Jun

25

Sanctions Sought Against Companies Providing Telcom Equipment to Iran


Posted by at 8:34 pm on June 25, 2009
Category: Iran Sanctions

Twitter Keeps Iran AfloatEven though Iran’s mobile phone infrastructure was crucial to the ability of Iranians to send to the outside world video, still images and first-hand reports of the events in Iran, Senators Chuck Schumer and Lindsey Graham think it’s a good idea to impose sanctions on two European companies that provided equipment used by Iran’s mobile phone infrastructure. The rush to pitchforks and torches was occasioned by a Wall Street Journal report earlier this week that revealed that Nokia Siemens Networks, a joint-venture of the German and Finnish telecom equipment giants, provided equipment that the Iranian government was using to monitor mobile telephone and Internet communications. A spokesman for the joint venture indicated that the technology provided to Iran was intended for lawful intercepts, a capability provided by the joint-venture and other companies to telcom providers around the world, including the United States. Lawful interception capacity is built into telcom networks to enable interception of communications relating to child pornography, drug trafficking, terrorism and other criminal activities.

Schumer and Graham are proposing to introduce legislation tomorrow that would require U.S. government contractors that export “sensitive technologies” such as the intercept technology to Iran to terminate relationships with Iran before applying for new contracts or renewing existing contracts. The proposed legislation allows the President to waive the restrictions as long as the reasons for the waiver are reported to Congress. If, as Nokia Siemens Networks claims, the intercept capability is inherent in all networking equipment, the Graham-Schumer proposal could have the counterproductive effect of slowing the growth of Iran’s mobile telephone system. At this point, that would seem to benefit the currently embattled Iranian regime to the detriment of ordinary Iranians as well as dissidents in Iran seeking to communicate with the outside world.

Ironically, Schumer and Graham appear not to realize that they might do more for Iranian dissidents and the ordinary Iranian in the street by limiting sanctions rather than increasing them. As we noted in an earlier post, current sanctions, as interpreted by OFAC, arguably prohibit the provision of social networking and similar services, such as Twitter and Facebook, to Iranians, even though these services have been essential to allowing the flow of information from Iran to the rest of the world. More good could be done by legislation expanding and clarifying the information and telecommunications exception to make provision of Twitter, messaging-services, Facebook, YouTube and the like to private citizens in Iran clearly and unambiguously legal.

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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4 Comments:


Clif — Congressional passage of a secondary boycott on companies who have done business with our “enemies” (where no U.S. players or exports are involved) is lousy policy, and certainly does nothing to advance U.S. national security or foreign policy interests toward Iran. Jawboning is one thing, and we should be using our diplomatic might on all fronts, but legislating against foreign sales that may not be so different from what our U.S. companies sell abroad and domestically seems quite shortsighted.

Comment by Ex-OFAC on June 26th, 2009 @ 11:57 am

I agree that secondary boycotts are lousy policy. They also arguably violate our WTO obligations. The E.U. raised that claim about certain provisions of Helms-Burton which we resolved by a promise from the Clinton Administration not to enforce them.

Comment by Clif Burns on June 26th, 2009 @ 12:14 pm

That interception is an inherent capacity of networking has been true since the first telegraph systems. It would take a level of encryption that is already prohibited in order to prevent communications over a network to be immune from the network operator. If we truly want the Mullahs to fall, then the US Government ought to do every thing it can to foster communications and information with and within Iran. Its well worth noting that the only two surviving Communist dictatorships were and are also the objects of the most comprehensive trade embargoes. Trade and travel embargoes protect despots, who always use them to their advantage in order to isolate their population from the outside world, thereby suppressing a major cause of dissatisfaction and dissent. Trade embargoes also cut us off from potential sources of human intelligence: Just last week in an interview on NPR I heard Nick Burns crying that we had no good sources of intelligence in Iran because American business had not been present for 30 years. I wish he had had that epiphany while he was at State.

Comment by Hillbilly on June 30th, 2009 @ 9:38 am

That interception is an inherent capacity of networking has been true since the first telegraph systems.

Which gives me the opportunity to reference one of my favorite scenes in one of my favorite books Le Comte de Monte-Cristo. That scene being the one where Edmond Dantès forcefully takes over a telegraph station in order to send a false signal that leads to the financial ruin of Danglars. People forget that in the early days, there were telegraph operators in relay stations that had the task of retransmitting messages that they received.

Comment by Clif Burns on June 30th, 2009 @ 10:30 am