/image.img.jpg/0/0/1452210054914.jpg?ve=1 [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Marc Turi

Two days ago, on October 4, a federal district court in Arizona dismissed a criminal indictment brought in 2014 against Marc Turi that accused him of lying in two brokering applications that Turi had submitted to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) in 2011. The dismissal was based on a motion to dismiss filed the day before by the prosecution noting that a consent agreement had been reached between Turi and DDTC.  Under that consent agreement, released by DDTC yesterday,  Turi agreed that for four years he will not engage in any “activities subject to the ITAR.”

The Turi case is, to say the least, an odd case, not the least because it involves an arms deal with the Libyan rebels which everyone — DDTC, the prosecutors, and Turi — concede never took place.

The story begins with the revolt in Libya that broke out in February 2011. Near the end of that month, the rebels attempted to establish an interim government under the banner of organization known as the Libyan National Transitional Council (“NTC”). On February 26, 2011, the UN imposed an arms embargo on Libya, which DDTC finally got around to implementing some three months later on May 24, 2011, when it amended Part 126 to include Libya. The NTC was ultimately recognized as the government of Libya by the United Nations on September 16, 2011.

According to the indictment, on March 11, 2011 and before the US imposed the arms embargo on Libya in May, Marc Turi filed an application seeking to broker the sale of certain arms from Eastern Europe to the NTC. This application was denied by DDTC on March 22, 2011, by DDTC.

A week later, on March 29, 2011, Turi filed another application with DDTC requesting permission to broker to the government of Qatar a list of arms which the indictment, in paragraph 24(ee), described as “nearly identical” to the arms detailed in the previous application relating to the NTC. That application was granted by DDTC on May 5, 2011. On June 11, 2011, Turi filed an application to broker the same arms listed in the Qatar application to the U.A.E. government instead.

On June 29, 2011, Turi sent a letter, apparently never signed, to Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the Chairman of the NTC, by which the NTC agreed to reimburse the government of UAE for the arms described in the brokering applications filed by Turi with respect to Qatar and UAE. That letter was never signed, the arms never went to the NTC and the U.S. government indicted Turi for lying in the UAE and Qatar brokering applications by failing to reveal that the arms were destined ultimately to the NTC.

Turi’s defense, as revealed in his Motion to Compel Discovery, was that he was, in fact, acting on behalf of the CIA which sought to arm the NTC notwithstanding the UN embargo. Turi and the government then wrangled over these discovery requests, which the government claimed sought classified information, until the DDTC deal was reached and the government requested the dismissal of the indictment.

With these facts in mind, let’s look at the documents released by DDTC relating to the settlement.  These documents are, to say the least, odd. To begin with DDTC does not charge Turi with lying in the brokering applications he made with respect to Qatar and the UAE.

Instead, DDTC in its proposed charging letter first accuses Turi of making an unapproved proposal to the NTC in violation of section 126.1(e) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, citing the June 29 letter to Chairman of the NTC. Apparently no one at DDTC actually read section 126.1(e) because there is no way that this letter violated that section. That section only prohibits proposals “made to any country referred to in this section (including the embassies or consulates of such a country), or to any person acting on its behalf.” Given that the NTC was not recognized as the legitimate government of Libya until September 2011, the letter to the NTC in June, when NTC was simply a rebel organization, was not made to Libya or anyone acting on its behalf and so could not violate section 126(e).

The second violation in the DDTC charging letter is that Turi acted as a broker for Libya without authorization. This is problematic on two counts. The first is that if Qatar hires Turi to send arms to Libya the Turi is brokering for Qatar and not for Libya. Perhaps there’s a problem that Qatar’s intentions with respect to Libya weren’t revealed in the application, but DDTC isn’t charging Turi with violating the prohibition on false statements in applications. Besides, that was the charge DOJ made, and they dropped that.

But the second, and larger, problem with the brokering charge is this: DDTC had to know when it approved the Qatar brokering application where the arms were headed. That application was filed exactly one week after the Libya application was denied and covered a list of arms nearly identical to the ones in the Libya application. DDTC isn’t that stupid, nor is everyone else as stupid as DDTC must imagine.

Consider this: say you’re a compliance officer and an employee asks to ship some flowers to Iran. You, of course, say no. Five minutes later he’s back in your office saying he decided to send the exact same flowers to the UAE instead. No problem, you say. Does anyone honestly think that DDTC or BIS or OFAC would look the other way? Or would they have your head on a platter?

DDTC and that State Department almost certainly were fine with letting Qatar arm the rebels in Libya; they just could not admit that in writing.

 

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Oct

4

Export Control Reform For and By Dummies


Posted by at 10:34 pm on October 4, 2016
Category: DDTCUSML

Blue Hour Capitol Building

Having ignored the export control reforms initiated by the executive branch over the last seven or so years, the geniuses on the Hill have now decided to wade into the field with, as you might imagine, not entirely salubrious results. At the end of September, a bill was introduced in the House (with a companion bill in the Senate) to move most of Category I on the United States Munitions List (“USML”) over to the Commerce Control List (“CCL”). Specifically, it would move every firearm other than combat shotguns and firearms with special military application to the CCL.

There appear to be two motivations for this. First, this is an effort to exempt all gun manufacturers from the registration requirement (and associated fees) set forth in Part 122 of the United States Munitions List. Second, this is an apparent response to recent guidance by DDTC that tried to draw a distinction between manufacturing, which requires registration, and gunsmithing, which does not. Some critics claimed that some activities defined as manufacturing should be treated as gunsmithing instead.

The proposed legislation simply moves the items to the CCL but allows BIS the discretion to determine where on the CCL these items would go. BIS would be free to designate, and likely would designate, these moved items as 600 series items, which would result in a license requirement for all destinations. BIS would also be free to determine which, if any, license exceptions would be available. This means that it is unlikely, or at least possible, that the proposed legislation would not necessarily make it any easier to export arms; rather, it would only reliably eliminate the registration and fee requirement. Calling this the Export Control Reform Act, as the legislation styles itself, seems inapposite; a better name would be the Gun Manufacturer Financial Relief Act.

Photo Credit: Blue Hour Capital Building by Clif Burns, via www.clifburns.net. Copyright 2016 Clif Burns

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Aug

12

Friday Round-Up


Posted by at 4:28 pm on August 12, 2016
Category: BISDDTCOFACSDN List

Bumper Cars on the Boardwalk

Here are a few recent odds and ends that are worth a mention (and to catch up on a few things I missed while on vacation):

  • The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) issued guidance as to which activities are “gunsmithing” that do not require registration under part 122 and which are “manufacturing” and do require registration. This guidance defines “gunsmithing” and “manufacturing” completely differently from the definitions used by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”). For example, assembling kits into guns is “manufacturing” according to ATF but not according to DDTC. On behalf of lawyers everywhere: Thanks, DDTC, for keeping us busy!
  • More revisions to the TAA Guidelines, which are longer and less interesting than all six volumes of Proust, were announced. These mostly take into account the new definitions of export, re-export and retransfer that were recently adopted as an interim final rule by DDTC. I’ve said it before, and I’ll say it again, true export reform would get rid of the ridiculous TAA process entirely and make it similar to the  process used by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) for licensing technology exports.
  • The United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) is auctioning off 2,719.32669068 bitcoins. You will be, I’m sure, relieved to know that the auction notice explicitly states that the USMS won’t accept any bids from anyone on OFAC’s SDN List. I wouldn’t want Eliot Ness going after Rooster Cogburn, even if it would make a better movie than Batman v. Superman.

Photo Credit: Bumper Cars on the Boardwalk by Clif Burns, via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/JXGCgz. Copyright 2016 Clif Burns

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Copyright © 2016 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)