Jul

22

Export Violation Charged Under Overseas Smuggling Law


Posted by at 9:03 pm on July 22, 2008
Category: General

Tomoaki Iishiba
ABOVE: Tomoaki Iishiba

Captain Tomoaki Iishiba, stationed at Fort Lewis in Washington State, has been charged in connection with his shipment of sixty EoTech 553 night-vision-compatible holographic rifle sights to Japan without obtaining the required export license. Prior to these charges, Captain Iishiba was best known as one of the technical consultants on a computer war game known as Metal Gear Solid.

The export classification of these sights is unclear. The one-count criminal information filed by the U.S. Attorney makes no attempt to provide an export classification for the items. If these sights are principally used on firearms listed on Category I of the USML then they would be classified as Category I(h) and require a license from the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. The sights could also be covered by ECCN 0A987 which covers “optical sighting devices for firearms,” but this classification does not require a license in the case of shipments to Japan. So, we can probably safely assume that the government believes that the items are properly classified as USML Category I(h).

Notwithstanding the likely USML classification of the sights, the criminal information does not charge Iishiba under 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c), the criminal provision of the Arms Export Control Act. Rather the charge is conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 555, the overseas anti-smuggling provision added by the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005.* That section provides as follows:

Whoever fraudulently or knowingly exports or sends from the United States, or attempts to export or send from the United States, any merchandise, article, or object contrary to any law or regulation of the United States, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise, article or object, prior to exportation, knowing the same to be intended for exportation contrary to any law or regulation of the United States, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

Significantly, the criminal information doesn’t allege that Iishiba knew that it was illegal to export the sights. Rather it only alleges that he “knowingly exported” the rifle sights. Now the reason to charge under 18 U.S.C. § 555 rather than Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(h), seems clear: the prosecution is trying to avoid the scienter requirement of the later statute.

Section 127.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations is violated by an unlicensed export of a defense article whether or not the violator was aware that the export required a license. And it would appear that the prosecution is reading the anti-smuggling provision to require only a knowing export that violates a regulation without a scienter requirement. Whether a court will support this reading of the new provision remains to be seen.


*The provision was enacted as 18 U.S.C. § 554, even though there was already a § 554, and it was later recodified as § 555. The information, however, continues to cite the provision as 18 U.S.C. § 554.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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5 Comments:


A close parsing of Section 554/555 does not necessarily eliminate the requirement to prove specific intent. The full paragraph must be read together, and the last phrase modifies the preceding predicate: “knowing the same to be intended for exportation contrary to any law or regulation of the United State”, should be read to impose a specific intent requirement on the second part of the section, and be indicative of intent. That said, I’m sure that this is part of the Bush DoJ’s campaign to change the scienter requirement by judicial activism rather than by legislation.

Comment by Mike Deal on July 22nd, 2008 @ 9:36 pm

I think that phrase that you quote only modifies “receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise” and doesn’t necessarily modify “exports.” That being said, courts are hesitant to impose criminal liability on people for doing things that they don’t know to be illegal, so I suspect that courts will read in a scienter requirement. That being said, the best explanation for charging under this statute rather than 2778(c) is to try to build precedent for the claim that they don’t have to prove that the defendant knows the export is illegal

Comment by Clif Burns on July 22nd, 2008 @ 10:36 pm

Every Eotech 553 box is labeled with a warning that the item cannot be exported without State Department approval. Pretty hard to claim ignorance of the export restriction when it’s on every box this product ships in from the factory.

Perhaps the defendant will claim illiteracy, and say he was unable to read the warning. Yeah, right…

Comment by Sho Kimura on July 23rd, 2008 @ 8:55 pm

My point is, however, that the prosecution is trying to charge the case so that it doesn’t have to prove he knew that the exports were illegal.

Comment by Clif Burns on July 24th, 2008 @ 7:25 pm

This is the information from Eotech-inc.com site.

As you can tell for EOTech 553 classification by ECCN 0A987 by itself is not enough. If we were talking about 552 or 512 site, than from my understanding than no license is required for Japan according to Country Chart.

This Holographic Weapon Sight must be exported from the United States in accordance with Export Administration Regulations ECCN 0A987. Diversion contrary to U.S. law is prohibited. In accordance with U.S. law (Title 15 CFR part 746 and Supplement No. 1 to Part 774; and Title 31 CFR) resale/re-export or transfer of Holographic Weapon Sight Models 552, 551, 512, 511, 4X magnifier and 3X magnifier to certain designated countries is prohibited without prior written consent of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

The Holographic Weapon Sight Models 553, 557 and 555 are controlled under U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and may not be exported without proper authorization by the U.S. Department of State.

Comment by Stan on August 21st, 2008 @ 10:05 am