Archive for the ‘Criminal Penalties’ Category

Global Recession Hits Criminal Arms Merchants Too

Wednesday, March 3rd, 2010
Monzer al-Kassar
ABOVE: Monzer al-Kassar


An article that I just noticed in the February 8 issue of The New Yorker, tells the fascinating story of a D.E.A. sting operation conducted in Spain against Monzer al-Kassar, the notorious arms dealer alleged to have sold weapons both to the Achille Lauro terrorists and to the United States as part of the Iran-Contra affair. Kassar was arrested in Spain, extradited to the United States, and convicted in a Manhattan court to thirty years in prison on charges that he conspired to sell arms to FARC, a paramilitary terrorist group in Colombia.

The whole story is worth reading, but several details in the article are of particular note. First, the article emphasizes that arms dealers can be elusive because they structure their deals to comply with the laws of the countries in which they reside, negotiating sales from one country to another without ever leaving their home base where the brokering transactions are perfectly legal.

Second, and I know this will come as a shock, corrupt countries readily sell end-user certificates to arms dealers and certain arms manufacturers don’t even bother to read the end-user certificates that they demand. In one instance, Kassar bought weapons using an end-user certificate from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen even though the DPRY had ceased to exist two years earlier when North and South Yemen reunited. One of the D.E.A. undercover agents almost blew his cover when he told Kassar that the Nicaraguan end-user certificate to be used in the FARC transaction had cost several million dollars.

Kassar scoffed, saying that with that kind of money he “could have bought a whole country.”

Third, Kassar was caught because he abandoned his ordinary caution and allowed himself to be taped agreeing to sell arms that the undercover agents told Kassar would be used by FARC to kill Americans. As the reporter for the article stated:

Everyone I spoke to who has worked with Kassar over the years expressed surprise that someone so cautious could be caught on tape agreeing to sell weapons to the FARC. One possible explanation is that, compared with the last decades of the twentieth century—when conflicts in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East generated steady revenue—these are difficult times for weapons traffickers. When Samir first approached Tareq al-Ghazi in Lebanon, Ghazi told him that Kassar had been struggling to maintain his profit margins.

A diminished demand for black-market weapons may be driving other arms traffickers to assume risks that they would never have taken in the past. A year after the capture of Kassar, the S.O.D. team arrested Viktor Bout, the Tajik arms dealer, in Bangkok—using the same sting. (Bout asserts his innocence, and, to date, the Thai government has refused to extradite him.)

Kassar maintains his innocence and continues to insist that he was playing along with the D.E.A undercover agents in order to turn them in to Spanish authorities.

U.S. Extradition Request for Export Defendant Heard by French Court

Wednesday, January 20th, 2010
Majid Kakavand
ABOVE: Majid Kakavand


Amir Ardebili, who we posted on here and here, is not the only Iranian being chased by U.S. prosecutors for activities he committed entirely outside the United States and which were legal in the country where they took place. Majid Kakavand, on whom we previously posted here, used a company of his in Malaysia to order electronic components from U.S. companies and then transshipped those components to Iran. He was provisionally arrested in France in March 2009 at the request of the United States and is currently in France, out of jail but unable to leave France, awaiting the French court’s decision on the U.S. extradition request.

According to this article in the New York Times, a hearing was held last week by a French court on the extradition request. Kakavand’s lawyers argued that Kakavand’s activities did not violate any laws of France or the European Union and that the items were innocuous items that were not useful in the defense industry. Because these items could be legally shipped to Malaysia without an export license and because the U.S. criminal information against Kakavand did not allege that the items in question were on the Commerce Control List or the United States Munitions List, this argument seems to have some force. Another hearing has been scheduled by the French court for February 17.

And as with the Ardebili case, the Iranians were quick to link the fate of Kakavand with an Iranian trial. In this case, the trial in question is a prosecution brought by Iran against a 24-year-old French academic, Clotilde Reiss, in connection with her alleged participation in opposition protests following the Iranian elections last June. Apparently, the concept of a fair trial is so foreign to Iran that it hasn’t occurred to the Iranian government that a French court might actually listen to defense arguments and make a decision based on the rule of law.

Virginia Company Pleads Guilty to Arms Brokering Charges

Thursday, January 14th, 2010

E.D. Va. CourthouseVirginia-based Taipan Enterprises Ltd. pleaded guilty to, and paid a $15,000 fine for, charges that it illegally engaged in arms-brokering without registering with, and obtaining licenses from, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”). The Statement of Facts that supported the guilty plea revealed that Taipan’s woes began when its President, Ioannis Papathanassiou, was questioned by U.S. Customs upon returning from Brazil and told the customs agents that he was in Brazil selling farm equipment. An inspection of his luggage revealed product brochures from Agrale for military vehicles which Papathanassiou allegedly falsely stated were for farming purposes.

The Statement of Facts detailed subsequent transactions that involved the attempted sale of night vision goggles, machine pistols, M4 rifles and gas grenades among other items. Significantly, however, there is no allegation in the Statement of Facts that any of the sales ever occurred. Instead, in each instance, the Statement of Facts said that Papathanassiou “attempted” to sell the items. Notwithstanding that the only charges against Papathanassiou related to transactions that were attempted but uncompleted, he was charged with arms brokering without registering with DDTC as an arms-broker or obtaining necessary licenses for arms-brokering. Apparently just discussing a potential transaction requires registration.

The problem with this theory is, of course, the definition of “broker” in Part 129 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations under which Taipan was charged. Under that definition, found in section 129.2(a), “broker” is defined as:

any person who acts as an agent for others in negotiating or arranging contracts, purchases, sales or transfers of defense articles or defense services in return for a fee, commission, or other consideration.

It’s probably safe to say that Taipan didn’t receive a fee or commission from the manufacturers of the defense articles for proposed sales that never occurred. Even if Taipan did receive a fee or commission for these attempted sales, the receipt of the fee or commission from the manufacturers is a necessary element of the charged criminal violation and needed to be alleged in the Statement of Facts in order to support the plea.

Guilty Pleas for Violating the “There Oughta Be A” Law

Wednesday, December 16th, 2009

Border StationTwo men, one in Texas and one in New Jersey, have pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 554 in connection with a scheme where the New Jersey man provided false NAFTA certificates of origin to the Texas man, who then used them to export non-U.S. textiles to customers in Mexico. Obviously, the purpose of this scheme was to defraud Mexico of duties that otherwise would have been due on the textile imports if it had been disclosed that they weren’t U.S.-origin goods.

This, of course, is a very, very, very bad thing. Particularly so far as the Mexicans are concerned. And there ought to be a law, as they say. But that law isn’t 18 U.S.C. § 554. Since nobody involved in the prosecution or investigation of the two men appears to have read the law, let’s do something novel and actually read it:

Whoever fraudulently or knowingly exports or sends from the United States, or attempts to export or send from the United States, any merchandise, article, or object contrary to any law or regulation of the United States, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise, article or object, prior to exportation, knowing the same to be intended for exportation contrary to any law or regulation of the United States, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

I’ve added the emphasis to the statutory text so that you can easily see that section 554 cannot be violated on its own but requires that another federal law or regulation be violated. So what U.S. statute is violated when the fake NAFTA certificate is presented to Mexican customs officials? Nothing on the CPB form for the NAFTA Certificate of Origin references any laws that would be broken by false statements on the form.

Certainly, there was no violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1592 because that statute only applies to false statements to U.S. Customs made in connection with imports into the United States. Even if somehow or another section 1592 applied in this case, violation of the statute results in civil penalties but does not make the exportation itself contrary to law as required for a violation of section 554. That argument applies as well to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 which criminalizes certain material misrepresentations in certain government documents: that statute doesn’t make the export of the goods illegal.

Nor is the identity of the other law required for a violation of section 554 revealed in the court documents released in this case. That other necessary law isn’t mentioned or referred to in the criminal information, in the plea agreement for the New Jersey defendant, or in the plea agreement for the Texas defendant. Only 18 U.S.C § 554 is mentioned in those three documents. In short, the two men were prosecuted for, and plead guilty to, violating a law that they simply didn’t violate and couldn’t legally have violated.

One has to wonder whether the attorneys for the two defendants did anything in this case other than take their fees and assure the defendants that they got a good deal from the prosecution. The lesson here, for defense attorneys and prosecutors alike, is that just because something ought to be against the law doesn’t mean that it actually is against the law. That’s one of the things you were supposed to have learned in law school.

UPDATE: Stu Seidel now at Baker & McKenzie (and before that having a long and distinguished career at Customs) points out in comments that the fake certificate would in fact violate 19 U.S.C § 1592(f) which prohibits false statements in NAFTA certificates on exported goods. However, like section 1592(a) the provision doesn’t make the exportation illegal, rather it imposes civil penalties for violations. Since it doesn’t make the export unlawful but only the certification unlawful it cannot stand as a predicate statute for a violation of section 554. Similarly 19 C.F.R. § 181.81, cited by Stu, can support a penalty for the false certification but not a finding that the export is illegal. Neither section 1592(f) nor 19 C.F.R. § 181.81 were cited by the information or the plea agreement as the predicate statutes for the charged violation of section 554.

Maybe the Shoe Is on the Other Foot

Tuesday, December 15th, 2009

Free The HikersOn Monday, a U.S. Federal District Court Judge in Delaware sentenced Amir Hossein Ardebili, who was the subject of this earlier post on Export Law Blog, to five years in prison, less time served and credit for good behavior, based on Ardebili’s guilty plea to U.S. charges arising out of attempted exports of military goods to Iran. During Ardebili’s statement at the sentencing hearing, he frequently burst into tears, even at one point crying so much that a break was taken.

Iran immediately denounced the sentence and announced that it would try three American hikers that wandered into Iran last summer, implicitly linking Ardebili’s fate to that of the three U.S. hikers now held in Iranian prisons According to an Iranian press agency, Iran Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, said that the jail sentence handed down yesterday was “illegal.” Tehran has also argued that under international law officials in Georgia were obliged to return Ardebili to Iran rather than giving him to U.S. agents, reports Iran’s Press TV network.

Iran’s claim of a requirement to return Ardebili under international law is not quite on the mark since there really isn’t such a recognized right in extradition matters. As generally understood, international law holds that no country is obliged to extradite anyone. This understanding of international law explains why there are a hundreds of bilateral extradition treaties, although the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty with Georgia. That doesn’t mean that a country, such as Georgia, cannot voluntarily hand over someone in the absence of a treaty. However, that is normally only done after a representation of reciprocal treatment by the country requesting extradition.

U.S. law does permit, in limited circumstances, extradition from the United States in the absence of a treaty with the country requesting extradition. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) the U.S. will allow such extradition from the United States of foreign persons but only for violent crimes that are not deemed political offenses. Certainly the crime that Ardebili was alleged to have committed was not a violent crime and so an extradition of a person from the U.S. on export charges by a country without an extradition treaty would be illegal under U.S. law. This means that the U.S. couldn’t really make a commitment of reciprocal treatment to Georgia to support its request for a non-treaty extradition of Ardebili. If the situation were reversed, U.S. law would actually prohibit the extradition

The problem created here is that the shaky grounds for U.S. jurisdiction over Ardebili detract from our own country’s argument that Iran should return the hikers. After all, Iran’s claim of jurisdiction to hold the hikers is stronger than the U.S. claim of jurisdiction over Ardebili even if Iran’s substantive claim that the hikers broke the law is dubious. After all, the hikers were captured in Iran whereas Ardebili was lured into Georgia and arrested there.

And If The Shoe Were on the Other Foot?

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009
Amir Ardebili
ABOVE: Amir Ardebili captured on
surveillance video in Tbilsi, Georgia


Amir Hossein Ardebili, an Iranian national, engaged in extensive negotiations from Iran and apparently on behalf of the Iranian government to export defense items from the United States to Iran. The U.S. companies, however, were sting operations set up by U.S. undercover agents. When the agents lured Ardebili from Iran to Tbilsi, Georgia, they arrested him in October 2007 and, seemingly with the cooperation of Georgian authorities, brought him back to the United States where he was secretly imprisoned and held under a sealed indictment.

Ardebili has pleaded guilty to charges, among other things, that he violated the United States Arms Export Control Act. In preparation for his sentencing on December 14, some of the sealed documents, including a redacted version of the indictment have been unsealed. Prior to the unsealing, the identity of the city where Ardebili was snatched had been undisclosed but it’s now clear that, as had been rumored, Ardebili had traveled to Georgia to meet with the agents.

The government’s sentencing memorandum, in an effort to obtain the maximum term of imprisonment possible, provides further details of the undercover investigation. Significantly, the memo stresses that the Ardebili was engaged in procurement activities for his sole customer, the government of Iran, which was seeking the items because it believed it was going to go to war with the United States.

Ardebili’s attorney has filed a motion for a downward variance from the sentencing guidelines, arguing that the 22 months already served in solitary confinement caused Ardebili to become clinically depressed. The motion further noted that all of Ardebili’s activities were legal in Iran, where they took place, and that he was acting “indirectly on behalf of the Government of Iran.”

What are we to make of the fact here that the defendant was acting in Iran on behalf of the Iranian government and was later taken by U.S. agents from Georgia to stand trial in the United States? After the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), abduction of defendants from foreign countries in order to bring them to the United States to stand trial is legal. The doctrine of functional sovereign immunity from prosecution for acts taken on behalf of foreign governments is basically confined to high officials of those countries. And the U.S. takes the controversial position that it has criminal jurisdiction over anyone located in foreign countries trying to export items from the United States.

Of course, if the shoe were on the other foot, if an American businessman had been abducted by Iranian agents from a hotel in, say, Russia and then secretly held in solitary confinement for two years in Iran, you can bet your you-know-what that we would be screaming bloody murder. I am not a fan of the Government of Iran or its nuclear aspirations, but we really have to understand that if we employ extraordinary means such as were employed here then we will have no cause to complain when those same methods are used against U.S. citizens abroad.

Here is some of the surveillance video of the meeting between the U.S. agents and Ardebili in Georgia:

Monsieur Monsieur Cops Cops Plea Plea

Monday, November 23rd, 2009
Jacques Monsieur
ABOVE: M. Jacques
Monsieur


Monsieur Jacques Monsieur, international arms dealer and man of mystery who, I previously reported, once tried to excuse his arms dealing by claiming to be working for U.S. and French intelligence services, pleaded guilty today in a federal court in Mobile to charges that he had illegally attempted to export aircraft parts to Iran. Amazingly neither the CIA nor it’s French counterpart the DST rode into the courtroom at the last minute to save Mr. Monsieur.

According to an article in the Mobile Press Register, the plea agreement offers Monsieur a chance to reduce his penalty by providing helpful information in his own case and others. It may well be the case that the U.S. is more interested in Monsieur’s Iranian contacts than in Monsieur himself.

In my original post on Monsieur Monsieur, I expressed more than a small amount of skepticism that Monsieur would, during the middle of a deal to export jet engines from New York to Iran, casually show up in New York where he could be, and was, arrested by U.S. officials. A commenter on my original post says that “a little birdie” told him that Monsieur was nabbed in Panama by U.S. officials then taken to New York for his arrest, a credible, if still unverified, story.

Spy Games

Thursday, October 8th, 2009

Dawn HannaIn March, Dawn Hanna was convicted by a jury in Detroit for exporting mobile telecom equipment to Saddam Hussein in violation of the U.S. embargo against Iraq in place at the time of the export. Hanna claimed throughout her trial that the purchaser of the equipment told her that the end user was in Turkey. The government’s sentencing memo, however, cited a number of communications and emails from Hanna where she seemed quite aware that the items were destined for Iraq and not Turkey.

The case, however, recently took an interesting turn of sorts. Apparently the person who approached Hanna to purchase the equipment, a Jordanian named Emad al-Yawer, has come forward and claimed that he was working for the CIA when he approached Hanna. According to al-Yawer, in an affidavit filed in April, the CIA wanted to alter the equipment to track Saddam and listen to his conversations. As al-Yawer said somewhat more colorfully in a recent interview with a Detroit television station:

The whole idea was, once they get to Saddam, send a smart bomb and blow him into smithereens

The judge apparently did not find the new evidence sufficient to grant Hanna a new trial. Prosecutors in the case have said that the new evidence remains under seal, although apparently a redacted version of the al-Yawer affidavit is available on a website set up by Dawn Hanna’s parents.

Of course, the interesting question here is whether it matters at all that al-Yawer was working for (or with) the CIA. Even if he was cooperating with the CIA, the efforts by Hanna’s defenders to say that the sale of the equipment to Hussein was the government’s fault doesn’t seem that convincing. Certainly this argument wouldn’t have been convincing if the purchaser was an undercover U.S. government agent. I suppose that if the alleged CIA agents had directed al-Yawer to buy the equipment from Hanna, this argument might have some legs. Similarly, if the CIA had contacted Hanna directly, identified themselves as CIA agents, enlisted her help in exporting the equipment, and then had her prosecuted, Hanna might have an argument. But there is no evidence that any of this happened.

Dutch Export Defendant Flies to U.S. to Face Charges

Wednesday, September 30th, 2009

Rob KraaipoelBack in 2007, I discussed in two posts (here and here) a criminal complaint filed against Netherlands-based Aviation Services International, B.V., and its owner Rob Kraaipoel, a citizen and resident of the Netherlands. The criminal complaint accused Kraaipoel and his company of exporting U.S.-origin items from the Netherlands to Iran without required U.S. licenses. Given the absence of any contacts by Aviation Services and Kraaipoel with the United States, I stated that the U.S.-origin of the goods was not a sufficient basis for criminal jurisdiction over the two Dutch entities and that an extradition request might not be viewed favorably by Dutch courts. A temporary denial order was later put in place by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) against Kraaipoel and his company. That order forbade U.S. entities from exporting any items to Kraaipoel or Aviation Services or participating in any exports to them. And that, I thought, would be the end of the matter.

So I was more than a little surprised to read that Kraaipoel appeared last week before a federal judge here in D.C. entering a plea of guilty, both individually and on behalf of Aviation Services, to charges arising from his exports of U.S.-origin goods from the Netherlands to Iran. Had he foolishly planned a vacation to Disneyland and gotten nabbed at an airport in the United States? Had a Dutch judge actually granted a motion for extradition in this matter? No, according to the government’s motion to quash an arrest warrant issued against Kraaipoel in 2007, Kraaipoel had retained U.S. counsel and had voluntarily agreed to fly to the United States to face the music.

Why on earth would he do that? The plea agreement, after the agreed downward adjustments from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, calls for a penalty of 46 to 57 months in jail. Of course, we can only speculate here, but it seems that several factors might be in play. Even if a Dutch court was unlikely to entertain an extradition motion, law enforcement authorities in other jurisdictions might enforce the warrant at the request of the United States. Think Roman Polanski. This has been done in at least one export case where a U.K. resident was arrested by Polish authorities based on a U.S. arrest warrant. The BIS denial order would also have probably been hurting Kraaipoel’s business, but the last temporary denial order expired in April 2009, and Kraaipoel and his company are not currently on the Denied Parties List. Even if more TDOs are imposed, nothing in a guilty plea would motivate BIS to lift a denial order but rather would serve more as a basis to extend any existing denial order.

Oddly Kraaipoel was allowed to return to the Netherlands after entering his plea and no date for sentencing was set. An AP report quoted Kraaipoel’s attorney as saying that the defendants were hoping for a sentence of probation only in light of anticipated cooperation with prosecutors. The plea agreement indeed provides that Kraaipoel would be released pending sentencing in light of his anticipated cooperation in further investigations. And it further states provides that in the event that Kraaipoel provides “substantial assistance,” the government would move that the defendant be allowed to argue for a sentence with a lesser period of incarceration. The proffer of proof indicates that Kraaipoel was acting in concert with Iranian individuals operating in Cyprus and the U.A.E. Sounds like they might be the next targets of this investigation.

German Court Orders Retrial in Iran Export Case

Monday, September 21st, 2009

iran_bombThe Institute for Science and International Security recently released an interesting report on Germany’s criminal prosecution of Vanaki Mohsen, who was accused of exporting various dual use items to Iran in violation of Germany’s War Weapons Control Act. The prosecution arose from Vanaki’s brokering of the export of certain high-speed cameras that could be used in the development and testing of nuclear weapons. Vanaki brokered this sale from a Russian company to an Iranian front company in the U.A.E.

Although the ISIS report isn’t clear on this, it appears that Vanaki must have been charged under section 19 of the German law. Although the law prohibits exporting or brokering of “war weapons,” it is likely that the high-speed cameras were considered a dual-use item rather than a war weapon. In that case, section 19 would prohibit the brokering of the item to Iran if, and only if, Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

This lead to an unusual step by Vanaki’s defense which introduced the United States’ 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (“NIE”) on Iran which, the defense claimed, concluded that Iran had abandoned its nuclear program in 2003 and had not resumed it by 2007 when the high-speed cameras at issue were sold to Iran. The German trial court agreed and acquitted the defendant.

The prosecution appealed, and the appeals court sent the case back to the trial court for another trial. In reaching its decision, the appeals court pointed out that the trial court put too much reliance on the 2007 NIE. The NIE’s conclusion that it was “moderately confident” that Tehran had not resumed its nuclear weapons program was far from proof that it had, in fact, not resumed that program. The appeals court also relied on a supplemental report from the Bundesnachrichtendienst (“BND”), Germany’s foreign intelligence service, which discussed the development by Iran of a missile launcher as well as similarities in procurement practices by Iran and countries known to have nuclear weapons programs, such as Pakistan and North Korea. Based on this report, the appeals court found that it was now likely that Vanaki would be convicted on a retrial and sent the case back to the trial court.

Two things bear noting here. First, Germany’s export laws in this case, and in other cases that involve dual-use items, impose an intolerably heavy burden of proof in export prosecutions. In effect, the state has to prove that the country in question has a nuclear program, an element of proof that would be difficult and almost necessarily speculative in the case of many countries which are believed to be developing nuclear weapons but have not yet admitted that fact. Second, it appears that the BND assessment must provide some fairly certain intelligence demonstrating the existence and scope of Iran’s nuclear program. This may explain why Germany, unlike some other EU countries, has recently seemed more interested in restricting certain exports to Iran.