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	<title>Comments on: An Eye for an Eye, A Boycott for a Boycott</title>
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	<description>Latest News on DDTC, BIS, OFAC, and other export law matters</description>
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		<title>By: Mike Deal</title>
		<link>http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/288/comment-page-1#comment-7785</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike Deal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 14:24:13 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>It should be noted that these are information furnishing violations, rather than an actual agreement to engage in a boycott.  Aside from the question of whether the expiration of the EAA pursuant to a clear &quot;sunset&quot; provision (Section 19 of the EAA)constitutes an emergency occurring outside the United States as required by the granting provisions of 50 USC 1701, restrictions on furnishing information are not supported while the EAA &quot;is in lapse&quot; (bureaucratic double speak for having expired by a clear provision of law) and the EAR is continued under IEEPA because 50 USC 1702(b)(3), as last amended in 1994 by the Free Trade in Ideas Act, excludes from Presidential power under IEEPA any regulation on the import or export of information or informational materials unless such information is controlled for national security purposes pursuant to section 5 of the EAA or for anti-proliferation or anti-terrorism purposes pursuant section 6 of the EAA.  Prohibitions on furnishing information for boycotting purposes were authorized only under section 8 of the EAA and are therefore not supported by emergency power under IEEPA.  The amendments to IEEPA in 1988 and 1994 restricting the power to regulate the free flow of non-technical information were contemporaneous with legislation amending the EAA, and well after the adoption of IEEPA in 1977, so under the cannons of construction it cannot be argued that Congress could not have intended to restrict executive authority in this regard. 

Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the regulation on furnishing boycott information alone, unrelated to and/or without proof of actual boycott conduct, would survive First Amendment challenge, especially without a clear Congressional mandate.  The Baldridge case by the 8th Circuit rejecting an early First Amendment challenge was decided before the line of Supreme Court cases expanding First Amendment protection for commercial speech.  It is difficult to see how the information furnishing prohibitions could survive the test established by the Hudson Valley and 44 Liquor Market cases, especially when the EAA is in lapse and there is no clear Congressional finding regarding the boycott in the text of IEEPA. But even in those rare times when the EAA is in effect, it is unlikely that the prohibition on providing &quot;negative certificates of origin&quot; would pass constitutional muster under the analysis in the 44 case given that the conduct, compliance with a primary boycott is permitted, and provision of an affirmative certificate is permitted.  The regulations are pure content related and therefore unconstitutional. 

Imposition of a denial order is also unauthorized. 50 USC 1705 authorizes only civil fines and criminal penalties.  It does not authorize imposition of a denial order as a penalty.  Issuance of a denial order while the EAA is &quot;in lapse&quot; [sic] is therefore a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act because it is a sanction not specifically authorized by statute.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It should be noted that these are information furnishing violations, rather than an actual agreement to engage in a boycott.  Aside from the question of whether the expiration of the EAA pursuant to a clear &#8220;sunset&#8221; provision (Section 19 of the EAA)constitutes an emergency occurring outside the United States as required by the granting provisions of 50 USC 1701, restrictions on furnishing information are not supported while the EAA &#8220;is in lapse&#8221; (bureaucratic double speak for having expired by a clear provision of law) and the EAR is continued under IEEPA because 50 USC 1702(b)(3), as last amended in 1994 by the Free Trade in Ideas Act, excludes from Presidential power under IEEPA any regulation on the import or export of information or informational materials unless such information is controlled for national security purposes pursuant to section 5 of the EAA or for anti-proliferation or anti-terrorism purposes pursuant section 6 of the EAA.  Prohibitions on furnishing information for boycotting purposes were authorized only under section 8 of the EAA and are therefore not supported by emergency power under IEEPA.  The amendments to IEEPA in 1988 and 1994 restricting the power to regulate the free flow of non-technical information were contemporaneous with legislation amending the EAA, and well after the adoption of IEEPA in 1977, so under the cannons of construction it cannot be argued that Congress could not have intended to restrict executive authority in this regard. </p>
<p>Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the regulation on furnishing boycott information alone, unrelated to and/or without proof of actual boycott conduct, would survive First Amendment challenge, especially without a clear Congressional mandate.  The Baldridge case by the 8th Circuit rejecting an early First Amendment challenge was decided before the line of Supreme Court cases expanding First Amendment protection for commercial speech.  It is difficult to see how the information furnishing prohibitions could survive the test established by the Hudson Valley and 44 Liquor Market cases, especially when the EAA is in lapse and there is no clear Congressional finding regarding the boycott in the text of IEEPA. But even in those rare times when the EAA is in effect, it is unlikely that the prohibition on providing &#8220;negative certificates of origin&#8221; would pass constitutional muster under the analysis in the 44 case given that the conduct, compliance with a primary boycott is permitted, and provision of an affirmative certificate is permitted.  The regulations are pure content related and therefore unconstitutional. </p>
<p>Imposition of a denial order is also unauthorized. 50 USC 1705 authorizes only civil fines and criminal penalties.  It does not authorize imposition of a denial order as a penalty.  Issuance of a denial order while the EAA is &#8220;in lapse&#8221; [sic] is therefore a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act because it is a sanction not specifically authorized by statute.</p>
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		<title>By: Clif Burns</title>
		<link>http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/288/comment-page-1#comment-7784</link>
		<dc:creator>Clif Burns</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 13:58:34 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Thanks, Ladyx, I should have mentioned the suspension of the fine.  Since the fines seemed, frankly, small in comparison to the denial order, I didn&#039;t really mention it.  And you&#039;re right, there may have been a trade-off.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks, Ladyx, I should have mentioned the suspension of the fine.  Since the fines seemed, frankly, small in comparison to the denial order, I didn&#8217;t really mention it.  And you&#8217;re right, there may have been a trade-off.</p>
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		<title>By: Ladyx</title>
		<link>http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/288/comment-page-1#comment-7782</link>
		<dc:creator>Ladyx</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Feb 2008 13:03:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>In the settlement agreement I noticed that the civil penalty was suspended for two years - a possible trade-off for the non-standard denial order?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the settlement agreement I noticed that the civil penalty was suspended for two years &#8211; a possible trade-off for the non-standard denial order?</p>
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